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LIBRARY 


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THE  BLOCKADE 


AND 


THE  CRUISERS 


THE  NA  VY  IN  THE  CIVIL  IVAR.—L 


THE  BLOCKADE 

AND 

THE  CRUISERS 


JAMES  RUSSELL  SOLEY, 

PROFESSOR  U.  S.  NAVY 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER’S  SONS 


1887 


Copyright,  1883,  by 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER’S  SONS 


Trow’s 

Printing  and  Bookbinding  Company 
201-213  East  i2t/i  Street 


NEW  YORK 


°\)?).)  f 

St>  V & 

CX)k  .</ 


PREFACE. 


As  the  introductory  volume  of  a series,  it  is  the  purpose 
of  this  book  to  deal  not  only  with  the  specific  subjects  men- 
tioned in  the  title,  but  also  with  the  general  condition  of 
the  Navy  at  the  outbreak  of  the  War,  the  peculiar  difficul- 
ties before  it,  and  the  way  in  which  the  difficulties  were 
met.  In  this  connection  it  has  been  necessary  to  touch 
incidentally  upon  matters  that  are  the  subject  of  animated 
controversy  in  the  Navy  at  the  present  moment.  Such  a re- 
ference to  actual  questions  cannot  be  avoided,  if  the  lessons 
of  the  War  are  to  be  fairly  and  fearlessly  regarded. 

For  statements  of  fact,  reliance  has  been  chiefly  placed 
upon  the  written  accounts,  official  or  unofficial,  of  those 
who  took  part  in  the  events  recorded.  In  describing  the 
operations  of  the  blockade-runners,  the  narratives  of  Maf- 
fitt,  Roberts,  and  Wilkinson  have  been  largely  used.  Fi- 
nally, the  writer  must  acknowledge  his  obligations  to  many 
kind  friends,  both  in  and  out  of  the  service,  who  have  aided 
him  with  valuable  advice  and  suggestions. 


402880 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

List  of  Maps,  ix 

CHAPTER  I. 

The  Preparations,  1 

CHAPTER  II. 

The  Blockade, .26 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Chesapeake, 47 

CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Atlantic  Squadrons, 82 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  Gulf  Squadrons, 121 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Blockade-Runners, 163 


CONTENTS. 


viii 

CHAPTER  VII. 

PAGE 

The  Commerce-Destroyers, 168 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Conclusion, , . 231 

APPENDIX  A. 

Vessels  of  the  United  States  Navy,  March  4,  1861,  . 241 

APPENDIX  B. 

Vessels  Constructed  or  Projected,  1861-65,  . . 244 

APPENDIX  C. 

Instructions  from  Flag-Officer  Goldsborough  to 
Officers  Commanding  Blockading  Vessels,  . . 251 


LIST  OF  MAPS. 


In  marking  the  channels  in  all  the  maps  in  this  volume  the  twelve- 
foot  curve  has  been  followed.  The  dotted  surface  therefore  represents 
a depth  of  twelve  feet  or  less. 


The  Blockaded  Coast, 

Hampton  Roads,  . 

Entrances  to  Cape  Fear  River,  „ 
Entrances  to  Charleston  Harbor, 
Passes  of  the  Mississippi, 

Entrance  to  Mobile  Bat, 
Galveston  Harbor  and  Entrance, 


to  face  36 
. 60 
• . 92 

. 106 
. 127 
. 133 
. 145 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  PREPARATIONS. 

The  Naval  War  of  1861  was  marked  by  two  principal  feat- 
ures. The  first  is  that  while  one  side  had  a small  force 
of  naval  vessels,  which  were  generally  good  of  their  kind, 
the  other  entered  the  contest  with  absolutely  nothing  that 
could  be  called  a man-of-war.  The  second  is  that  though 
certain  developments  in  the  character  and  construction  of 
ships  and  of  weapons  had  been  foreshadowed  before  the  war, 
and  had  even  been  partially  realized,  it  was  while  the  strug- 
gle was  actually  in  progress  that  changes  took  place  in  these 
respects  which  amounted  to  a revolution  in  naval  warfare. 
At  the  beginning  the  fact  that  sailing  vessels  were  soon  to 
be  laid  aside  was  still  far  from  general  recognition,  espe- 
cially among  officers  of  conservative  tendencies;  the  three 
great  weapons  of  to-day,  the  rifled  gun,  the  ram,  and  the 
torpedo,  were  almost  unknown  in  the  service ; and  iron 
armor  was  still  an  experiment.  The  modifications  of  the 
past  fifteen  years  had  accustomed  men’s  minds  to  the  idea 
that  considerable  changes  would  gradually  take  place ; but 
none  foresaw  or  were  prepared  for  the  tremendous  develop- 
ment that  was  wrought  in  four  years  of  actual  fighting. 

L-l  1 


2 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Modern  naval  warfare  was  therefore  almost  a new  art  to 
the  officers  that  were  called  in  1861  into  active  service.  The 
long  period  of  profound  peace  that  followed  the  wars  of 
Napoleon  had  been  broken  only  by  the  war  with  Mexico  in 
1846,  the  Crimean  War  in  1854,  and  the  Franco-Austrian 
War  in  1859.  None  of  these  was  marked  by  naval  operations 
on  any  important  scale,  and  such  operations  as  there  were 
indicated  but  faintly  the  coming  development.  In  the  con- 
test with  Mexico,  steamers  were  used  in  war  for  the  first 
time ; but  the  enemy  was  so  destitute  of  naval  resources 
that  their  overwhelming  importance  was  not  fully  recog- 
nized. The  operations  of  the  navy  were  confined  to  the 
attack  of  imperfectly-fortified  points  on  the  seaboard,  and  to 
blockading  a country  that  had  no  commercial  importance. 
The  Crimean  War  advanced  a step  farther.  The  destruction 
of  the  Turkish  fleet  at  Sinope,  in  1853,  showed  the  effective- 
ness of  horizontal  shell-firing,  as  invented  by  Paixlians, 
while  the  success  of  the  French  ironclads  at  Kinburn  led 
the  way  to  the  practice  of  casing  ships-of-war  in  armor.  In 
1858  experiments  were  made  at  Portsmouth  with  the  Erebus 
and  Meteor,  two  lightly-armored  floating  batteries ; and 
these  were  followed,  in  France  and  in  England,  by  the 
Gloire  and  the  Warrior,  veritable  ironclad  cruisers.  But 
the  new  system  was  still  in  its  experimental  stage  ; and  it 
was  left  to  the  war  of  1861  to  show  clearly  its  practical 
value. 

The  application  of  armor  to  the  sides  of  vessels  was  accom- 
panied, or  rather  induced,  by  improvements  in  ordnance, 
especially  by  the  introduction  of  rifled  guns  in  Europe  and 
of  the  heavy  cast-iron  smooth-bores  of  Dahlgren  in  America. 
Both  these  improvements,  however,  were  of  recent  date. 
The  first  successful  employment  of  rifled  cannon  in  actual 
war  was  made  by  the  French  in  the  Italian  campaign  of 


THE  PREPARATIONS. 


3 


1859 ; while  the  heavy  Dahlgren  guns  had  hardly  been  ten 
years  in  use,  and  were  still  undergoing  development. 

In  regard  to  the  ram,  though  seemingly  a paradox,  it  may 
be  said  that  its  employment  in  naval  warfare  was  so  ancient 
that  in  1861  it  was  really  a new  weapon.  Its  revival  was  a 
direct  consequence  of  the  application  of  steam  to  the  propul- 
sion of  vessels.  The  Greeks  and  Romans  had  used  it  in 
their  galley-fights  with  destructive  effect ; and  it  was  only 
displaced  by  heavy  guns  when  oars  were  displaced  by  sails, 
when  ships  no  longer  fought  end-on,  but  broadside  to  broad- 
side, and  when  the  close-hauled  line  ahead  took  the  place  of 
the  direct  attack  in  line  abreast,  of  the  old  galley  tactics. 
The  introduction  of  steam,  by  giving  ships-of-war  a motive 
power  under  their  own  control,  independent  of  the  action  of 
the  wind — an  advantage  similar  to  that  which  the  triremes 
possessed  in  their  banks  of  oars — revived  the  trireme’s  mode 
of  attack,  and  made  the  ram  once  more  an  effective  weapon. 
But  in  1861  this  phase  of  naval  development  had  not  been 
recognized,  and  the  sinking  of  the  Cumberland,  in  March  of 
the  next  year,  first  revealed  the  addition  that  steam  had  made 
to  the  number  and  variety  of  implements  of  destruction. 

Torpedoes,  though  of  more  recent  introduction  than  rams, 
were  not  wholly  new  weapons.  The  idea  of  the  torpedo, 
first-  discovered  by  Bushnell,  and  developed  by  Fulton,  was 
rejected  by  the  English  Government  in  1805,  because  it  was 
recognized  as  giving  an  advantage  to  a weak  navy  over  a 
powerful  one,  and  its  adoption  could  only  impair  the  mari- 
time supremacy  of  Great  Britain.  On  account  of  this  ad- 
vantage which  the  torpedo  gave  to  the  weaker  side,  it  was 
brought  into  use  by  the  Russians  in  the  Crimea,  and,  though 
none  of  the  allied  vessels  were  destroyed  by  its  agency,  it 
none  the  less  contributed  appreciably  to  the  protection  of 
Russian  harbors.  But  its  great  importance  was  not  estab- 


4 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


lished  until  the  Civil  War,  and  then  only  in  the  second  year. 
The  Confederates  took  it  up  for  the  same  reason  that  the 
Russians  had  adopted  it  in  1854,  and  the  English  had  re- 
jected it  in  1805.  Driven  by  the  poverty  of  their  naval 
resources  to  the  use  of  every  device  that  ingenuity  could 
suggest,  in  the  fall  of  1862  they  established  a bureau  at 
Richmond  to  elaborate  and  systematize  torpedo  warfare ; 
and  the  destruction  of  the  Housatonic,  the  Tecumseh,  the 
Patapsco,  and  many  smaller  vessels,  showed  the  tremendous 
power  of  the  newly  adopted  weapon. 

From  the  fact  that  the  navy  at  this  period  was  concerned 
with  an  essentially  living  and  growing  science,  it  was  impor- 
tant that  its  officers,  above  all  in  the  senior  grades,  should  be 
men  of  progressive  minds  and  of  energetic  and  rapid  action. 
Especially  was  this  the  case  when  the  navy  found  itself 
upon  the  threshold  of  a great  war,  in  which  every  variety 
of  naval  operation  was  to  be  attempted,  and  every  contriv- 
ance of  mechanical  art  was  to  be  employed.  No  doubt 
a war  always  brings  new  men  to  the  front,  irrespective  of 
rank  or  age.  But  the  main  object  of  a navy’s  existence  in 
time  of  peace  is  to  be  in  a condition  of  instant  readiness  for 
war,  and  this  object  can  only  be  attained  by  having  the 
ablest  and  most  energetic  men  in  the  foremost  places.  Un- 
less such  a provision  is  made,  and  made  before  war  begins, 
the  possibilities  of  naval  development  will  be  neglected ; 
the  vigor  and  audacity  that  should  mark  the  earlier  opera- 
tions of  a war  will  be  wanting ; and  the  opportunity  of  strik- 
ing sharp  and  sudden  blows  at  the  outset  will  be  lost. 

Unfortunately,  in  1861,  the  arrangement  of  the  navy  list 
failed  to  meet  this  essential  condition  of  readiness  for  active 
operations.  Long  years  of  peace,  the  unbroken  course  of 
seniority  promotion,  and  the  absence  of  any  provision  for 
retirement,  had  filled  the  highest  grade  with  gallant  veter- 


THE  PREPARATIONS, 


5 


ans,  most  of  whom  had  reached  an  age  that  unfitted  them 
for  active  service  afloat.  At  the  head  of  the  list  were  the 
seventy-eight  captains.  A few  of  them  were  men  of  com- 
manding talents,  and  these  few  left  their  mark  upon  the 
records  of  the  wTar.  Of  the  rest,  some  had  obtained  distinc- 
tion in  an  earlier  period  of  their  career.  But  it  is  only  in 
exceptional  men  that  the  physical  and  mental  vigor  is  to  be 
found  that  resists  the  enfeebling  influences  of  advancing 
years ; and  it  would  be  unjust  to  expect  the  active  opera- 
tions of  war  to  be  successfully  carried  on  by  a body  of  com- 
manding officers  most  of  whom  had  passed  their  sixtieth 
year. 

This  was,  however,  only  one  of  the  difficulties  of  the  situ- 
ation. The  excessive  accumulation  of  older  officers  at  the 
head  of  the  list  was  felt  as  a heavy  drag  all  the  way  down 
to  the  foot.  Promotion  was  blocked,  as  there  was  no  pro- 
vision for  retirement ; and  the  commanders  and  lieutenants, 
many  of  whom  were  conspicuous  for  ability  and  energy, 
were  stagnating  in  subordinate  positions.  The  commanders 
at  the  head  of  the  list  were  between  fifty-eight  and  sixty 
years  of  age — a time  of  life  at  which  few  men  are  useful  for 
active  service.  The  upper  lieutenants  were  forty-eight  or 
fifty — some  indeed  were  past  fifty — and  very  few  were  in 
command  of  vessels,  as  there  were  two  hundred  officers 
above  them.  The  first-lieutenant  of  the  Hartford,  at  that 
time  the  flagship  of  the  East  India  squadron,  had  been 
thirty-four  years  in  the  service.  He  and  his  contemporaries, 
who  had  entered  the  navy  at  sixteen  or  thereabout,  had  not 
yet  risen  to  the  responsibilities  of  command.  This  enforced 
continuance  in  subordinate  stations  could  not  fail  to  tell 
upon  even  the  best  men.  The  tendency  of  such  a system  is 
to  make  mere  routine  men,  and  to  substitute  apathy  and  in- 
dolence for  zeal  and  energy.  If  a man  that  has  had  proper 


6 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


training  is  not  fit  for  command  at  thirty-six,  it  is  not  likely 
that  he  will  ever  be  fit  for  it.  If  he  has  reached  the  point 
of  fitness,  every  year  of  postponement,  unless  he  is  a very 
extraordinary  man,  is  a year  of  deterioration. 

The  efficiency  of  the  service  was  further  weakened  by  the 
vicious  system  of  promotion  by  seniority,  to  which  the  navy 
has  always  clung  tenaciously,  in  the  face  of  reason  and 
precedent,  of  the  analogies  of  civil  preferment,  and  the  ex- 
ample of  other  military  and  naval  establishments.  The 
defects  of  this  system  may  be  briefly  indicated.  Every  man 
who  lives  long  enough,  unless  gross  incompetency  can  be 
proved  against  him,  goes  to  the  head  of  the  list,  while  those 
who  have  entered  the  service  later,  however  much  they  may 
excel  in  ability  or  zeal,  remain  below  to  wait  their  turn.  It 
is  purely  a question  of  survival.  An  officer  comes  to  look 
upon  promotion  as  his  right,  apart  from  any  considerations 
of  merit  or  distinction.  Public  opinion  in  the  service  has 
no  leaders,  for  the  leading  minds  are  not  destined,  as  they 
would  be  in  every  other  profession,  to  gravitate  to  the  lead- 
ing positions.  They  simply  take  their  turn.  The  natural 
conservatism  of  a military  body  is  exaggerated,  and  judg- 
ment becomes  warped  by  tradition.  As  promotion  is  sure, 
there  is  no  inducement  to  effort.  No  one  will  readily  as- 
sume responsibility,  for  he  only  runs  a risk  without  any 
prospect  of  reward.  It  is  not  so  much  the  presence  of  poor 
material  that  injures  a service,  as  its  elevation  by  an  iron 
rule  of  promotion,  and  the  enforced  subordination  of  more 
capable  men.  As  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  1855  tersely 
put  it,  “It  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  elevating  the  in- 
competent, and  then  ordering  the  unpromoted  competent  to 
do  their  work.” 

It  became  evident,  shortly  after  the  war  began,  that  steps 
must  be  taken  to  remedy  the  existing  state  of  things ; but 


THE  PREPARATIONS. 


7 


nothing  could  be  done  at  once,  and  it  was  only  in  Decem- 
ber, 1861,  that  a law  was  passed  retiring  all  officers  at  the 
age  of  sixty-two,  or  after  forty-five  years  of  service.  By  the 
same  law,  any  captain  or  commander  might  be  selected  for 
the  command  of  a squadron,  with  the  rank  of  flag-officer, 
which  should  give  him  authority  over  his  seniors  in  the 
squadron.  Another  act,  passed  in  the  following  summer, 
created  the  grades  of  rear-admiral  and  commodore,  recast 
the  whole  corps  of  officers,  and  established  promotion  by  se- 
lection temporarily  in  the  highest  grade.  These  measures, 
though  late  in  coming,  had  the  desired  effect.  The  veterans 
were  gradually  replaced  by  younger  men ; the  commanders 
and  lieutenants  were  raised  to  the  places  they  were  qualified 
to  fill ; and  new  life  was  infused  into  the  service. 

But  the  spirit  of  routine  had  for  thirty  years  pervaded  the 
naval  establishment,  and  the  change  could  not  be  effected  in 
a day.  The  whole  tendency  of  the  navy  had  been  to  pre- 
serve traditions,  and  to  repress  individuality  in  the  junior 
officers.  Men  thought  alike,  talked  alike,  and  acted  alike. 
The  officers  in  active  service,  grown  old  in  the  lower  grades, 
and  but  little  encouraged  to  exercise  their  powers  of  volition, 
had  come  to  regard  themselves  as  parts  of  a machine,  and  to 
wait  for  the  orders  of  their  superior.  As  a general  thing, 
the  assumption  of  responsibility  was  neither  desired  nor 
permitted ; and  the  subordinate  who  presumed,  even  in  an 
emergency,  to  act  upon  his  own  judgment,  was  apt  to  bring 
down  upon  himself  official  censure.  It  is  related  of  one  of 
the  captains  at  the  battle  of  New  Orleans,  a man  of  unques- 
tioned courage,  that  when  he  fell  in  with  the  Manassas,  he 
hailed  ship  after  ship  to  obtain  an  order  from  the  admiral 
to  run  her  down.  Nor  was  this  an  extreme  case.  As  it  hap- 
pened, the  character  of  the  war  was  such  as  to  call  especially 
for  self-reliance,  resolute  action,  readiness  of  resource,  and 


8 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


the  exercise  of  individual  judgment.  But  confirmed  habits 
are  not  easily  shaken  off ; and  the  operations  of  the  first  two 
years  show  from  time  to  time  the  persistence  of  old  tradi- 
tions. Nothing  short  of  a complete  upheaval  of  the  service 
brought  about  the  needful  change ; commanders  became 
admirals  by  a single  step  ; and  junior  officers  became  first- 
lieutenants  of  the  ships  in  which  they  were  serving  as  mid- 
shipmen. Finally,  when  the  great  leaders  came  into  posi- 
tions of  active  command,  their  encouragement  and  approval 
of  individual  enterprise  gave  to  their  juniors  the  opportuni- 
ties of  which  the  latter  were  only  too  eager  to  avail  them- 
selves. 

It  was  another  unfortunate  feature  of  the  situation,  that 
while  there  was  a superabundance  of  old  officers,  there* was 
a deficiency  in  the  junior  grades.  Below  the  lieutenants 
there  were  less  than  a hundred  masters  and  midshipmen. 
These,  together  with  a dozen  of  the  younger  lieutenants, 
were  graduates  of  the  Naval  Academy ; and  their  service 
during  the  war  showed  the  value  of  their  thorough  training. 
To  fill  the  gap  at  the  foot  of  the  list  the  three  upper  classes 
of  acting  midshipmen  were  ordered  from  the  Academy  into 
active  service.  Most  of  these  were  mere  boys.  They  found 
themselves,  with  only  the  experience  of  two  or  three  years 
at  the  Naval  School,  suddenly  placed  in  positions  of  difficulty 
and  responsibility.  Many  of  them  were  lieutenants  at  nine- 
teen ; but  no  better  work  was  done  in  the  naval  war  than 
that  which  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  these  lads  from  the 
Academy. 

The  deficiency  of  officers  was  increased  by  the  resignation 
or  dismissal  of  those  who  took  side  with  the  South.  There 
were  322  of  these  of  all  grades  and  corps,  and  among  them 
were  several  of  marked  ability.  But  even  without  the  losses 
occasioned  by  retirement  and  by  resignation,  the  number  of 


THE  PREPARATIONS. 


9 


officers  would  have  been  wholly  insufficient  to  meet  the  de- 
mands of  the  war.  Volunteers  were  called  for,  and  great 
numbers  entered  the  service.  There  were  appointed  al- 
together about  7,500.  The  regular  officers  formed  only 
one-seventh  of  the  whole  service ; but  in  general  they  filled 
the  most  important  positions.  The  additions  to  the  line  of 
the  navy  were  composed  of  a great  variety  of  material. 
Some  were  merchant  captains  and  mates  of  experience  ; 
others  had  never  been  at  sea.  Those  employed  on  the 
Mississippi  were  chiefly  steamboat  men  and  pilots.  Many 
of  them  were  capable  and  gallant  men,  who,  though  unused 
to  the  handling  of  guns  and  the  discipline  of  a military 
service,  conducted  themselves  honorably  and  acquitted 
themselves  with  credit.  As  a class,  the  volunteers  were  an 
indispensable  addition  to  the  naval  force,  and  rendered 
valuable  service.  Without  the  least  reflection  upon  their 
good  qualities,  it  may  be  said  that  their  efficiency  would 
have  been  increased  by  a previous  military  training.  But 
no  attempt  had  ever  been  made  to  form  a reserve  for  the 
navy ; and  the  administration  was  fortunate  when  it  secured 
any  nautical  experience,  although  military  training  might  be 
wholly  wanting. 

Great  as  was  the  want  of  officers,  the  want  of  trained  sea- 
men was  equally  great.  The  complement  of  the  navy  had 
been  fixed  at  7,600.  Of  these  there  were  on  March  10,  1861, 
only  207  in  all  the  ports  and  receiving-ships  on  the  Atlantic 
coast.  It  was  a striking  illustration  of  the  improvidence  of 
naval  legislation  and  administration,  that  in  a country  of 
thirty  millions  of  people  only  a couple  of  hundred  were  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Navy  Department.  Seamen  could  not  be 
had  either  to  man  the  ships  that  might  be  commissioned,  or 
to  protect  the  exposed  stations  at  Annapolis  and  Norfolk. 
Prompt  measures  were  taken  during  the  first  year  to  in- 
I.— 1* 


10 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


crease  the  force ; and  later,  a great  expansion  took  place. 
In  Inly,  1863,  there  were  34,000  men  in  the  service.  But  at 
all  times  there  was  a difficulty  in  obtaining  trained  seamen. 
Large  bounties  were  offered  by  State  and  local  authorities 
for  enlistment  in  the  army,  and  transfers  between  the  two 
services  were  not  authorized  by  law.  When  the  draft  was 
established,  mariners  were  subjected  to  it  like  other  citi- 
zens, without  any  regard  to  the  service  which  they  would 
prefer,  or  for  which  they  might  be  specially  fitted.  In  as- 
signing the  quotas  to  each  locality,  no  allowance  was  made 
to  maritime  communities  for  the  seamen  they  had  furnished  ; 
so  that  they  were  forced,  in  self-defence,  to  send  their  sea- 
faring population  into  the  army.  In  1864,  a law  was  passed 
correcting  these  evils ; but  meantime  the  navy  suffered,  and 
vessels  were  occasionally  unable  to  go  to  sea  for  want  of 
men.  As  the  necessities  of  the  service  grew  more  pressing, 
the  number  of  men  in  the  navy  increased.  To  obtain  them, 
it  was  necessary  to  hold  out  extraordinary  inducements  ; and 
in  the  last  months,  bounties  as  high  as  one  thousand  dollars 
were  offered  and  paid  for  a single  seaman.  When  the  war 
ended,  there  were  51,500  men  in  the  service. 

Nothing  shows  more  forcibly  the  dependence  of  the  navy 
upon  the  merchant  marine  for  recruiting  its  ranks  in  time  of 
war  than  the  enormous  additions  both  of  officers  and  seamen 
that  took  place  between  1861  and  1865.  It  is  from  the  mer- 
chant marine  that  such  reinforcements  must  always  be 
chiefly  drawn.  To  fill  the  cadres  of  the  army  a well-trained 
and  organized  militia  stands  always  ready,  at  least  in  many 
of  the  States ; but  no  steps  have  ever  been  taken  toward  es- 
tablishing a sea-militia,  even  since  its  importance  has  been 
demonstrated  by  the  war.  A trained  reserve  force  is  a 
greater  necessity  for  the  navy  than  for  the  army,  not  because 
the  one  service  is  more  important  than  the  other,  but  be- 


THE  PREPARATIONS. 


11 


cause  its  ranks  are  less  easily  recruited.  It  may  be  said 
that  drill  will  make  any  man  a soldier,  while  a special  train- 
ing is  required  to  make  an  efficient  man-of-war’s  man.  The 
army  is  purely  a military  profession;  the  navy  combines 
two  professions — each  an  occupation  by  itself — the  military 
and  the  nautical.  Hence  the  greater  necessity  for  the  navy 
of  a large  body  of  trained  officers ; and  hence,  also,  the 
greater  importance  of  a partially-trained  naval  reserve. 

In  materiel,  the  navy  was  by  no  means  in  a backward  con- 
dition. The  wise  policy,  begun  before  the  establishment  of 
the  Navy  Department,  of  building  vessels  which  should  be 
the  best  possible  specimens  of  their  class,  had  been  steadily 
adhered  to  ; and  in  war-ship  construction  the  United  States 
still  held,  and  continued  to  hold  until  1867,  a place  very 
near  the  highest.  When  the  importance  of  steam  as  a mo- 
tive power  had  become  established,  the  early  side- wheelers 
were  built, — first  the  Mississippi  and  Missouri,  and  later  the 
Powhatan,  Susquehanna,  and  Saranac.  The  Powhatan  and 
Susquehanna,  at  the  time  they  were  launched,  in  1850,  were 
the  most  efficient  naval  vessels  afloat.  Next  came  the  six 
screw-frigates,  which  were  built  in  1855,  and  were  regarded 
all  the  world  over  as  the  model  men-of-war  of  the  period. 
Of  these  the  largest  was  the  Niagara.  The  other  five,  the 
Roanoke,  Colorado,  Merrimac,  Minnesota,  and  Wabash, 
were  vessels  of  a little  over  three  thousand  tons,  and  they 
carried,  for  their  day,  a powerful  battery.  Again,  in  1858, 
twelve  screw-sloops  of  two  classes  were  built,  most  of  which 
were  admirable  vessels,  though  they  were  wanting,  with  a 
few  exceptions,  in  the  important  quality  of  speed.  The  first 
class,  vessels  of  about  two  thousand  tons,  included  the  Lan- 
caster, Hartford,  Richmond,  Brooklyn,  and  Pensacola.  The 
second  class,  of  which  the  Pawnee  and  Iroquois  were  the 
largest,  were  also  serviceable  vessels.  Finally,  in  February, 


12 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


1861,  Congress  liad  made  appropriation  for  seven  new  screw- 
sloops,  which  were  intended  to  be  as  efficient  as  their  pre- 
decessors. 

But  these  measures,  "well-judged  though  they  were,  were 
only  a first  step  in  the  general  conversion  of  the  naval  force 
from  sailing  vessels  into  steamers.  Of  the  ninety  names 
borne  on  the  Navy  Register  in  1861,  fifty  were  those  of  ves- 
sels of  the  older  type — ships-of-the-line,  frigates,  sloops,  and 
brigs.  Several  of  the  liners  were  still  on  the  stocks,  never 
having  been  completed.  The  others  were  notable  ships  in 
their  day,  but  their  day  was  past  and  gone  forever.  The 
list  of  frigates  was  headed  by  the  Constitution  and  the 
United  States,  built  originally  in  the  last  century,  and  ren- 
dered famous  by  the  victories  of  1812.  Others  had  been 
built  within  a more  recent  period,  but  the  type  had  not  been 
materially  altered.  The  frigates  were  useful  as  receiving 
and  practice-ships  ; but  as  far  as  war-service  was  concerned, 
they  had  only  a historic  value.  But  little  more  could  be 
said  of  the  sloops  and  brigs  ; and  the  remainder  of  the  sail- 
ing fleet  were  store-ships. 

Though  swelling  the  total  of  ships-of-war  to  a considerable 
figure,  the  sailing  vessels  added  little  or  nothing  to  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  force.  This  fact  explains,  in  some  degree,  the 
inadequacy  of  the  navy  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  A 
change  had -taken  place  about  fifteen  years  before  in  the 
motive  power  of  ships,  so  radical  that  all  the  constructions 
of  an  earlier  date  were  completely  superseded.  In  1840  the 
navy  was  stronger  for  its  day  than  in  1860 ; because  in  1840 
all  its  ships  were  ships  of  the  period,  while  in  1860  only 
half  the  fleet  could  be  so  regarded.  The  distance  in  time 
that  separated  the  second  Macedonian  from  the  Powhatan 
was  not  much  greater  than  that  between  the  Powhatan  and 
the  Hartford  ; yet  in  the  first  case  the  change  was  a revolu- 


THE  PREPARATIONS. 


13 


tion,  while  in  the  second  it  was  only  a development.  A 
captain  that  fought  the  Invincible  Armada  would  have  been 
more  at  home  in  the  typical  war-ship  of  1840,  than  the  aver- 
age captain  of  1840  could  have  been  at  that  time  in  the  ad- 
vanced types  of  the  Civil  War.  As  a matter  of  fact,  it  was  no 
uncommon  thing  in  1861  to  find  officers  in  command  of 
steamers  who  had  never  served  in  steamers  before,  and  who 
were  far  more  anxious  about  their  boilers  than  about  their 
enemy.  As  naval  science  had  advanced  more  in  the  last 
twenty-five  years  than  in  the  two  hundred  years  preceding, 
more  than  half  the  vessels  on  the  navy  list  had  become  sud- 
denly useless,  and  the  effective  force  was  narrowed  down  to 
the  forty  that  had  steam  as  a motive  power. 

Another  fact  which  helped  to  account  for  the  want  of 
preparation  in  1861  was  the  supineness  of  the  Navy  De- 
partment during  the  last  months  of  Buchanan’s  administra- 
tion. Few  wars  come  on  without  some  note  of  warning ; 
and  this  was  no  exception.  The  effective  force,  small  as  it 
was,  might  easily  have  been  so  disposed  as  to  be  ready  for 
an  emergency,  without  even  exciting  comment.  The  failure 
to  take  the  necessary  measures  need  not,  however,  be  im- 
puted to  a treacherous  sympathy  with  the  insurgents.  It 
was  only  a part  of  the  general  policy  of  inaction,  deliberately 
adopted  by  the  Government  during  the  winter  of  1860-61, 
which  forbade  any  measures  pointing  even  remotely  to  co- 
ercion. The  most  ordinary  preparations  were  neglected; 
and  if  the  crippling  of  the  fleet  had  been  intentional,  it 
could  not  have  been  more  effectual. 

Of  the  forty  steamers  included  in  the  general  list,  five 
were  unserviceable,  two  of  them  being  still  on  the  stocks, 
and  the  others  useless  except  as  receiving-ships.  Two  more 
were  mere  tugs,  and,  together  with  the  Michigan,  sta- 
tioned on  the  lakes,  may  be  thrown  out  of  the  calculation. 


14 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Eight  others,  including  the  five  frigates,  were  laid  up  in 
ordinary.  There  remained  twenty-four  steamers,  whose  dis- 
position on  the  4th  of  March  was  as  follows : 


Class. 

Name. 

Station. 

One  screw-frigate 

Niagara 

Returning  from  Japan. 
Coast  of  Africa. 
Pacific. 

Home  Squadron  (Pen- 
sacola). 

East  Indies. 

Mediterranean. 

Mediterranean. 

Home  Squadron  (re- 
turning from  Vera 
Cruz). 

Pacific. 

Five  screw-sloops  (1st  class). 
Three  side-wheel  steamers  . . 

- 

r San  Jacinto  . . 

Lancaster 

Brooklyn 

Hartford 

^ Richmond  . . . 
' Susquehanna  . 
Powhatan .... 

[ Saranac 

" Mohican 1 

Narragansett . 

Iroquois 

Pawnee 

Coast  of  Africa. 
Pacific. 

Medi  t erran  ean. 

Washington. 

Pacific. 

East  Indies. 

Eight  screw-sloops  (2d  class). 

Wyoming 

Dacotah 

Five  screw  steamers  (3d  class) 

Pocahontas . . . 

[ Seminole 

'Wyandotte. . . 

Mohawk 

Crusader 

Sumter 

Home  Squadron  (re- 
turning from  V era 
Cruz). 

Coast  of  Brazil. 

Home  Squadron  (Pen- 
sacola). 

New  York. 

New  York. 

Coast  of  Africa. 

Mystic 

Coast  of  Africa. 

Two  side-wheel  steamers 

\ Pulaski 

Brazil. 

l Saginaw 

East  Indies. 

It  will  be  observed  that  of  the  twelve  vessels  composing 
the  Home  Squadron,  seven  were  steamers ; and  of  these 
only  three,  the  Pawnee,  Mohawk,  and  Crusader,  were  in 
northern  ports  and  at  the  immediate  disposal  of  the  new  ad- 
ministration. The  best  part  of  the  fleet  was  scattered  all 
over  the  world. 

In  the  matter  of  ordnance,  as  in  ships,  the  navy  had  been 
making  active  progress.  In  the  old  sailing  vessels,  the 


THE  PREPARATIONS. 


15 


32 -pounder,  which  was  simply  a development  of  the  18s  and 
24s  of  1812,  and  the  VUI-inch  shell-gun  were  still  the  usual 
guns.  Since  1850,  the  powerful  Dahlgren  smooth-bore  shell- 
guns  had  been  introduced,  and  the  new  steam-frigates  and 
sloops  were  armed  with  them.  The  IX-inch  guns  of  this 
description  were  mounted  in  broadside,  and  the  Xl-inch 
(with  a few  X-inch)  on  pivots.  The  powers  of  the  Xl-inch 
had  not  been  fully  tested,  and  the  prescribed  service-charge 
was  smaller  than  it  was  afterward  found  that  the  gun  would 
bear.  The  latest  development  of  the  smooth-bore  gun  was 
the  XV-inch,  one  of  which  was  generally  mounted  in  each 
monitor  turret.  Rifled  guns  were  gradually  introduced  dur- 
ing the  war.  These  were  chiefly  Parrott  guns,  20-,  30-,  and 
100-pounders.  They  were  cast-iron  guns,  strengthened  by  a 
wrought-iron  band  around  the  breech.  Later,  60-pounders 
and  150-pounders  were  manufactured.  The  Parrott  gun  of 
the  smaller  calibres  was  serviceable,  but  as  a heavy  gun  it 
was  dangerous,  and  occasionally  burst.  Besides  the  Parrott 
guns,  a few  light  cast-iron  Dahlgren  rifles  were  made ; and 
in  the  Western  flotilla,  when  it  was  transferred  to  the  navy, 
there  were  several  army  rifled  42-j)Ounders,  which  were  so 
dangerous  as  to  be  nearly  useless. 

The  demands  of  the  new  service  were  many  and  various. 
There  was  the  river  service,  where  the  navy  acted  largely  in 
co-operation  with  the  army,  in  the  reduction  of  fortified 
points,  and  in  opening  and  keeping  open  the  lines  of  com- 
munication. For  this  the  essential  qualification  was  light 
draft.  It  needed  small  handy  vessels,  capable  of  approach- 
ing the  shore,  and  of  passing  through  shallow  and  difficult 
channels.  Quite  distinct  from  it  was  the  ocean  service, 
which  meant  the  pursuit  and  capture  of  Confederate  cruisers, 
and  of  vessels  engaged  in  illegal  trade.  The  prime  neces- 
sity here  was  speed.  Lastly,  there  was  the  coast  service, 


16 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


comprising  the  maintenance  of  the  blockade,  and  detached 
operations  against  fortifications  protected  by  powerful  bat- 
teries. The  blockade  required  vessels  that  combined  both 
speed  and  light  draft,  together  with  seaworthiness,  and  a 
certain  degree  of  force  to  resist  the  sudden  attacks  which 
were  made  from  time  to  time,  in  the  hope  of  raising  the 
blockade,  or  what  was  perhaps  of  equal  importance,  of  in- 
ducing a belief  abroad  that  such  a result  had  been  accom- 
plished. The  attack  of  fortified  harbors,  on  the  other  hand, 
though  from  the  nature  of  things  carried  on  in  connection 
with  the  blockade,  called  for  an  entirely  different  type  of 
vessel.  Here,  force  pure  and  simple,  was  needed ; force  of- 
fensive and  defensive,  heavy  guns  and  heavy  armor. 

For  all  these  kinds  of  service,  vessels  were  required,  and 
vessels  in  great  numbers.  A small  force  could  accomplish 
nothing.  The  operations  on  the  Mississippi  and  its  tribu- 
taries alone,  operations  which  were  second  to  none  in  extent 
and  efficiency,  and  carried  on  wTholly  in  the  enemy’s  country, 
required  a large  fleet.  For  the  ocean  service,  the  vessels,  to 
accomplish  their  object,  must  be  numerous ; while  a very 
few  served  every  purpose  of  the  enemy.  It  was  easy  for 
the  half-dozen  commerce-destroyers  to  catch  merchantmen, 
with  which  every  sea  was  filled,  while  it  was  a very  difficult 
matter  to  catch  the  half-dozen  commerce-destroyers.  Sim- 
ilarly, the  blockade  service  required  vessels  at  every  port 
and  inlet ; otherwise  it  was  not  even  legal,  to  say  nothing  of 
its  being  ineffective. 

In  meeting  the  wants  of  the  navy,  the  new  administration 
proceeded  with  energy.  All  the  ships  on  foreign  stations, 
except  three,  were  recalled.  Measures  were  taken  at  once 
to  increase  the  force  by  fitting  out  all  the  serviceable  vessels 
that  were  laid  up,  by  building  in  navy  yards,  and  in  private 
yards  on  contract,  and  by  purchase  in  the  open  market.  The 


THE  PREPARATIONS. 


17 


difficulties  were  great,  for  the  force  required  was  enormous ; 
and  there  were  neither  officers,  men,  ships,  nor  guns  availa- 
ble, nor  authority  to  procure  them.  Ship-owners  had  failed 
to  see  that  steamers  were  to  supplant  sailing-vessels  for 
commercial  purposes,  and  though  the  merchant  marine  was 
still  considerable,  it  had  not  been  modernized.  Nor  had 
any  systematic  plan  been  adopted,  by  which  a Government 
inspection  might  secure  the  construction  of  merchant  vessels, 
imperfectly  perhaps,  yet  in  some  degree  adapted  for  con- 
version into  men  of  war.  Indeed,  in  the  absence  of  a de- 
mand, ship-builders  were  not  prepared  to  supply  steamers 
of  any  kind  to  a considerable  extent.  The  number  of  ma- 
chine-shops was  small — from  twenty  to  thirty  at  the  most — 
and  their  plant  only  equal  to  the  ordinary  work  of  the  con- 
struction and  repair  of  machinery.  There  were  not  more  than 
eight  of  these  of  any  considerable  size ; and,  in  the  sudden 
demand  for  locomotives  and  transports  for  the  army  and  for 
marine  engines  for  the  navy,  they  were  strained  to  the  utmost. 

Five  distinct  measures  were  immediately  adopted  for  the 
increase  of  the  naval  force.  The  first  was  to  buy  everything 
afloat  that  could  be  made  of  service.  Purchases  were  made 
directly  by  the  Department,  or  by  officers  acting  under  its 
direction.  By  the  1st  of  July,  twelve  steamers  had  been 
bought,  and  nine  were  employed  under  charter.  Subse- 
quently it  appeared  that  the  business  of  purchasing,  being 
a purely  mercantile  matter,  might  be  suitably  placed  in  the 
hands  of  a business  man,  who  should  act  as  the  responsible 
agent  of  the  Department  in  conducting  the  transactions. 
This  plan  was  adopted  in  July.  Each  purchase  was  in- 
spected by  a board  of  officers,  and  in  this  way  the  Depart- 
ment was  enabled  to  secure,  as  far  as  any  such  were  to  be 
found,  suitable  vessels  at  a suitable  price.  The  board  of  in- 
spection could  not  exact  a very  high  degree  of  excellence  or 


18 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


fitness,  because  everything  afloat  that  could  in  any  way  be 
made  to  answer  a purpose  was  pressed  into  the  service.  The 
vessels  were  of  all  sizes  and  descriptions,  from  screw-steamers 
and  side-wheelers  of  two  thousand  tons  to  ferry-boats  and 
tugs.  Some  of  the  larger  steamers  were  fast  vessels  and 
made  efficient  cruisers.  The  Connecticut,  the  Cuvier,  the 
De  Soto,  and  the  Santiago  de  Cuba  paid  for  their  cost 
several  times  over  in  the  prizes  they  captured.  The  ma- 
jority of  the  purchased  steamers  were  between  one  hundred 
and  eight  hundred  tons.  Some  of  the  least  promising  of 
these  improvised  men-of-war  did  good  service  against 
blockade-runners.  The  steamer  Circassian,  one  of  the 
most  valuable  prizes  made  during  the  war,  was  captured 
outside  of  Havana  by  a Fulton  ferry-boat.  Even  for  fighting 
purposes,  however,  the  ferry-boats,  with  their  heavy  guns, 
were  by  no  means  to  be  despised.  There  were  purchased 
altogether  up  to  December,  3861,  79  steamers  and  58  sailing 
vessels,  137  in  all.  The  number  of  vessels  bought  during 
the  whole  war  amounted  to  418,  of  which  313  were  steamers. 
After  the  war  was  over,  they  were  rapidly  sold,  at  less  than 
half  their  cost. 

The  second  measure  adopted  by  the  administration  was 
the  construction  of  sloops-of-war.  Seven  of  these  had  been 
authorized  by  Congress  in  February,  but  the  Department 
resolved  to  build  eight,  assigning  two  to  each  navy  yard. 
Four  of  these  vessels,  the  Oneida,  Kearsarge,  Wachusett, 
and  Tuscarora,  were  reproductions  of  three  of  the  sloops  of 
1858,  which  made  the  work  of  construction  quicker  and  easier, 
the  designs  being  already  prepared.  In  the  latter  part  of 
1861,  six  additional  sloops  were  built,  of  the  same  general 
class,  but  larger.  All  these  fourteen  sloops,  like  their  models 
of  two  years  before,  were  excellent  vessels,  and  several  of 
them  are  still  in  the  service  as  second-rates  and  third-rates. 


THE  PREPARATIONS. 


19 


The  third  measure  adopted  by  the  Department,  on  its  own 
responsibility,  without  waiting  for  the  action  of  Congress, 
was  to  contract  with  private  parties  for  the  construction  of 
small,  heavily  armed  screw-gunboats.  Twenty-three  of  these 
were  built,  of  which  the  Unadilla  and  Pinola  may  be  regarded 
as  types.  They  were  of  five  hundred  and  seven  tons  each, 
and  mounted  from  four  to  seven  guns.  Some  of  them, 
within  four  months  from  the  date  of  contract,  were  afloat, 
armed,  and  manned,  and  took  part  in  the  battle  of  Port 
Royal.  From  their  rapid  construction,  they  were  commonly 
knowm  as  the  “ninety-day  gunboats.”  Nine  of  themw'ere  in 
Farragut’s  fleet  at  the  passage  of  the  forts  below  New  Or- 
leans. They  were  an  important  addition  to  the  navy,  and 
were  actively  employed  both  in  fighting  and  blockading  dur- 
ing the  whole  wTar. 

For  service  in  the  rivers  and  in  narrow  sounds  and  chan- 
nels, still  another  class  of  vessels  wras  needed.  To  meet  this 
want,  a fourth  measure  was  adopted,  by  building  twelve  pad- 
dle-wheel steamers,  three  or  four  hundred  tons  larger  than 
the  gunboats,  but  still  small  vessels,  and  of  very  light 
draft.  To  avoid  the  necessity  of  turning,  they  were  pro- 
vided with  a double  bow,  and  a rudder  at  each  end.  These 
were  the  famous  “ double-enders.”  The  first  twelve  were 
the  so-called  Octorara  class.  Twenty-seven  larger  vessels  of 
the  same  type  were  afterwards  built,  composing  the  Sassacus 
class.  The  Wateree,  a vessel  of  the  same  size  and  gen- 
eral design,  was  built  of  iron.  Finally  the  Mohongo  class, 
also  of  iron,  consisted  of  seven  double-enders  of  still  larger 
size,  and  carrying  a heavier  armament.  The  Asliuelot 1 and 
Monocacy  still  represent  this  class  in  the  service. 

The  fifth  and  last  measure  for  the  increase  of  the  naval 


1 News  of  the  loss  of  the  Ashuelot  is  received  as  this  volume  is  going  to  press. 


20 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


force  was  tlie  construction  of  ironclads.  Congress  had 
passed,  at  the  extra  session  in  August,  an  appropriation  of  a 
million  and  a half  dollars  for  armored  vessels,  to  be  built 
upon  plans  approved  by  a board  of  officers.  The  board  was 
composed  of  three  of  the  ablest  captains  in  the  service, 
Smith,  Paulding,  and  Davis.  Out  of  a large  number  of 
plans  proposed,  three  were  selected  by  the  board  and  or- 
dered by  the  Department.  Upon  these  plans  were  built  the 
New  Ironsides,  the  Galena,  and  the  Monitor. 

Most  of  the  measures,  as  outlined  above,  refer  to  the  first 
year  of  the  war ; but  these  five  types  of  vessels,  converted 
merchantmen,  sloops,  gunboats,  double-enders,  and  iron- 
clads, represent  the  additions  to  the  sea-going  navy  during 
the  four  years.  There  was  also  an  immense  river  fleet,  com- 
posed of  river-steamboats,  rams,  ironclads,  “ tinclads,”  and 
mortar-boats,  a collection  of  nondescripts,  which  under  the 
leadership  of  able  commanders,  made  the  naval  operations  on 
the  Mississippi  as  brilliant  and  successful  as  any  in  the  war. 

In  the  construction  of  the  new  sliips-of-war,  no  attempt 
was  made  to  reproduce  the  fine  screw-frigates  of  1855, 
as  they  failed  to  show  their  usefulness,  except  perhaps  at 
Port  Royal  and  at  Fort  Fisher.  The  Colorado  could  not  be 
got  over  the  bar,  when  Farragut  went  up  to  New  Orleans, 
and  the  Roanoke  and  Minnesota  were  helpless  at  Hampton 
Roads.  In  the  latter  half  of  the  war,  however,  the  Depart- 
ment undertook  the  construction  of  a class  of  vessels  of  con- 
siderable size,  but  very  different  in  character.  These  were 
large,  wooden  steamers,  with  fine  lines,  excessively  long  and 
sharp  and  narrow,  of  light  draft  for  their  size,  in  which  every 
quality  was  sacrificed  to  speed.  In  some  of  these  the  length 
was  as  great  as  eight  times  the  beam.  They  were  to  be  sea- 
going cruisers.  Their  main  purpose  was  to  capture  the  com- 
merce-destroyers ; and  perhaps,  in  case  of  foreign  complica- 


THE  PREPARATIONS. 


21 


tions,  to  do  a little  commerce-destroying  themselves.  Their 
armament  was  heavy  ; but  armament  was  not  their  principal 
feature.  Above  all  things,  they  were  to  be  fast ; and  in  those 
that  were  built,  the  desired  result  was  generally  secured. 
One  of  them,  the  Wampanoag  or  Florida,  succeeded  in  at- 
taining for  a short  time  the  extraordinary  speed  of  seventeen 
and  three-fourths  knots  an  hour. 

The  plan  which  comprehended  the  construction  of  these 
vessels  was  a scheme  of  somewhat  large  dimensions,  and 
was  never  completed.  Of  the  three  principal  types,  named 
respectively  after  the  Ammonoosuc,  the  Java,  and  the  Con- 
toocook,  twenty-five  vessels  were  projected,  and  most  of 
them  were  begun  ; but  few  of  them  were  launched,  and  these 
only  after  the  close  of  the  war.  Under  the  pressure  of  urgent 
necessity,  they  were  built  of  unseasoned  white-oak  timber,  in- 
stead of  the  live-oak  which  had  been  hitherto  used  for  ships- 
of-war  ; and  such  of  them  as  were  finished  were  no  sooner 
in  the  water  ^than  they  began  to  decay.  Six  years  after 
the  war  was  ended,  the  chief  constructor,  writing  of  these 
vessels,  reported  that  some  of  them,  costing  over  a million  of 
dollars,  had  made  only  one  cruise,  and  then  had  been  found 
too  rotten  to  be  repaired.  They  served  the  purpose,  how- 
ever of  contributing,  with  other  circumstances,  to  modify 
the  menacing  attitude  of  foreign  powers ; and  their  serious 
imperfections  were  the  necessary  result  of  the  situation. 
The  Administration  was  bound  to  do  its  utmost  to  provide 
for  every  contingency  ; and  the  failure  of  preparation  during 
peace,  when  plans  could  be  matured,  and  materials  accumu- 
lated at  leisure,  compelled,  when  the  time  of  action  came,  a 
hurried  and  lavish  expenditure. 

Great  as  was  the  task  before  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment in  preparing  for  a naval  war,  it  was  as  nothing  to  that 


22 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


of  tlie  enemy.  The  latter  had  at  his  disposal  a small  number 
of  trained  officers  imbued  with  the  same  ideas,  and  brought 
up  in  the  same  school,  as  their  opponents.  Some  of  these, 
like  Buchanan,  Semmes,  Brown,  Maffitt,  and  Brooke,  were 
men  of  extraordinary  professional  qualities ; but  except 
in  its  officers,  the  Confederate  Government  had  nothing 
in  the  shape  of  a navy.  It  had  not  a single  ship-of-war. 
It  had  no  abundant  fleet  of  merchant-vessels  in  its  ports 
from  which  to  draw  reserves.  It  had  no  seamen,  for  its 
people  were  not  given  to  seafaring  pursuits.  Its  only  ship- 
yards were  Norfolk  and  Pensacola.  Norfolk,  with  its  im- 
mense supplies  of  ordnance  and  equipments,  was  indeed 
invaluable;  but  though  the  three  hundred  new  Dahlgren 
guns  captured  in  the  yard  were  a permanent  acquisition,  the 
yard  itself  was  lost  w7hen  the  war  was  one- fourth  over.  The 
South  wTas  without  any  large  force  of  skilled  mechanics ; and 
such  as  it  had  were  early  summoned  to  the  army.  There 
were  only  three  rolling-mills  in  the  country,  two  of  wrhich 
were  in  Tennessee;  and  the  third,  at  Atlanta,  w7as  unfitted 
for  heavy  work.  There  were  hardly  any  machine-shops  that 
wrere  prepared  to  supply  the  best  kind  of  workmanship  ; and 
in  the  beginning  the  only  foundry  capable  of  casting  heavy 
guns  was  the  Tredegar  Iron  Works,  w hich  under  the  direc- 
tion of  Commander  Brooke,  was  employed  to  its  fullest 
capacity.  Worst  of  all,  there  were  no  raw  materials,  except 
the  timber  that  was  standing  in  the  forests.  The  cost  of  iron 
was  enormous,  and  toward  the  end  of  the  war  it  w~as  hardly 
to  be  had  at  any  price.  Under  these  circumstances,  no  gen- 
eral plan  of  naval  policy  on  a large  scale  could  be  carried 
out ; and  the  conflict  on  the  Southern  side  became  a species 
of  partisan,  desultory  warfare. 

A Navy  Department  had  been  established  by  an  act  of 
the  Provisional  Congress  on  February  21.  Mallory,  who 


THE  PREPARATIONS. 


23 


had  been  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs  in 
the  United  States  Senate,  was  appointed  Secretary  of  the 
Navy.  In  matters  relating  to  ordnance  and  armor,  the  lead- 
ing spirit  at  the  Department  was  Commander  Brooke,  who 
was  afterward  Chief  of  Bureau.  As  early  as  the  15th  of 
March  an  appropriation  of  one  million  dollars  was  made  for 
the  construction  or  purchase  of  ten  steam-gunboats.  The 
Administration  made  tremendous  efforts  to  create  a navy  ; 
but  in  spite  of  the  greatest  perseverance  and  ingenuity,  it 
found  itself  checked  and  hampered  at  every  turn.  By  dint 
of  using  everything  it  could  lay  hands  on,  it  got  together 
in  the  beginning  a small  and  scattered  fleet,  which  had 
hardly  the  semblance  of  a naval  force.  Six  of  the  revenue- 
cutters  came  early  into  its  possession.  The  steam-battery 
Fulton  was  seized  at  Pensacola,  and  $25,000  were  appro- 
priated to  complete  and  equip  her.  The  Merrimac  was 
presently  raised  at  Norfolk,  and  found  to  have  no  seri- 
ous injury.  Encouragement  was  given  to  private  enter- 
prise, by  Davis’s  immediate  adoption  of  the  plan  of  issuing 
letters-of-marque.  It  was  recognized  that  one  of  the  most 
vulnerable  points  on  the  Union  side  lay  in  its  commerce ; 
and  it  was  against  commerce  alone  that  the  insurgent  navy 
throughout  the  war  was  able  to  sustain  the  offensive.  The 
Federal  Government  could  not  retaliate,  because  there  was 
no  commerce  to  retaliate  upon.  The  carrying  trade  of  the 
South  was  in  foreign  hands ; and  the  only  way  to  assail 
it  was  by  establishing  a blockade,  which  affixed  to  it  an 
illegal  character.  Powerless  to  raise  the  blockade  of  their 
own  coast,  and  much  less  to  establish  one  at  the  North,  the 
Confederates  confined  their  aggressions  chiefly  to  merchant 
vessels  ; and  having,  by  the  address  of  their  agents,  and 
the  negligence  of  the  English  authorities,  secured  a few 
cruisers  well  adapted  for  the  purpose,  they  inflicted  injur- 


24 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


ies  on  the  American  merchant  marine  from  which  it  nevei 
recovered. 

But  this  was  warfare  for  which  only  a few  vessels  -were 
needed.  For  strictly  naval  warfare,  where  ships-of-war 
measured  themselves  against  each  other,  the  South  was 
never  able  to  accumulate  a sufficient  force.  Old  vessels 
were  altered,  new  vessels  were  built  at  different  points,  and 
some  of  them  were  for  a time  successful,  or  at  least  did  not 
yield  without  a hard  struggle  ; but  there  was  no  possibility, 
except  perhaps  for  a time  on  the  Mississippi,  of  sustained 
or  concerted  action.  The  naval  force  that  opposed  Golds- 
borough  in  the  Sounds  was  pitifully  weak,  as  was  that  which 
Dupont  found  at  Port  Royal.  Little  more  could  be  said  of 
the  squadron  at  New  Orleans,  though  the  ironclad  Missis- 
sippi, if  accident  and  mismanagement  had  not  delayed  her 
commission,  might  have  given  Farragut’s  fleet  some  an- 
• noyance.  At  Mobile  the  Tennessee,  under  the  gallant  Bu- 
chanan, fought  almost  single-handed  the  whole  fleet,  only 
to  be  captured  after  a heroic  defence.  At  Savannah,  the 
Atlanta  was  captured  almost  as  soon  as  she  appeared. 
Charleston  was  never  able  to  make  more  than  a raid  or  two 
on  the  blockading  force.  The  Albemarle  maintained  herself 
for  six  months  in  the  waters  of  North  Carolina,  but  she  was 
blockaded  in  the  Roanoke  River,  and  was  finally  destroyed 
by  the  daring  of  Cushing.  Finally  the  Merrimac,  which 
was  lost  through  our  own  shortcomings,  had  a brilliant 
but  brief  career  in  Hampton  Roads. 

These  isolated  attempts  comprised,  together  with  the  ex- 
ploits of  the  cruisers,  the  sum  of  the  naval  operations  on  the 
Southern  side.  Viewed  in  the  light  of  the  difficulties  to  be 
met  by  the  Confederate  navy,  they  were  little  less  than  phe- 
nomenal. But  as  forming  a standard  of  comparison  for  fu- 
ture wars,  or  for  the  strength  of  future  enemies,  they  are  hardly 


THE  PREPARATIONS. 


25 


to  be  considered.  To-day  we  are  worse  off,  for  the  period 
in  which  we  live,  than  we  were  in  1861,  when  the  feebleness 
of  onr  enemy  gave  ns  eight  months  for  preparation ; and  if 
it  should  ever  be  our  misfortune  to  be  involved  in  another 
war,  we  shall  probably  have  a far  more  formidable  antag- 
onist to  encounter,  and  one  prepared  to  carry  on  hostilities 
from  the  very  outset. 

I.— 2 


CHAPTER  H. 


THE  BLOCKADE. 

The  first  measure  of  naval  warfare  undertaken  by  the  Ad- 
ministration, and  the  one  which  it  carried  out  for  four  years 
with  the  most  sustained  effort,  was  one  that  seemed  at  the 
outset  in  the  highest  degree  impracticable.  A navy  of 
thirty-five  available  modern  vessels,  while  it  might  be  ex- 
pected to  produce  substantial  results  by  concentrated  at- 
tacks at  isolated  points  on  the  seaboard,  or  in  engagements 
with  the  enemy’s  ships-of-war,  counted  for  almost  nothing 
as  an  effectual  barrier  to  commerce  along  3,000  miles  of 
coast.  To  undertake  such  a task,  and  to  proclaim  the  un- 
dertaking to  the  world,  in  all  its  magnitude,  at  a time  when 
the  Navy  Department  had  only  three  steam- vessels  at  its 
immediate  disposal  in  home  ports,  was  an  enterprise  of  the 
greatest  boldness  and  hardihood.  For  the  days  of  paper 
blockades  were  over;  and,  though  the  United  States  were 
not  a party  to  the  Declaration  of  Paris,  its  rule  in  regard  to 
blockade  was  only  the  formal  expression  of  a law  universally 
recognized.  “ Blockades,  to  be  binding,  must  be  effective — 
that  is  to  say,  maintained  by  a force  sufficient  really  to  pre- 
vent access  to  the  coast  of  the  enemy ; ” or,  according  to  the 
general  interpretation  given  to  the  treaty,  sufficient  to  create 
an  evident  danger  in  entering  or  leaving  the  port.  In  this 
sense,  the  Government  understood  its  responsibilities  and 
prepared  to  meet  them. 


THE  BLOCKADE. 


27 


It  was  natural,  in  view  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  force,  that 
foreign  governments  should  look  at  the  measure  with  sus- 
picion, and  should  watch  its  execution  with  careful  scrutiny. 
Commercial  communities  abroad  doubted  the  seriousness  of 
the  undertaking,  because,  in  their  ignorance  of  the  energy 
and  the  resources  of  the  Government,  they  doubted  its  feasi- 
bility. An  effective  blockade  on  such  a scale  was  a thing 
unprecedented,  even  in  the  operations  of  the  foremost  naval 
powers  of  the  world.  It  seemed  to  be  an  attempt  to  revive 
the  cabinet  blockades  of  half  a century  before,  when  Eng- 
land and  France  laid  an  embargo  upon  each  other’s  coasts, 
and  captured  all  vessels  at  sea  whose  destination  was  within 
the  proscribed  limits ; and  when  Spain  interdicted  com- 
merce with  the  northern  colonies  in  South  America,  and  as 
a matter  of  form,  kept  a brig  cruising  in  the  Caribbean  Sea. 

No  time  was  lost  in  announcing  the  intentions  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. On  the  19th  of  April,  six  days  after  the  fall  of  Sum- 
ter, the  President  issued  a proclamation  declaring  the  block- 
ade of  the  Southern  States  from  South  Carolina  to  Texas.  On 
the  27th  the  blockade  was  extended  to  Virginia  and  North 
Carolina.  The  terms  of  the  proclamation  were  as  follows  : 

“ Now  therefore  I,  Abraham  Lincoln,  President  of  the  United  States 
. . . have  farther  deemed  it  advisable  to  set  on  foot  a blockade 

of  the  ports  within  the  States  aforesaid,  in  pursuance  of  the  laws  of 
the  United  States  and  of  the  Law  of  Nations  in  such  case  provided. 
For  this  purpose  a competent  force  will  be  posted  so  as  to  prevent  en- 
trance and  exit  of  vessels  from  the  ports  aforesaid.  If,  therefore,  with 
a view  to  violate  such  blockade,  a vessel  shall  approach  or  shall  attempt 
to  leave  any  of  the  said  ports,  she  will  be  duly  warned  by  the  com- 
mander of  one  of  the  blockading  vessels,  who  will  endorse  on  her  regis- 
ter the  fact  and  date  of  such  warning,  and  if  the  same  vessel  shall  again 
attempt  to  enter  or  leave  the  blockaded  port,  she  will  be  captured,  and 
sent  to  the  nearest  convenient  port  for  such  proceedings  against  her, 
and  her  cargo  as  prize,  as  may  be  deemed  advisable.  ” 


28 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Upon  the  issue  of  the  proclamation,  the  Government  im- 
mediately found  itself  confronted  with  the  question  whether 
the  movement  at  the  South  should  be  regarded  as  rebellion 
or  as  war.  From  the  legal  point  of  view  the  acts  of  the 
insurgents  could  be  looked  upon  in  no  other  light  than 
as  armed  insurrection,  “ levying  war  against  the  United 
States,”  and  under  the  constitutional  definition,  the  actors 
were  guilty  of  treason.  But  the  extent  of  the  movement, 
its  well-defined  area,  and,  above  all,  its  complete  govern- 
mental organization,  made  it  impossible  to  put  the  legal 
theory  into  practice  ; and  almost  from  the  beginning  hos- 
tilities were  carried  on  precisely  as  in  a regular  war.  The 
Government,  however,  in  its  dealings  with  foreign  powers 
always  asserted  stoutly  that  the  movement  was  purely  an 
insurrection,  and  that  those  in  arms  against  it  were  rebels, 
and  not  belligerents. 

This  position,  though  it  involved  occasional  inconsist- 
encies, was  maintained  with  considerable  success,  except 
in  relation  to  the  status  of  prisoners,  and  in  those  cases 
where  the  operations  of  the  wrar  affected  foreign  interests. 
The  question  first  arose  in  reference  to  the  blockade. 
Blockade,  in  the  ordinary  sense,  is  purely  an  act  of  war. 
It  means  the  closing  of  an  enemy’s  ports,  and  the  capture 
of  all  vessels,  neutral  or  hostile,  attempting  to  enter  with 
knowledge  of  the  blockade.  It  enables  a belligerent  to 
seize  vessels  on  the  high  seas  bound  for  a blockaded  port. 
It  stands  on  the  same  footing  as  the  right  of  search,  which 
is  exclusively  a war  right ; and  like  the  right  of  search,  it  is 
a benefit  to  the  belligerent,  and  a hardship  to  the  neutral. 

Even  after  the  President’s  proclamation,  which  was  to  all 
intents  a belligerent  declaration,  and  after  the  blockade  had 
been  set  on  foot,  the  Government  still  held  to  its  theory 
that  the  parties  to  the  contest  were  not  belligerents,  and  that 


THE  BLOCKADE. 


29 


rebellion  was  not  in  any  sense  war.  In  bis  report  of  July  4, 
1861,  at  the  special  session  of  Congress,  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  referred  to  the  blockade  in  these  terms : 

“In  carrying  into  effect  these  principles,  and  in  suppressing  the  at- 
tempts to  evade  and  resist  them,  and  in  order  to  maintain  the  Consti- 
tution and  execute  the  laws,  it  became  necessary  to  interdict  commerce 
at  those  ports  where  duties  could  not  be  collected,  the  laws  maintained 
and  executed,  and  where  the  officers  of  the  Government  were  not  toler- 
ated or  permitted  to  exercise  their  functions.  In  performing  this  do- 
mestic municipal  duty,x  the  property  and  interests  of  foreigners  became 
to  some  extent  involved  in  our  home  questions,  and  with  a view  to 
extending  to  them  every  comity  that  the  circumstances  would  justify, 
the  rules  of  blockade  were  adopted,  and,  as  far  as  practicable,  made 
applicable  to  the  cases  that  occurred  under  this  embargo  or  non-inter- 
course of  the  insurgent  States.  The  commanders  of  the  squadron 
were  directed  to  permit  the  vessels  of  foreigners  to  depart  within  fif- 
teen days,  as  in  cases  of  actual  effective  blockade,  and  then  vessels 
were  nob  to  be  seized  unless  they  attempted,  after  having  been  once 
warned  off,  to  enter  an  interdicted  port  in  disregard  of  such  warning.  ” 

In  referring  to  the  blockade  in  these  words,  the  Navy  De- 
partment clearly  had  in  mind  a measure  of  internal  admin- 
istration ; and  this  domestic  application  of  a belligerent  right 
was  excused  on  the  ground  of  a desire  to  extend  every  possi- 
ble comity  to  foreigners.  But  in  putting  forward  this  plea, 
the  Secretary  failed  to  see  that  the  application  of  the  rules 
of  blockade  to  a domestic  embargo,  so  far  from  extending 
comity  to  foreigners,  abridged  their  rights,  and  imposed  on 
them  liabilities  and  penalties  which  no  domestic  embargo  of 
itself  could  produce.  It  was  not  the  foreign  trader,  but  the 
belligerent  cruiser  that  gained  by  the  adoption  of  the  rules 
of  blockade.  A government  has  the  right  to  close  its  own 
ports,  and  to  impose  heavy  penalties  upon  all  who  attempt 


1 The  italics  are  not  in  the  original. 


30 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


to  enter ; but  it  cannot  by  virtue  of  any  such  measure  search 
and  seize  foreign  vessels  on  the  high  seas,  even  though 
bound  for  the  embargoed  port.  To  do  this  it  must  establish 
a blockade.  In  other  words,  it  must  wage  war,  and  the  two 
parties  in  the  contest  must  become  belligerents. 

Although  it  may  have  been  the  intention  of  the  Executive 
in  July  to  regard  the  blockade  as  a domestic  embargo,  it 
soon  gave  up  the  idea  in  practice.  Neutral  vessels  were 
searched  and  captured  at  sea.  Prizes  were  sent  in  for  adju- 
dication, and  condemned  for  breach  of  blockade  and  for 
carrying  contraband,  “in  pursuance  of  the  laws  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Law  of  Nations  in  such  case  provided,”  and 
not  in  pursuance  of  any  law  imposing  civil  forfeitures  or 
penalties  for  violation  of  a domestic  embargo.  The  forms  of 
examination  and  procedure  were  those  of  belligerent  prize- 
courts;  and  the  decisions  expressly  recognized  a state  of 
war,  and  could  be  founded  on  no  other  hypothesis. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  complaint  against  the 
British  Government  of  having  done  an  unfriendly  act  in 
recognizing  the  rebels  as  belligerents,  had  no  very  serious 
foundation.  The  Queen’s  proclamation  of  neutrality,  pub- 
lished on  May  13,  was  a statement  that  hostilities  existed 
between  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and  “ certain 
States  styling  themselves  the  Confederate  States  of  Amer- 
ica,” and  a command  to  British  subjects  to  observe  a strict 
neutrality  between  the  contending  parties.  Its  form  and 
contents  were  those  commonly  found  in  the  declarations  of 
neutrals  at  the  outbreak  of  war.  The  annoyance  it  gave  to 
the  Government  and  the  elation  it  caused  at  the  South  were 
due  to  the  fact  that  it  appeared  somewhat  early  in  the  strug- 
gle, and  that  it  was  the  first  recognition  from  abroad  of  the 
strength  and  organization  of  the  insurgent  Government.  As 
a matter  of  law,  Great  Britain  had  the  right  to  declare  her- 


THE  BLOCKADE. 


31 


self  neutral,  especially  after  the  blockade  was  proclaimed,  as 
blockade  is  a purely  belligerent  act.  Her  offence,  reduced 
to  its  exact  proportions,  consisted  in  taking  the  ground  of 
a neutral  before  the  magnitude  and  force  of  the  insurrec- 
tion were  such  as  to  justify  it.  But  the  hopes  raised  at 
the  South  by  the  proclamation  led  to  the  prevalent  belief 
throughout  the  Union  that  it  was  dictated  by  unfriendly 
motives ; while  the  undisguised  sympathy  for  the  Southern 
cause  shown  by  the  upper  classes  in  England  tended  to 
strengthen  the  impression  and  to  aggravate  the  wound. 

The  inception  of  the  blockade  was  somewhat  irregular. 
Ordinarily  a blockade  may  begin  in  one  of  two  ways ; either 
by  a public  announcement  coupled  with  the  presence  of  a 
force  before  the  blockaded  port ; or  by  stationing  the  force 
without  an  announcement.  The  first  is  a blockade  by  noti- 
fication ; the  second  is  a blockade  in  fact.  As  breach  of 
blockade  only  becomes  an  offence  when  accompanied  by 
knowledge,  actual  or  constructive,  of  the  existence  of  the 
blockade,  it  is  a question  of  some  importance  when  the 
blockade  begins  and  how  knowledge  of  it  is  to  be  ac- 
quired. In  a blockade  by  notification,  knowledge  is  held 
to  have  been  acquired  when  sufficient  time  has  elapsed 
for  the  notice  to  have  been  generally  received ; and  after 
this  time  a neutral  vessel,  by  sailing  for  the  blockaded 
port,  has  committed  an  offence  and  incurred  a penalty. 
With  a blockade  that  is  purely  de  facto , on  the  other  hand, 
knowledge  must  be  obtained  on  the  station,  and  neutrals 
have  a right  to  sail  for  the  port  and  to  be  warned  off  on 
their  arrival. 

Whether  a blockade  is  initiated  as  a blockade  by  notifica- 
tion or  as  a blockade  de  facto , the  indispensable  condition 
of  its  establishment  is  the  presence  of  a force  at  the  block- 
aded port.  Actual  notice  of  the  fact  can  never  precede  the 


32 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


existence  of  the  fact.  The  President’s  two  proclamations 
did  not  therefore  constitute  actual  notice,  because  at  the 
date  of  their  issue  there  was  not  even  a pretence  that  the 
blockade  existed.  Nor  do  they  appear  to  have  been  so  in- 
tended. The  idea  was  rather  to  publish  a manifesto  declar- 
ing in  a general  way  the  intentions  of  the  Government,  and 
then  to  carry  them  out  as  promptly  as  circumstances  would 
permit. 

The  blockade  therefore  began  as  a blockade  de  facto , not 
as  a blockade  by  notification.  During  the  summer  of  1861 
vessels  were  stationed  at  different  points,  one  after  another, 
by  which  the  blockade  at  those  points  was  separately  estab- 
lished. Notices,  of  a more  or  less  informal  character,  were 
given  in  some  cases  by  the  commanding  officer  of  the  block- 
ading force ; but  no  general  practice  was  observed.  When 
Captain  Poor,  in  the  Brooklyn,  took  his  station  off  the  Mis- 
sissippi, he  merely  informed  the  officer  commanding  the 
forts  that  New  Orleans  was  blockaded.  Pendergrast,  the 
commanding  officer  at  Hampton  Roads,  issued  a formal 
document  on  April  30,  calling  attention  to  the  President’s 
proclamation  in  relation  to  Virginia  and  North  Carolina, 
and  giving  notice  that  he  had  a sufficient  force  there  for 
the  purpose  of  carrying  out  the  proclamation.  He  added 
that  vessels  coming  from  a distance,  and  ignorant  of  the 
proclamation,  would  be  warned  off.  But  Pendergrast’s 
announcement,  though  intended  as  a notification,  was 
marked  by  the  same  defects  as  the  proclamation.  The  ac- 
tual blockade  and  the  notice  of  it  must  always  be  commen- 
surate. At  this  time,  there  were  several  vessels  in  Hamp- 
ton Roads,  but  absolutely  no  force  on  the  coast  of  North 
Carolina ; and  the  declaration  was  open  to  the  charge  of 
stating  what  was  not  an  existing  fact. 

The  importance  of  these  early  formalities  arises  from  the 


THE  BLOCKADE. 


33 


fact  that  the  liability  of  neutral  vessels  depends  on  the  ac- 
tual existence  of  the  blockade,  and  upon  their  knowledge 
of  it.  Until  the  establishment  of  the  blockade  is  known, 
actually  or  constructively,  all  vessels  have  a right  to  be 
warned  off.  When  the  fact  has  become  notorious,  the  privi- 
lege of  warning  ceases.  In  the  statement  about  warning, 
therefore,  the  President’s  proclamation  said  either  too  much 
or  too  little.  If  it  was  intended,  as  the  language  might 
seem  to  imply,  that  during  the  continuance  of  the  block- 
ade— which,  as  it  turned  out,  was  the  same  thing  as  dur- 
ing the  continuance  of  the  war — all  neutral  vessels  might 
approach  the  coast  and  receive  individual  warning,  and  that 
only  after  such  warning  would  they  be  liable  to  capture,  it 
conceded  far  more  than  usage  required.  If  it  meant  simply 
that  the  warning  would  be  given  at  each  point  for  such  time 
after  the  force  was  posted  as  would  enable  neutrals  gen- 
erally to  become  aware  of  the  fact,  it  conveyed  its  mean- 
ing imperfectly.  In  practice,  the  second  interpretation  wTas 
adopted,  in  spite  of  the  remonstrances  of  neutrals ; and  the 
warnings  given  in  the  early  days  of  the  blockade  were  grad- 
ually discontinued,  the  concessions  of  the  proclamation  to 
the  contrary  notwithstanding.  The  time  when  warning- 
should  cease  does  not  appear  to  have  been  fixed ; and  in 
one  instance  at  least,  on  the  coast  of  Texas,  it  was  given  as 
late  as  July,  1862.  The  fact  pf  warning  was  commonly  en- 
dorsed on  the  neutral’s  register.  In  some  cases  the  warn- 
ings had  the  same  fault  as  Pendergrast’s  proclamation,  in 
being  a little  too  comprehensive,  and  including  ports  where 
an  adequate  force  had  not  yet  been  stationed.  The  board- 
ing officers  of  the  Niagara,  when  off  Charleston,  in  May, 
warned  vessels  off  the  whole  Southern  coast,  as  being  in  a 
state  of  blockade,  though  no  ship-of-war  had  as  yet  appeared 
off  Savannah ; and  the  Government  paid  a round  sum  to 
I. — 2* 


34 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


their  owners  in  damages  for  the  loss  of  a market,  which  was 
caused  by  the  official  warning. 

The  concession  of  warning  to  neutrals  at  the  port,  if  it 
had  continued  through  the  war,  would  have  rendered  the 
blockade  to  a great  extent  inoperative.  Vessels  would  have 
been  able  to  approach  the  coast  without  risk  of  capture,  and 
to  have  lain  about  the  neighborhood  until  a good  oppor- 
tunity offered  for  running  past  the  squadron.  In  other 
words,  the  first  risk  of  the  blockade-runner  would  have  been 
a risk  of  warning,  instead  of  a risk  of  capture;  and  the 
chances  in  his  favor  would  have  been  materially  increased. 
The  courts,  as  well  as  the  cruisers,  disregarded  the  procla- 
mation as  soon  as  the  blockade  was  fairly  established,  and 
held,  in  accordance  with  English  and  American  precedents, 
that  warning  was  unnecessary  where  actual  knowledge  could 
be  proved. 

It  is  probable  that  when  the  blockade  was  proclaimed  it 
was  thought  that  the  measure  could  be  adequately  carried 
out  by  stationing  a small  squadron  at  the  principal  com- 
mercial ports,  supplemented  by  a force  of  vessels  cruising 
up  and  down  the  coast.  The  number  of  points  to  be  covered 
would  thus  be  reduced  to  four  or  five  on  the  Atlantic  and  as 
many  more  on  the  Gulf.  Had  this  expectation  been  real- 
ized, the  blockade  would  have  been  by  no  means  the  stupen- 
dous undertaking  that  it  seemed  to  observers  abroad.  Act- 
ing upon  such  a belief,  the  Government  entered  upon  its 
task  with  confidence  and  proceeded  with  despatch.  The 
Niagara,  wffiich  had  returned  from  Japan  on  April  24,  was 
sent  to  cruise  off  Charleston.  The  Brooklyn  and  Pow- 
hatan moved  westward  along  the  Gulf.  Before  the  1st  of 
May,  seven  steamers  of  considerable  size  had  been  chartered 
in  New  York  and  Philadelphia.  One  of  these,  the  Keystone 
State,  chartered  by  Lieutenant  Woodhull,  and  intended  es- 


THE  BLOCKADE. 


35 


pecially  for  use  at  Norfolk,  was  at  her  station  in  Hampton 
Roads  in  forty-eiglit  hours  after  Woodhull  had  received  his 
orders  in  Washington  to  secure  a vessel.  The  screw-steamer 
South  Carolina,  of  eleven  hundred  and  sixty -five  tons,  pur- 
chased in  Boston  on  May  3,  arrived  off  Pensacola  on  June 
4 ; and  the  Massachusetts,  a similar  vessel  in  all  respects, 
and  bought  at  the  same  time,  was  equally  prompt  in  reach- 
ing Key  West. 

Notwithstanding  these  efforts,  the  blockade  can  hardly  be 
said  to  have  been  in  existence  until  six  weeks  after  it  was 
declared,  and  then  only  at  the  principal  points.  When  the 
Niagara  arrived  off  Charleston  on  the  lltli  of  May,  she  re- 
mained only  four  days ; and  except  for  the  fact  that  the  Har- 
riet Lane  was  off  the  bar  on  the  19th,  there  was  no  blockade 
whatever  at  that  point  for  a fortnight  afterward.  The  Brit- 
ish Government  called  attention  to  this  fact,  and  suggested 
that  a new  blockade  required  a new  notification,  with  the 
usual  allowance  of  time  for  the  departure  of  vessels;  bub 
the  State  Department  did  not  regard  the  blockade  as  having 
been  interrupted.  Savannah  was  blockaded  on  the  28tli  of 
May.  In  the  Gulf,  Mobile  and  New  Orleans  received  notice 
on  the  26th  from  the  Powhatan  and  the  Brooklyn  ; and  a 
month  later  the  South  Carolina  was  at  Galveston.  At  the 
principal  points,  therefore,  there  was  no  blockade  at  all 
during  the  first  month,  and  after  that  time  the  chain  of  in- 
vestment was  far  from  being  complete.  Indeed  it  could 
hardly  be  called  a chain  at  all,  when  so  many  links  w^ere 
wanting.  Even  Wilmington,  which  later  became  the  most 
important  point  on  the  coast  in  the  operations  of  the  block- 
ade-runners, was  still  open,  and  the  intermediate  points 
w’ere  not  under  any  effective  observation. 

As  liability  for  breach  of  blockade  begins  with  the  mere 
act  of  sailing  for  the  blockaded  port,  the  distance  of  this 


36 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


port  from  the  point  of  departure  becomes  an  important  con- 
sideration to  the  blockade-runner.  The  longer  the  distance 
to  be  traversed  the  greater  the  risk ; and  some  method  of 
breaking  the  voyage  must  be  devised,  so  that  as  much  of  it 
as  possible  may  be  technically  innocent.  The  principal 
trade  of  the  South  during  the  war  was  with  England ; and 
it  became  an  object  to  evade  liability  during  the  long  trans- 
atlantic passage.  For  this  purpose,  all  the  available  neutral 
ports  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  coast  were  made  entrepots 
for  covering  the  illegal  traffic. 

There  were  four  principal  points  which  served  as  inter- 
mediaries for  the  neutral  trade  with  the  South ; Bermuda, 
Nassau,  Havana,  and  Matamoras.  Of  these  Nassau  was  the 
most  prominent.  Situated  on  the  island  of  New  Providence 
in  the  Bahamas,  it  is  only  about  one  hundred  and  eighty 
miles  in  a straight  line  from  the  coast  of  Florida.  Florida, 
however,  was  not  the  objective  point  of  the  leading  blockade- 
runners.  It  had  neither  suitable  harbors  nor  connections 
with  the  interior.  The  chief  seats  of  commerce  on  the 
Eastern  coast  were  Savannah,  Charleston,  and  Wilmington. 
The  run  to  these  points  from  Nassau  was  from  five  hundred 
to  six  hundred  miles,  or  three  days,  allowing  for  the  usual 
delays  of  the  passage.  For  such  trips,  small  quantities  of 
coal  were  needed,  which  gave  great  room  for  stowage  of 
cargo.  There  was  no  great  depth  of  water  at  Nassau,  which 
was  an  advantage  to  the  blockade-runners  ; and  the  cruisers 
generally  took  their  station  off  Abaco  Light,  fifty  miles 
away.  New  Providence  was  surrounded  by  numbers  of 
small  islands,  over  whose  waters,  within  a league  of  the 
shore,  the  sovereignty  of  a great  power  threw  a protection 
as  complete  and  as  effective  as  that  of  guns  and  fortifica- 
tions. A vessel  bound  to  Nassau  from  one  of  the  blockaded 
ports  must  have  been  hard-pressed  indeed  if  she  could  not 


The  Blockaded  Coast. 


THE  BLOCKADE. 


37 


find  a refuge.  The  navigation  among  the  islands  was  dan- 
gerous and  difficult,  the  channels  were  intricate,  and  reefs 
and  shoals  abounded ; but  skilful  pilots  were  always  at  the 
command  of  the  blockade-runners. 

Nassau  was  a place  of  no  special  importance  before  the 
war.  Its  inhabitants  lived  chiefly  by  fishing  and  wrecking. 
But  with  the  demands  of  the  moment,  it  suddenly  became  a 
commercial  emporium.  Its  harbor  was  crowded  with  ship- 
ping. Its  wharves  were  covered  with  cotton-bales  awaiting 
transportation  to  Europe,  and  with  merchandise  ready  to  be 
shipped  for  the  blockaded  country.  Confederate  agents 
were  established  here,  and  took  charge  of  the  interests  of 
their  Government  in  connection  with  the  contraband  trade. 
Money  quickly  earned  was  freely  spent,  and  the  war,  at  least 
while  it  lasted,  enriched  the  community. 

Bermuda  shared,  though  in  a less  degree,  the  profits  of 
the  blockade-running  traffic.  Its  connection  was  closest 
with  Wilmington,  which  was  six  hundred  and  seventy-four 
miles  distant,  and  which  was  the  favorite  port  of  the  block- 
ade-runners, especially  in  the  last  year  of  the  war.  In  the 
Gulf,  Havana  had  a similar  importance.  The  run  to  the 
coast  of  Florida  was  only  a little  over  one  hundred  miles. 
But  Key  West  was  inconveniently  near,  the  Gulf  blockade 
was  strict,  and  after  New  Orleans  was  captured,  the  trade 
offered  no  such  inducements  as  that  on  the  Atlantic  coast. 
Nevertheless  it  is  stated  by  Admiral  Bailey,  on  the  authority 
of  intercepted  correspondence  of  the  enemy,  that  between 
April  1 and  July  6,  1863,  fifty  vessels  left  Havana  to  run  the 
blockade. 

The  situation  of  Matamoras  was  somewhat  peculiar.  It 
was  the  only  town  of  any  importance  on  the  single  foreign 
frontier  of  the  Confederacy.  Situated  opposite  the  Texan 
town  of  Brownsville,  on  the  Bio  Grande,  about  forty  miles 


38 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


from  its  mouth,  and  in  neutral  territory,  it  offered  peculiar 
advantages  for  contraband  trade.  The  Rio  Grande  could 
not  be  blockaded.  Cargoes  shipped  for  Matamoras  were 
transferred  to  lighters  at  the  mouth  of  the  river.  On  their 
arrival  at  Matamoras  they  were  readily  transported  to  the 
insurgent  territory.  Accordingly,  in  1862,  the  place  became 
the  seat  of  a flourishing  trade.  The  sudden  growth  of  the 
city  was  a notorious  fact,  as  was  also  the  cause  that  led  to  it. 
Yet  the  Government  was  unable  to  put  a stop  to  the  traffic, 
unless  evidence  could  be  brought  to  show  that  the  cargoes 
were  really  destined  for  the  enemy.  Several  vessels  bound 
for  Matamoras  were  captured  and  sent  in,  but  in  most  of  the 
cases  the  prize  court  decreed  restitution,  on  the  ground  that 
a neutral  port  could  not  be  blockaded,  and  therefore  there 
could  be  no  breach  of  blockade  in  sailing  for  it.  Even  in 
the  case  of  the  Peterhoff,  which  was  captured  near  St. 
Thomas  under  suspicious  circumstances,  and  whose  papers 
showed  Matamoras  as  her  destination,  only  the  contraband 
part  of  the  cargo  was  condemned. 

When  the  advantage  of  a neutral  destination  was  fully  un- 
derstood, it  became  the  practice  for  all  the  blockade-runners 
out  of  European  ports  to  clear  for  one  or  the  other  of  these 
points,  and  upon  their  arrival  to  wait  for  a favorable  oppor- 
tunity to  run  over  to  their  real  destination.  Nobody  could 
be  deceived  by  this  pretence  of  an  innocent  voyage  ; and  the 
courts,  looking  only  at  the  final  destination,  condemned  the 
vessels  when  there  was  evidence  of  an  ultimate  intention  to 
break  the  blockade.  This  decision  rested  upon  an  old  prin- 
ciple of  the  English  prize-courts,  known  as  the  doctrine  of 
continuous  voyages,  according  to  which  the  mere  touching 
at  an  intermediate  port  of  a vessel  engaged  in  an  illegal 
voyage  could  not  break  the  continuity  of  the  voyage  or 
remove  the  taint  of  illegality.  Hence,  if  a vessel  cleared 


THE  BLOCKADE. 


39 


from  Liverpool  with  the  intention  of  merely  touching  at 
Nassau,  and  then  proceeding  to  Charleston,  and  if  this  inten- 
tion could  be  proved  from  the  papers,  the  character  of  the 
cargo,  and  the  examination  of  persons  on  board,  the  two 
voyages  were  held  to  be  one,  and  condemnation  followed. 

In  order  to  meet  the  new  difficulty,  a new  device  was 
adopted.  Cargoes  were  sent  out  to  Nassau,  and  were  there 
transshipped,  sometimes  directly,  from  vessel  to  vessel,  in  the 
harbor,  sometimes  after  being  landed  on  the  wharf ; and 
thence  were  transported  in  a new  conveyance  to  the  block- 
aded port.  Return  cargoes  were  transshipped  in  the  same 
way.  This  had  a double  advantage.  It  made  the  continuity 
of  the  transaction  much  more  difficult  of  proof,  and  it 
enabled  the  capitalists  engaged  in  the  trade  to  employ  two 
different  classes  of  vessels,  for  the  service  for  which  each  was 
specially  adapted.  For  the  long  voyages  across  the  Atlantic 
heavy  freighters  could  be  used,  of  great  capacity  and  stoutly 
built ; and  the  light,  swift,  hardly  visible  steamers,  with  low 
hulls,  and  twin-screws  or  feathering  paddles,  the  typical 
blockade-runners,  could  be  employed  exclusively  for  the 
three  days’  run  on  the  other  side  of  Nassau  or  Bermuda. 
But  here  again  the  courts  stepped  in,  and  held  that  though 
a transshipment  was  made,  even  after  landing  the  cargo  and 
going  through  a form  of  sale,  the  two  voyages  were  parts  of 
one  and  the  same  transaction,  and  the  cargo  from  the  outset 
was  liable  to  condemnation,  if  the  original  intention  had 
been  to  forward  the  goods  to  a blockaded  port.  Nor  did 
the  decisions  stop  here.  As  all  the  property,  both  ship  and 
cargo,  is  confiscated  upon  proof  of  breach  of  blockade,  it 
was  held  that  the  ships  carrying  on  this  traffic  to  neutral 
ports  were  confiscable,  provided  the  ultimate  destination  of 
the  cargo  to  a blockaded  port  was  known  to  the  owner.  In 
the  words  of  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court,  44  The 


40 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


sliips  are  planks  of  the  same  bridge,  all  of  the  same  kind, 
and  necessary  for  the  convenient  passage  of  persons  and 
property  from  one  end  to  the  other.” 

The  adoption  of  this  rule  by  the  highest  courts  in  the 
United  States  raised  a loud  outcry  on  the  part  of  those  in- 
teres  ed  in  the  traffic,  and  was  severely  criticised  by  publi- 
cists abroad,  especially  by  those  who  favored,  in  general,  the 
continental  view  of  the  laws  of  war.  The  United  States 
were  accused  of  sacrificing  the  rights  of  neutrals,  which  they 
had  hitherto  upheld,  to  the  interests  of  belligerents,  and  of 
disregarding  great  principles  for  the  sake  of  a momentary 
advantage.  In  truth,  however,  the  principle  adopted  by  the 
court  was  not  a new  one,  though  a novel  application  was 
made  of  it  to  meet  a novel  combination  of  circumstances. 
It  had  formerly  been  applied  to  cases  where  neutrals,  en- 
gaged in  illegal  trade  between  two  ports  of  a belligerent, 
had  endeavored  to  screen  the  illegality  of  the  voyage  by  the 
interposition  of  a neutral  port,  with  or  without  the  landing 
of  goods  and  the  employment  of  a new  conveyance.  In 
these  cases  Lord  Stowell  held  that  the  continuity  of  the 
voyage  was  not  broken,  unless  the  cargo  was  really  imported 
into  the  common  stock  of  the  neutral  country.  That  the 
principle  had  not  been  applied  to  blockades  was  due  to  the 
fact  that  circumstances  had  never  called  for  it,  as  the  prac- 
tice of  breaking  a blockade  had  never  before  been  carried 
out  on  such  a scale,  with  such  perfect  appliances,  and  by 
the  use  of  such  ingenious  devices.  The  really  difficult  ques- 
tion before  the  court  was  as  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  evi- 
dence in  each  case.  It  was  to  be  expected  that  every  arti- 
fice in  the  nature  of  simulated  papers,  pretended  ownership, 
false  destination,  and  fictitious  transfers  would  be  adopted 
to  escape  liability  ; and  it  was  the  business  of  the  court  to 
penetrate  all  these  disguises,  and  to  ascertain  the  real  char- 


THE  BLOCKADE. 


41 


acter  of  each  transaction.  It  is  probable  that  in  no  case 
was  injustice  done  in  brushing  aside  and  disregarding  the 
various  ceremonies,  more  or  less  elaborate  and  artificial, 
that  were  performed  over  blockade-running  cargoes  at  Nas- 
sau and  Bermuda ; and  it  must  often  have  happened  that 
the  ingenuity  of  shippers  was  rewarded  by  a decree  of  resti- 
tution for  the  want  of  technical  evidence,  when  there  was 
no  moral  doubt  as  to  the  vessel’s  guilt. 

As  a last  resort,  the  blockade-running  merchants  adopted 
an  expedient  so  original  and  so  bold  that  it  may  almost  be 
said  to  have  merited  success.  As  cargoes  from  Liverpool  to 
Nassau  ran  a risk  of  capture,  the  voyage  was  broken  again, 
this  time  not  by  a neutral  destination,  but  by  one  in  the 
country  of  the  very  belligerent  whom  the  trade  was  to  injure. 
Goods  were  shipped  to  New  York  by  the  regular  steamship 
lines,  to  be  carried  thence  to  Nassau,  and  so  to  find  their 
way  to  the  blockaded  territory.  It  wTas  supposed  that  the 
United  States  would  not  interfere  with  commerce  between 
its  own  ports  and  those  of  a neutral.  This  expectation, 
however,  was  not  well-founded.  The  Government  of  the 
United  States,  although  federal  in  its  organization,  wTas  not 
so  impotent  in  regard  to  the  regulation  of  trade  as  was  that 
of  Great  Britain  in  enforcing  the  neutrality  of  its  subjects  ; 
and  if  action  could  not  betaken  through  the  Courts,  it  could 
be  taken  through  the  custom-houses.  As  soon  as  it  was  dis- 
covered at  New  York  that  the  trade  with  Nassau  and  Ber- 
muda was  assuming  large  proportions,  instructions  were 
issued  to  collectors  of  customs  in  the  United  States  to  re- 
fuse clearances  to  vessels  which,  whatever  their  ostensible 
destination,  were  believed  to  be  intended  for  Southern 
ports,  or  whose  cargoes  were  in  imminent  danger  of  fall- 
ing into  the  hands  of  the  enemy ; and  if  there  was  merely 
ground  for  apprehension  that  cargoes  were  destined  for 


42 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


tlie  enemy’s  use,  the  owners  were  required  to  give  ample 
security. 

The  instructions  were  perfectly  general  in  character,  nam- 
ing no  particular  port  or  country.  The  agents  of  the  block- 
ade-runners, however,  styling  themselves  merchants  of  Nas- 
sau, adopted  a tone  of  righteous  indignation,  and  actually 
had  the  effrontery  to  complain  of  this  “ unjust  discrimina- 
tion ” against  what  they  ingenuously  called  the  trade  of  the 
Bahamas.  As  if,  indeed,  the  Bahamas  had  had  any  trade, 
or  Nassau  any  merchants,  before  the  days  of  blockade-run- 
ning! They  succeeded,  however,  in  persuading  Earl  Rus- 
sell to  take  up  the  diplomatic  cudgels  in  their  behalf ; but 
from  the  long  correspondence  that  followed,  the  English 
Government,  being  clearly  in  the  wrong,  derived  little  satis- 
faction, and  a stop  was  put  to  the  traffic. 

The  character  of  the  blockade  changed  materially  as  the 
war  went  on.  At  first  the  prevailing  idea  seems  to  have 
been  that  its  object  was  to  put  a stop  to  legitimate  trade, 
and  that  this  object  was  secured  by  the  official  declaration. 
The  squadrons  seem  to  have  been  employed  rather  to  com- 
ply with  the  requirements  of  international  law,  and  to  make 
the  prohibition  binding  upon  neutrals,  than  as  being  them- 
selves the  agency  by  which  the  prohibition  was  to  be  en- 
forced, and  without  which  it  was  only  so  much  waste  paper. 
This  idea  had  some  foundation  in  view  of  the  fact  that  from 
the  beginning,  though  the  blockading  force  was  then  incon- 
siderable, the  regular  course  of  trade  at  the  Southern  ports 
was  actually  interrupted,  neutrals  for  a time  respecting  the 
proclamation,  or  being  satisfied  to  receive  their  warning 
and  to  go  elsewhere.  In  place  of  the  regular  commerce, 
however,  a contraband  trade  grew  up,  little  by  little,  which, 
beginning  with  any  materials  that  came  to  hand,  and  carried 
on  chiefly  by  people  along  the  coast,  gradually  grew  to  con- 


THE  BLOCKADE. 


43 


siderable  proportions.  Then,  and  then  only,  was  the  true 
character  of  the  blockade  recognized,  and  measures  were 
taken,  by  increasing  the  force  and  by  perfecting  its  organ- 
ization, to  make  the  watch  so  close  as  really  to  prevent  egress 
and  ingress.  But  by  this  time  the  capital  embarked  in  the 
business  was  so  large  as  to  secure  the  construction  of  ves- 
sels built  especially  for  the  purpose,  beautifully  adapted  to 
the  work,  and  far  more  difficult  to  capture.  Therefore,  while 
the  efforts  of  the  blockaders  were  redoubled,  the  difficulties 
before  them  wTere  vastly  increased.  The  old  traditional 
idea  of  a blockade,  maintained  by  a few  large  vessels  mov- 
ing up  and  down  before  a port,  at  a distance,  gave  place  to 
the  entirely  novel  practice  of  anchoring  a large  number  of 
small  and  handy  steamers  in  an  exposed  position  close  to 
the  bar  at  the  entrance  of  the  blockaded  harbors ; and  the 
boldness  with  which,  after  the  first  six  months,  men  kept 
their  vessels  close  in  with  the  shore  and  manfully  rode  out 
the  gales  at  their  anchors — a thing  which  seafaring  men,  as 
a rule,  had  regarded  as  impossible,  and  which  would  have 
appalled  the  stoutest  captains  of  former  times — showed  as 
clearly  as  the  actual  engagements  the  real  stuff  of  which  the 
navy  was  made. 

As  to  the  legal  efficiency  of  the  blockade  after  the  first 
six  months,  there  can  be  no  question ; and  by  the  end  of  the 
second  year  its  stringency  wTas  such  that  only  specially- 
adapted  vessels  could  safely  attempt  to  run  it.  If  proof  of 
its  efficiency  was  needed,  it  could  be  found  in  the  increased 
price  of  cotton  and  in  the  scarcity  of  manufactured  goods 
at  the  South.  In  the  last  year  it  became  as  nearly  perfect 
as  such  an  operation  can  be  made.  Taking  its  latest  devel- 
opment as  a type,  it  is  probable  that  no  blockade  has  ever 
been  maintained  more  effectually  by  any  State ; and  it  is 
certain  that  no  State  ever  had  such  a blockade  to  maintain. 


44  the  blockade  and  the  cruisers. 

Apart  from  its  enormous  extent,  it  had  four  characteristics 
which  mark  it  as  wholly  unprecedented:  in  the  peculiar 
formation  of  the  shore,  which  gave  almost  a double  coast- 
line throughout,  penetrated  by  numerous  inlets,  giving  ac- 
cess to  a complicated  network  of  channels ; in  the  vicinity  of 
neutral  ports  friendly  to  the  blockade-runners ; in  the  cot- 
ton-monopoly of  the  South,  which  made  the  blockade  a 
source  of  irritation  to  neutrals ; and  finally,  but  the  most 
important  consideration  of  all,  in  the  introduction  of  block- 
ade-running vessels  propelled  by  steam. 

The  success  of  this  undertaking,  so  unprecedented  both 
in  its  magnitude  and  difficulty,  can  best  be  judged  by  the 
results.  The  number  of  prizes  brought  in  during  the  war 
was  1,149,  of  which  210  were  steamers.  There  were  also 
355  vessels  burned,  sunk,  driven  on  shore,  or  otherwise  de- 
stroyed, of  which  85  were  steamers ; making  a total  of  1,504 
vessels  of  all  classes.  The  value  of  these  vessels  and  their 
cargoes,  according  to  a low  estimate,  was  thirty- one  millions 
of  dollars.  In  the  War  of  1812,  which  has  always,  and 
justly,  been  regarded  as  a successful  naval  war,  the  num- 
ber of  captures  was  1,719.  But  the  War  of  1812  was  waged 
against  a commercial  nation,  and  the  number  of  vessels 
open  to  capture  was  therefore  far  greater.  Of  the  prop- 
erty afloat,  destroyed  or  captured  during  the  Civil  War,  the 
larger  part  suffered  in  consequence  of  the  blockade.  More- 
over, in  the  earlier  war,  out  of  the  whole  number  of  captures, 
1,428  were  made  by  privateers,  which  were  fitted  out  chiefly 
as  a commercial  adventure.  In  the  Civil  War  the  work 
was  done  wholly  by  the  navy ; and  it  was  done  in  the  face 
of  obstacles  of  which  naval  warfare  before  that  time  had 
presented  no  example  or  conception. 

As  a military  measure,  the  blockade  was  of  vital  impor- 
tance in  the  operations  of  the  war ; and  it  has  been  com- 


THE  BLOCKADE. 


45 


monly  said  that  without  it  hostilities  would  have  been  pro- 
tracted much  longer,  and  would  have  been  far  more  bitter 
and  bloody  than  they  were.  Its  peculiar  importance  lay  in 
the  isolation  of  the  Southern  States  and  in  their  dependence 
upon  the  outside  world  for  the  necessaries  of  life.  The 
only  neutral  frontier  was  along  the  Rio  Grande ; and  the 
country,  for  many  miles  on  both  sides  of  the  boundary* 
offered  few  facilities  for  trade  or  transportation.  All  sup- 
plies must  come  from  the  seaboard;  and  the  purely  ag- 
ricultural character  of  Southern  industry  made  supplies 
from  abroad  a necessity.  Had  the  position  of  the  two  op- 
ponents been  reversed,  and  an  efficient  blockade  main- 
tained against  the  Northern  ports,  it  would  have  told  with 
far  less  severity  than  at  the  South. 

Besides  the  exclusion  of  manufactured  goods,  and  espe- 
cially of  munitions  of  war,  which  was  one  of  the  prime  ob- 
jects of  the  blockade,  its  second  and  equally  important 
object  was  to  prevent  the  exportation  of  cotton,  with  which 
at  this  time  the  Southern  States  supplied  the  world.  The 
amount  of  floating  capital  at  the  South  was  never  large ; 
land  and  slaves  were  the  favorite  forms  of  investment ; 
and  the  sale  of  cotton  was  therefore  the  main  source  of  in- 
come. When  exportation  was  cut  off,  the  Government  was 
deprived  of  its  revenues  for  the  war,  and  the  people  of  the 
very  means  of  existence.  It  was  the  common  impression 
at  the  South  that  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  especially  Eng- 
land, had  too  great  an  interest  in  the  cotton  supply  to  tol- 
erate a prohibition  on  exportation ; and  it  was  believed, 
or  at  least  hoped,  that  the  blockade  would  prove  a fatal 
measure  for  its  originators,  by  the  injury  it  would  work 
abroad.  The  injury  was  not  over-estimated ; and  it  doubt- 
less had  its  effect  upon  the  sympathies  of  the  interested 
foreign  state.  Lancashire,  the  great  centre  of  the  cotton 


46 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


manufacture,  was  compelled  to  close  its  mills ; and  the 
distress  that  resulted  among  the  operatives  may  be  esti- 
mated by  the  fact  that,  two  years  after  the  war  had  begun, 
no  less  than  ten  millions  of  dollars  had  been  disbursed  by 
the  Relief  Committees.  But  the  British  Government,  what- 
ever may  have  been  its  disposition,  had  at  no  time  a plausible 
pretext  for  intervention  ; and  the  blockade  continued  to  be 
enforced  with  increased  rigor. 

As  the  war  went  on,  the  naval  forces,  securing  the  co- 
operation of  small  bodies  of  troops,  gradually  obtained 
a foothold  at  various  points  and  converted  the  blockade  into 
a military  occupation.  These  points  then  became  the  head- 
quarters of  the  different  squadrons — ports  for  rendezvous, 
refitment,  and  supply,  for  the  “repairs  and  coal”  that  were 
forever  drawing  away  the  blockaders  from  their  stations  at 
critical  moments.  By  the  spring  of  1862  all  the  squadrons 
were  well  provided  in  this  respect,  though  some  of  the  cen- 
tres of  occupation  were  occasionally  recovered  by  the  enemy. 
Especially  on  the  coast  of  Texas,  blockade  and  occupation 
alternated  at  the  different  Passes  throughout  the  war,  partly 
in  consequence  of  the  want  of  troops  to  hold  the  occupied 
points.  Curiously  enough,  too,  these  centres  of  occupation 
became  in  a small  way  centres  of  blockade-running— Nassaus 
and  Bermudas  on  a diminutive  scale.  Norfolk,  Beaufort 
in  North  Carolina,  Hilton  Head  with  its  sutler’s  shops,  Pen- 
sacola, and  New  Orleans  each  carried  on  a trade,  prosperous 
as  far  as  it  went,  with  the  surrounding  coast.  At  New 
Orleans,  the  blockade  of  Lake  Ponchartrain  was  kept  up 
long  after  the  city  was  taken,  not  to  prevent  access  to  the 
port,  but  to  capture  the  illicit  traders  that  cleared  from  it ; 
and  Farragut  was  obliged  to  remonstrate  sharply  with  the 
Collector  for  the  readiness  with  which  papers  covering  the 
trade  were  issued  by  the  custom-house. 


CHAPTER  m. 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 

The  blockade  began,  both  in  name  and  in  fact,  at  Hampton 
Roads,  and  here  it  continued  to  be  maintained  with  the  high- 
est efficiency.  The  only  attempt  to  raise  it  was  that  made 
by  the  Merrimac  in  March,  1862  ; and  after  this  attempt  was 
defeated,  the  blockading  squadron  remained  in  undisturbed 
possession  until  the  close  of  the  war.  The  safe  and  commo- 
dious anchorage  in  the  Roads,  its  nearness  to  Washington, 
and  the  protection  afforded  by  Fortress  Monroe  made  it  a 
convenient  naval  rendezvous  ; and  for  this  reason  it  seems  to 
have  been  adopted  as  the  station  for  the  flag-ship  of  the 
North  Atlantic  squadron.  Its  importance  as  a blockading 
station,  especially  in  the  early  part  of  the  war,  was  due  to 
the  fact  that  it  commanded  the  entrance  to  the  James  and 
Elizabeth  Rivers,  upon  one  of  which  lay  the  Confederate 
capital,  and  upon  the  other  their  principal  naval  depot. 
The  events  of  the  first  year,  however,  which  took  place  in 
and  about  the  Roads,  had  little  to  do  with  the  outside  block- 
ade, and  properly  form  an  episode  by  themselves,  which  has 
its  beginning  and  end  in  the  loss  and  the  recovery  of  Nor- 
folk. 

The  loss  of  the  Norfolk  Yard  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
has  been  already  alluded  to.  This  Yard  had  always  been 
extensively  used  as  a depot  for  arms  and  munitions  of  all 
kinds ; and  in  the  spring  of  1861  it  contained  a very  large 


48 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


supply.  The  ordinary  work  was  going  on  actively  ; and  there 
was  nothing  to  be  seen  on  the  spot  to  indicate  that  a crisis 
was  at  hand.  The  vessels  at  the  Yard  comprised  an  old  sliip- 
of-the-line,  the  Pennsylvania,  which  was  used  as  a receiving 
ship ; five  large  sailing-vessels,  laid  up  in  ordinary ; the  sail- 
ing-sloops Germantown  and  Plymouth  ; and  the  brig  Dolphin. 
The  last  three  were  ready  for  sea.  The  steam-frigate  Merri- 
mac,  whose  importance  was  greater  than  that  of  all  the  others 
combined,  was  undergoing  repairs  in  her  machinery. 

The  Navy  Yard  was  situated  on  the  left  bank  of  Elizabeth 
River,  nearly  opposite  the  town  of  Norfolk,  and  nine 
miles  above  Sewall’s  Point,  where  the  narrow  channel  that 
forms  a continuation  of  the  river  enters  the  Roads.  There 
were  only  a few  seamen  and  marines  to  hold  it,  the  commu- 
nity outside  was  unfriendly,  and  the  employees  were  only 
waiting  for  the  action  of  the  State  to  range  themselves 
against  the  Government.  The  majority  of  the  officers  were 
Southern  men,  and  were  in  sympathy  with  the  Southern 
cause.  Late  in  March,  the  Cumberland,  the  flagship  of  the 
Home  Squadron,  came  in  from  the  Gulf  and  was  sent  to 
Norfolk.  She  had  a crew  of  300  men,  and  a heavy  battery, 
and  the  towns  on  both  sides  of  the  river  were  at  her  mercy, 
if  she  chose  to  attack  them.  As  a sailing  sloop-of-war,  she 
could  not  be  of  material  assistance  in  bringing  off  the  threat- 
ened vessels ; but  she  held  the  key  to  the  position. 

The  State  convention  of  Virginia  had  been  in  session  since 
the  middle  of  February,  but  nothing  had  yet  been  done  which 
indicated  its  final  action.  The  secret  session,  at  which  the 
ultimate  question  was  to  be  decided,  began  on  the  16th  of 
April.  Up  to  the  critical  moment  the  idea  had  prevailed  in 
Washington  that  any  action  tending  to  show  a want  of  con- 
fidence in  public  sentiment  in  Virginia  would  crystallize  the 
opposition  to  the  Union,  and  drive  the  State  into  secession. 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


49 


This  idea,  had  found  expression  in  the  instructions  issued  to 
the  Gommandant  of  the  Yard,  Commodore  McCauley,  who 
was  repeatedly  warned  to  take  no  stejos  that  would  give  rise 
to  suspicion  of  hostile  intention.  On  the  lOth  of  April,  as 
affairs  grew  more  threatening,  the  Commandant  was  ordered 
to  put  the  shipping  and  public  property  in  a condition  to  be 
moved  out  of  danger  ; but  at  the  same  time  he  was  cautioned 
not  to  give  needless  alarm.  Two  days  later,  orders  were 
given  for  the  Merrimac  to  be  prepared  with  the  utmost  de- 
spatch to  proceed  to  Philadelphia ; and  as  it  wTas  stated  that 
the  necessary  repairs  to  the  engine  wTould  take  four  weeks, 
the  Engineer-in-Chief  of  the  Navy  was  sent  down  in  person 
to  forward  matters.  He  was  the  bearer  of  a letter  from  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  Gommodore  McCauley,  which  con- 
tained these  words : 

44  The  Department  desires  to  have  the  Merrimac  removed  from  the 
Norfolk  to  the  Philadelphia  Navy  Yard  with  the  utmost  despatch.  The 
Engine er-in- Chief,  Mr.  B.  F.  Isherwood,  has  been  ordered  to  report  to 
you  for  the  purpose  of  expediting  the  duty,  and  you  will  have  his  sug- 
gestions for  that  end  carried  promptly  into  effect.’” 

On  the  afternoon  of  Wednesday,  the  17th,  it  was  reported 
by  Isherwood,  the  Engineer-in-Chief,  that  the  Merrimac  was 
ready  for  steam ; and  fires  were  started  the  next  morning  at 
daybreak.  Everything  was  in  readiness  to  proceed  to  sea, 
and  officers  and  men  were  detailed  for  the  vessels  that  were 
to  go  out.  But  the  Commodore,  still  influenced  by  the  de- 
sire to  allay  suspicion,  and  by  the  assertions  of  some  of  his 
officers  that  if  the  Merrimac  were  removed  Virginia  would 
certainly  go  out  of  the  Union,  could  not  bring  himself  to 
take  decided  action,  notwithstanding  the  explicit  instructions 
of  the  Department ; and  at  two  in  the  afternoon,  he  ordered 
the  fires  to  be  hauled.  Meantime  the  enemy  were  taking 
I. — 3 


Hampton  Reads. 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


51 


advantage  of  every  hour  of  delay.  Troops  were  thrown  into 
Norfolk  in  considerable  numbers,  and  batteries  were  erected 
opposite  the  Yard.  Light-ships  had  already  been  sunk  in  the 
narrow  channel  off  Sewall’s  Point,  and  other  obstructions 
were  put  in  position  on  the  subsequent  night.  McCauley 
sent  a message  to  the  Commanding  General,  Taliaferro,  to 
the  effect  that  if  he  continued  to  throw  up  works  in  a threat- 
ening position,  the  Commodore  would  regard  it  as  an  act  of 
war,  and  fire  upon  them.  In  reply,  General  Taliaferro  dis- 
claimed any  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  the  batteries  ; and 
McCauley  was  obliged  to  rest  satisfied  with  this  answer. 
Lieutenant  Selfridge  of  the  Cumberland  volunteered  to  take 
the  Dolphin  down  to  Craney  Island,  and  prevent  any  further 
obstructing  of  the  river ; but  the  Commodore,  though  at  first 
consenting,  finally  refused  to  give  him  permission. 

On  Friday,  the  19th,  Commodore  McCauley  resolved  to 
destroy  the  principal  vessels.  It  is  hard  to  say  why  he  ar- 
rived at  this  conclusion,  the  Merrimac’s  engine  having  been 
reported  ready  and  her  fires  lighted  the  day  before.  The 
time  for  heeding  the  sensitiveness  of  the  population  was  now 
past ; and,  in  this  respect,  it  made  little  difference  whether 
the  other  ships  were  sunk  and  the  Cumberland  went  out 
alone,  or  whether  they  all  left  the  place  together.  Nothing, 
however,  was  done  during  the  day.  On  Friday  night  the 
guns  in  the  parks  were  spiked — an  injury  which  could 
be  repaired  in  a few  hours.  At  the  same  time,  a quan- 
tity of  ordnance  stores  was  put  on  board  the  Cumberland. 
On  the  next  day,  the  Southern  officers  on  duty  at  the  Yard 
resigned  or  deserted ; the  destruction  or  removal  of  the  prop- 
erty was  continued  ; and  finally,  the  four  ships  were  scuttled. 

Already  on  the  18th,  Commodore  Hiram  Paulding  had  been 
directed  by  the  Department  to  proceed  to  Norfolk  with  the 
Pawnee,  then  lying  at  Washington,  and  take  command  of  the 


a OF  ILL  Lib. 


52 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


vessels,  using  force,  if  necessary,  to  prevent  them  from  fall- 
ing into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  He  was  also  ordered  to 
destroy  what  he  could  not  bring  off  before  abandoning  the 
Yard.  At  the  same  time,  officers  were  sent  to  New  York  and 
Philadelphia  to  charter  steamers,  and  to  proceed  with  all  de- 
spatch to  Hampton  Roads. 

The  Pawnee  left  Washington  on  Friday,  and  arrived  at 
Fortress  Monroe  on  the  afternoon  of  Saturday.  Here  she 
took  on  board  Captain  Wright  of  the  Engineers,  and  a regi- 
ment of  Massachusetts  volunteers.  At  this  very  moment, 
the  work  of  disabling  the  vessels  at  the  Navy  Yard  had  begun. 
Two  hours  later,  at  eight  o’clock  in  the  evening,  the  Pawnee 
came  in  sight  of  Norfolk.  The  Cumberland  was  lying  off 
the  Yard,  and  went  to  quarters  as  the  strange  vessel  ap- 
proached. A fresh  wind,  blowing  down  the  stream,  pre- 
vented her  from  making  out  the  Pawnee’s  answer  to  her 
hail,  but  the  latter  could  hear  the  voice  of  the  officer  com- 
manding the  Cumberland’s  pivot  gun,  asking  if  he  should 
fire.  On  board  the  Pennsylvania,  which  wTas  lying  below 
the  Cumberland,  Lieutenant  Allen,  seeing  the  imminence  of 
the  danger,  with  extraordinary  presence  of  mind,  called  out 
to  the  commanding  officer,  asking  him  to  cheer  the  approach- 
ing vessel.  In  an  instant  it  was  done  ; and  the  Pawnee  wras 
saved  from  what  seemed  an  inevitable  catastrophe. 

It  had  been  Paulding’s  intention  to  make  a disposition  of 
the  vessels  at  various  points  between  Norfolk  and  the  mouth 
of  the  river  in  such  a way  as  to  command  the  channel.  He 
would  have  been  able  to  hold  this  position  until  the  ar- 
rival of  the  newly-chartered  steamers,  wiien  he  could  have 
brought  off  all  the  ships  in  safety.  But  the  action  w’hich 
had  been  taken  only  two  hours  before  at  the  Yard  forestalled 
his  plan;  and  though  the  Pawnee  and  Cumberland  were  a 
really  formidable  force,  which,  with  the  infantry  regiment, 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


53 


could  have  held  the  enemy  in  check  until  either  reinforce- 
ments arrived  or  the  property  was  removed — or,  at  least, 
until  the  work  of  destruction  was  completed — Paulding  de- 
cided to  burn  the  principal  buildings,  and  abandon  the  Yard. 
For  this  puipose  parties  were  hurriedly  organized ; one 
under  Commander  Alden  to  prepare  the  storehouses  and 
workshops ; another  under  Commander  Sands  for  the  ship- 
houses  ; a third  to  distribute  combustibles  among  the  sink- 
ing vessels ; and  a fourth,  under  Commander  John  Bodgers, 
assisted  by  Captain  Wright,  to  blow  up  the  dry-dock.  An  at- 
tempt was  made  to  disable  the  guns  that  had  been  spiked,  by 
knocking  off  the  trunnions  ; but  this  was  unsuccessful. 

Shortly  before  two  in  the  morning,  the  reports  came  from 
the  various  parties  that  all  was  ready.  A little  delay  was 
occasioned  at  this  point  by  the  Commandant  of  the  Yard. 
The  veteran  Commodore,  with  obstinate  gallantry,  refused 
to  leave  his  post.  Finally  Alden  was  sent  to  bring  him  off. 
All  the  officers  and  men  were  withdrawn  except  eight,  who 
were  divided  among  the  three  firing  parties.  The  Pawnee 
left  the  wharf,  took  the  Cumberland  in  tow,  and  started 
down  the  river.  Two  boats  were  left  behind,  one  for  the 
firing  parties  on  shore,  the  other  for  that  which  was  to  de- 
stroy the  ships.  At  4.20  a rocket  was  fired  as  a signal,  and 
in  a few  minutes  ship-houses,  shops,  and  vessels  were  in  a 
blaze. 

The  people  on  shore  were  brought  safely  off,  except 
Bodgers  and  his  party,  who  had  far  to  go,  and  who  were  cut 
off  from  the  wharf  by  the  burning  buildings.  They  passed 
out  into  the  town,  and  obtained  a boat ; but  the  river  was 
now  lighted  by  the  conflagration,  and  they  had  not  gone  far 
before  they  were  obliged  to  surrender. 

Though  a few  shops  and  houses  were  burnt,  the  work  was 
done  so  hurriedly  that  the  best  part  of  the  valuable  material 


54 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


at  the  Yard  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The  dry-dock 
was  not  destroyed,  as  the  fuse  failed  to  ignite  the  powder ; 
but  whether  from  accident  or  from  the  work  of  other  hands 
has  never  been  discovered.  The  magazine,  with  great  num- 
bers of  loaded  shells,  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  tons  of  pow- 
der, had  already  been  seized.  Two  thousand  guns  of  all  des- 
criptions were  left  practically  uninjured,  three  hundred  of 
them  being  new  Dahlgren  guns  of  various  calibres.  Besides 
the  guns,  machinery,  steel  plates,  castings,  construction  ma- 
terials, and  ordnance  and  equipment  stores  in  vast  quantities 
came  into  the  possession  of  the  Confederates ; and  severe  as 
the  loss  of  so  much  material  would  have  been  by  itself  to 
the  Federal  Government,  it  was  rendered  tenfold  greater 
by  supplying  the  necessities  of  the  enemy. 

The  latter  immediately  set  about  utilizing  their  new  ac- 
quisition. The  captured  Dahlgren  guns  were  distributed 
throughout  the  country,  and  many  were  the  occasions  when 
the  Government  had  cause  to  regret  the  irreparable  disaster 
which  had  supplied  the  enemy  so  cheaply  with  a priceless 
armament  of  first-class  modern  ordnance.  The  Germantown 
and  Plymouth  were  raised  and  restored,  but  the  Confeder- 
ates had  neither  time  nor  money  to  waste  in  equipping  them 
for  sea.  The  Merrimac  was  also  raised,  and  though  her 
upper  works  were  destroyed,  her  hull  and  boilers,  and  the 
heavy  and  costly  parts  of  her  engine  were  but  little  injured. 
A board  of  officers,  of  which  Lieutenant  John  M.  Brooke  wa« 
the  principal  member,  prepared  a design  for  converting  her 
into  an  ironclad,  by  constructing  upon  her  hull  an  armored 
casemate  with  inclined  sides  and  submerged  eaves.  The 
plates  were  made  under  Brooke’s  superintendence  at  the 
Tredegar  foundry,  and  it  was  hoped  that  the  vessel  would 
be  invulnerable,  even  against  the  powerful  broadsides  of  the 
United  States  fleet. 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


55 


While  the  Confederates  were  thus  preparing  their  ironclad, 
the  Federal  Government  was  at  work  upon  the  construction 
of  a suitable  antagonist.  The  war,  for  the  moment,  was 
being  carried  on,  not  at  Hampton  Roads,  but  at  Norfolk  and 
Brooklyn,  and  the  victory  was  to  depend  not  only  upon  the 
bravery  of  the  officers,  but  upon  the  speed  of  the  mechanics. 
It  was  a race  of  constructors  ; and  in  spite  of  the  difficulties 
at  the  South,  and  the  comparative  facilities  at  the  command 
of  the  Department  at  Washington,  the  Confederates  were 
the  winners.  The  secret  of  their  success  lay  in  promptness 
of  preparation.  On  the  10th  of  June  Brooke  was  ordered 
at  Richmond  to  prepare  the  designs  and  specifications  of  an 
ironclad  vessel,  and  on  the  23d  an  engineer  and  a constructor 
were  associated  with  him  in  the  work.  The  board  reported 
without  delay,  and  work  on  the  Merrimac  was  begun  at  once. 
On  the  other  hand,  nothing  was  done  at  Washington  until 
the  meeting  of  Congress.  The  extra  session  began  July  5, 
and  the  appropriation  was  made  August  3.  The  ironclad 
board  was  convened  on  the  8th  of  the  same  month.  Its  re- 
port was  made  September  16  ; and  the  contract  for  the  Moni- 
tor was  not  completed  until  October  4.  To  this  delay  may  be 
directly  traced  the  action  of  the  8th  of  March,  and  the  de- 
struction of  the  Congress  and  the  Cumberland. 

The  hull  of  the  Monitor  was  built  at  the  Continental  Iron 
Works,  at  Greenpoint,  Brooklyn,  from  Ericsson’s  plans  and 
under  his  supervision.  The  vessel  was  begun  in  the  latter 
part  of  October.  The  mechanics  worked  in  three  gangs,  each 
for  the  space  of  eight  hours,  so  that  the  work,  when  finally 
undertaken,  went  on  without  interruption  night  and  day. 
The  construction  of  the  vessel  was  pushed  forward  so  rapidly 
that  on  the  30th  of  January,  1862,  not  quite  four  months  after 
the  signing  of  the  contract,  the  Monitor  was  launched. 

The  new  structure  consisted  of  a small  iron  hull,  upon 


56 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


wliicli  rested  a large  raft,  surmounted  by  a revolving  turret. 
The  hull  was  one  hundred  and  twenty-four  feet  long,  and 
thirty-four  feet  wide  at  the  upper  edge.  The  raft  projected 
at  the  bow  and  stern,  its  total  length  being  fifty  feet  greater 
than  that  of  the  hull.  Its  overhang  amidships  was  three  feet 
eight  inches  wide,  gradually  increasing  towards  the  bow  and 
stern.  The  raft  was  five  feet  deep,  and  was  protected  by  a 
side  armor  of  five  one-incli  iron  plates  backed  by  oak.  The 
deck  was  covered  with  two  half-inch  plates,  over  timber  laid 
on  heavy  wooden  beams.  The  turret  was  armored  with  eight 
one-inch  plates,  and  its  roof  was  protected  by  railroad  iron. 
In  it  were  two  Xl-inch  Dahlgren  guns.  The  pilot-house  was 
placed  on  deck,  in  front  of  the  turret,  and  was  built  of  square 
iron  bars  or  logs,  notched  together,  with  a bolt  through  the 
corners.  On  the  top  of  the  pilot-house  was  an  iron  plate,  an 
inch  and  a half  thick,  set  in  a ledge  without  fastenings. 

The  Department  selected  Lieutenant  John  L.  Worden  for 
the  command  of  the  Monitor.  He  was  ordered  on  January  13, 
while  the  vessel  was  still  on  the  stocks.  Lieutenant  S.  Dana 
Greene  volunteered  to  go  in  her,  and  at  Worden’s  request 
was  ordered  as  executive  officer.  Two  acting-masters,  Stod- 
der  and  Webber,  also  joined  her.  There  were  four  engineer 
officers,  of  whom  the  senior  was  First  Assistant-Engineer 
Isaac  Newton.  Chief-Engineer  A.  C.  Stimers  made  the  pas- 
sage in  the  vessel,  as  the  Government  inspector,  to  report 
upon  her  machinery.  The  crew  were  volunteers,  selected  by 
Worden  from  the  receiving-ship  North  Carolina  and  the  fri- 
gate Sabine  ; and  “a  better  one,”  to  quote  Worden’s  state- 
ment, “no  naval  commander  ever  had  the  honor  to  com- 
mand.” 

The  first  cruise  of  the  Monitor  was  a novel  experiment  and, 
as  the  event  showed,  full  of  hazard.  Had  she  been  intended 
merely  as  a floating  battery  to  protect  the  harbor  in  which 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


57 


she  was  built,  the  service  would  have  called  for  no  extraordi- 
nary sacrifice.  But  she  was  to  go  to  sea ; and  many  expe- 
rienced officers,  both  in  the  navy  and  in  the  merchant  service, 
doubted  seriously  her  ability  to  keep  afloat  in  any  but  the 
calmest  weather,  and  regarded  the  enterprise  as  desperate — 
an  opinion  which  the  Monitor’s  subsequent  career  fully  jus- 
tified. If  she  sank,  she  would  sink  quickly ; and  there  was 
small  chance  that  any  of  the  devoted  men  penned  up  in  her 
submerged  hull  would  escape.  All  this  was  well  understood 
by  her  officers  and  men  ; and  with  a courage  and  self-devotion 
of  no  common  order,  they  voluntarily  accepted  the  conditions, 
and  prepared  to  meet  the  danger. 

The  general  plan  of  the  Monitor,  as  originally  invented  by 
Ericsson,  was  little  less  than  an  inspiration  of  genius.  But 
the  first  vessel  of  the  type  was  by  no  means  perfect  in  its  de- 
tails, and  many  improvements  were  made  in  those  subse- 
quently built.  The  defects,  for  grave  defects  they  were,  had 
a marked  influence  upon  both  her  sea-going  and  her  fighting 
qualities,  and  put  her  at  a great  disadvantage  as  compared 
with  her  successors.  Her  armored  deck  or  raft  was  attached 
to  the  hull  by  a single  set  of  rivets,  which  were  unequal  to 
the  strain  caused  by  a heavy  sea  striking  the  projecting  bow 
from  underneath.  Her  smoke-pipes  and  blower-pipes  pro- 
jected only  a few  feet  above  the  deck,  and  could  hardly  fail 
to  ship  large  quantities  of  water  in  a heavy  sea.  In  action, 
her  weakest  point  was  the  pilot-house.  Its  rude  structure, 
that  of  an  iron  log  hut,  was  ill-calculated  to  resist  the  blow  of 
a heavy  projectile.  Its  roof  was  detached,  merely  resting  by 
its  weight  on  the  walls.  Its  position  on  the  deck  forward  of 
the  turret  was  disadvantageous,  as  it  precluded  end-on  fire 
when  the  vessel  was  approaching  an  enemy,  and  reduced  the 
circular  sweep  of  the  guns  by  nearly  eight  points.  But  the 
worst  feature  of  the  arrangement  was  the  separation  of  the 
I.— 3* 


58 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


captain  who  was  manoeuvring  the  ship  from  the  lieutenant 
w7ho  was  working  the  turret  and  firing  the  guns.  Each  was 
completely  cut  ofi‘  from  the  other,  except  by  a speaking-tube, 
which  opened  in  the  floor  of  the  movable  turret,  and  through 
which  the  sound  would  only  pass  when  the  turret  was  in  its 
normal  position.  The  experience  of  the  first  Monitor  led  to 
the  simple  device  of  putting  the  pilot-house  over  the  turret,  a 
change  that  wTas  suggested  by  Newton,  the  engineer  of  the  ves- 
sel. Finally  the  machinery  for  turning  the  turret,  a wheel 
and  rod  connected  by  gearing  with  the  turret-engine,  w7as  so 
defective  that  the  turret  was  equally  slow  in  starting,  and, 
once  started,  in  coming  to  a stop  ; and  there  was  hardly  time 
to  point  the  guns  before  the  muzzles  had  swept  by  tlieir 
target.  But  considering  the  time  in  which  she  was  built, 
the  wonder  is  not  that  she  was  imperfect,  but  that  she  was  in 
anywise  ready  ; and  it  was  wTell  for  the  country  that  she  did 
not  wait  another  day  to  complete  her  preparations. 

The  first  trial  of  the  Monitor  was  made  February  19,  on 
the  day  that  she  was  delivered  at  the  Navy  Yard.  She  was 
put  in  commission  on  the  25tli,  when  a second  trial  took 
place  ; but  her  steering  gear  was  not  in  working  order,  and 
she  did  not  go  out  of  the  East  River.  At  a third  trial,  a week 
later,  she  steamed  down  to  Sandy  Hook,  and  tried  her  guns. 
The  mechanics  were  still  at  work  upon  her  ; indeed,  the  ves- 
sel was  hardly  completed  when  she  left  New  York,  though 
the  workmen  were  busy  during  the  night  before  she  sailed. 
Finally,  at  11  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  Thursday,  March  G, 
she  started  down  the  harbor ; and  in  the  afternoon  she  was 
fairly  at  sea  on  her  way  to  the  Chesapeake. 

The  passage  down  was  difficult  and  dangerous.  The  Mon- 
itor was  in  tow  of  the  Seth  Low,  a small  tug,  and  was  accom- 
panied by  two  unseaworthy  gunboats,  the  Currituck  and 
Sachem.  The  ten  days  between  the  commission  of  the  Mon- 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


59 


itor  and  her  departure  had  given  the  crew  little  time  for 
practice  in  the  management  of  the  novel  craft,  with  its  com- 
plicated mechanism.  The  wind  was  moderate  during  Thurs- 
day night  and  Friday  morning ; but  about  noon,  off  the 
Delaware,  it  freshened  to  a strong  breeze  from  the  northwest, 
and  caused  a rough  sea,  which  broke  over  the  vessel’s  deck, 
forcing  the  water  in  floods  through  the  hawse-pipes  and 
under  the  turret.  In  the  afternoon  the  sea  increased,  and 
breaking  over  the  smoke-pipe  and  blower-pipe,  caused  the 
blower-bands  to  slip  and  break.  This  stopped  the  draft  in 
the  furnace,  and  filled  the  engine-room  and  fire-room  with 
gas.  Newton,  with  the  other  engineers  and  the  firemen, 
strove  in  vain  against  the  gas,  trying  to  repair  the  injury,  and 
they  were  only  rescued  as  they  lay  unconscious  on  the  floor 
of  the  engine-room.  As  the  engines  were  now  useless  either 
for  propulsion  or  pumping,  the  water  gained  rapidly.  The 
hand-pump  was  used  and  the  men  set  to  bailing,  but  with 
little  effect,  as  the  water  could  only  be  carried  off  over  the 
wall  of  the  turret.  At  last  the  tug  was  headed  for  the  shore. 
After  five  hours’  steaming,  the  vessels  came  into  smoother 
water  ; the  engine-room  was  cleared  of  gas,  the  blower-bands 
were  repaired,  and  the  engine  once  more  moved  slowly. 

So  matters  continued  until  shortly  after  midnight,  when 
the  Monitor,  in  crossing  a shoal,  suddenly  ran  into  a heavy 
head-sea.  The  water  came  up  through  the  anchor-well, 
forced  the  air  through  the  hawse-pipe,  and  flowed  in  a 
stream  over  the  ward-room  table  to  the  berth-deck.  Efforts 
were  made  to  close  the  hawse-pipe,  and  the  rush  of  water 
was  partly  checked.  But  the  sea  now  broke  violently  over 
the  deck,  and  again  entered  the  blower-pipes.  Another 
disaster  seemed  imminent.  The  head  wind  prevented  Wor- 
den from  hailing  the  tug,  and  in  the  hurry  of  preparation 
no  arrangement  had  been  made  for  signalling  at  night. 


60 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Every  sea  that  dashed  the  spray  over  the  blowers  was  anx- 
iously watched ; and  every  few  minutes  word  came  from  the 
engine-room  that  the  engine  could  not  go  much  longer  un- 
less the  water  was  kept  out.  About  this  time  the  wheel- 
ropes  jumped  off  the  steering  wheel,  owing  to  the  pitching 
of  the  ship,  and  became  jammed.  The  vessel  was  now  unman- 
ageable and  began  to  sheer  about  wildly ; but  the  tow-rope 
held,  and  half  an  hour’s  work  repaired  the  injury.  After 
five  critical  hours,  daylight  broke,  and  the  tug  was  ordered 
to  go  nearer  the  shore.  By  eight  o’clock  the  danger  was 
over.  At  four  in  the  afternoon  of  the  8th  of  March  the 
Monitor  passed  Cape  Henry.  Immediately  afterward  the 
hawser  parted,  but  the  vessel  was  now  in  smooth  water. 

In  the  absence  of  Flag-Officer  Goldsborough,  tlie  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  of  the  North  Atlantic  blockading  squad- 
ron, who  was  engaged  at  this  time  in  the  expedition  against 
Boanoke  Island,  the  senior  officer  present  in  Hampton 
Boads  was  Captain  John  Marston  of  the  Boanoke.  The 
force  consisted  of  the  Boanoke  and  the  Minnesota,  lying 
near  Fortress  Monroe,  and  two  sailing-vessels,  the  Congress 
and  the  Cumberland,  at  anchor  off  Newport  News.  All  were 
admirable  vessels  of  their  class.  The  Congress  was  a fifty- 
gun  frigate,  and  though  rebuilt,  or  rather  built  anew,  in 
1841,  represented  the  type  of  1812.  The  Cumberland  was  a 
sloop-of-war  of  twenty-four  guns.  The  Boanoke  and  the 
Minnesota  were  screw-frigates  of  forty  guns.  These  vessels 
have  been  already  referred  to.  They  were  the  pride  of  the 
navy,  and  before  the  war  had  been  regarded  as  the  highest 
and  most  perfect  type  of  the  men-of-war  of  the  period.  Yet 
it  required  but  the  experience  of  a single  afternoon  in 
Hampton  Boads,  in  the  month  of  March,  1862,  to  show  that 
all  of  them  were  antiquated,  displaced,  superseded,  and  that 
a new  era  had  opened  in  naval  warfare. 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


61 


The  Merrimac,  which  had  been  a sister  ship  of  the  Minne- 
sota and  Roanoke,  was  now  completed  and  in  commission  at 
Norfolk,  under  her  new  name  of  the  Virginia.  She  was  to 
all  intents  a new  vessel.  Her  masts  had  been  removed,  and 
her  casemate,  which  sloped  at  an  angle  of  forty-five  degrees, 
and  resembled  the  roof  of  a house,  had  been  armored  with 
two  layers  of  wrought-iron  plates,  each  two-and-a-half  inches 
thick,  with  a seven-inch  wooden  backing.  She  was  armed 
with  six  IX-inch  Dahlgren  guns  and  two  32-pounder  Brooke 
rifles  in  broadside,  and  Vll-incli  Brooke  rifles  on  pivots  in 
the  bow  and  stern ; and  a cast-iron  ram  projected  eighteen 
inches  from  her  bow. 

The  Congress  and  Cumberland  had  been  lying  off  Newport 
News  for  several  months.  Their  ostensible  duty  was  to 
blockade  the  James  River ; but  it  is  not  very  clear  how  a 
sailing-vessel  at  anchor  could  be  of  any  use  for  this  purpose. 
Most  of  the  old  sailing-vessels  of  the  navy  had  by  this  time 
been  relegated  to  their  proper  place  as  school-ships,  store- 
ships,  and  receiving-ships,  or  had  been  sent  to  foreign  sta- 
tions where  their  only  duty  was  to  display  the  flag.  Nothing 
shows  more  clearly  the  persistence  of  old  traditions  than  the 
presence  of  these  helpless  vessels  in  so  dangerous  a neigh- 
borhood. Although  the  ships  themselves  were  of  no  value 
for  modern  warfare,  their  armament  could  ill  be  spared ; and 
they  carried  between  them  over  eight  hundred  officers  and 
men,  whose  lives  were  exposed  to  a fruitless  sacrifice. 1 

Commander  William  Smith,  who  had  commanded  the 
Congress  for  six  months,  had  been  detached  early  in  March. 
He  turned  over  the  command  to  his  executive,  Lieutenant 
Joseph  B.  Smith,  but  remained  on  board  while  waiting  for 
his  steamer,  and  during  the  engagement  of  the  8tli  he 


1 Captain  Fox,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Select  Committee,  says  that  the  sail- 
ing-vessels were  left  in  Hampton  Roads  at  the  request  of  the  military  authorities. 


62 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


served  as  a volunteer.  Radford,  the  commander  of  the 
Cumberland,  was  attending  a court  of  inquiry  on  board  the 
Roanoke  when  the  Merrimac  came  out,  and  the  command 
of  the  sloop  devolved  on  Lieutenant  Morris.  When  the 
Merrimac  was  reported,  Radford  landed,  and  rode  to  New- 
port News  ; but  he  only  arrived  in  time  to  see  the  end  of 
the  action.  Both  ships  were  therefore  fought  by  their  first 
lieutenants;  but  they  could  not  have  been  defended  with 
more  resolution  and  gallantry,  and  no  skill  would  have 
availed  to  alter  the  final  result. 

So  many  rumors  about  the  Merrimac  had  been  current  in 
the  fleet,  without  any  visible  results,  that  the  prevalent  feel- 
ing in  regard  to  her  was  one  of  skepticism.  It  was  known 
that  extensive  alterations  had  been  made  in  the  vessel,  but  it 
was  not  supposed  that  her  powers  of  resistance  would  render 
her  shot-proof  under  the  fire  of  such  broadsides  as  the  two 
vessels  could  bring  against  her.  Moreover,  her  sister  ships, 
the  Roanoke  and  Minnesota,  lay  below  near  the  fort.  A 
careful  lookout  was  kept  up,  however ; the  ships  were 
anchored  with  springs  on  their  cables,  and  half  the  watch 
slept  at  quarters. 

On  the  6th  of  March,  the  frigate  St.  Lawrence  came  in,  a 
vessel  in  all  respects  similar  to  the  Congress.  But  so  far 
from  increasing  the  force  to  bo  opposed  to  the  Merrimac,  she 
only  added  another  to  the  Hst  of  probable  victims. 

On  Saturday,  the  8tli,  a little  before  one  o’clock  in  the 
afternoon,  while  the  Monitor  was  still  outside  the  Capes,  the 
Merrimac  finally  came  out  from  Norfolk.  She  was  under  the 
command  of  Franklin  Buchanan,  whoso  ability  and  energy 
had  won  him  a high  place  in  the  esteem  of  his  brother- 
officers  in  the  navy  before  the  war.  She  was  accompanied 
by  two  gunboats,  the  Beaufort  and  Raleigh,  of  one  gun 
each.  Turning  directly  into  the  channel  by  which  she  could 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


63 


reach  Newport  News,  the  Merrimac  approached  the  two 
vessels  at  anchor.  The  latter  had  been  cleared  for  action, 
the  Cumberland  when  the  enemy  was  sighted,  and  the  Con- 
gress after  he  had  entered  the  James  River  channel.  They 
would  have  been  no  better  off  if  they  had  got  under  wTay ; 
the  wind  was  light,  and  their  tug,  the  Zouave,  was  not  pow- 
erful enough  to  tow  them  off.  Soon  after  twTo  o’clock  the 
Merrimac  opened  fire  with  grape  from  her  bow  gun.  Pass- 
ing along  the  starboard  side  of  the  Congress,  whose  shot  re- 
bounded from  her  iron  side  like  pebbles,  she  steered  directly 
for  the  Cumberland.  The  latter  received  her  with  a dis- 
charge of  shot  which  entered  the  port,  knocked  off  the  muz- 
zles of  two  guns,  and  killed  or  -wounded  nineteen  men,  but 
did  not  stop  her  progress.  Approaching  steadily,  bows  on, 
she  raked  the  sloop  with  her  pivot  gun,  and  keeping  her  way, 
struck  her  full  under  the  starboard  fore-channels,  delivering 
her  fire  at  the  same  time.  The  force  of  the  blow  drove  the 
Merrimac1  s ram  so  far  into  the  planking  that  it  was  wrenched 
off,  as  she  wTithdrewT ; and  a hole  wTas  opened  in  the  side  of 
the  Cumberland,  into  which  the  water  rushed  in  a full  stream. 

The  bow  of  the  Cumberland  immediately  began  to  settle, 
and  her  fate  wras  decided.  Nevertheless  she  continued  to 
fight  with  the  persistence  and  energy  of  desperation.  The 
gun’s  crews  kicked  off  their  shoes,  and  stripped  to  the  wTaist. 
Tanks  of  cartridges  were  hoisted  on  the  gun-deck  and 
opened,  and  round  after  round  wus  fired  at  the  ironclad. 
Never  did  a crew  fight  a ship  with  more  spirit  and  hardi- 
hood than  these  brave  fellows  of  the  Cumberland  while  the 
vessel  w~as  going  down.  Nor  was  it  a mere  idle  display  of 
gallantry,  this  holding  on  till  the  last ; for  in  these  days, 
in  naval  battles,  the  game  is  not  over  until  the  last  gun  is 
fired,  and  a chance  shot  may  recover  the  day  for  a seemingly 
beaten  combatant. 


64 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


For  three-quarters  of  an  hour,  from  the  time  when  the 
Cumberland  was  struck  until  she  sank,  the  enemy’s  fire 
was  concentrated  upon  her  with  terrible  effect.  A shell 
passing  through  the  hatch  burst  in  the  sick-bay,  killing 
four  of  the  wounded.  On  the  berth-deck,  the  wounded  men 
were  lifted  upon  racks  and  mess-chests,  to  keep  them  from 
drowning;  and  as  the  water  rose,  those  who  fell  on  the 
upper  decks  were  carried  amidships  and  left  there.  The 
Merrimac  hailed  and  demanded  a surrender;  but  Morris 
returned  a refusal.  Already,  the  boats  had  been  lowered 
and  made  fast  in  a line  on  the  shore  side.  At  half-past 
three,  the  forward  magazine  was  drowned,  and  five  minutes 
later  the  order  was  given  to  the  men  to  leave  quarters  and 
save  themselves.  The  water  had  now  risen  to  the  gun-deck  ; 
a last  shot  was  fired  as  the  ship  heeled  over  to  port,  and 
officers  and  crew  jumped  for  their  lives  into  the  water.  A 
moment  more,  and  the  Cumberland,  with  her  ensign  still 
flying  at  the  peak,  sank  to  her  tops. 

While  the  Merrimac  was  occupied  with  the  Cumberland, 
three  steamers,  the  Patrick  Henry,  Jamestown,  and  Teazer, 
which  had  been  lying  at  the  mouth  of  the  James  River,  ran 
past  the  batteries  at  Newport  News,  and  joining  the  other 
gunboats,  opened  a brisk  fire  upon  the  Congress,  which  told 
severely  upon  her  crew.  Seeing  the  fate  of  the  Cumberland, 
Smith  sought  to  escape  the  enemy’s  ram  by  running  ashore. 
He  set  the  jib  and  topsails,  and  with  the  assistance  of  the 
tug,  ran  up  on  the  flats,  hoping  in  this  way  to  delay  the  bat- 
tle until  the  other  fiigates  should  arrive ; but  his  movement 
was  only  escaping  destruction  in  one  form  to  meet  it  in 
another.  No  sooner  was  the  Congress  hard  and  fast  than  the 
Mammae,  taking  a position  astern  of  her,  at  a distance  of 
one  hundred  and  fifty  yards,  raked  her  fore  and  aft  with 
shells ; and  the  smaller  steamers  joined  in  the  attack  with 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


65 


spirit  and  effect.  The  Congress  conld  only  reply  with  her 
two  stern  gn ns,  and  these  were  soon  disabled. 

The  unequal  contest  lasted  for  an  hour.  The  old  frigate 
could  do  nothing.  Her  decks  were  covered  with  the  dead  and 
dying  ; her  commander  was  killed,  and  fire  had  broken  out 
in  different  parts  of  the  ship.  The  affair  had  ceased  to  be  a 
fight ; it  was  simply  a wholesale  slaughter.  As  the  Minnesota 
had  run  aground,  there  was  no  prospect  of  relief  ; and  Lieu- 
tenant Pendergrast,  upon  whom  the  command  had  fallen,  to 
prevent  the  useless  carnage,  hoisted  a white  flag. 

The  Beaufort  and  Raleigh  were  sent  alongside  the  Congress 
to  receive  possession  and  to  remove  the  prisoners  ; but  a 
sharp  fire  of  artillery  and  small  arms  from  the  shore  drove 
them  off.  The  Teazer  was  then  ordered  to  set  fire  to  the 
Congress,  but  she  also  wras  beaten  back.  The  Merrimac 
thereupon  renewed  her  fire,  using  incendiary  shot,  and  the 
people  of  the  Congress,  who  had  remained  passive  while  the 
contest  was  going  on  over  and  around  them,  manned  their 
boats  and  escaped  to  the  shore.  The  ship,  left  to  herself, 
continued  to  burn  slowly,  and  at  one  o’clock  the  next  morn- 
ing she  blew  up. 

While  these  battles  were  in  progress,  the  two  screw-frigates, 
which  formed  the  only  effective  force  on  the  ground,  made 
an  effort  to  get  into  action,  but  not  with  any  great  success. 
The  Minnesota,  under  Captain  Van  Brunt,  was  the  first  to 
move,  getting  under  way  soon  after  the  enemy  wras  sighted, 
at  a signal  from  the  Roanoke.  As  she  passed  Sewall’s  Point, 
the  batteries  opened  fire  on%  her,  but  did  not  stop  her  prog- 
ress. After  steaming  five  miles  she  grounded.  She  was  then 
a mile  and  a half  from  the  scene  of  action.  When  the  aban- 
donment of  the  Congress  left  the  Merrimac  free  to  engage  a 
new  antagonist,  she  turned  her  attention  to  the  stranded 
frigate.  Fortunately  for  the  latter,  the  Merrimac  drew7  too 


66 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


much  water  to  approach  within  less  than  a mile  of  her  posi- 
tion ; and  her  fire  at  this  distance  was  ineffective.  The 
Patrick  Henry  and  Jamestown,  taking  their  position  on  the 
bow  and  stern  of  the  Minnesota,  did  her  more  injury  with 
their  rifled  guns  than  did  their  powerful  consort.  The 
Minnesota’s  fire  had  no  effect  upon  the  Merrimac,  but  she 
succeeded  in  beating  back  the  gunboats  ; and  during  two  or 
three  hours  of  conflict,  neither  side  gained  or  lost. 

The  Roanoke,  which  was  disabled  by  a broken  shaft,1 * * * * *  got 
under  way  soon  after  the  Minnesota,  and  with  the  assistance 
of  a couple  of  tugs,  moved  slowly  in  the  direction  of  New- 
port News.  She  went  far  enough  to  see  the  Cumberland 
sink  and  the  Congress  surrender.  Soon  after  the  second 
event,  she  grounded;  but  the  tugs  managed  to  tow  her 
head  around  and  to  get  her  afloat.  Sending  the  tugs  to  as- 
sist the  Minnesota,  the  Roanoke  now  withdrew  and  dropped 
down  to  her  anchorage. 

As  the  Roanoke  was  on  her  way  back,  the  St.  Lawrence 
passed  her,  making  her  way  laboriously  to  the  scene  of  action 
in  tow  of  a gunboat.  Captain  Purviance,  with  a gallantry 
that  deserved  a better  instrument,  wTas  endeavoring  to  bring 
his  fine  old  fifty-gun  frigate  to  battle  with  the  ironclad. 
Fortunately  for  him  and  for  his  ship,  he  also  w7ent  aground, 


1 Captain  Fox,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Select  Committee  on  March  10, 1862, 

says : “ The  shaft  of  the  Roanoke  was  broken  about  the  5th  of  November,  and  it 

was  believed  that  it  could  be  repaired  in  about  two  months.  That  was  the  report 

made  to  us.  But  upon  inquiry,  it  was  found  that  every  forge  in  the  country 

capable  of  doing  the  work  was  employed.  There  being  a large  number  of  con- 
tracts out  for  steamers,  every  one  of  which  must  have  a shaft,  every  available 
forge  in  the  country  was  running  to  the  utmost  of  its  capacity.  Finally,  we 
found  one  establishment  that  agreed  to  forge  the  shaft,  but  refused  to  turn  and 

finish  it,  which,  of  itself,  is  as  important  and  difficult  a matter  as  the  forging. 

The  Government  had  no  adequate  means  to  turn  such  an  enormous  piece  of  forg- 
ing. They  undertook  it,  however,  with  such  means  as  they  had  at  the  New  Yoik 
Navy  Yard,  and  it  is  now  about  finished,  although  it  broke  every  piece  of  machin- 
ery they  had  which  was  put  upon  it,  and  special  machinery  had  to  be  made  for  it.” 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


67 


while  still  at  some  distance  from  the  enemy,  against  whom 
he  discharged  a series  of  futile  broadsides.  Night  was  now 
approaching ; and  the  St.  Lawrence  slowly  returned  to  her 
place  in  the  roads  below. 

At  seven  o’clock  the  Merrimac  ceased  firing,  and  with- 
drew to  Sewall’s  Point.  She  had  done  a good  day’s  work. 
She  had  sunk  one  of  her  opponents,  and  burnt  another. 
Only  daylight  was  needed  to  capture  or  exterminate  the  rest. 
She  saw  her  prey  within  her  grasp  ; and  by  all  human  calcu- 
lation the  whole  force  must  fall  into  her  hands  on  the  next 
day.  The  conflict  had  left  her  without  any  material  injury  ; 
and  she  returned  to  her  anchorage  fully  satisfied  with  the 
work  of  the  day,  and  the  prospects  for  the  morrow. 

But  an  event  had  already  occurred  which  put  a new  aspect 
upon  affairs  in  Hampton  Boads.  At  four  in  the  afternoon 
the  Monitor  had  passed  Cape  Henry.  Her  officers  had  heard 
the  heavy  firing  in  the  direction  of  Fortress  Monroe,  and  the 
ship  was  shipped  of  her  sea-rig  and  prepared  for  action.  A 
pilot-boat,  spoken  on  the  way  up,  gave  word  of  the  disastrous 
engagement  that  had  just  ended ; and  presently  the  light  of 
the  burning  Congress  confirmed  the  news.  At  nine  o’clock 
the  Monitor  had  anchored  near  the  Boanoke,  and  Worden 
went  on  board  to  report. 

In  order  to  carry  out  the  project  of  opening  the  Potomac 
Biver,  explicit  orders  had  been  given  to  Captain  Marston  to 
send  the  Monitor  directly  to  Washington.  Similar  orders  had 
been  sent  to  Worden,  but  they  only  reached  New  York  two 
hours  after  he  had  sailed.  The  state  of  affairs  was  such,  how- 
ever, that  Marston  and  Worden  were  more  than  justified  in 
disregarding  the  orders.  No  sane  man  would  have  done  other- 
wise. Worden  accordingly  proceeded  to  the  assistance  of  the 
Minnesota,  which  was  still  aground  off  Newport  News.  Act- 
ing-Master Samuel  Howard  volunteered  to  act  as  pilot.  Be- 


68  the  blockade  and  the  cruisers. 


fore  midnight  the  Monitor  had  joined  the  Minnesota;  but 
the  frigate  failed  to  get  afloat  at  high  water,  and  the  Monitor 
remained  by  her  during  the  rest  of  the  night. 

At  daylight  on  the  morning  of  Sunday,  March  9,  the 
Merrimac  was  discovered  with  her  attendant  gunboats  under 
the  batteries  at  Sewall’s  Point.  The  Minnesota  lay  still  in 
the  same  position,  apparently  helpless.  The  diminutive  iron 
battery  beside  her  was  hardly  noticed ; and  at  half -past  seven 
the  Merrimac  was  under  way,  confident  of  repeating,  on  a 
larger  scale,  the  victory  of  the  day  before.  Buchanan  had 
been  disabled  by  a wound,  and  she  was  now  commanded  by 
Lieutenant  Catesby  Jones.  She  steamed  down  leisurely 
toward  the  Kip  Baps,  turned  into  the  Minnesota’s  channel, 
and  opened  fire  while  still  a mile  away.  She  succeeded  in 
putting  a shot  under  the  Minnesota’s  counter,  near  the  water 
line,  but  did  no  further  injury.  The  Monitor’s  anchor  was 
up,  her  men  at  quarters,  her  guns  loaded,  and  everything 
ready  for  action.  She  immediately  got  under  way,  to  en- 
gage as  far  as  possible  from  the  Minnesota,  and,  to  Van 
Brunt’s  surprise  and  relief,  headed  directly  for  the  Mem- 
mac’s  starboard  bow,  covering  the  frigate.  Worden  reserved 
his  fire  until  he  was  close  upon  the  enemy;  then,  altering 
his  course,  he  gave  orders  to  commence  firing,  and,  stopping 
the  engine,  passed  slowly  by.  The  Merrimac  returned  the 
fire,  but  with  little  effect ; the  turret  was  a small  target,  and 
the  projectiles  passed  over  the  low  deck.  Shell,  grape, 
canister,  and  musket  balls,  flew  about  in  every  direction,  but 
did  no  injury.  Acting-Master  Stodder  carelessly  leaned  for 
a moment  against  the  turret,  and  a shot  striking  the  outer 
wall,  produced  a concussion  that  disabled  him.  As  the  tur- 
ret was  struck  the  shot  glanced  off  from  its  curved  side ; and 
though,  from  the  imperfections  of  the  machinery,  it  was  regu- 
lated with  difficulty,  it  continued  to  revolve  as  freely  as  ever. 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


69 


After  passing  the  Merrimac,  Worden  turned,  and,  crossing 
her  stern,  attempted  to  disable  her  screw,  which  he  missed 
by  a few  feet.  Returning,  he  passed  up  along  her  port  side, 
firing  deliberately.  The  vessels  were  so  close  that  several 
times  they  nearly  came  in  contact.  Presently  they  separated, 
and  the  Merrimac  attacked  the  Minnesota.  In  shifting  her 
position,  she  grounded,  but  got  off  soon  after.  The  frigate 
received  her  as  she  approached  with  a discharge  from  her 
full  broadside  and  X-inch  pivot ; of  which  Van  Brunt  ob- 
served, somewhat  extravagantly,  that  “it  would  have  blown 
out  of  water  any  timber-built  ship  in  the  world.”  But  the 
days  of  timber-built  ships  were  numbered,  and  nothing  proved 
it  more  clearly  than  Van  Brunt’s  ineffectual  broadside.  The 
Merrimac  replied  with  a shell  from  her  rifled  bow-gun,  which 
entered  the  berth-deck  amidships,  tore  four  rooms  into  one, 
and  set  the  ship  on  fire.  The  flames  were  soon  extinguished. 
A second  shell  exploded  the  boiler  of  the  tugboat  Dragon. 
Van  Brunt  concentrated  his  broadside  upon  the  ironclad,  and 
fifty  solid  shot  struck  her  side  with  no  more  effect  than  the 
pelting  of  liail-stones.  By  the  time  she  had  fired  her  third 
shell,  the  Monitor  had  interposed  again ; and  the  Merrimac, 
running  down  at  full  speed,  attempted  to  repeat  her  success- 
ful attack  on  the  Cumberland.  Worden  saw  the  movement, 
and  suddenly  {jutting  his  helm  hard-a-port,  he  gave  his  ves- 
sel a broad  sheer,  receiving  the  blow  of  the  ram  on  his  star- 
board quarter,  whence  it  glanced  off  without  doing  any 
injury. 

During  the  engagement,  Worden’ had  taken  his  place  in 
the  pilot-house,  from  the  lookout-holes  of  which  he  was  able 
to  see  the  course  of  the  action  and  to  direct  the  working  of 
the  ship  and  of  the  guns.  Greene  had  charge  of  the  turret 
and  handled  the  battery.  These  two  men  fought  the  ship. 
Acting-Master  Stodder  was  at  first  stationed  at  the  wheel  that 


70 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


started  the  revolving-gear,  and  when  he  was  disabled,  Chief- 
Engineer  Stimers  volunteered  to  take  his  place,  and  did  the 
best  that  could  be  done  in  the  exhausting  work  of  turning 
the  refractory  turret.  The  powder  division  on  the  berth- 
deck  was  in  charge  of  Acting-Master  Webber.  The  pay- 
master and  captain’s  clerk,  also  stationed  on  the  berth-deck, 
passed  the  orders  from  the  pilot-house.  The  men  had  gone 
into  the  engagement  worn  out,  having  had  no  rest  for  forty- 
eight  hours,  and  little  to  eat.  But  they  were  picked  men, 
and  during  the  short  time  that  Worden  had  been  with  them 
he  had  won,  in  an  extraordinary  degree,  their  confidence  and 
regard.  Accordingly  they  did  their  work  with  unflinching 
courage  and  resolution. 

The  situation  in  the  turret  was  a difficult  one.  Shut  up  in 
a revolving  iron  cask,  on  a moving  platform,  and  cut  off  from 
the  captain  except  through  slow  and  imperfect  communica- 
tion by  passing  the  word,  when  minutes  and  even  seconds 
were  important,  Greene  fought  under  heavy  disadvantages. 
The  direction  of  the  bow  and  stern  and  of  the  starboard  and 
port  beam  were  marked  on  the  stationary  flooring,  but  the 
marks  were  soon  obliterated,  and  after  one  or  two  revolutions 
it  was  impossible  to  guess  at  the  direction  of  the  ship  or  the 
position  of  the  enemy.  The  only  openings  through  which 
anything  could  be  seen  were  the  gunports  ; and  these  were 
closed  except  at  the  moment  of  firing,  as  an  entering  shot 
would  have  disabled  the  guns.  Curiously  enough,  neither 
of  the  port-stoppers  was  struck,  though  the  edges  of  the 
ports  and  the  turret  wall  between  them  were  jagged  and 
dented  by  the  Memmac’s  shot.  At  last  the  difficulties  be- 
came so  great,  the  revolutions  so  confusing,  and  the  mechan- 
ism governing  the  movements  of  the  turret  so  little  under 
control,  that  it  was  left  stationary,  and  the  ship  was  fought 
and  the  guns  pointed  by  the  helm. 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


71 


After  fighting  for  two  hours,  the  Monitor  hauled  off  to 
hoist  shot  into  the  turret.  At  half -past  eleven,  the  engage- 
ment was  renewed.  The  enemy  now  concentrated  his  fire  on 
the  pilot-house,  which  was  the  weakest  part  of  the  vessel.  At 
a moment  when  Worden  was  looking  through  one  of  the 
openings,  a shell  struck  the  wall  at  the  opening,  and  ex- 
ploded. The  explosion  fractured  one  of  the  iron  logs  of  the 
frame,  and  lifted  half-way  off  the  iron  hatch  that  rested  in- 
securely on  the  top.  Worden’s  eyes  were  filled  with  powder 
and  slivers  of  iron,  and  he  was  blinded  and  stunned.  Blind 
as  he  was,  he  could  see  the  stream  of  light  from  the  roof, 
and  unable  to  determine  the  extent  of  the  injury,  he  had  the 
presence  of  mind  to  give  orders  to  put  the  helm  to  starboard 
and  sheer  off.  With  the  captain  disabled  and  the  quarter- 
master dazed  by  the  shock,  it  was  some  minutes  before  word 
was  passed  to  the  turret  of  the  disaster  in  the  pilot-house. 
When  Greene  came  out  and  passed  forward  he  found  the 
captain  at  the  foot  of  the  ladder,  stunned  and  helpless,  his 
face  black  and  streaming  with  blood.  Leaving  him  to  the 
surgeon,  Greene  mounted  to  the  pilot-house,  while  S timers 
replaced  him  in  the  turret ; and  the  vessel,  which  during 
these  moments  of  unavoidable  delay  had  been  without  a cap- 
tain, and  steaming  no  one  knew  whither,  once  more  faced 
the  enemy. 

Seeing  the  Monitor  draw  off,  Van  Brunt,  under  the  suppo- 
sition that  his  protector  was  disabled  and  had  left  him,  pre- 
pared for  the  worst,  and  made  ready  to  destroy  his  ship. 
But,  at  this  point,  the  Merrimac  withdrew  to  Norfolk.  As 
she  moved  off,  Greene  fired  at  her  twice,  or  at  most  three 
times.  He  then  returned  to  the  Minnesota,  and  remained  by 
her  until  she  got  afloat.  To  have  followed  the  Merrimac 
under  the  batteries  of  Sewall’s  Point  would  have  been  run- 
ning a greater  risk  than  the  circumstances  would  warrant, 


72 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


considering  the  important  interests  at  Hampton  Roads,  of 
which  the  Monitor  afforded  the  sole  protection. 

It  appears  that  the  movements  of  the  Monitor,  at  the  time 
when  there  was  no  captain  to  direct  her,  led  others  besides 
Van  Brunt  to  suppose  that  she  had  given  up  the  fight ; and 
the  assertion  has  since  been  confidently  made  that  she  was 
beaten  and  driven  off  by  the  enemy.  The  statement  is  not 
borne  out  by  the  facts,  as  the  Monitor  only  wTent  off  a short 
distance  into  shoal  water,  and  presently  renewed  the  combat. 
But  assuming  for  the  moment  that  the  Merrimac  was  left  in 
possession  of  the  field,  why  did  she  not  continue  her  opera- 
tions ? The  retreat  of  the  Monitor  would  have  left  matters 
in  precisely  the  situation  in  which  the  Merrimac  supposed 
them  to  be  when  she  came  out  in  the  morning.  It  is  to  be 
presumed  that  her  object  then  was  to  destroy  the  Minnesota. 
The  Monitor  prevented  her  for  four  hours  from  doing  this  ; 
now,  however,  if  the  Monitor  had  retreated,  why  did  she  not 
attack  the  frigate  ? 

Instead  of  continuing  the  fight,  the  Merrimac  steamed  to 
Norfolk.  Jones  gives  as  his  reason  for  returning  that  he  be- 
lieved the  Minnesota  to  be  entirely  disabled.  What  ground 
he  had  for  forming  such  a belief  does  not  appear.  It  has  also 
been  suggested  that  his  pilots  led  him  to  suppose  that  delay 
would  prevent  him  from  crossing  the  bar.  But  what  need 
had  he  to  cross  ? The  bar  was  a mile  above  Sewall’s  Point ; 
he  had  anchored  safely  the  night  before  under  the  battery, 
and  after  destroying  the  Minnesota — supposing  that  the 
Monitor  had  disappeared — he  could  do  the  same  again,  and 
go  up  to  Norfolk  at  his  leisure.  If,  however,  his  injuries 
w’ere  so  great  that  he  was  compelled  to  lose  no  time  in  re- 
turning to  Norfolk,  it  would  seem  that  instead  of  his  haring 
defeated  the  Monitor,  the  Monitor  had  defeated  him.  In 
truth,  the  claim  that  the  Merrimac  was  victorious  is  singu- 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


73 


larly  bold,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  half  an  hour  after  the  last 
shot  was  fired  the  Minnesota  was  lying  aground  in  the  very 
spot  she  had  occupied  in  the  morning,  the  Monitor  w~as  lying 
alongside  her,  neither  of  them  being  materially  injured, 
and  the  supposed  victor  was  steaming  as  fast  as  possible  to 
Elizabeth  River,  in  order  to  cross  the  bar  before  the  ebb- 
tide. 

Though  both  the  ironclads  were  severely  pounded  in  the 
engagement,  neither  had  developed  fully  its  offensive  strength, 
and  all  things  considered  they  got  off  rather  easily.  The 
only  serious  casualty  on  either  side  was  the  injury  received 
by  Worden.  The  Merrimac  leaked  somewhat  from  the  colli- 
sion of  her  unarmed  stem  with  the  Monitor’s  overhang,  and 
the  plates  of  her  armor  were  broken  where  they  were  struck, 
but  the  wooden  backing  was  not  penetrated.  The  roof  of 
the  Monitor’s  pilot-house  was  partly  displaced,  and  one  of  its 
beams  was  cracked ; but  otherwise  the  vessel  was  left  intact. 
She  was  struck  twenty-one  times ; eight  times  on  the  side- 
armor,  twice  on  the  pilot-house,  seven  times  on  the  turret, 
and  four  times  on  deck.  The  deepest  indentations  on  the 
sides  were  four  inches,  on  the  turret  two  inches,  and  on  the 
deck  one  inch.  Had  the  Monitor’s  guns  been  depressed  to 
strike  the  enemy  at  the  water  line,  where  there  was  only  one 
inch  of  armor,  or  had  the  latter  concentrated  his  fire  on  the 
pilot-house  of  the  Monitor,  which  was  her  weakest  point,  the 
result  might  have  been  more  decisive.  So  with  the  ord- 
nance. The  service  charge  for  the  Xl-inch  guns  was  fif- 
teen pounds,  and  the  Bureau  had  enjoined  upon  Worden  to 
limit  himself  to  this,  though  it  was  found  later  that  thirty 
pounds  could  be  safely  used  ; and  on  the  other  hand,  owing 
to  the  great  demand  among  the  Confederates  for  juojectiles 
at  other  points,  and*  to  the  supposition  that  she  would  have 
only  wooden  vessels  to  encounter,  the  Merrimac  was  not  sup- 
I. — 4 


74 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


plied  with  solid  shot,  which  would  have  been  far  more  effec- 
tive against  armor  than  shells. 

No  single  event  of  the  naval  war  produced  more  momen- 
tous results  than  the  victory  of  the  Monitor.  The  first  day’s 
battle  in  Hampton  Roads  had  shown  that  the  enemy  pos- 
sessed an  engine  of  destruction  wThose  offensive  powers  were 
a new  revelation  in  maritime  warfare.  There  was  nothing  at 
hand  to  offer  even  a show  of  effective  resistance.  On  that 
memorable  Saturday  night  dismay  and  consternation  per- 
vaded the  fleet ; the  Merrimac  had  the  frigates  at  her  mercy, 
and  the  waters  of  Hampton  Roads  under  her  control.  To  all 
appearances  the  confidence  of  the  country  in  its  navy  was  on 
the  point  of  being  rudely  shaken  by  the  sudden  destruction 
of  a large  force  of  its  most  powerful  ships.  The  blockade 
was  about  to  be  raised  at  the  point  where  it  had  seemed  to 
be  most  firmly  established.  A roadstead  whose  occupation 
was  of  the  highest  strategic  importance  was  about  to  pass 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy ; and  the  proposed  plan  of  an 
invasion  of  the  Peninsula  would  be  rendered  impracticable  if 
the  army’s  base  and  communications  were  threatened  by  the 
Merrimac.  It  was  even  feared  that  the  ironclad  would  issue 
from  the  Chesapeake  and  levy  contributions  on  Northern 
ports;  and  though  it  was  afterward  known  that  she  could 
not  have  gone  to  sea  with  safety,  the  fact  that  she  was  at 
large  and  that  her  egress  was  unchecked  w^ould  have  pro- 
duced incalculable  mischief  both  at  home  rnd  abroad. 

But  the  renown  of  the  Monitor  and  of  the  gallant  officer 
who  commanded  her  rest  no  less  on  the  courage  and  conduct 
that  carried  her  to  victory  than  on  the  importance  of  the  ac- 
tion and  the  dramatic  interest  that  surrounded  it.  The  expe- 
dition had  started  from  New  York  as  a forlorn  hope.  To 
Worden  it  was  doubly  so,  for  he  had  left  a sick-bed  to  as* 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


75 


sume  the  command,  and  he  had  been  told  by  his  physician 
that  he  could  hardly  hope  to  come  back  alive.  With  a forti- 
tude beyond  all  praise  he  held  to  his  purpose,  and  carried 
the  experimental  craft  through  her  first  perilous  sea- voyage. 
After  two  sleepless  days  and  nights  he  entered  Hampton 
Roads,  only  to  find  that  the  fleet  was  demoralized  and  that 
the  whole  weight  of  the  crisis  rested  upon  him.  With  hardly 
a moment  for  rest  or  for  preparation,  he  took  his  untried  ves- 
sel boldly  into  action  with  an  enemy  whose  powers  had  just 
been  proved  in  a successful  engagement,  and  whose  enor- 
mous size  caused  his  little  battery  to  sink  into  comparative 
insignificance.  The  close  of  the  battle  found  the  enemy  in 
retreat,  the  blockade  unbroken,  the  fleet  saved,  and  the 
Roads  reconquered.  For  these  overwhelming  results,  and 
for  the  skill  and  heroism  that  achieved  them  in  the  face  of 
extraordinary  difficulties,  the  names  of  Worden  and  the  Moni- 
tor will  always  be  linked  by  the  country  in  affectionate  re- 
membrance. 1 


1 Though  not,  strictly  speaking,  within  the  province  of  history,  it  may  be  worth 
while  to  quote  here,  as  it  has  never  before  been  made  public,  a touching  letter  which 
was  sent  to  Worden  by  the  crew  of  the  Monitor  at  the  time  when  he  was  lying  in 
Washington  disabled  by  his  wound.  As  an  expression  of  genuine  feeling  from 
rough  and  untrained  men,  and  as  showing  the  enthusiastic  devotion  which  Wor- 
den had  gained  from  his  crew,  its  interest  is  both  human  and  historical. 

To  Captain  Worden. 

“Hampton  Roads.  April  24th,  1862. 

“U.  S.  Monitor. 

“ To  our  Dear  and  Honored  Captain. 

“Dear  Sir  : These  few  lines  is  from  your  own  crew  of  the  Monitor,  with  their 
kindest  Love  to  you  their  Honored  Captain,  hoping  to  God  that  they  will  have 
the  pleasure  of  welcoming  you  back  to  us  again  soon,  for  we  are  all  ready  able  and 
willing  to  meet  Death  or  any  thing  else,  only  give  us  back  our  Captain  again. 
Dear  Captain,  we  have  got  your  Pilot-house  fixed  and  all  ready  for  you  when  you 
get  well  again ; and  we  all  sincerely  hope  that  soon  we  will  have  the  pleasure  of 
welcoming  you  back  to  it.  . . . We  are  waiting  very  patiently  to  engage  our 

Antagonist  if  we  could  only  get  a chance  to  do  so.  The  last  time  she  came  out 
we  all  thought  we  would  have  the  Pleasure  of  sinking  her.  But  we  all  got  disap- 


76 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


After  the  battles  of  the  8tli  and  9th  of  March,  Buchanan 
was  relieved,  in  consequence  of  his  wound,  by  Commodore 
Tattnall,  who  assumed  command  of  the  4 4 naval  defences  of 
the  waters  of  Virginia  ” on  the  29th.  His  fleet  was  composed 
of  the  same  vessels  that  had  taken  part  in  the  two  actions. 
The  Merrimac  came  out  of  dry-dock  on  the  4th  of  April. 
She  had  been  thoroughly  repaired,  and  was  in  as  good  con- 
dition as  before  the  engagement.  Another  layer  of  iron  had 
been  partially  put  on,  a new  ram  had  been  adjusted,  and  she 
was  furnished  with  solid  shot.  Her  only  weak  points  were  in 
her  ports,  which  were  without  covers  ; and  in  her  engines, 
upon  which  full  dependence  could  not  be  placed. 

On  the  morning  of  April  11,  the  Merrimac  steamed  down 
the  river,  and  came  out  into  Hampton  Boads.  Goldsborough 
had  now  returned  from  the  Sounds.  The  Minnesota,  with 
the  Monitor  and  the  other  vessels  of  the  squadron,  was  lying 
at  Fortress  Monroe,  or  a little  below ; and  the  Merrimac  took 
her  position  between  SewalFs  Point  and  Newport  News,  out 
of  range  of  the  guns  of  the  fort. 

Goldsborough,  impressed  with  the  importance  of  keeping 
the  Merrimac  in  check,  in  order  that  she  might  not  interfere 
with  McClellan’s  operations,  and  in  accordance  with  the 
wishes  of  the  Department,  was  inclined  to  take  no  unneces- 
sary risk,  and  to  do  nothing  that  would  precipitate  a conflict. 

pointed,  for  we  did  not  fire  one  shot  and  the  Norfolk  papers  says  we  are  cowards  in 
the  Monitor— and  all  we  want  is  a chance  to  show  them  where  it  lies  with  you  for 
our  Captain  We  can  teach  them  who  is  cowards.  But  there  is  a great  deal  that 
we  would  like  to  write  to  you  but  we  think  you  will  soon  be  with  us  again  your- 
self. But  we  all  join  in  with  our  kindest  love  to  you,  hoping  that  God  will  restore 
you  to  us  again  and  hoping  that  your  sufferings  is  at  an  end  now,  and  we  are  all 
so  glad  to  hear  that  your  eyesight  will  be  spaired  to  you  again.  We  would  wish  to 
write  more  to  you  if  we  have  your  kind  Permission  to  do  so  but  at  present  we  all 
conclude  by  tendering  to  you  our  kindest  Love  and  affection,  to  our  Dear  and 
Honored  Captain. 

“ Wo  remain  untill  Death  your  Affectionate  Crew 

“The  Monitor  Boys.” 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


77 


He  had  no  intention  of  taking  the  offensive,  or  of  engaging, 
except  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances.  Additions 
to  his  force  were  expected  to  arrive  shortly,  and  the  situation 
was  considered  too  critical  to  leave  anything  to  chance.  No 
action  therefore  took  place,  the  vessels  of  the  squadron  hav- 
ing steam  up,  but  remaining  in  their  position  near  the  fort. 

A large  number  of  transports,  store-ships,  and  chartered 
vessels  were  lying  at  this  time  in  or  about  the  Roads.  Golds- 
borough  had  cautioned  them  about  the  danger  of  lying  near 
Hampton,  and  most  of  them  had  withdrawn  below  the  fort. 
On  the  11th,  however,  two  brigs  and  a schooner,  employed 
by  the  Quartermaster’s  Department,  were  still  lying  between 
Newport  News  and  Hampton  Bar.  By  Tattnall’s  direction 
the  Jamestown  and  Raleigh  steamed  across,  captured  the  ves- 
sels, and  brought  them  over  to  Sewall’s  Point,  in  full  sight  of 
the  fleet.  Humiliating  as  the  incident  was,  it  was  not  of  suffi- 
cient importance  to  change  Goldsborougli’s  plan,  supposing 
that  his  plan  was  right.  In  the  occurrences  of  this  day,  the 
Department  commended  Goldsborough’s  action,  and  it  left 
to  his  discretion  the  conduct  of  subsequent  operations. 

Matters  remained  in  this  position  for  nearly  a month,  the 
squadron  having  been  increased  during  this  time  by  the  ad- 
dition of  the  new  ironclad  Galena,  the  Vanderbilt,  and  other 
vessels.  In  May  it  became  apparent  to  the  Confederates 
that  the  progress  of  military  operations  would  compel  the 
abandonment  of  Norfolk,  and  consultations  were  held  by 
the  military  and  naval  authorities  as  to  the  disposition  of 
the  Merrimac.  Early  on  the  morning  of  May  8,  the  United 
States  steamers  Galena,  Aroostook,  and  Port  Royal  were  sent 
up  the  James  River.  The  Merrimac  was  at  Norfolk,  and  a 
demonstration  was  made  by  the  rest  of  the  squadron  against 
the  battery  at  Sewall’s  Point.  Presently  the  Merrimac  came 
down  the  river.  It  was  not  Goldsborough’s  intention  to 


78 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


make  a serious  attack  on  tlie  fort,  his  object  being  merely  tc 
ascertain  the  strength  of  the  works  and  the  possibility  of  ef- 
fecting a landing  of  the  troops. 

The  Monitor  had  orders  to  fall  back  into  fair  channel  way, 
and  only  engage  the  Merrimac  seriously  in  such  a position 
that  the  Minnesota  and  the  other  vessels  could  run  her  down, 
if  an  opportunity  presented  itself.  According  to  Goldsbor- 
ough,  “the  Merrimac  came  out,  but  was  even  more  cautious 
than  ever.  The  Monitor  was  kept  well  in  advance,  and  so 
that  the  Merrimac  could  have  engaged  her  without  difficulty 
had  she  been  so  disposed ; but  she  declined  to  do  it,  and 
soon  returned  and  anchored  under  Sewall’s  Point.”  1 

On  the  10  th,  Tattnall  learned  that  the  fort  at  Sewall’s 
Point  had  been  abandoned,  and  that  the  United  States  troops, 
having  landed  at  Ocean  View,  were  rapidly  advancing  on  Nor- 
folk. By  the  evening  Norfolk  had  surrendered,  and  he  re- 
solved to  withdraw  to  the  James  River.  The  pilots  informed 
him  that  they  could  take  the  ship  up  with  a draft  of  eighteen 
feet.  The  Merrimac  drew  twenty-two  feet,  and  preparations 
Were  made  to  lighten  her.  After  working  half  the  night,  and 
stripping  the  ship  so  that  she  was  unfit  for  action,  the  pilots, 
apparently  not  wishing  to  go  out,  declared  that  it  would  be 
impossible  to  take  her  up  as  far  as  Jamestown  Flats,  the 
point  to  which  McClellan’s  army  was  supposed  to  have  occu- 
pied the  river.  Tattnall  thereupon  concluded  to  destroy  his 


1 It  is  impossible  to  reconcile  the  statements  of  the  two  opposing  commanders, 
in  regard  to  the  events  of  this  day.  Tattnall  says:  “ We  passed  the  battery  and 
stood  direotiy  for  the  enemy  for  the  purpose  of  engaging  him,  and  I thought  au 
action  certain,  particularly  as  the  Minnesota  and  Vanderbilt,  which  were  an- 
chored beiow  Fortress  Monroe,  got  under  way  and  stood  up  to  that  point,  appar- 
ently with  the  intention  of  joining  their  squadron  in  the  roads.  Before,  how- 
ever, we  got  within  gunshot,  the  enemy  ceased  firing  and  retired  with  all  speed 
under  the  protection  of  the  guns  of  the  Fortress,  followed  by  the  Virginia,  until 
the  shells  from  the  Rip  Raps  passed  over  her.  The  Virginia  was  then  placed  at 
her  moorings  near  Sewall’s  Point.” 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


79 


ship ; and,  setting  her  on  fire,  he  landed  his  officers  and  men 
and  escaped  by  way  of  Suffolk.  At  five  o’clock  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  11th  the  Merrimac  blew  up. 

Possession  of  Norfolk  being  now  resumed,  active  opera- 
tions came  to  an  end,  and  the  blockading  station  at  Hampton 
Roads  ceased  to  be  the  scene  of  conflict.  The  Monitor,  after 
remaining  all  summer  in  the  James  River,  was  sent  to  Wash- 
ington for  repairs  in  September,  and  two  months  later  re- 
turned to  Hampton  Roads. 

The  career  of  the  Monitor  was  now  nearly  over.  On  the 
afternoon  of  the  29  th  of  December,  she  set  out  for  Beaufort, 
N.  C.,  in  tow  of  the  Rhode  Island.  Admiral  Lee  had  left  the 
time  of  departure  at  the  discretion  of  Bankhead,  the  com- 
mander of  the  Monitor  ; and  the  latter  chose  a clear  pleasant 
day,  when  a light  wind  was  blowing  from  the  southwest,  and 
everything  promised  fair  weather.  The  passage  to  Beaufort 
was  about  as  long  as  that  from  New  York  to  Hampton  Roads. 
The  Monitor  was  accompanied  by  the  Passaic,  which  was  in 
tow  of  the  State  of  Georgia.  All  went  well  until  the  morning 
< >f  the  second  day,  when  the  ships  began  to  feel  a swell  from 
the  southward.  Gradually  the  wind  freshened,  and  the  sea 
broke  over  the  pilot-house  of  the  Monitor.  The  weather  was 
threatening  all  day,  with  occasional  squalls  of  wind  and  rain  : 
but  the  bilge-pumps  were  kept  at  work,  and  the  ironclads 
remained  free  from  water. 

As  evening  came  on,  and  Hatteras  was  passed,  matters  be- 
gan to  grow  worse.  The  wind  increased  and  hauled  to  the 
southward,  causing  a heavy  sea.  As  the  Monitor  rose  to  the 
swell,  the  projecting  armor  of  her  bow  received  the  shock  of 
the  advancing  wave  full  on  its  flat  under-surface,  coming 
down  with  a clap  like  thunder.  The  sea  rose  fast,  submerg- 
ing the  pilot-house,  and  forcing  its  way  into  the  turret  and 


80 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


blower-pipes.  Trenchard,  who  commanded  the  Ehode  Island, 
stopped  his  vessel,  to  see  if  the  Monitor  would  not  ride  more 
easily  or  make  less  water;  but  the  inert  mass  of  iron  only  fell 
off  and  rolled  heavily  in  the  trough  of  the  sea.  Again  the 
Ehode  Island  started,  with  the  Monitor  yawing  and  plunging 
behind  her.  The  strain  on  her  forward  overhang  had  loosened 
the  plates  under  her  bow,  and  she  began  to  leak ; and  though 
all  the  pumps  were  working,  the  water  gained  on  them  fast. 
At  ten  o’clock  it  became  evident  that  no  efforts  would  avail 
to  save  the  ship  ; and  Bankhead  made  the  signal  of  distress, 
cut  the  hawser,  and  ranged  up  under  the  lee  of  the  Ehode 
Island.  Boats  were  lowered,  and  the  dangerous  work  began 
of  removing  the  crew  of  the  sinking  ironclad,  over  whose 
deck  the  seas  were  no  w breaking  in  quick  succession.  As  the 
vessels  touched,  ropes  were  thrown  over  the  Ehode  Island’s 
quarter ; but  the  crew  could  not  or  would  not  seize  them. 
The  Ehode  Island’s  cutter  took  off  a boat-load  of  men  suc- 
cessfully, but  the  launch  was  stove  by  the  working  of  the 
Monitor;  and  Trenchard,  finding  that  his  owTn  vessel  was 
imperilled  by  the  sharp  bow  and  sides  of  her  companion,  was 
obliged  to  move  away. 

It  was  now  nearly  midnight ; the  ship  was  sinking  fast,  the 
rising  water  had  put  out  the  fires,  engines  and  pumps  had 
stopped,  and  again  the  Monitor  fell  off  into  the  trough  of  the 
sea,  where  she  rolled  sluggishly.  Seeing  this,  Bankhead  let 
go  the  anchor,  which  brought  her  head  to  wind.  The  greater 
part  of  the  crew  had  now  been  rescued  ; but  a few  had  been 
wTaslied  overboard,  and  twenty  or  so  still  remained  on  board, 
waiting  for  the  boats  to  return.  During  these  trying  mo- 
ments Bankhead  set  a bailing  party  at  work,  not  in  the  hope 
of  reducing  the  water,  but  to  give  occupation  to  his  men. 
Slowly  and  cautiously  the  last  boat  approached,  keeping  off 
with  her  oars  from  the  side  of  the  ironclad,  and  while  Bank- 


THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


81 


head  held  the  painter  she  took  off  the  remnant  of  the  crew, — 
all  but  a few  poor  fellows  who,  dazed  and  terrified,  could  not 
be  made  to  leave  the  turret.  Last  of  all  Bankhead  jumped 
in,  and  the  boat  pulled  toward  the  Bhode  Island,  and  was 
got  safely  on  board.  A few  moments  more,  and  the  Monitor 
slowly  settled  and  disappeared. 

I.— 4* 


CHAPTER  IV. 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 

The  first  step  in  the  establishment  of  the  Atlantic  block- 
ade was  the  proclamation  issued  by  Commodore  Pendergrast, 
still  in  command  of  the  Home  Squadron  at  Hampton  Roads. 
The  only  effective  blockade  then  existing  was  maintained  by 
the  Cumberland,  and  such  other  vessels  as  had  been  hastily 
collected,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Fortress  Monroe.  In  car- 
rying out  the  plan,  it  was  decided  to  put  the  whole  force 
on  the  Atlantic  coast  under  one  command,  and  Commodore 
Stringham  was  accordingly  appointed  flag-officer  commanding 
the  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron.  The  Minnesota,  which 
had  been  laid  up  in  ordinary  at  Boston,  was  assigned  to  him 
as  flagship,  and  on  the  13th  of  May  he  arrived  at  Hampton 
Roads,  and  entered  upon  his  command. 

The  instructions  sent  to  Stringham  on  May  1 will  serve 
to  show  exactly  the  views  of  the  Department  in  its  first 
efforts  to  establish  the  blockade.  They  were  as  follows  : 

“ The  President,  by  Proclamation  of  April  19,  1861,  ordered  a block- 
ade of  the  ports  within  the  States  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Alabama, 
Florida,  Mississippi,  Louisiana,  and  Texas ; and  by  a supplemental 
Proclamation  of  the  27th  of  April,  1801,  he  extends  th3  blockade  so  as 
to  include  the  ports  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina.  In  pursuance  of 
the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  Law  of  Nations,  in  such  cases 
provided,  it  becomes  necessary  that  a competent  force  be  posted  so  as 
to  prevent  the  entrance  and  exit  of  vessels  from  the  ports  aforesaid. 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS: 


83 


“With  this  view  you  will  establish  and  enforce  a blockade  at  each 
and  all  of  the  ports  in  the  States  enumerated  east  of  Key  West,  and  a 
sufficient  disposable  force  will  be  placed  under  the  command  of  yourself 
that  you  may  carry  these  orders  into  effect.  On  you  will  devolve  the 
duty  of  blockading  all  the  ports  east  of  Key  West.  You  will  duly 
notify  neutrals  of  the  declaration  of  blockade,  and  give  to  it  all  the  pub- 
licity in  your  power.  The  blockade  must  be  strict  and  absolute  and 
only  public  armed  vessels  of  foreign  powers  should  be  permitted  to 
enter  the  ports  which  are  placed  in  a state  of  blockade.  To  neutral  or 
foreign  vessels,  that  are  already  in  the  ports,  you  will  allow  a reasonable 
number  of  days  to  leave  them.  The  country  relies  upon  your  command, 
with  the  squadron  of  the  Gulf,  to  make  this  blockade  effectual,  so  as  to 
close  all  of  the  ports  of  the  States  above  named,  protect  our  commerce 
from  the  depredations  of  privateers,  and  contribute,  by  your  activity  and 
vigilance,  to  the  speedy  suppression  of  the  insurrectionary  movements 
and  the  adjustment  of  the  present  unhappy  difficulties.  It  will  not  be 
improper  to  state  to  you  that  a lawful  maritime  blockade  requires  the 
actual  presence  of  an  adequate  force  stationed  at  the  entrance  of  the 
port,  sufficiently  near  to  prevent  communication.  . . . You  will 

permit  no  neutral  or  foreign  vessel  proceeding  toward  the  entrance  of 
a blockaded  port  to  be  captured  or  detained  if  she  shall  not  have  pre- 
viously received  from  one  of  the  blockading  squadron  a special  notifica- 
tion of  the  existence  of  the  blockade. 

“ This  notification  must  be  inserted  in  writing  on  the  muster-roll  of 
the  neutral  vessel,  by  the  cruiser  which  meets  her  ; and  it  should  con- 
tain the  announcement,  together  with  statements  of  the  day  and  the 
latitude  in  which  it  was  made. 

“The  United  States  have  at  all  times  maintained  these  principles  on 
the  subject  of  blockade,  and  you  will  take  care  not  to  attempt  the  appli- 
cation of  penalties  for  a breach  of  blockade  except  in  cases  where  your 
right  is  justified  by  these  rules.” 

The  following  additional  instructions  were  issued  May  4 : 

“The  Department  would  in  every  instance  allow  at  least  fifteen  days 
for  vessels  to  depart  with  or  without  cargo  after  the  blockade  is  set  with 
a sufficient  force.  Notice  should  be  given,  by  such  extended  publicity 
a3  you  can  command,  at  each  and  every  port  as  soon  as  the  blockade 
is  established. 


84 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


“Commodore  Pendergrast  will  inform  you  of  the  condition  of  affairs 
and  orders  received.  He  will  also  assist  with  the  Cumberland  in  en- 
forcing the  blockade  for  the  present. 

“ I need  not  enjoin  vigilance  and  promptness  to  prevent  privateering 
and  depredations. 

“ There  are  several  vessels  in  the  waters  of  the  Chesapeake  to  aid  you, 
and  others  which  are  being  equipped  will  soon  arrive  out  and  report. 
The  names,  officers,  crews,  and  armaments  of  these  vessels  are  not  yet 
reported  in  full  to  the  Department,  in  consequence  of  the  haste  and 
activity  necessary  to  get  them  afloat  at  the  earliest  moment. 

“ Some  of  the  vessels  can,  it  is  believed,  aid  in  blockading  the  Mis- 
sissippi and  Mobile.  But  much  must  be  committed  to  your  judgment 
and  discretion. 

“Commodore  Mervine  will  shortly  proceed  to  the  Gulf  with  the 
[steamer]  Mississippi,  and  other  vessels  will  be  speedily  despatched  to 
reinforce  the  blockading  squadron,  and  close  Galveston  and  other  ports.” 

No  time  was  therefore  lost  in  making  a beginning.  But 
for  the  first  three  months  it  was  only  a beginning ; and  at 
some  points  it  cannot  be  said  to  have  gone  so  far  as  that. 
The  Niagara,  under  Captain  McKean,  had  arrived  at  Boston, 
April  24,  and  was  sent  to  New  York  for  necessary  repairs. 
These  were  hurriedly  completed  and  she  proceeded  to 
Charleston  to  set  on  foot  the  blockade  at  that  point.  She 
arrived  at  her  post  on  May  11.  After  lying  off  the  bar  four 
days,  and  warning  several  vessels  “off  the  whole  Southern 
coast,  ” for  which,  as  already  mentioned,  the  Government 
afterward  paid  heavy  damages,  she  was  directed  to  proceed 
to  sea  to  intercept  certain  shiploads  of  arms  and  munitions 
of  war,  which  were  known  to  be  on  their  way  from  Europe  to 
New  Orleans  or  Mobile.  The  Niagara  touched  at  Havana,  and 
later  joined  the  Gulf  blockade.  The  Harriet  Lane  was  off 
Charleston  on  the  19tli,  and  cruised  for  some  days  near  that 
part  of  the  coast  ;*  but  the  blockade  in  reality  was  raised,  for 
the  port  remained  open  until  May  28,  when  the  Minnesota 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


85 


arrived.  On  the  same  day  the  blockade  of  Savannah  was  es- 
tablished by  the  Union,  a steamer  which  had  been  chartered 
at  Philadelphia  five  days  after  the  President’s  first  proclama- 
tion was  issued.  At  the  beginning  of  July,  the  Atlantic 
Squadron  comprised  twenty-two  vessels,  but  most  of  them 
were  stationed  in  Hampton  Roads  or  were  cruising  at  a dis- 
tance from  the  coast. 

The  line  of  operations  of  the  Atlantic  Blockading  Squad- 
ron began  originally  at  Washington,  and  extending  down  the 
Potomac  River  and  the  Chesapeake,  passed  out  to  sea 
between  the  Capes,  following  the  coast  to  Key  West.  The 
boundary  was  afterward  fixed  at  Cape  Canaveral. 

Upon  this  line  there  were  three  principal  points  of  block- 
ade, Wilmington,  Charleston,  and  Savannah.  They  became 
centres  of  blockade  in  the  beginning,  because  of  their  com- 
mercial importance  ; and  the  first  two  remained  so  until  the 
end,  because  they  offered  peculiar  advantages  to  blockade- 
runners,  and  were  capable  of  defence  almost  to  the  last 
against  attacks  by  sea. 

The  different  stretches  of  coast  that  lay  between  and  out- 
side the  blockade  centres  had  peculiar  features  of  their  own. 
Between  Washington  and  Hampton  Roads  lay  the  military 
frontier.  The  blockade  in  the  Potomac  River  was  therefore 
largely  devoted  to  the  restriction  of  communication  between 
the  two  shores,  and  to  keeping  open  the  water-approaches  of 
the  capital ; and  the  work  of  the  Potomac  flotilla  was  of  a 
kind  by  itself.  Below  the  Potomac  lay  the  mouths  of  the 
Virginia  rivers,  near  the  upper  waters  of  which  were  the 
great  battlefields  of  the  war ; and  the  naval  operations  car- 
ried on  in  this  neighborhood  were  always  subsidiary  to  the 
movements  of  the  army. 

The  Potomac  flotilla  was  organized  in*May,  1861,  under  the 
command  of  Commander  James  H.  Ward,  and  formed  at  first 


86 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


a part  of  the  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron.  On  May  31 
Ward  attacked  the  Confederate  batteries  at  Acquia  Creek,  in 
the  steamer  Freeborn,  assisted  by  the  other  vessels  of  the 
flotilla,  the  Anacostia  and  Besolute.  The  shore  batteries 
were  silenced,  and  the  enemy  retreated  to  their  works  on  the 
heights.  This  was  the  first  naval  engagement  of  the  war. 
On  the  next  day,  the  Pawnee,  under  Commander  Kowan, 
was  sent  down  from  Washington,  and  the  attack  was  re- 
newed, the  Pawnee  joining  in  the  bombardment  with  her 
heavy  battery. 

On  June  27,  Ward  made  a landing  at  Matthias  Point  with 
a small  party  of  men.  He  was  accompanied  by  Lieutenant 
Chaplin  of  the  Pawnee.  His  object  seems  to  have  been  to 
clear  away  the  woods  on  the  point,  which  afforded  shelter 
to  the  enemy ; but  he  underestimated  the  force  opposed  to 
him,  and  he  had  hardly  landed,  when  a body  of  troops, 
numbering  four  or  five  hundred,  came  over  the  brow  of  the 
hill  to  attack  him.  Ordering  the  men  to  lie  off  in  their 
boats,  Ward  returned  to  the  Freeborn,  and  opened  fire  on 
the  advancing  column.  Chaplin  landed  his  handful  of  men 
a second  time,  and  threw  up  a breastwork ; but  about  this 
time  Ward  was  killed  while  sighting  his  bow-gun,  and  the 
fire  from  the  vessel  ceased.  In  consequence  of  this  acci- 
dent, signal  was  made  to  Chaplin  to  return ; but  the  enemy 
had  now  advanced  within  two  hundred  yards,  and  opened 
a galling  fire  upon  the  party.  Chaplin  collected  his  men 
and  sent  them  to  the  boats,  waiting  himself  until  the  last. 
When  he  came  to  the  beach,  only  one  man  remained  with 
him,  and  the  boat  had  drifted  out.  But  Chaplin,  who  was 
a man  of  uncommon  character,  was  unwilling  to  bring  it 
back  under  the  enemy’s  fire  ; and  as  the  man  who  was  with 
him  could  not  swim,  Chaplin  took  him  on  his  shoulders, 
musket  and  all,  and  swam  out  with  him  to  the  boat. 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


87 


After  Ward’s  death,  Commander  Craven  succeeded  to  the 
command  of  the  flotilla.  Occasional  brushes  with  the  enemy 
took  place,  schooners  were  cut  out  or  burned,  and  the  river 
was  kept  open  until  the  end  of  October,  when  the  heavy  bat- 
teries thrown  up  on  the  Virginia  shore  made  it  impassable. 

Early  in  1862  the  Confederates  withdrew  from  their  posi- 
tions along  the  river.  The  work  of  the  flotilla  in  the  Po- 
tomac during  the  remainder  of  the  war,  under  its  succes- 
sive commanders,  Wyman,  Harwood,  and  Parker,  was  chiefly 
confined  to  the  suppression  of  the  small  attempts  at  illicit 
traffic  which  are  always  found  along  a frontier  of  belligerent 
operations.  In  the  other  Virginian  rivers  the  flotilla  at  the 
same  time  took  part  in  active  operations,  in  connection  with 
the  movements  of  the  army  and  the  protection  of  transports 
and  supplies. 

Outside  the  Chesapeake  the  real  blockade  service  began. 
A little  to  the  south  of  the  Capes  is  found  the  double  coast 
which  extends  as  *ar  as  Wilmington.  The  peculiar  conforma- 
tion of  the  coast  consists  of  a long  narrow  belt  of  sand,  jut- 
ting out  in  three  prominent  headlands,  Cape  Hatteras,  Cape 
Lookout,  and  Cape  Fear.  The  sand-belt  is  broken  at  inter- 
vals by  shallow  inlets.  Within  it  lie  the  two  Sounds,  exten- 
sive sheets  of  water,  upon  whose  tributary  rivers  are  a number 
of  more  or  less  important  towns.  Below  Wilmington  the 
coast  sweeps  in,  describing  a long  curve,  at  the  southern  ex- 
tremity of  which,  in  a deep  recess,  lies  Georgetown.  At  this 
point  the  shore  begins  to  assume  the  insular  character  which 
is  so  well  defined  below  Charleston.  From  here  to  Fernan- 
dina  it  forms  a series  of  low  swampy  islands,  separated  by 
narrow  rivers  and  arms  of  the  sea,  making  an  intricate 
network  of  water-courses.  At  intervals  the  groups  of  isl- 
ands are  broken  by  large  estuaries  at  the  mouths  of  rivers. 
There  are  five  of  these  between  Charleston  and  Savannah — 


88 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Stono  Inlet,  North  Edisto,  South  Edisto,  St.  Helena,  and 
Port  Royal.  Below  Tybee  Roads,  the  entrance  to  Savannah, 
the  same  formation  continues,  with  six  important  sounds— * 
Wassaw,  Ossabaw,  St.  Catherine,  Sapelo,  Doboy,  and  Alta- 
maha.  Brunswick  is  the  only  town  of  importance  in  this 
region,  with  an  entrance  at  St.  Simon’s  Sound.  From  St. 
Simon’s  the  line  of  islands  and  sounds  continues,  including 
Sb.  Andrew’s,  Cumberland  Sound  at  Fernandina,  St.  John’s, 
and  St.  Augustine.  Below  this  point,  the  coast  of  Florida  con- 
sists of  narrow  reaches  of  sand  enclosing  long  lagoons,  only 
broken  by  small  and  infrequent  passes.  In  the  whole  extent 
of  the  South  Atlantic  Squadron  there  were  twenty  or  more  of 
these  small  inlets,  in  each  of  which  it  was  necessary  to  keep 
a vessel,  if  the  blockade  was  to  be  rigidly  maintained. 

During  the  summer  of  1861  great  efforts  were  made  by  the 
Confederates  to  show  that  the  blockade  was  inefficient.  It 
was  commonly  spoken  of  in  their  newspapers  as  “the  paper 
blockade,”  and  steps  were  taken  by  foreign  governments, 
and  especially  by  that  of  Great  Britain,  to  ascertain  its  true 
character.  The  Gladiator,  an  English  cruiser,  commanded 
by  Captain  Hickley,  whose  name  is  an  all-sufficient  guarantee 
of  the  accuracy  of  his  reports,  made  two  cruises  of  observa- 
tion off  the  Atlantic  coast,  at  the  beginning  and  at  the  end 
of  July.  On  his  first  cruise,  after  a careful  search,  he  could 
find  nothing  in  the  shape  of  a blockader  between  Cape  Henry 
and  Cape  Fear.  The  force  in  Hampton  Roads  was  composed 
of  the  Minnesota,  Roanoke,  and  Susquehanna,  the  sailing- 
frigate  Santee,  the  Cumberland,  and  the  steamers  Anacostia, 
Dawn,  Daylight,  and  Quaker  City,  On  his  second  cruise, 
the  eastern  entrance  of  Wilmington  was  still  open,  as  were 
the  inlets  to  the  northward ; but  four  vessels,  the  frigate 
Roanoke,  the  small  steamer  Albatross,  and  two  sailing-ves- 
sels, the  St.  Lawrence  and  the  Savannah,  were  cruising  off 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


89 


the  coast.  Hickley  did  not  round  Cape  Fear  on  his  second 
cruise  ; had  he  done  so,  he  would  have  found  one  vessel  off 
the  mouth  of  Cape  Fear  River.  This  was  the  steamer  Day- 
light, which  arrived  on  the  20  th  of  July,  and  immediately 
notified  the  commanding  officer  of  Fort  Caswell  of  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  blockade. 

Notwithstanding  the  very  inadequate  force  on  the  station, 
the  vessels  of  the  squadron  acted  upon  the  assumption  of 
the  existence  of  an  efficient  blockade.  On  July  16,  the  Brit- 
ish brig  Herald,  two  days  out  from  Beaufort,  was  captured 
by  the  St.  Lawrence,  on  the  edge  of  the  Gulf  Stream,  two 
hundred  miles  from  land.  The  Department  ordered  the  re- 
lease of  the  Herald,  but  she  was  detained  by  the  court,  and 
finally  condemned.  Three  days  earlier,  Pendergrast,  then 
in  command  of  a projected  “West  India  Squadron,”  was 
lying  at  Charleston,  and  published  anew  his  proclamation  of 
April  30,  announcing  an  efficient  blockade  of  Virginia  and 
North  Carolina,  and  repeating  the  warning  that  he  had  a 
sufficient  naval  force  “ here  ” (that  is,  at  Charleston)  for  the 
purpose  of  carrying  out  the  proclamation.  Proclamations, 
however,  even  though  they  may  be  of  questionable  validity, 
are  not  entirely  without  effect.  Hickley  reported  that  trade 
on  the  coast  of  North  Carolina  was  stagnant ; and,  as  has 
been  already  said,  regular  commerce  was  for  the  time  being 
actually  stopped  by  the  original  proclamation  of  the  Presi- 
dent. In  the  months  of  June,  July,  and  August  forty-two 
vessels  entered  and  cleared  at  Wilmington,  but  nearly  all 
were  small  coasters.  The  arrivals  at  Charleston,  from  June 
1 to  December  1,  numbered  one  hundred  and  fifty  vessels 
of  the  same  description.  Most  of  these  entered  at  some  of 
the  numerous  side  channels  to  be  found  in  the  network  of 
inlets  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  port.  Indeed,  vessels  made 
the  inshore  passage  from  Charleston  to  Fernandina  without 


90 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


interruption  as  late  as  the  end  of  July,  1861,  and  perhaps  later. 
The  Wabash  and  Yandalia  were  at  this  time  off  Charleston, 
and  the  Jamestown  and  Flag  off  Savannah.  These  vessels, 
though  hardly  fitted  for  the  work,  nevertheless  made  the 
blockade  legally  efficient  at  the  main  entrances  of  these  two 
ports.  But  the  intermediate  points,  on  the  coast  of  South 
Carolina  and  Georgia,  and  the  whole  inland  passage,  as  far 
south  as  Fernandina,  were  entirely  without  a blockade  of  any 
kind. 

The  increase  of  the  blockading  forces,  and  the  gradual 
extension  of  the  blockade,  led  to  a division  of  the  duties  of 
the  station.  The  North  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron,  in- 
cluding the  coast  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  was  as- 
signed to  Flag-Officer  Goldsborough,  who  assumed  com- 
mand on  September  23.  Flag-Officer  Dupont  was  appointed 
to  the  South  Atlantic  Squadron,  from  the  northern  boun- 
dary of  South  Carolina  to  Cape  Florida,  and  hoisted  his  flag 
in  the  Wabash  on  October  29.  Goldsborough  remained  in 
command  just  a year.  He  was  relieved  September  5,  1862, 
by  Acting  Bear- Admiral  Lee,  who  retained  the  squadron  for 
two  years.  The  later  blockade  of  Wilmington  was  brought  to 
a remarkable  state  of  efficiency,  through  the  untiring  efforts 
and  zeal  of  the  officers  of  the  squadron.  In  the  last  year  of 
the  war,  when  the  expedition  against  Fort  Fisher  was  decided 
on,  the  command  of  the  North  Atlantic  Station  was  offered 
to  Farragut,  and,  upon  his  declining  it,  Porter  was  appointed. 
Porter  entered  upon  his  duties  October  12,  1864,  and  Lee  was 
transferred  to  the  Mississippi. 

The  first  step  in  the  conversion  of  the  blockade  of  the 
North  Atlantic  coast  into  a military  occupation  was  the  cap- 
ture of  the  forts  at  Hatteras  Inlet,  by  Stringliam,  with  a 
small  body  of  troops  under  General  Butler,  August  29,  1861. 
This  was  followed^  in  February,  1862,  by  the  expedition  of 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


91 


Goldsborough  and  Burnside  against  Roanoke  Island,  and 
the  active  operations  conducted  subsequently  by  Rowan  in 
the  Sounds.  The  most  important  points  in  the  interior 
waters  of  North  Carolina  were  then  occupied,  and  the  small 
commerce  in  the  Sounds  came  to  an  end.  After  a while 
Beaufort  became  the  centre  of . occupation,  though  the  head- 
quarters of  the  squadron  and  the  station  of  the  flagship  con- 
tinued for  a long  time  to  be  at  Hampton  Roads. 

On  the  20fch  of  July  the  steamer  Daylight  took  her  station 
off  the  mouth  of  Cape  Fear  River.  With  this  diminutive 
force  began  the  famous  blockade  of  Wilmington — the  port 
which  later  in  the  war  became  the  scene  of  the  most  bril- 
liant successes  of  the  blockade-runners  and  the  most  strenu- 
ous efforts  of  the  blockaders.  The  town  is  situated  on  Cape 
Fear  River,  about  twenty-eight  miles  from  its  mouth.  There 
are  two  entrances  to  the  river,  one  from  the  eastward,  called 
New  Inlet,  the  other  from  the  southward  at  the  river  mouth. 
The  entrances  are  not  more  than  six  miles  apart  in  a straight 
line  ; but  between  the  two  lies  Smith’s  Island,  a long  strip  of 
sand  and  shoal,  with  the  headland  of  Cape  Fear  projecting 
far  out  at  the  southern  extremity.  Continuing  the  line  of 
Cape  Fear,  the  dangerous  Frying  Pan  Shoals  extend  out  ten 
miles  farther,  making  the  distance  by  water  between  the 
two  entrances  little  short  of  forty  miles. 

Each  of  the  channels  was  protected  by  strong  works,  and 
each  required  a separate  blockading  force.  Smithville,  a 
small  town  on  the  Cape  Fear  River  about  equidistant  from 
the  two  entrances,  was  the  point  of  departure  of  the  blockade- 
runners.  Dropping  down  from  Wilmington  to  this  place,  they 
could  here  await  their  opportunity  and  take  their  choice  be- 
tween the  main  channel  and  New  Inlet,  whichever  seemed  at 
the  moment  most  favorable.  Neither  presented  any  serious 
difficulties  to  the  navigator,  though  vessels  entering  from 


92 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


the  south  were  occasionally  caught  on  “ the  Lump,”  a round 
shoal  in  the  channel.  To  the  north  of  New  Inlet,  on  Federal 


Entrances  to  Cape  Fear  River. 


Point,  was  Fort  Fisher.  Fort  Caswell  overlooked,  in  the 
same  way,  the  mouth  of  the  river.  Each  of  the  blockading 
squadrons,  obliged  to  keep  out  of  range  of  the  forts,  was 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


93 


stationed  in  a semicircle,  ten  miles  or  more  in  length,  with 
its  extremities  near  the  shore.  The  forts  kept  a sharp  look- 
out, and  if  a stray  blockader  ventured  in  too  far,  he  was 
quickly  apprised  of  it  by  a shell,  and  made  to  keep  his  dis 
tance.  The  blockade-runners,  sighting  the  land  toward  even- 
ing, would  wait  outside  until  it  was  dark,  and  then,  mak- 
ing a dash  at  full  speed  through  the  fleet,  would  be  under 
the  guns  of  the  fort  in  a twinkling,  and  safe  from  capture. 
Such  a port,  so  protected,  it  was  almost  impossible  to  close, 
and  fast  vessels  could  slip  in  past  the  most  vigilant  force. 
Accordingly  it  was  at  Wilmington  that  blockade-running 
maintained  itself  longest  and  most  actively,  after  it  had 
nearly  ceased  elsewhere.  In  1863-64,  it  was  at  its  height ; 
but  toward  the  end  of  the  latter  year  it  began  gradually 
to  decline.  Even  after  the  first  attack  on  Fort  Fisher,  a 
few  vessels  succeeded  in  passing  in  and  out  with  impunity  ; 
and  the  practice  only  came  to  an  end  when  the  fort  suc- 
cumbed. 

The  improvement  in  the  efficiency  of  the  Wilmington  block- 
ade was  partly  due  to  the  increase  in  the  number  of  vessels, 
and  partly  to  a better  understanding  of  the  exigencies  of  the 
service.  In  August,  1862,  one  of  the  blockade-running  cap- 
tains reports  that  the  vessels  of  the  inshore  squadron  carried 
lights  at  their  peaks  all  night ; and  the  same  captain  states  a 
year  later  that  a j)ortion  of  the  fleet  remained  at  anchor  dur- 
ing the  night.  On  the  other  hand,  Admiral  Lee,  describing 
the  blockade  of  the  same  port  in  October,  1864,  says  that  the 
smaller  vessels  were  kept  as  near  the  bar  and  batteries  as  the 
state  of  the  weather,  the  light,  and  their  draft  would  allow. 
These  were  pressed  in  by  a line  of  larger  vessels,  and  these 
again  by  the  divisional  officer,  moving  along  the  line.  Ves- 
sels of  the  outer  line  which  discovered  blockade-runners 
were  allowed  to  chase,  but  those  on  the  inner  line  were  re- 


94 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


quired  to  keep  tlieir  station.  All  the  vessels  were  kept 
under  way  all  night.  In  the  summer  of  1864,  the  headquar- 
ters of  the  squadron  were  removed  from  Hampton  Roads  to 
Beaufort.  In  the  fall  the  blockading  force  at  the  two  en- 
trances numbered  fifty  steamers,  some  of  them  the  fastest 
in  the  service.  Nowhere  was  the  work  of  the  blockade  more 
arduous  and  difficult  than  at  Wilmington.  The  squadron 
captured  or  destroyed  sixty-five  steam  blockade-runners  dur- 
ing the  war ; and  yet  they  continued  to  effect  an  entrance. 
The  result  only  shows  that  the  absolute  locking-up  of  a well- 
fortified  port,  whose  trade  offers  powerful  inducements  to 
commercial  enterprise,  is  an  actual  impossibility. 

It  was  during  his  service  on  this  station,  while  in  command 
of  the  Monticello,  that  Cushing  performed  two  of  those  dare- 
devil exploits  which  gave  him  a name  and  a fame  apart  in  the 
history  of  the  war.  The  first  of  these  took  place  in  Febru- 
ary, 1864,  while  the  Monticello  was  blockading  the  mouth  of 
Cape  Fear  River.  On  the  night  of  the  28th,  Cushing  fitted 
out  two  boats,  and  taking  with  him  Acting-Ensign  Jones, 
Acting-Master’s  Mate  Howarth,  and  twenty  men,  he  pro- 
ceeded past  the  fort  and  up  the  river  to  Smith ville.  His 
object  was  to  land  at  the  town,  capture  the  commanding 
officer,  and  board  any  vessels  he  might  find  in  the  harbor. 
It  was  an  enterprise  hardly  worth  the  risk,  for  the  danger 
was  great,  and  the  capture  of  a dozen  commanding  officers  at 
such  posts  as  Smithville  would  not  compensate  for  the  loss 
of  one  Cushing.  Still,  Cushing’s  coolness  and  audacity 
would  counterbalance  almost  any  risk,  and  he  had  no  idea  of 
being  lost  on  this  occasion. 

The  party  reached  the  town,  and  landed  in  front  of  the  ho- 
tel. Concealing  his  men  under  the  bank,  Cushing  proceeded 
to  capture  some  negroes,  from  whom  he  obtained  the  infor- 
mation he  wanted ; then,  taking  with  him  the  two  officers 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


95 


and  a seaman,  he  walked  to  General  Herbert’s  headquar- 
ters. On  the  opposite  side  of  the  street  were  the  barracks, 
in  which  the  garrison  was  quartered,  numbering  about  1,000 
men.  Unfortunately,  the  General  was  out,  having  gone  to 
Wilmington.  Cushing  entered  the  house  with  his  party 
and  captured  an  engineer  officer.  The  Adjutant-General  was 
also  in  the  house,  but  went  off  in  haste  to  the  woods,  and 
neglected  to  call  out  the  garrison.  Cushing  returned  quietly 
with  his  prisoner  to  the  boat,  passing  within  a few  yards  of 
the  sentry  on  the  wharf.  A few  minutes  after  he  had  em- 
barked the  alarm  was  given,  and  signal  was  made  to  Fort 
Caswell  that  boats  were  in  the  harbor;  but  the  party  had 
passed  the  fort  before  it  could  open  tire. 

The  second  expedition  was  made  in  the  following  June. 
Cushing  had  received  permission  from  Admiral  Lee  to  at- 
tempt the  destruction  of  the  Confederate  ram  Raleigh,  sup- 
posed to  be  lying  in  the  river.  On  the  night  of  the  23d  of 
June,  he  left  his  ship,  the  Monticello,  in  the  first  cutter, 
with  Jones  and  Howarth,  the  same  officers  that  had  accom- 
panied him  on  his  previous  expedition,  and  fifteen  men. 
Pulling  up  the  river,  the  party  passed  the  forts  and  the  town 
of  Smithville.  Meantime  the  moon  had  come  out,  and  when 
about  fifteen  miles  from  the  mouth  of  the  river,  they  were 
discovered  by  sentries  on  the  bank.  Making  a feint  of  going 
back,  Cushing  doubled  as  soon  as  he  reached  the  shadow  of 
the  opposite  bank,  and  continued  on  his  course.  Toward 
morning,  when  within  seven  miles  of  Wilmington,  he  landed 
and  hid  the  boat  in  a swamp.  The  boat’s  crew  remained  all 
day  in  concealment,  watching  the  river.  At  night,  as  they 
were  preparing  to  move,  two  boats  were  captured,  containing 
a fishing  party  returning  to  Wilmington,  who  were  pressed 
into  service  as  guides. 

Duiing  the  remainder  of  the  second  night,  Cushing  was 


96 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


occupied  in  making  a thorough  examination  of  the  obstruc- 
tions three  miles  below  the  town.  At  daybreak  he  moved 
up  one  of  the  creeks,  until  he  found  a road.  Leaving  a few 
of  his  men  with  the  boat,  he  landed,  and  followed  the  road 
until  he  came  upon  the  main  road  between  Wilmington  and 
Fort  Fisher.  Presently,  by  lying  in  wait,  he  captured  a 
mounted  courier  with  the  mail  from  the  fort,  which  contained 
much  valuable  information.  The  courier  from  the  town 
came  along  two  hours  later,  but,  catching  sight  of  a blue- 
jacket, made  off  with  all  speed.  Cushing  galloped  after  him 
on  the  captured  horse,  but  the  second  courier  was  better 
mounted  than  the  first,  and  made  his  escape. 

Cushing  had  now  been  away  from  the  boat  for  some  hours, 
and  his  men  had  had  nothing  to  eat.  He  therefore  set 
about  in  a characteristic  way  to  obtain  provisions.  After 
capturing  other  prisoners,  he  learned  that  a store  was  to  be 
found  two  miles  off ; and  mounting  Howarth  on  the  captured 
horse  with  the  courier’s  coat  and  hat,  he  sent  him  to  market. 
Howarth,  who  was  a man  of  easy  manner  and  a fine  assur- 
ance, engaged  freely  in  conversation  with  the  people  whom 
he  met  on  the  road,  and  passed  without  suspicion.  Presently 
he  returned  with  a supply  of  provisions.  After  dinner,  the 
party  amused  themselves  by  cutting  the  telegraph  wires,  and 
at  dark  they  rejoined  the  boat. 

The  third  and  last  night  in  the  river  had  now  begun,  and 
Cushing  prepared  to  return.  Embarking  with  the  prisoners, 
he  went  to  examine  the  condition  of  the  Raleigh.  She  was 
found  to  have  been  destroyed,  and  was  now  a total  wreck. 
Proceeding  down  the  liver,  Cushing  set  his  prisoners  adrift 
in  boats,  without  oars  or  sails,  so  that  they  might  not  report 
his  presence  too  early.  The  moon  had  now  lisen,  and  as  he 
readied  the  mouth  of  the  river,  he  was  discovered  by  a 
guard-boat.  Just  as  he  was  preparing  to  attack  her,  three 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


97 


others  came  out  from  the  shadow,  and  at  the  same  instant 
five  more  appeared  from  the  other  side.  The  cutter  was 
nearly  surrounded,  and  Cushing,  turning  in  the  only  direc- 
tion left  open,  found  a schooner  filled  with  troops  ahead  of 
him.  It  seemed  now  that  the  game  was  up ; but  Cushing’s 
never-failing  pluck  stood  by  him.  He  made  a dash  in  the 
direction  of  the  western  bar,  and  the  enemy  endeavored  to 
intercept  him ; but  as  the  side  of  his  boat  that  was  toward 
them  was  in  shadow,  they  lost  sight  of  him  for  a time.  Tak- 
ing advantage  of  a favorable  moment,  Cushing  turned  sud- 
denly and  headed  at  full  speed  for  New  Inlet.  His  coolness 
communicated  itself  to  the  men;  the  strokes  of  the  oars 
kept  perfect  time,  and  the  boat,  after  a vigorous  pull,  shot 
ahead  into  the  breakers.  Here  the  enemy  did  not  venture 
to  follow ; and  the  cutter  was  brought  back  after  her  three 
days’  absence,  without  any  casualty  whatever. 

Only  one  serious  attempt  was  made  by  the  Confederates  to 
raise  the  blockade  and  put  an  end  to  the  occupation  of  the 
Sounds  of  North  Carolina.  This  took  place  in  1864,  when  the 
ram  Albemarle  made  her  appearance  at  Plymouth.  This  ves- 
sel was  built  at  Edward’s  Ferry,  on  the  Roanoke  River.  At- 
tention had  been  called  to  her  formidable  character  as  early 
as  June,  1863,  by  Lieutenant-Commander  Flusser,  command- 
ing the  naval  forces  at  Plymouth,  an  officer  whose  bravery  and 
ability  had  won  recognition  both  in  and  out  of  the  service. 
His  vessels  could  not  reach  the  Ferry,  on  account  of  the  shal- 
lowness of  the  water  and  the  batteries  that  lined  the  bluffs ; 
and  urgent  representations  had  been  made  to  the  Admiral  in 
command,  to  the  Department,  and  finally  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  at  Flusser’s  instance.  But  no  action  had  been  taken, 
and  the  work  of  construction  went  on  without  interruption. 

By  April,  1864,  the  ram  was  completed,  and  preparations 
were  made  for  a combined  movement  against  the  Federal 
I.— 5 


98 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


forces  at  Plymouth.  On  the  17th  and  18th,  vigorous  attacks 
were  made  upon  the  forts  by  the  Confederates,  supported  by 
artillery.  At  this  time,  the  force  under  Flusser  consisted  of 
the  Miami,  one  of  the  smaller  double-enders,  the  Southfield, 
and  two  tugs  used  as  picket-boats.  The  Miami  and  South- 
field  carried  a rifled  100-pounder,  and  five  or  six  IX-inch 
guns  each ; and  during  the  action  on  shore,  by  throwing 
shells  at  the  enemy,  they  helped  to  repel  the  assaults  on  the 
forts.  On  the  evening  of  the  second  day,  the  two  vessels 
were  lashed  together,  in  expectation  of  the  ram’s  approach, 
the  Miami,  Flusser’ s vessel,  being  on  the  starboard  side. 

At  midnight,  the  picket-boat  announced  that  the  Albemarle 
was  descending  the  river.  She  came  down  slowly,  under 
cover  of  the  trees  on  the  river  bank,  and  as  she  approached 
the  vessels,  she  ran  out  obliquely.  Passing  the  Miami’s  bow, 
she  made  straight  for  the  Southfield.  Her  ports  were  closed, 
she  did  not  fire  a shot ; but  she  struck  the  Southfield  fairly 
on  the  starboard  bow,  forcing  her  ram  into  the  fireroom.  As 
the  ram  was  drawn  out,  the  Southfield  filled  and  sank. 

Meantime  both  vessels  had  opened  fire  on  the  assailant 
with  their  heavy  guns.  The  guns  had  been  left  loaded  with 
shell  since  the  afternoon  firing,  although  the  Albemarle  was 
expected ; and  as  the  projectiles  struck  the  ram’s  iron  side, 
they  burst  into  fragments  which  rebounded  over  the  Miami’s 
deck.  Three  or  four  of  the  pieces  struck  Flusser,  who  wa3 
instantly  killed.  Half  a dozen  others  were  wounded;  but 
the  ram  received  no  injury.  The  hawsers  that  lashed  the 
vessels  parted,  and  the  crew  of  the  sinking  steamer  jumped 
to  the  Miami.  The  latter  then  retreated,  and  with  the  two 
tugs,  dropped  down  to  the  mouth  of  the  river.  The  Albe- 
marle followed  for  a short  distance,  and  shots  were  ex- 
changed, but  without  effect  on  either  side.  Next  day  Ply- 
mouth surrendered. 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


99 


It  now  became  a matter  of  importance  to  reinforce  the 
blockading  vessels  in  the  Sounds,  as  the  ram  might  at  any 
moment  come  out  of  the  river  and  repossess  all  the  waters  of 
North  Carolina.  Three  of  the  larger  double-enders,  the  Sas- 
sacus,  Mattabesett,  and  Wyalusing,  were  sent  down,  and  the 
force  was  placed  under  the  command  of  Captain  Melancton 
Smith. 1 The  squadron  was  posted  off  the  month  of  the  Roa- 
noke, and  careful  preparations  were  made  for  the  expected 
attack. 

On  the  5th  of  May  the  Albemarle  came  down,  accompanied 
by  a steamer  carrying  troops,  and  a captured  army-transport 
loaded  with  provisions  and  coal,  prepared  for  an  extended 
cruise  in  the  Sounds.  The  squadron  got  under  way,  and 
met  her  about  ten  miles  from  the  mouth  of  the  river.  At  a 
little  before  five  in  the  afternoon  she  opened  the  engagement, 
by  firing  two  shots  at  the  Mattabesett,  the  leading  vessel. 
The  latter,  followed  by  the  Sassacus  and  Wyalusing,  passed 
up  alongside  the  Albemarle,  delivering  their  broadsides  at  a 
distance  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards.  Turning,  they 
came  back  on  the  opposite  side,  and  the  smaller  vessels  took 
their  place.  The  ram  was  thus  placed  between  two  fires. 
The  Sassacus,  which  had  drawn  off  a little  from  the  line,  now 
turned,  and,  gathering  headway,  struck  the  enemy  fairly 
with  her  stem,  just  abaft  the  beam.  Though  the  double- 
enders  were  not  adapted  for  ramming,  it  had  been  decided 
to  try  this,  as  well  as  every  other  expedient,  in  the  hope  of 
inflicting  some  injury.  The  ram  careened  a little,  but  did 
not  sink  ; and  as  the  Sassacus  remained  alongside,  the  Albe- 
marle’s port  opened,  and  a 100-pound  Brooke  rifle-shot 
was  discharged  through  one  of  the  boilers  of  the  double- 


1 Each  of  these  vessels  carried  the  following:  armament:  two  100-pound  Par- 
rotts,  four  IX-inch  guns,  four  2-4-pounders,  two  12-pound  howitzers.  The  Sa» 
sacus  had  two  20-pounders  in  addition. 


100 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


ender.  The  escaping  steam  filled  the  vessel,  scalding  many 
of  the  crew,  and  she  drifted  off,  firing  until  out  of  range. 
The  other  vessels  continued  the  action  until  dark,  but  with- 
out disabling  the  enemy.  At  night,  the  ram  returned  to  the 
river,  her  armor  somewhat  battered,  but  her  machinery  ap- 
parently intact.  Though  not  destroyed,  she  had  been 
severely  hammered ; the  store-vessel  she  had  brought  with 
her  was  captured  ; and  her  projected  conquest  of  the  Sounds 
came  to  naught.  The  next  time  she  ventured  down  the 
river,  a shell  from  the  Whitehead  caused  her  to  turn  back  ; 
and  she  seemed  to  have  no  inclination  for  a second  conflict. 

An  effort  wTas  now  made  to  destroy  the  ram  by  placing  tor- 
pedoes in  the  river,  but  without  success.  One  of  these 
attempts  was  planned  and  carried  out  by  enlisted  men,  and 
deserves  to  be  noticed,  if  only  as  showing  the  pluck  and  de- 
votion of  the  seamen  of  the  navy  during  the  war.  The  men 
who  took  part  in  the  expedition  were  John  W.  Loyd,  cox- 
swain, Allen  Crawford  and  John  Lavertv,  firemen,  and 
Charles  Baldwin  and  Benjamin  Loyd,  coalheavers.  All 
were  volunteers  from  the  Wyalusing.  On  the  afternoon  of 
the  25th  of  May,  the  party  ascended  the  Middle  River,  a 
small  branch  of  the  Roanoke,  in  a boat,  taking  with  them 
two  torpedoes.  These  were  carried  on  a stretcher  across  the 
swamps  to  the  main  river.  Loyd,  the  coxswain,  and  Bald- 
win swam  the  river  with  a line,  and  hauled  the  torpedoes  to 
the  Plymouth  side,  above  the  town.  They  were  then  con- 
nected by  a bridle,  and  floated  down  the  river,  guided  by 
Baldwin.  It  was  his  intention  to  place  them  across  the  bow 
of  the  Albemarle,  and  Crawford,  from  the  swamps  on  the 
opposite  side,  was  to  explode  them  at  a signal.  All  went 
well  until  the  torpedoes  were  within  a few  yards  of  the  ram, 
when  the  line  fouled  a schooner.  At  the  same  moment, 
Baldwin  was  discovered  by  a sentry,  and  shots  were  fired, 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


101 


followed  by  a volley  of  musketry.  As  success  was  no  longer 
possible,  the  line  was  cut,  and  the  five  men  made  their 
escape,  reaching  the  vessel  with  difficulty,  some  of  them 
after  several  days  of  wandering  in  the  swamps. 

The  Department  now  determined  to  take  energetic  meas- 
ures to  destroy  the  Albemarle,  and  selected  Cushing,  whose 
latest  performances  at  Wilmington  had  made  him  famous,  to 
carry  out  its  design.  Two  steam-launches  or  iDicket-boats 
were  fitted  out  at  New  York  under  the  direction  of  Admiral 
Gregory,  and  rigged  with  spar-torpedoes  designed  by  Chief- 
Engineer  Wood.  Both  the  launches  were  to  be  used  in  the 
expedition,  but  one  of  them  was  lost  in  crossing  Chesapeake 
Bay,  on  the  way  down  from  New  York.  Cushing  was  not  the 
man  to  be  deterred  by  an  accident,  and  he  proceeded  to  carry 
out  his  purpose  with  the  remaining  boat. 

Late  in  October*  Cushing  appeared  with  his  launch  in 
Albemarle  Sound.  The  senior  officer  at  this  time  was  Com- 
mander Macomb,  whose  vessel,  the  Shamrock,  was  lying  with 
the  rest  of  the  division  in  the  Sound,  some  miles  from  the 
Roanoke.  One  or  two  of  the  small  steamers  were  stationed 
as  a picket  at  the  mouth  of  the  river,  and  midway  betwoc  n 
them  and  the  squadron  lay  one  of  the  double-enders,  as  an 
outpost.  After  a day  or  two  spent  in  preparations,  during 
which  several  additional  officers  and  men  joined  the  laanch, 
she  was  taken  up  the  Sound  by  the  Otsego.  Remaining 
alongside  until  everything  was  ready,  she  started  up  the 
river,  on  the  night  of  the  26tli  of  October  ; but  after  proceed- 
ing a short  distance  she  grounded,  and  the  time  lost  in  get- 
ting her  off  made  it  too  late  to  carry  out  the  purpose  of  the 
expedition.  So  the  party  returned  to  the  Otsego. 

The  Albemarle  at  this  time  was  lying  at  the  wharf  at  Ply- 
mouth, on  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  eight  miles  from  its 
mouth.  The  stream  averaged  two  hundred  yards  in  width, 


102 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


and  was  lined  on  both  sides  by  Confederate  pickets.  A mile 
below  the  town  was  the  wreck  of  the  Southfield,  surrounded 
by  schooners.  It  was  known  that  the  enemy  kept  a careful 
watch  at  this  point,  and  that  a gun  was  in  position  to  com- 
mand the  bend  of  the  river. 

The  launch  started  for  the  second  time  at  midnight  on  the 
27th.  The  party  consisted  of  Cushing ; three  Acting-Master’s 
Mates,  Howarth,  Gay,  and  Woodman ; Paymaster  Swan ; two 
engineer  officers,  Steever  and  Stotesbury ; and  eight  men. 
The  Shamrock’s  second  cutter,  with  two  officers  and  eleven 
men,  was  taken  in  tow,  ready  to  cast  off  and  to  board  the 
Southfield  if  the  party  was  discovered  in  passing.  The  tor- 
pedo was  placed  at  the  end  of  a spar,  at  the  starboard  bow  of 
the  launch.  The  bow  was  decked  over  and  carried  a 12- 
pound  howitzer.  The  engines  were  covered  with  tarpaulins, 
to  shut  off  the  light  and  sound,  and  at  l8w  speed  the  noise 
of  the  machinery  could  scarcely  be  heard. 

The  night  w^as  dark  and  stormy,  with  now  and  then  a heavy 
fall  of  rain.  Most  of  the  officers  stood  or  sat  in  the  forward 
part  of  the  launch.  Cushing,  Howarth,  and  Woodman  stood 
abaft  the  deck.  Cushing  was  on  the  right,  holding  the  tor- 
pedo lines ; Howarth,  his  companion  in  the  enterprises  at 
Wilmington,  was  next  him ; and  Woodman,  who  knew  the 
river  well,  was  on  the  left  by  the  wheel.  On  the  deck  by 
the  howitzer  stood  Gay ; and  Swan  was  on  the  light  behind 
Cushing.  The  engineers  and  the  firemen  were  at  their  post 
by  the  engine,  and  the  rest  were  stationed  on  the  bow,  near 
the  wheel,  and  in  the  stern.  The  last  were  to  clear  the  tiller 
ropes,  in  case  they  should  foul. 

Running  cautiously  under  the  trees  on  the  right  bank,  the 
launch  proceeded  on  her  way  up  the  enemy’s  river.  It  was 
Cushing’s  intention,  if  he  could  get  ashore  unobserved,  to 
land  below  the  ram,  board  her  from  tlio  wharf,  and  bring 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


103 


her  down  the  river.  To  carry  out  this  plan,  it  was  necessary 
that  the  attack  should  be  a surprise  ; but,  failing  in  this,  he 
was  prepared  to  attack  with  the  torpedo.  In  either  case,  he 
meant  to  give  the  enemy  as  little  warning  as  he  could.  After 
the  first  mile  or  two,  perfect  silence  was  maintained,  and  the 
little  craft  sped  noiselessly  on  its  course.  Arriving  at  the 
Southfield,  it  passed  her  within  twenty  yards,  but  the  guards 
either  were  asleep  or  failed  to  notice  the  tv7o  boats  as  they 
moved  along  in  the  darkness.  Rounding  the  bend  of  the 
river,  the  launch  came  to  an  open  reach  upon  wiiich  lay 
the  towTn  of  Plymouth.  Here  a fire  had  been  kindled  on 
the  bank,  w7hich  reflected  a faint  light  over  the  wTater  from 
the  houses. 

Creeping  along  silently  and  stealthily,  the  launch  ap- 
proached the  landing  below  the  wharf.  Just  then  a dog 
barked,  and  a sentry,  aroused,  discovered  the  boat  and  hailed 
her.  Receiving  no  answer,  he  hailed  again  and  fired.  Up 
to  this  moment  not  a word  had  been  uttered.  But  in  an  in- 
stant the  situation  was  changed.  The  time  for  surprises  was 
past ; and  Cushing,  giving  up  without  a second  thought  his 
cherished  project,  at  once  threw  off  all  concealment,  and  in  a 
loud  voice  called  out,  “ Ahead  fast!”  In  the  same  breath 
he  ordered  the  cutter  to  cast  loose,  capture  the  Southfield’s 
pickets,  and  go  down  the  river.  Pushing  on  tw7o  hundred 
yards  further,  he  saw  for  the  first  time  the  dim  outlines  of 
the  Albemarle,  on  the  port  bow,  and  close  aboard.  The 
light  of  the  fire  showed  a line  of  logs  in  the  water,  within 
which,  at  a distance  of  thirty  feet,  lay  the  vessel.  The 
launch  w7as  too  near  the  logs  to  rise  over  them  at  the  sharp 
angle  her  course  wTas  then  making,  and  Cushing  saw  that  he 
must  sheer  off  and  turn  before  he  could  strike  them  fairly 
and  with  sufficient  headway. 

The  alarm  on  board  the  Albemarle  had  now  become  gen- 


104 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


eral ; rattles  were  sprung,  the  bell  was  rung  violently ; and 
a shower  of  rifle-bullets  was  poured  in  upon  the  launch. 
Swan  received  a slight  wound,  and  Cushing  had  three  bullets 
in  his  clothing,  but  no  one  was  disabled.  Passing  close  to 
the  enemy,  the  launch  took  a wide  sweep  out  to  the  middle 
of  the  river ; then  turning,  it  headed  at  full  speed  for  the 
ram.  As  he  approached,  Cushing,  with  the  rollicking 
bravado  and  audacity  that  marked  all  his  doings,  shouted  at 
the  top  of  his  voice,  “ Leave  the  ram  ! We  are  going  to  blow 
you  up ! ” with  more  exclamations  of  the  same  kind,  in  which 
the  others  joined.  To  Cushing,  who  went  into  action  with 
the  zest  of  a schoolboy  at  football,  and  the  nerve  and  well- 
balanced  judgment  of  a veteran,  the  whole  affair  was  half 
sport,  even  while  the  bullets  were  flying  around  him,  and 
while  he  could  hear  the  snapping  of  the  primers,  as  the  guns 
of  the  ram  were  brought  to  bear.  Luckily  they  missed  fire. 
As  he  came  near,  Cashing  ordered  the  howitzer  to  be  trained 
and  fired ; and  he  directed  every  movement  himself,  which 
was  promptly  carried  out  by  those  in  the  bow.  He  says  of 
this  incident  in  his  report : “ The  enemy’s  fire  was  very 

severe,  but  a dose  of  canister,  at  short  range,  served  to  mod- 
erate their  zeal  and  disturb  their  aim.” 

In  a moment  the  launch  struck  the  boom  of  logs,  abreast 
of  the  ram’s  quarter  port,  and  pressed  over  them.  As  it  ap- 
proached the  side  of  the  ram,  the  torpedo-spar  was  lowered ; 
and  going  ahead  slowly  until  the  torpedo  was  well  under 
the  Albemarle’s  bottom,  Cushing  detached  it  with  a vigor- 
ous pull.  Waiting  until  he  could  feel  the  torpedo  rising 
slowly  and  touching  the  vessel,  he  pulled  the  trigger-line  and 
exploded  it.  At  the  same  second,  as  it  seemed  to  those  in 
the  boat,  the  Albemarle’s  gun  was  fired,  while  the  launch 
was  within  a dozen  feet  of  the  muzzle.  To  Cashing  it  seemed 
that  the  shot  went  crashing  through  his  boat,  though  in  fact 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


105 


she  was  not  touched.  A column  of  water,  thrown  up  by  the 
explosion  of  the  torpedo,  fell  in  the  launch,  and  the  latter, 
being  entangled  in  the  logs,  could  not  be  extricated. 

When  he  saw  that  he  could  not  bring  the  boat  off,  Cush- 
ing, after  refusing  to  surrender,  ordered  the  crew  to  save  them- 
selves, and  taking  off  his  coat  and  shoes,  jumped  into  the 
river.  Others  followed  his  example ; but  all  returned  except 
three,  Woodman,  and  two  of  the  crew,  Higgins  and  Houghton. 
Houghton  made  his  escape,  but  the  other  two  were  drowned. 
Cushing  swam  to  the  middle  of  the  stream.  Half  a mile  be- 
low he  met  Woodman  in  the  water,  completely  exhausted. 
Cushing  helped  him  to  go  on  for  a little  distance,  but  he  was 
by  this  time  too  weak  to  get  his  companion  ashore.  Reaching 
the  bank  with  difficulty,  he  waited  till  daylight,  when  he 
crawled  out  of  the  water  and  stole  into  the  swamp,  not  far 
from  the  fort.  On  his  way  he  fell  in  with  a negro,  whom  he 
sent  to  gain  information  as  to  the  result  of  the  night’s  work. 
As  soon  as  he  learned  that  the  Albemarle  was  sunk,  he  moved 
on  until  he  came  to  a creek,  where  he  captured  a skiff,  and 
in  this  lie  made  his  way  the  next  night  to  the  picket-boat  at 
the  mouth  of  the  river. 

The  rest  of  the  party,  unable  either  to  resist  or  to  escape, 
surrendered,  and  were  taken  ashore  by  a boat  from  the  Albe- 
marle. The  ram  heeled  over  and  sank  at  her  moorings  and 
so  remained  until  Plymouth  was  finally  recaptured. 

The  South  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron  had  but  two 
commanders,  Dupont  and  Dahlgren.  The  transfer  was  made 
July  6,  1863.  Dupont’s  command  opened  with  the  victory 
of  Port  Royal,  which  gave  the  squadron  the  best  and  most 
commodious  harbor  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  After  the  first 
success,  the  activity  of  Admiral  Dupont,  seconded  by  the 
ability  and  energy  of  his  captains — a body  of  officers  remark- 


106 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Entrances  to  Charleston  Harbor. 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


107 


able  for  their  high  professional  qualities — secured  the  control 
of  the  vast  network  of  lagoons  and  inlets  extending  on  the 
one  hand  to  Charleston,  and  on  the  other  to  Fernandina.  The 
blockade  was  made  thoroughly  efficient  in  the  sounds ; and 
the  capture  of  Fort  Pulaski  in  the  following  summer,  in 
which  a detachment  from  the  fleet  assisted,  made  the  Savan- 
nah River  nearly  inaccessible  to  the  blockade-runners.  Port 
Royal  then  became  the  centre  of  occupation,  and  the  head- 
quarters of  the  fleet. 

The  principal  centre  of  blockade  in  the  South  Atlantic  was 
Charleston.  An  attempt  was  made  early  in  the  war  to  close 
the  entrance  by  placing  obstructions  in  the  channel.  A 
number  of  vessels,  most  of  them  old  whalers,  were  bought 
for  the  purpose  by  the  Navy  Department  at  a cost  of  $1G0,- 
000.  They  were  loaded  with  stone  and  sunk  in  rows  on  the 
bar,  under  the  direction  of  Captain  Davis.  The  plan  proved 
a failure,  not  through  any  want  of  skill  in  carrying  it  out, 
but  from  the  operation  of  natural  causes.  The  vessels  soon 
buried  themselves  in  the  sand,  or  were  gradually  moved  out 
of  position  by  the  action  of  the  water,  and  blockade-runners 
passed  in  as  freely  as  if  no  obstructions  existed.  The  ex- 
periment was  tried  at  other  points  with  the  same  result, 
and  the  attempt  was  finally  given  up. 

The  bar  at  Charleston  extends  several  miles  out  to  sea, 
and  the  main  ship  channel,  running  nearly  north  and  south, 
follows  the  trend  of  Morris  Island  at  a distance  of  a mile 
from  the  shore.  During  the  first  half  of  the  war  the  bat- 
teries on  Morris  Island  kept  the  fleet  outside  the  bar,  and 
the  blockade  was  maintained  at  a great  disadvantage.  More- 
over, several  inlets  to  the  north  and  south  afforded  access 
to  Charleston  for  vessels  of  light  draft.  These  were  only 
closed  after  Dupont  had  taken  command.  In  the  summer 
and  fall  of  18G3  the  army,  supported  by  the  ironclads,  grad- 


108 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


ually  drove  the  Confederates  out  of  tlieir  works  on  the 
Island,  and  the  monitors  took  their  station  inside,  somewhat 
to  the  southward  of  Cumming’s  Point.  Blockade-runners 
were  then  driven  to  the  use  of  the  Beach  channel,  at  the 
northern  side  of  the  harbor.  This  channel  skirted  the  shore 
of  Sullivan’s  Island,  and  opened  into  the  harbor  through  a 
narrow  passage  close  to  Fort  Moultrie.  Its  outer  end  lay 
abreast  of  Breach  Inlet,  near  which  was  Fort  Marshall ; and 
from  this  point  to  Fort  Beauregard,  and  thence  to  Fort 
Moultrie,  heavy  batteries  lined  the  beach.  It  became  usual 
to  send  a vessel  at  night  to  this  entrance,  which,  weighing 
early,  got  away  from  the  Breach  Inlet  batteries  before  day- 
break. Occasionally  it  happened  that  blockade-runners, 
which  had  come  in  during  the  night,  would  be  seen  in  the 
morning  hard  and  fast  aground  at  the  inner  entrance.  No 
attempt  could  be  made  to  seize  them,  lying  as  they  did 
directly  under  the  guns  of  Moultrie ; but  they  could  be  de- 
stroyed by  the  fire  of  the  monitors,  and  a collection  of 
wrecks  was  gradually  accumulated  at  this  point. 

Toward  the  close  of  the  war  the  blockade  of  Charleston, 
like  that  of  Wilmington,  increased  in  stringency.  Dahlgren 
describes  it  as  being  perfectly  close,  until  a few  very  fast 
steamers  of  trifling  draft  were  built  in  England  expressly 
for  the  purpose  of  evading  it,  and  these  did  not  pass  with 
impunity.  So  keen  did  the  watch  afterward  become  that  a 
vessel  on  the  way  out,  whose  presence  was  only  known  by 
seeing  her  two  masts  cut  off  the  light;  on  Sumter,  was  cap- 
tured by  the  observer’s  signalling  the  cruisers  outside.  But 
even  then  the  port  could  not  be  absolutely  closed.  The 
‘ 4 very  fast  steamers  of  trifling  draft”  were  so  difficult  to 
catch  that  up  to  the  last  moment  they  were  occasionally 
going  in  and  out ; and  three  or  four  of  them  were  at  the 
wharves  of  Charleston  when  the  city  was  taken. 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


109 


The  Savannah  River  was  easily  blockaded  after  the  capture 
of  Fort  Pulaski.  Ifcs  channel,  narrow  and  difficult  at  the 
best,  was  well-nigh  impassable  when  stripped  of  buoys  and 
lights  ; and  the  fort,  lying  opposite  the  narrowest  point,  pre- 
vented access  in  the  daytime.  The  principal  side  entrance 
to  the  city  of  Savannah,  through  Wassaw  Sound,  was  effectu- 
ally closed  when  the  Sounds  were  occupied  after  the  battle 
of  Port  Royal. 

The  Confederates  were  not  at  any  time  sufficiently  strong 
to  raise  the  blockade  on  the  South  Atlantic  coast.  The  raids 
that  were  made  with  this  object — sudden  dashes  into  the 
midst  of  the  blockading  fleet — though  well  organized  and 
conducted,  failed  to  accomplish  any  more  important  result 
than  disabling  one  or  two  vessels,  and  increasing  the  watch- 
fulness of  the  blockaders. 

One  of  the  boldest  of  these  attempts  was  made  in  the 
winter  of  1863,  off  Charleston.  On  the  morning  of  January 
31,  before  daylight,  two  ironclad  rams,  the  Chicora  and 
the  Palmetto  State,  came  out  of  the  harbor,  crossed  the 
bar,  and,  under  cover  of  a thick  haze,  approached  the  ves- 
sels stationed  outside.  It  happened  that  at  this  time  two  of 
the  largest  vessels  of  the  blockading  fleet,  the  Powhatan  and 
Canandaigua,  had  been  sent  to  Port  Royal  for  coal  and 
repairs.  Of  those  that  remained,  numbering  ten  or  more 
steamers,  the  Housatonic  was  the  only  war- vessel  of  consider- 
able size.  The  others  were  chiefly  purchased  vessels  and 
gunboats.  It  was  one  of  the  many  disadvantages  of  the  ex- 
posed station  outside  the  bar  that  it  necessitated  the  distri- 
bution of  the  ships  over  a wide  area,  and  at  this  time  they 
were  spread  out  in  a line  five  or  six  miles  in  length. 

The  Mercedita  was  the  first  vessel  attacked.  It  could  not 
be  said  that  she  was  off  her  guard,  for,  only  an  hour  before, 
she  had  slipped  her  cable  and  overhauled  a troop-sliip,  which 


110 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


was  running  for  the  channel  by  mistake.  She  had  returned 
to  her  anchorage,  when  one  of  the  rams  suddenly  appeared 
out  of  the  mist,  close  aboard.  The  ram  lay  so  low  in  the 
water,  just  under  the  starboard  quarter,  that  the  Mercedita’s 
guns  could  not  be  trained  upon  her  ; and  before  the  steamer 
could  move  away,  a rifle- shell  from  the  ram,  passing  through 
her  condenser  and  steam-drum,  and  exploding  on  the  port 
side,  for  a time  disabled  her.  Stellwagen,  the  commander 
of  the  Mercedita,  in  response  to  a demand  from  the  ram, 
surrendered,  and  sent  Abbot,  his  first  lieutenant,  on  board, 
who  gave  his  parole  for  the  officers  and  crew. 

The  ram  now  abandoned  the  Mercedita,  and  joined  her 
consort,  which  had  already  engaged  Commander  Leroy  in 
the  Keystone  State.  Leroy  had  discovered  his  assailant  in 
time  to  get  under  way  and  exchange  shots.  The  enemy,  un- 
injured by  his  fire,  succeeded  in  exploding  a shell  in  his 
fore-hold,  and  Leroy  kept  off  until  the  flames  wTere  extin- 
guished. Returning,  he  attempted,  under  a full  head  of 
steam,  to  run  down  his  antagonist ; but  the  latter  had  now 
been  joined  by  her  companion,  and  the  Keystone  State  was 
received  with  a fire  that  effectually  checked  her.  Two  shells 
burst  on  her  quarter-deck ; others  struck  the  sides,  near  or 
below  the  water-line ; and  finally  one  passed  through  the  port 
steam-drum  and  lodged  in  the  starboard.  Her  engines  were 
now  useless,  her  motive  power  was  gone,  the  water  began  to 
pour  in  through  the  shot-holes,  and  the  fore-liold  was  again 
on  fire.  Thereupon  she  lowered  her  colors;  but  as  the 
enemy  continued  his  fire,  and  did  not  take  possession,  they 
were  again  hoisted  and  the  engagement  renewed. 

By  this  time,  nearly  the  whole  squadron  was  under  way ; 
and,  at  the  critical  moment,  three  of  the  small  steamers 
came  up,  and  the  rams  retreated  after  a protracted  but  desul- 
tory conflict.  As  they  went  off,  shots  were  exchanged  with 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


Ill 


the  squadron,  but  little  damage  was  done  on  either  side,  and 
the  rams  gained  a safe  refuge  under  the  guns  of  Fort  Sum- 
ter. The  attack  had  been  judiciously  planned  and  boldly 
executed,  as  far  as  it  went ; though  it  might  have  been  more 
successful  if  it  had  been  maintained  persistently  after  the 
first  onset.  Among  the  vessels  of  the  blockading  squadron 
there  was  a want  of  systematic  co-operation.  The  first  shot 
was  fired  at  five  o’clock ; and  the  rams  had  not  retreated  out 
of  range  until  half -past  seven.  During  this  period  of  two 
hours  and  a half,  the  brunt  of  the  battle  was  borne  by  the 
Mercedita  and  the  Keystone  State.  The  other  vessels  sup- 
posed that  a number  of  blockade-runners  had  come  in  to- 
gether, and  no  arrangement  seems  to  have  been  made  for 
prompt  communication  and  support.  The  Memphis  came  in 
for  a share  of  the  attack,  but  after  passing  one  of  the  rams 
and  discovering  its  strength  in  an  exchange  of  shots,  she 
steamed  out  of  range  to  the  eastward.  The  Augusta  was 
also  engaged,  but  as  she  did  not  get  under  way  until  half- 
past six,  her  part  in  the  action  was  not  important.  In  fact, 
neither  of  these  vessels  was  any  more  fitted  than  a ship  of 
pasteboard  to  cope  with  the  ironclads ; and  their  light  bat- 
teries made  no  impression  on  the  enemy.  The  Quaker  City 
wTas  more  actively  engaged,  but  with  little  more  effect  than 
to  divert  the  attention  of  the  rams,  and  prevent  the  Keystone 
State  from  being  blown  out  of  the  water.  The  Housatonic, 
lying  at  some  distance  from  the  scene  of  conflict,  had  got 
under  way  shortly  after  the  Augusta,  and  during  the  last 
hour  of  the  engagement,  she  did  much  firing,  but  little  ex- 
ecution, further  than  to  knock  away  the  pilot-house  and  flag- 
staff of  one  of  the  retreating  assailants. 

After  the  engagement  was  over,  a question  arose  as  to 
what  was  the  status  of  the  Mercedita.  When  Abbot 
went  on  board  the  ram,  he  gave  his  parole,  as  already  men- 


112 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


tioned,  in  the  name  of  the  captain,  for  the  officers  and  crew. 
The  agreement  was  verbal,  and  Abbot’s  report  stated  that  he 
had  given  his  word  that  the  officers  and  crew  would  not 
‘ ‘ take  up  arms  against  the  Confederate  States  unless  regu- 
larly exchanged.”  It  does  not  appear  that  Abbot  had  au- 
thority to  make  this  engagement,  but  no  steps  were  taken  by 
the  captain  to  repudiate  it.  Possibly  there  was  no  oppor- 
tunity to  take  any  steps.  In  his  report,  Stellwagen  simply 
says  : “ He  proceeded  aboard,  and  according  to  their  demand, 
gave  his  parole  on  behalf  of  himself  and  all  the  officers  and 
crew.”  In  regard  to  this  proceeding,  it  may  be  remarked 
that  it  is  a well  recognized  principle  that  prisoners  cannot  be 
forced  to  give  their  parole  ; and  it  is  manifestly  improper  to 
give  a parole  voluntarily,  during  the  progress  of  an  engage- 
ment. It  enables  the  assailant  to  neutralize  portions  of  the 
force  in  detail,  without  being  diverted  from  his  operations 
by  the  necessity  of  guarding  prisoners  ; and  it  precludes  re- 
capture, or  rather,  it  takes  away  any  advantage  that  may  be 
derived  from  recapture. 

At  six  o’clock,  according  to  Stellwagen’s  account,  which 
was  one  hour  after  the  engagement  began,  and  an  hour  and  a 
half  before  it  was  over,  the  injuries  to  the  Mercedita  were 
partially  repaired,  and  she  “got  things  in  order  to  start,  a 
little  steam  on;  hove  [up]  anchor.”  It  is  not  clear  whether 
she  then  went  off,  but  it  is  at  least  certain  that  she  changed 
her  position.  After  the  battle  she  proceeded  without  assist- 
ance to  Port  Royal.  This  removal  of  the  Mercedita  was 
afterward  the  foundation  of  a charge  made  by  the  Confeder- 
ates that  the  officers  of  the  vessel  had  violated  their  parole, 
by  taking  the  Mercedita  out  of  their  hands.  The  proceeding 
was,  in  fact,  a questionable  one,  as  it  is  merely  quibbling  to 
draw  a distinction  between  “ taking  up  arms,”  and  navigat- 
ing a ship-of-war  out  of  reach  of  an  enemy.  It  can  only  be 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


113 


excused  on  the  supposition  that  the  enemy  were  unable  to 
take  possession  owing  to  the  presence  of  a superior  force; 
and  it  shows  forcibly  the  predicament  in  which  an  officer 
may  place  himself  by  giving  a parole  which  virtually  places 
his  ship  hors  de  combat  during  the  progress  of  an  action. 

In  consequence  of  the  attack  of  the  rams,  the  authorities 
of  Charleston  seized  the  opportunity  to  declare  that  the 
blockade  was  raised.  A proclamation  was  published  the 
same  afternoon,  signed  by  Beauregard  and  Ingraham,  the 
Commanding  General  and  Senior  Naval  Officer,  declaring 
that  the  naval  forces  attacked  the  blockading  squadron,  and 
“ sunk,  dispersed,  or  drove  off  or  out  of  sight,  the  entire 
blockading  fleet.”  The  proclamation  was  accompanied  in 
the  newspapers  by  the  statement  that  two  vessels  were  sunk, 
four  burnt,  and  the  rest  driven  away  ; and  the  assertion  was 
said  to  be  sustained  by  the  testimony  of  several  of  the 
foreign  consuls,  who  had  gone  out  in  the  afternoon  in  a tug, 
and  had  seen  nothing  of  the  blockaders.  It  was  also  as- 
serted that  the  consuls  had  held  a meeting  in  the  evening, 
and  had  come  unanimously  to  the  oiunion  that  the  blockade 
was  legally  raised. 

The  asseverations  of  the  Charleston  newspapers  were  ex- 
tensively quoted  abroad,  and  grossly  exaggerated  as  they 
were,  raised  a serious  doubt  as  to  the  continued  efficiency 
of  the  blockade.  It  is  an  established  rule  that  the  absence 
of  a blockading  fleet,  caused  by  stress  of  weather,  if  the 
blockade  is  immediately  resumed,  constitutes  only  a tempo- 
ary  interruption  ; but  the  dispersion  of  a squadron  by  a hos- 
tile attack  puts  a stop  to  the  blockade  in  toto,  and  a renewal 
of  the  operation  requires  a new  proclamation,  or  rather,  re- 
. quires  knowledge  of  the  re-establishment  of  the  blockade 
as  a ground  for  condemnation.  If  the  assertion  that  the 
blockade  was  raised  had  been  true,  every  blockade-runner  in 


114 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Nassau  would  have  been  able  to  make  directly  for  Charles- 
ton, and  if  captured  without  having  received  warning  would 
have  escaped  condemnation  on  the  ground  of  want  of  knowl- 
edge. As  a matter  of  fact,  the  report  so  industriously 
spread  was  essentially  false,  though  it  had  enough  color  of 
truth  to  give  it  a ready  acceptance,  in  the  absence  of  proof 
to  the  contrary,  especially  when  backed  by  official  testi- 
mony. Out  of  ten  vessels  on  the  station,  two  had  been  dis- 
abled by  the  attack,  and  had  proceeded  to  Port  Royal.  Two 
other  vessels  were  sent  the  same  morning  to  Port  Royal,  the 
Augusta,  with  despatches  for  the  Admiral,  and  the  Memphis 
to  tow  the  Keystone  State.  Both  were  sent  back  immedi- 
ately by  Dupont.  In  the  afternoon,  firing  was  heard  in 
Stono  Inlet,  and  the  Flag  was  sent  thither.  Of  the  other 
five  vessels,  the  Stettin,  Ottawa,  and  Unadilla  were  not  en- 
gaged at  all,  and  neither  they,  nor  the  Housatonic  and 
Quaker  City  left  the  usual  line  of  blockade  during  the  day. 
If  the  consuls  did  not  see  these  five  vessels,  whose  logs  show 
that  they  were  in  plain  sight  all  day,  and  several  times  in 
communication,  it  was  because  they  did  not  look  at  them. 
The  report,  however,  had  served  its  purpose,  and  it  was 
commonly  believed  that  the  blockade  of  Charleston  was 
raised,  although  a written  declaration  of  five  captains  of 
the  squadron  was  published,  containing  a complete  refu- 
tation. 

The  attack  had  a good  effect  in  showing  the  necessity 
of  strengthening  the  force  before  Charleston,  which  had 
hitherto  only  been  adequate  to  cope  with  blockade-runners. 
The  Powhatan  wras  sent  to  Charleston  the  same  evening,  and 
the  New  Ironsides  and  Canandaigua  joined  a day  or  two  later. 
The  blockade  was  thereafter  continued  with  redoubled  vigi- 
lance, and  with  a new  sense  of  the  necessity  of  perfect  co- 
operation. 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


115 


The  disposition  of  the  vessels  of  the  South  Atlantic 
Squadron,  as  given  by  Admiral  Dupont  on  February  15,  1863, 
shows  what  a radical  change  had  taken  place  under  his  com- 
mand in  the  character  and  efficiency  of  the  blockade.  The 
arrangement  of  the  squadron  was  as  follows : 

At  Georgetown,  the  double-enders  Sebago  and  Conemaugh. 

Off  Bull’s  Bay,  the  steamer  Lodona. 

Off  Charleston,  the  New  Ironsides ; the  side-wheel  steamer 
Powhatan ; sloops-of-war  Canandaigua  and  Housatonic ; 
steamers  Flag,  Quaker  City,  James  Adger,  Augusta,  Huron, 
and  Memphis  ; schooners  G.  W.  Blunt  and  America. 

In  Stono  Inlet,  the  steamers  Pawnee,  Unadilla,  and  Com- 
modore McDonough. 

In  North  Edisto,  the  steamer  South  Carolina. 

In  St.  Helena,  the  bark  Kingfisher. 

In  Wassaw,  the  monitor  Passaic,  and  steamer  Marblehead. 

In  Ossabaw,  the  monitor  Montauk,  gunboats  Seneca  and 
Wissahickon,  and  steamer  Dawn. 

Guarding  St.  Catherine’s,  Sapelo,  Doboy,  and  St.  Simon’s 
Sounds,  the  steamers  Paul  Jones,  Potomska,  and  Madgie ; 
barks  Braziliera  and  Fernandina  ; and  mortar-schooner  Nor- 
folk Packet. 

In  St.  Andrew’s,  the  bark  Midnight. 

At  Fernandina,  the  steamer  Mohawk. 

In  St.  John’s  River,  the  steamers  Nonsuch  and  Uncas. 

At  Port  Royal,  the  headquarters  of  the  station,  were  the 
frigate  Wabash,  the  flagship,  the  store  ship  Vermont,  five 
tugs,  and  two  despatch-vessels ; and  temporarily  in  port, 
undergoing  repairs  or  taking  in  provisions,  the  monitors 
Weehawken  and  Patapsco,  and  the  steamers  Keystone  State, 
Stettin,  Wamsutta,  and  Ottawa.  The  experience  of  eighteen 
months  had  wrought  a change  indeed  in  the  methods  of  the 
coast  blockade,  since  there  were  on  a single  station  more 


. 116 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


vessels  than  the  navy  had  had  in  commission  at  the  out- 
break of  the  war. 

The  next  attempt  of  the  Confederates  to  raise  the  blockade 
on  the  South  Atlantic  station  resulted  disastrously  to  its 
projectors.  This  was  the  brief  cruise  of  the  Atlanta,  formerly 
the  Fingal,  in  Wassaw’  Sound,  in  June,  1863. 
j The  Fingal  was  an  iron  steamer  of  English  origin,  which 
had  run  the  blockade  of  Savannah  in  November,  1861.  She 
had  been  taken  by  the  Confederate  Government,  re-named 
the  Atlanta,  and  altered  and  strengthened  for  service  as  a 
man-of-war.  In  making  the  alterations,  she  had  been  cut 
down  so  as  to  leave  the  deck  about  two  feet  above  the  water 
when  loaded.  From  this  deck  rose  a casemate,  with  a flat 
roof  and  inclined  sides.  "Within  the  casemate  were  four 
Brooke  rifles,  two  Yl-^-inch  in  the  midship  ports,  and  two 
Vll-inch  on  pivots  at  the  bow  and  stern,  so  contrived  that 
they  could  be  fired  either  laterally  or  fore-and-aft.  The 
armor  protecting  this  powerful  battery  was  four  inches  thick, 
made  of  English  railroad  iron,  rolled  into  two-inch  plates. 
The  deck  was  of  enormous  strength,  and  its  edges  projected 
six  feet  from  the  side  of  the  vessel,  the  projection  being 
filled  in  and  protected  with  a heavy  covering  of  wood  and 
iron.  The  Atlanta’s  bow  ended  in  a ram,  over  which  pro- 
jected a torpedo  spar.  She  was  in  every  way  one  of  the 
most  powerful  vessels  which  the  Confederates  had  got  afloat ; 
and  great  things  were  expected  of  her. 

Intimations  had  reached  Admiral  Dupont  that  the  Atlanta 
and  other  ironclads  at  Savannah  were  on  the  point  of  leaving 
Wilmington  River  and  entering  Wassaw  Sound  for  the  pur- 
pose of  raising  the  blockade  at  that  place,  and  in  the  inlets  to 
the  southward.  It  was  to  be  another  raid  on  the  blockaders, 
like  that  of  the  31st  of  January ; but  the  vessel  to  be  em- 
ployed was  much  more  powerful.  Dupont,  however,  was 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


117 


careful  to  be  well  informed,  and  the  experience  of  the  pre- 
vious winter  had  not  been  lost.  The  double-ender  Cim- 
merone  was  at  this  time  maintaining  the  blockade  alone,  and 
two  monitors  were  despatched  to  Wassaw,  the  Weehawken, 
under  Captain  John  Rodgers,  and  the  Nahant,  under  Com- 
mander Downes.  The  Weehawken  had  already  won  an 
enviable  fame,  and  was  known  throughout  the  squadron  as  a 
vessel  that  was  always  ready  for  any  service  and  always  han- 
dled with  masterly  skill. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  17th  of  June,  the  ironclad 
was  discovered  coming  down  the  river.  She  was  accom- 
panied* by  two  steamers,  filled  with  spectators  who  had  come 
out  in  the  confident  expectation  of  witnessing  the  speedy  de- 
struction of  the  Federal  fleet.  It  was  to  be  a spectacle,  a 
party  of  pleasure,  like  that  which  tempted  the  people  of  Bos- 
ton, just  fifty  years  before,  to  sail  down  the  harbor,  on  the 
day  when  Lawrence  went  out  to  encounter  the  Shannon  ; and 
like  that  memorable  excursion,  it  was  doomed  to  end  in  dis- 
appointment. 

As  soon  as  the  Atlanta  came  in  sight,  Rodgers  beat  to 
quarters  and  cleared  the  ship  for  action.  Ten  minutes  later 
he  slipped  his  cable,  and  steamed  slowly  around  the  point  at 
the  entrance  of  the  river.  The  Nahant,  having  no  pilot, 
followed  in  his  wake.  Just  before  five  o’clock,  the  At- 
lanta, then  lying  across  the  channel  and  awaiting  the  attack, 
fired  the  first  shot,  which  passed  astern  of  the  Weehawken. 
For  twenty  minutes  more,  the  monitors  advanced  steadily 
until  within  three  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy.  Then  the 
Weehawken  opened. 

With  the  deliberateness  which  characterized  him  in  the 
most  trying  moments,  Rodgers  delivered  the  fire  of  his  two 
heavy  guns,  the  Xl-incli  and  the  XV-inch.  He  fired  five 
shots,  of  which  four  hit  the  Atlanta.  The  first,  a XV-inch 


118 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


cored  shot,  struck  the  inclined  side  of  the  vessel,  in  the  line  of 
the  ports  ; and  though  fired  at  an  angle  of  fifty  degrees  with 
her  keel,  penetrated  the  armor,  and,  ripping  out  the  wooden 
backing,  the  two  inner  layers  of  which  were  of  brittle  Georgia 
pine,  covered  the  deck  with  splinters.  From  the  effects  of 
this  shot,  forty  or  more  men  were  prostrated,  several  of 
whom  received  ugly  wounds  from  the  fragments  of  wood 
and  iron.  The  second  shot,  from  the  Xl-inch  gun,  struck 
the  edge  of  the  overhang,  and  started  the  plating.  The 
third  carried  off  the  roof  of  the  pilot-house,  wounded  the 
two  pilots,  and  stunned  the  men  at  the  wheel.  The  fourth 
shattered  a port-shutter,  driving  the  fragments  in  through 
the  port. 

Upon  this  the  Atlanta  hauled  down  her  colors,  and  hoisted 
a white  flag.  It  was  just  fifteen  minutes  after  the  Wee- 
hawken  had  commenced  firing.  The  Atlanta  was  not  dis- 
abled, nor  had  there  been  any  great  number  of  serious  casu- 
alties among  the  crew;  but  they  had  had  enough.  The 
possibilities  of  a XY-inch  gun,  fired  at  a range  of  two 
hundred  yards,  were  matters  that  they  had  no  wish  to  inves- 
tigate further.  As  Rodgers  diily  remarked  in  commenting 
upon  the  action,  the  first  shot  took  away  their  disposition  to 
fight,  and  the  third  their  ability  to  get  away. 

The  battle  was  so  short  and  decisive  that  the  Nahant  had 
no  opportunity  to  take  part  in  it.  When  the  Weeliawken 
ranged  up  to  her  prize,  the  latter  was  found  to  be  aground ; 
but  she  was  backed  off  a few  hours  later  with  little  difficulty, 
and  steamed  without  assistance  to  Port  Royal. 

The  engagement  of  the  Weehawken  and  the  Atlanta  was 
one  of  the  extraordinary  events  of  the  war,  and  illustrates, 
perhaps  better  than  any  other,  the  revolution  which  fifty 
years  of  scientific  progress  had  wrought  in  naval  warfare. 
The  action  of  the  Chesapeake  and  Shannon,  which  took 


THE  ATLANTIC  SQUADRONS. 


119 


place  in  June,  1813,  off  Boston,  had  enough  points  of  resem- 
blance to  make  the  two  engagements  a fair  subject  of  com- 
parison. Both  were  exceptional  victories,  for  so  complete  a 
victory  in  fifteen  minutes,  the  time  covered  in  each  of  the  two 
fights,  will  probably  always  be  exceptional.  Nor  does  the 
resemblance  stop  here.  In  both  actions  the  victorious  cap- 
tain is  one  of  the  marked  men  of  his  service — bold  but  pru- 
dent, attentive  to  details,  minutely  careful  in  preparation, 
skilful  in  action.  Each  is  a splendid  type  of  his  kind  in  the 
age  to  which  he  belongs.  As  Broke  wras  the  model  captain 
of  his  day,  so  Rodgers  is  of  his.  The  Shannon  was  always 
ready  for  any  kind  of  service,  her  discipline  exact,  her  crew 
willing,  her  gunnery  precise.  The  Weehawken  shows  her 
surpassing  excellence  in  the  same  qualities  ; for  no  man  knew 
better  than  Rodgers  how  to  get  good  work  and  ready  service 
from  his  men.  But  the  captain  of  1813  is  an  able  executive,  a 
skilful  seaman,  a capable  gunnery  officer ; while  the  captain 
of  1863  is  all  this,  and  a man  of  science  in  addition.  On  the 
losing  side,  the  parallel  is  equally  striking.  There  is  in 
both  engagements  the  same  negligence  of  preparation,  shown 
in  the  case  of  the  Atlanta  by  the  extreme  disorder  of  the 
vessel,  and  in  that  of  the  Chesapeake  by  the  disorganization 
of  the  crew.  There  is  the  same  ineffective  gun-practice,  the 
same  speedy  demoralization.  Both  captains  are  brave  men  * 
but  both  go  into  action  with  the  same  easy  confidence,  in 
each  case  fully  shared,  perhaps  largely  created,  by  the  peo- 
ple around  them,  who  go  off  in  pleasure-boats  to  witness  the 
fight,  as  if  it  were  to  be  merely  an  exhibition  of  fireworks. 

But  here  the  parallel  ceases.  There  is  little  in  common 
between  the  stately  frigates — the  Chesapeake,  bearing  down 
before  the  wind  under  all  sail,  or  the  Shannon,  with  her 
lofty  spars,  and  her  main  topsail  against  the  mast,  and  the 
two  rafts  whose  armored  citadels  protect  everything  but  the 


120 


TEE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


decks  and  the  funnel.  As  little  do  the  batteries  of  carro- 
nades  and  long  eighteens  resemble  the  Brooke  rifles  of  the 
Atlanta  or  the  huge  Dahlgren  smooth-bores  of  the  monitor. 
The  mode  of  fighting  corresponds  to  the  character  of  the 
ships  and  the  weapons.  The  Chesapeake  ranges  up  along- 
side her  antagonist,  and  the  two  vessels  deliver  their  broad- 
sides almost  in  contact.  An  accident  brings  them  foul: 
and  straightway  the  crew  of  the  Shannon,  their  captain  at 
the  head,  rush  on  board  the  enemy  with  pike,  cutlass,  and 
pistol.  After  a bloody  struggle,  a hand-to-hand  pell-mell 
fight,  the  crew  of  the  Chesapeake  is  overpowered  and  surren- 
ders. Fifty  years  later,  the  vessels  do  not  approach  nearer 
than  two  hundred  yards,  and  four  shots,  deliberately  aimed, 
settle  the  whole  affair.  There  is  little  bloodshed  ; no  one  is 
touched  on  board  the  Weehawken,  and  the  injured  among 
the  prisoners  comprise  about  a tenth  part  of  the  defeated 


crew. 


CHAPTER  Y. 


THE  GULF  SQUADRONS. 

The  command  of  the  Gulf  Blockading  Squadron  was  as- 
signed to  Flag-Officer  ‘William  Mervine,  who  had  served  in 
California  during  the  Mexican  war,  and  who  had  now  been 
fifty-two  years  in  the  service.  He  arrived  in  the  Gulf  on  June 
8,  1861,  whither  he  was  shortly  followed  by  his  flagship, 
the  Colorado.  Before  his  arrival  the  blockade  had  been  set 
on  foot  by  the  vessels  already  on  the  station.  Some  of  these 
had  pushed  westward  late  in  May,  and  on  the  26th  of  that 
month,  the  Powhatan,  under  Porter,  arrived  off  Mobile, 
while  the  Brooklyn,  taking  her  station  on  the  same  day  off 
Pass-a-Loutre,  announced  the  blockade  of  New  Orleans.  The 
Powhatan  remained  off  Mobile  until  the  29th,  when  she  was 
relieved  by  the  Niagara,  which  came  in  from  Havana. 
Porter  then  proceeded  off  the  Southwest  Pass  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, which  he  blockaded  on  the  31st.  On  the  13th  of  June 
the  Massachusetts  arrived  off  the  Passes,  where  she  remained 
on  blockade  duty.  Galveston  was  invested  by  the  South 
Carolina,  on  the  2d  of  July.  When  Mervine  arrived  at  his 
post  on  the  8th  of  June,  in  the  frigate  Mississippi,  he  found 
a beginning  already  made,  and  by  July  he  had  a force  of 
twenty-one  vessels. 

Mervine’s  first  act  after  his  arrival  on  the  station  was  to 
publish  a proclamation  declaring,  in  the  usual  form,  that 
“ an  effective  blockade  of  the  port  of  Key  West,  Florida,  has 

L— 6 


122 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


been  established  and  will  be  rigidly  enforced  and  main- 
tained against  any  and  all  vessels  (public  armed  vessels  of 
foreign  powers  alone  excepted)  which  shall  attempt  to  enter 
or  depart  from  the  said  port  of  Key  West,  Florida.”  As 
Key  West  was  wholly  in  the  possession  of  the  United 
States  authorities,  and  as  it  is  a barren  island,  dependent  on 
supplies  by  sea  for  the  barest  necessaries  of  life,  the  procla- 
mation caused  some  consternation  among  the  inhabitants. 
Next  day,  however,  the  order  was  rescinded,  and  it  was  an- 
nounced that  trading  with  the  loyal  States  and  with  Cuba 
would  be  permitted  under  certain  restrictions. 

A cruise  made  by  H.  M.  S.  Jason,  Captain  Von  Donop, 
shortly  after  Mervine’s  arrival,  showed  the  following  disposi- 
tion of  the  forces  in  the  Gulf : the  Cuyler  was  off  Tampa 
Bay ; the  Montgomery  in  Appalachee  Bay  ; the  Mississippi, 
Niagara,  and  Water  Witch  off  Pensacola ; the  Huntsville  and 
the  sailing-sloop  St.  Louis  off  Mobile  ; and  the  Brooklyn, 
Powhatan  and  two  gunboats  were  off  the  Mississippi  Passes. 
The  Jason  did  not  go  to  Galveston.  This  report,  coupled 
with  other  evidence,  goes  to  show  that  during  the  first  few 
months,  the  main  entrances  to  the  principal  ports  in  the  Gulf, 
as  in  the  Atlantic,  were  efficiently  blockaded ; but  there  was 
no  blockade  of  the  intermediate  stretches  of  coast,  and  the 
side  entrances  to  the  ports  were  also  without  a guard. 

The  general  course  of  operations  in  the  Gulf  was  similar 
to  that  in  the  Atlantic ; and  the  same  plan  of  converting  the 
blockade  at  various  points  into  an  occupation  was  gradually 
but  systematically  carried  out.  A lodgment  was  effected  at 
New  Orleans  before  the  first  year  was  over,  and  the  necessity 
of  a blockade  was  largely  obviated  at  the  most  important 
point  on  the  coast.  From  this  base,  further  operations 
checked  the  desultory  commerce  carried  on  by  small  vessels 
in  the  Louisiana  bayous.  The  occupation  of  Ship  Island 


THE  GULF  SQUADRONS. 


123 


covered  the  waters  of  Mississippi  Sound,  where  a small 
coasting  trade  with  Mobile  was,  nevertheless,  persistently 
carried  on.  At  Pensacola,  Fort  Pickens  commanded  the 
entrance  from  the  beginning ; and  in  1862  the  city  was 
evacuated,  and  became  the  depot  of  the  West  Gulf  Squad- 
ron. Galveston  was  occupied  by  the  United  States  forces 
from  October,  1862,  until  the  disaster  on  the  first  day  of 
1863.  During  the  following  year,  possession  was  taken  of 
various  points  in  Texas,  but  the  land  forces  were  subse- 
quently withdrawn  and  the  blockade  re-established.  Fi- 
nally, in  August,  1864,  Mobile  was  closed  by  the  surrender  of 
the  forts  to  Admiral  Farragut  and  General  Granger. 

In  the  latter  part  of  September,  1861,  Mervine  was  relieved 
by  Flag-Officer  William  W.  McKean.  It  was  decided  that  a 
division  of  the  squadrons  in  the  Gulf  was  necessary,  such  as 
had  been  made  in  the  Atlantic,  and  the  Department  only 
waited  until  its  plan  of  active  operations  in  that  quarter 
could  be  matured  and  a sufficient  force  sent  to  the  station. 
Farragut  had  been  selected  to  command  the  expedition 
against  New  Orleans,  and  on  the  21st  of  February  he  as- 
sumed command  of  the  West  Gulf  Squadron,  with  a cruising- 
ground  extending  from  Pensacola  to  the  Rio  Grande.  Far- 
ragut remained  in  command  until  late  in  1864,  when  Commo- 
dore Thatcher  was  appointed  to  succeed  him. 

The  Eastern  Gulf  Squadron  extended  from  Cape  Canaveral 
on  the  eastern  coast  of  Florida,  to  Pensacola.  Its  head- 
quarters were  at  Key  West.  McKean  remained  in  command 
until  June  4,  1862,  when  he  was  relieved  by  Captain  Lard- 
ner.  Lardner  was  soon  followed  by  Commodore  Tlieodorus 
Bailey,  who  retained  the  command  two  years,  and  whose 
healLh  finally  broke  down,  as  did  that  of  many  of  his  offi- 
cers, upon  this  undesirable  station.  After  a short  interval, 
Commodore  Cornelius  K.  Stribling  assumed  the  command 


124 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


on  the  12th  of  October,  and  retained  it  until  the  close  of  the 
war. 

The  blockade  of  Florida  required  a different  management 
from  that  of  other  parts  of  the  coast.  There  were  no  large 
commercial  centres  which  might  influence  the  destination  of 
steamers  with  valuable  cargoes;  nor  were  there  any  points 
whose  position,  by  giving  ready  access  to  the  interior,  made 
it  indispensable  that  they  should  be  strongly  intrenched. 
Hence  the  main  force  of  the  blockade  could  not  be  concen- 
trated at  a few  points.  On  the  other  hand,  there  were  innu- 
merable bays  and  inlets,  difficult  and  dangerous  of  access, 
where  small  vessels  might  enter  unobserved,  and  remain 
concealed  for  an  indefinite  time.  It  was  well-nigh  impos- 
sible, no  matter  how  large  or  vigilant  the  force  in  these 
waters,  to  prevent  absolutely  the  trade  carried  on  by  these 
vessels.  The  best  that  could  be  done  was  to  keep  up  a con- 
stant watch,  and  to  scour  the  coast  at  intervals,  sending  in 
small  parties  in  boats  to  seize  a vessel  whenever  its  presence 
was  known.  Numberless  little  affairs  thus  took  place  on 
the  station  — engagements  with  small  batteries,  boarding 
parties,  cutting-out  expeditions,  raids  upon  salt-works,  sud- 
den dashes  into  remote  and  unfrequented  inlets,  on  dark 
nights,  through  tortuous  channels,  usually  followed  by  the 
capture  of  cotton-laden  schooners,  or  stray  boats,  or  bales 
of  cotton,  with  the  loss  of  a man  or  two  here  and  there. 

While  the  Tahoma  was  lying  off  Cedar  Keys,  on  February 
23,  1862,  a boat  expedition  was  sent  in,  under  Lieutenant 
Crosman,  to  cut  out  a schooner  lying  in  the  boat-channel 
between  Cedar  Keys  and  the  mainland,  and  to  capture  a 
ferry-boat  which  had  been  used  for  communicating  between 
the  land  and  the  Keys.  Crosman  secured  the  ferry-boat, 
but  the  schooner  lay  on  the  other  side  of  the  railroad  trestle 
crossing  the  channel ; and,  night  coming  on,  he  was  obliged 


THE  GULF  SQUADRONS. 


125 


to  defer  operations.  Going  into  the  channel  next  morning, 
he  found  that  the  schooner  had  disappeared;  and,  as  he 
was  coming  out  of  the  narrow  passage,  a heavy  fire  of  small 
arms  was  opened  from  a stockade  on  the  shore.  His  men 
were  at  the  oars,  pulling  against  a strong  flood  tide  and  a 
fresh  wind  ; and  the  two  officers  of  the  boats  were  the  only 
people  who  could  return  the  fire.  The  leading  boat  had 
barely  got  out  of  range,  when  the  prize  capsized.  Nothing 
daunted,  Crosman  pulled  back  under  the  fire  of  the  troops, 
which  covered  the  prize,  and  endeavored  to  right  her ; but 
after  some  time  spent  in  unavailing  efforts,  he  scuttled  and 
sank  her,  returning  with  the  loss  of  only  one  man  to  his 
ship. 

The  ferry-boat  Somerset,  under  Lieutenant-Commander 
Earl  English,  attacked  the  salt-works  near  Depot  Key  on 
October  4,  1862.  After  a few  shells  had  been  fired,  a white 
flag  was  hoisted  on  the  works,  and  a party  was  sent  on  shore 
to  destroy  them.  No  sooner  had  the  party  landed,  than  they 
were  fired  upon  from  the  building  displaying  the  flag  of 
truce,  and  half  of  them  were  disabled.  Immediately  after 
the  affair,  the  gunboat  Tahoma  arrived,  under  Commander 
John  C.  Howell.  A strong  force  was  landed,  led  by  Crcs- 
man  with  his  usual  energy  and  judgment,  and  fifty  or  sixty 
salt-boilers  were  destroyed. 

These  are  only  a few  out  of  numberless  small  affairs  that 
took  place  on  the  coast.  They  made  little  noise,  but  the 
service  was  one  that  involved  hardship  and  danger,  and  it 
exacted  ceaseless  activity  and  untiling  effort.  It  was  more 
like  the  old  conflicts  of  the  excisemen  and  smugglers  on 
the  Scottish  coast  than  the  regular  operations  of  warfare ; 
though  the  contrabandistas  of  Florida  had  no  occasion  to  sell 
their  lives  as  dearly  as  the  Hatteraicks  of  eighty  years  ago. 

In  the  West  Gulf,  the  most  important  points  were  Mobile 


126 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


and  New  Orleans.  The  latter  was  by  far  the  largest  and 
wealthiest  city  at  the  South  ; in  fact,  it  ranked  sixth  in  point 
of  population  among  the  cities  of  the  Union.  Its  tonnage 
movement  was  enormous,  its  export  trade  being  one  of 
the  most  extensive  in  the  world.  There  were  two  principal 
entrances  to  the  Mississippi,  Pass-a-Loutre  and  Southwest 
Pass,  though  there  were  several  others  of  less  importance. 
At  these  two  entrances  the  deposits  of  mud  made  by  the 
river  were  continually  altering  the  channels ; and  the  posi- 
tion of  the  bar  and  the  depth  of  water  were  shifting  and 
uncertain.  The  channel  was  deeper  now  in  one,  now  in  the 
other,  and  the  commerce  of  New  Orleans  varied  its  course 
accordingly.  The  smaller  passes  admitted  only  vessels  of 
the  lightest  draft. 

The  main  passes  were  about  fifteen  miles  in  length  and 
there  were  from  fourteen  to  seventeen  feet  of  water  on  the 
bars  at  their  mouth.  The  three  smaller  passes  had  from  six 
to  ten  feet.  At  the  point  of  divergence,  known  as  the  Head 
of  the  Passes,  the  stream  of  the  Mississippi  is  broad  and 
deep,  and  though  the  current  is  strong,  there  is  a safe  and 
roomy  anchorage.  The  two  forts  that  formed  the  main  de- 
fences of  New  Orleans  lay  twenty  miles  above  this  point,  and 
there  was  nothing  to  obstruct  the  movements  of  the  block- 
ading fleet  between  the  forts  and  the  bar.  It  would  seem 
that  the  first  step  in  the  blockade  of  New  Orleans  would 
naturally  be  to  station  a force  at  the  Plead  of  the  Passes, 
where  all  the  outlets  could  be  closed  at  once.  It  was  clearly 
the  most  economical  and  most  effectual  way  to  blockade  the 
river ; but  the  position  was  exposed  to  sudden  attacks  by  the 
enemy,  and  in  order  to  be  maintained  successfully,  it  re- 
quired a force  that  should  combine  strength  for  resisting 
attack  with  handiness  of  movement.  A sloop-of-war  with 
one  or  two  small,  active,  well-armed  despatch-vessels  or  gun- 


rttsses  of  the  Mississippi. 


128 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


boats,  to  act  as  pickets,  could  close  the  passage  effectually, 
and  by  the  exercise  of  constant  vigilance  could  reduce  the 
risk  of  lying  in  the  enemy’s  waters  to  a minimum. 

Early  in  October,  1861,  the  squadron  wTas  moved  up  from 
the  bar,  and  took  its  post  at  the  Head  of  the  Passes.  Pos° 
session  was  taken  of  the  telegraph  station,  and  work  was 
begun  on  a fortification.  The  force  consisted  of  the  Bich- 
mond,  commanded  by  Captain  John  Pope,  the  senior  officer 
present ; the  Vincennes,  Commander  Bobert  Handy ; the 
Preble,  Commander  French;  and  the  side-wheel  steamer 
Water  Witch,  Lieutenant  Francis  Winslow.  The  Vincennes 
and  the  Preble  were  sailing  sloops-of-war.  The  Bichmond 
was  one  of  the  smaller  of  the  first-class  screw-sloops  built 
shortly  before  the  war,  and  an  admirable  vessel,  carrying  a 
powerful  battery  of  twenty-two  IX-incli  guns,  one  80-pound- 
er, and  one  rifled  30-pounder.  The  Vincennes  carried  four 
VIH-inch  shell  guns,  and  fourteen  32-pounders.  The  Water 
Witch,  a small  vessel,  well  adapted  for  river  sendee,  had 
one  24-pound  howitzer,  two  12-pounders,  and  one  Dahlgren 
20-pounder.  It  was  known  that  considerable  preparations 
were  making  at  New  Orleans  to  fit  out  a naval  force  under 
the  direction  of  Commodore  Hollins,  and  in  particular  that 
a formidable  ram,  the  Manassas,  wTas  in  process  of  construc- 
tion ; but  no  extraordinary  precautions  seem  to  have  been 
taken  by  the  blockading  squadron  to  prevent  a surprise. 

On  the  11th  of  October,  the  Water  Witch  had  towed  a 
coaling  schooner  alongside  the  Bichmond,  and  had  afterward 
anchored  on  her  starboard  quarter,  a little  inshore.  The 
Preble  lay  in  advance  of  the  Bichmond,  about  one  hundred 
and  fifty  yards  off,  on  her  starboard  bow.  The  Vincennes 
was  lower  down  the  river,  on  the  opposite  side. 

A little  before  four  o’clock,  on  the  morning  of  the  12th, 
while  the  watch  on  deck  was  getting  coal  on  board  the  Bich* 


THE  GULF  SQUADRONS. 


129 


mond  from  tile  schooner  alongside,  a ram  was  discovered 
close  aboard.  This  was  the  Manassas,  commanded  by  Lieu- 
tenant-Commander  Warley.  The  Preble  saw  her  at  the 
same  moment,  as  well  as  the  prize-scliooner  Frolic,  and 
giving  the  alarm  at  once,  beat  to  quarters.  A moment  later, 
the  ram  struck  the  Richmond  abreast  of  the  port  fore- 
channels, making  a small  hole  in  her  side,  and  tearing  the 
schooner  from  her  fasts.  The  injury  was  speedily  repaired  ; 
and  the  Richmond,  slipping  her  cable  and  ranging  ahead, 
avoided  a second  blow  on  her  quarter.  The  ram,  having 
been  herself  seriously  injured  by  the  shock,  then  gave  up 
the  attempt,  and  standing  up  the  river,  received  broadsides 
from  the  Richmond  and  from  the  Preble  as  she  passed  them. 
Steaming  ahead,  the  Richmond  found  herself  near  the  shore, 
and  attempted  to  turn,  but  only  succeeded  in  getting  half- 
way round,  with  her  broadside  up  and  down  the  river.  Or- 
ders were  then  given  to  the  two  sailing-sloops  to  proceed 
down  the  Southwest  Pass,  while  the  Richmond  covered 
their  retreat. 

As  the  ram  passed  up  the  river  she  fired  a rocket.  Imme- 
diately afterward  three  lights  were  seen  in  motion,  which 
gradually  brightened  and  expanded  until  they  were  dis- 
covered to  be  fire-rafts,  drifting  down  on  the  squadron.  The 
Water  Witch  avoided  them  without  difficulty,  steering  to 
the  northeast,  up  the  stream,  while  the  rafts,  left  to  the 
wind  and  current,  drifted  to  the  western  shore,  doing  no 
injury.  The  rest  of  the  squadron  was  already  out  of  their 
reach,  on  its  way  to  the  bar. 

Winslow  now  remained  alone  in  the  Water  Witch,  near 
the  Head  of  the  Passes,  having  inteipreted  the  commanding 
officer’s  last  signal  to  mean  “ Act  at  discretion,”  and  being 
tinder  the  conviction  that  a force  was  still  required  at  this 
point  if  the  blockade  was  to  be  efficiently  maintained.  Tlio 
6*  1 


130 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


rest  of  the  squadron  apparently  took  a different  view  of  the 
state  of  affairs.  It  was  now  daylight  and,  making  a recon- 
noissance,  Winslow  discovered  the  smoke  of  four  steamers, 
above  a bend  in  the  river,  and  a bark-rigged  propeller  higher 
up,  having  the  appearance  of  a blockade-runner.  As  the  pro- 
peller would  have  a clear  path  through  Pass-a-Loutre  un- 
less the  squadron  could  be  brought  back,  the  Water  Witch 
steamed  at  full  speed  down  the  Southwest  Pass  until  she 
ove^ook  the  retreating  blockaders.  WThen  she  came  up 
with  them,  the  Richmond  was  making  a general  signal  to 
cross  the  bar.  Winslow  ranged  up  alongside  and  earnestly 
represented  the  necessity  of  returning  immediately  up  the 
river,  but  Pope,  deeming  the  position  of  the  squadron  un- 
safe, overruled  the  suggestion  and  ordered  the  Water  Witch 
to  the  assistance  of  the  sailing  vessels.  This  order  was  car- 
ried out.  The  Preble  was  piloted  across  the  bar  by  Davis, 
the  executive  of  the  Water  Witch,  and  the  gunboat  went  her- 
self to  assist  the  Vincennes;  but  before  WTnslow  could 
reach  her,  the  sloop  grounded.  A moment  later  the  Rich- 
mond also  ran  ashore. 

In  this  position  the  vessels  of  the  squadron  found  them- 
selves when  Hollins  came  down  the  Pass  with  his  flotilla. 
It  was  now  about  eight  o’clock.  The  enemy’s  attack  was  not 
maintained  with  any  great  spirit,  and  though  the  cannonade 
lasted  for  a couple  of  hours,  no  advantage  was  gained  by 
either  side.  As  the  Richmond  lay  with  her  broadside  up 
the  river,  she  could  rake  the  channel  effectuaUv;  and  the 
Confederates,  whose  force  of  lightly-armed  river-boats  was  no 
match  for  the  squadron,  kept  at  a respectful  distance  from 
her  heavy  battery.  Their  firing  was  inaccurate,  their  shells 
bursting  around  and  beyond  the  Richmond.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Richmond’s  shot  fell  short.  She  succeeded  once 
or  twice  in  backing  off  into  deeper  water,  and  drifted  do™ 


THE  GULF  SQUADRONS. 


131 


with  the  current,  grounding  finally  about  a quarter  of  a mile 
below  the  Vincennes;  but  the  little  "Water  Witch  pluckily 
held  her  position,  al  though  she  was  obliged  to  keep  actively 
moving  to  leave  a clear  space  for  the  Richmond’s  fire. 

The  position  of  the  Vincennes  would  now  have  become 
critical  had  the  enemy  shown  a bold  front  and  approached 
her  ; but  they  kept  off,  satisfied  with  a mere  demonstration. 
Then  came  the  most  singular  incident  of  this  singular  con- 
flict. The  Richmond  made  signal  to  the  vessels  below  the 
bar  to  get  under  wTay.  This  was  erroneously  interpreted  on 
board  the  Vincennes  as  an  order  to  abandon  the  vessel.  Cap- 
tain Handy,  apparently  himself  in  some  doubt  as  to  his  inter- 
pretation, sent  an  officer  to  the  Water  Witch  asking  if  such  a 
signal  had  been  made,  and  announcing  that  he  should  defend 
his  vessel.  Winslow  replied  to  the  question  that  it  was  im- 
possible, and  suggested  to  Handy  that  he  should  fight  his 
ship.  Handy  did  not  adopt  the  suggestion,  however,  but 
concluded  to  obey  the  supposed  order.  Having  first  caused 
a slow-match  to  be  applied  to  the  magazine,  he  manned  the 
boats,  and  sending  a part  of  his  crew  on  board  the  Water 
Witch,  he  repaired  to  the  Richmond  with  the  rest.  From 
some  dramatic  fancy,  he  wrapped  a large  American  ensign 
about  his  waist,  and  in  this  strange  guise  he  appeared  over 
the  side  of  the  commanding  officer’s  vessel.  This  was  at 
9.30,  when  the  enemy’s  forces  were  beginning  to  draw  off 
from  the  attack;  and  shortly  after  Captain  Handy  reached 
the  Richmond  they  withdrew  up  the  river. 

Captain  Pope,  after  waiting  “ a reasonable  time,”  as  he 
says  in  hi3  report,  for  the  explosion,  and  thinking,  “ from 
the  description  of  the  slow-match,”  that  it  had  gone  out, 
ordered  Handy  back  to  the  Vincennes.  The  latter  there- 
upon divested  himself  of  his  colors,  and  returned  to  his  ves- 
sel. The  next  day  she  was  got  afloat,  with  the  assistance  of 


132 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


the  South  Carolina,  which  was  ordered  up  from  Barrataria. 
A new  disposition  was  made  of  the  vessels,  and  the  blockade 
was  continued  by  keeping  a ship  off  the  mouth  of  each  of 
the  Passes. 

On  the  16th  of  September  Ship  Island  had  been  evacuated 
by  the  Confederates.  A force  was  landed  from  the  Massa- 
chusetts, and  the  fort  was  occupied.  The  island  became  an 
important  station,  and  facilitated  the  blockade  of  Mississippi 
Sound,  where  the  cruisers  might  intercept  the  small  vessels 
running  between  New  Orleans  and  Mobile.  On  the  19th  of 
October,  the  steamer  Florida  came  out,  under  Commodore 
Hollhi'i,  and  engaged  the  Massachusetts  off  the  island.  The 
Florida,  being  a faster  vessel,  and  of  less  draft,  was  able  to 
choose  her  distance,  and  the  engagement  was  carried  on  at 
long  range.  A 68-pounder  rifle-shell  was  exploded  in  the 
Massachusetts,  but  it  did  not  seriously  injure  the  vessel,  and 
the  enemy  finally  retreated  out  of  reach.  Ship  Island  served 
as  the  depot  of  the  West  Gulf  Squadron  until  the  evacuation 
of  Pensacola,  which  then  became  the  headquarters. 

Mobile,  the  second  point  of  importance  in  the  Gulf,  pre- 
sented few  natural  difficulties  to  the  blockaders  ; and  the 
same  peculiarities  that  made  it  an  easy  port  to  defend  made 
it  an  easy  port  to  blockade.  The  city  lies  at  the  head  of  a 
bay  twenty-four  miles  long  and  ten  miles  wide  in  its  upper 
part,  expanding  to  twenty  miles  at  its  southern  end.  Very 
little,  however,  of  this  large  sheet  of  water  is  accessible  for 
vessels  of  even  moderate  draught.  The  upper  anchorage  has 
only  twelve  feet  of  water.  The  lower  anchorage  has  from 
eighteen  to  twenty  feet,  and  is  five  miles  north  of  Mobile 
Point,  at  the  main  entrance  to  the  bay.  This  entrance  lies 
between  two  long,  narrow  sand-spits,  and  is  approached  by  a 
channel  running  north  and  south.  The  channel,  five  miles 


THE  GULF  SQUADRONS. 


133 


in  length,  and  only  half  a mile  wide  at  its  narrowest  point, 
has  at  its  southern  extremity  a bar,  upon  which  there  is  a 
depth  of  nearly  twenty-one  feet.  The  northern  end  was  pro* 


tected  by  two  forts,  one  of  them,  Fort  Morgan,  a work  of 
considerable  strength.  But  as  the  entrance  of  the  channel 
was  five  miles  from  the  forts,  the  blockading  squadron  could 


134 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


take  a position  close  to  tlie  bar ; and  the  blockade  was  re- 
duced to  a limited  area.  At  tliis  point,  therefore,  it  could 
be  maintained  more  effectually  and  by  a smaller  force  than 
at  almost  any  other  place  of  trade  on  the  coast. 

There  were  two  other  entrances  to  the  bay,  one  to  the 
westward,  with  so  little  water  as  to  be  comparatively  unim- 
portant, and  the  other  to  the  northeast,  extending,  like  the 
Beach  Channel  at  Charleston,  close  along  the  shore,  and  ter- 
minating directly  under  Fort  Morgan,  just  as  the  northeast 
channel  at  Charleston  terminated  at  Fort  Moultrie.  Though 
it  was  less  than  twelve  feet  deep  at  low  water,  and  therefore 
does  not  appear  on  the  map,  it  could  be  used,  when  the 
tide  served,  by  many  of  the  blockade-runners  ; and  when 
they  had  once  entered,  it  was  next  to  impossible  to  cut  them 
out.  Additional  blockading  vessels  were  generally  stationed 
at  both  these  side-entrances. 

Early  in  the  war,  the  force  off  Mobile  consisted  sometimes 
of  a single  vessel,  which  might  be  found  cruising  eight 
or  ten  miles  from  the  entrance ; but  after  the  first  year  a 
really  efficient  force  was  stationed  off  the  port,  and  toward 
the  end  the  vessels  lay  within  two  hundred  yards  of  the  bar 
buoy,  often  with  a single  gunboat  posted  inside  the  channel. 1 
Especially  after  the  second  escape  of  the  Florida,  the  officers 
of  the  squadron  were  put  on  their  mettle,  and  during  the 
year  before  its  capture,  Mobile  was  a difficult  port  for  block- 
ade-runners to  attempt. 

The  simplest  operations  on  the  blockade,  however,  were 
liable  to  a variety  of  accidents  and  incidents,  and  no  sendee 

1 The  old  theory  with  reference  to  the  danger  of  lying  off  Mobile  finds  expres- 
sion in  the  following  passage  of  Blunt's  Coast  Pilot  (ed.  1S41):  “Those  off  Mo- 
bile should  recollect  the  necessity  of  getting  an  offing  as  soon  as  there  are  appear- 
ances of  a gale  on  shore,  either  to  weather  the  Balize  or,  which  is  better,  to  take 
in  time  the  Road  of  Naso,  as  destruction  is  inevitable  if  you  come  to  anchor  out* 
side  Mobile  Bar  during  the  gale” 


THE  GULF  SQUADRONS. 


135 


demanded  a higher  degree  of  preparation  and  perseverance 
in  action.  This  was  illustrated  again  and  again.  A case 
occurred  early  in  1862,  which  will  serve  as  one  instance 
out  of  many.  On  the  20th  of  January,  the  steamer  R.  R. 
Cuyler,  watching  the  eastern  passage  over  Mobile  bar,  dis- 
covered a schooner  at  anchor,  near  the  shore,  several  miles 
to  the  eastward.  The  Cuyler  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant 
Francis  Winslow,  the  same  officer  who  had  shown  his  judg- 
ment and  courage  in  the  affair  at  the  Head  of  the  Passes. 
Apparently  it  was  a simple  enough  matter  for  the  Cuyler,  a 
fast  and  well-armed’  steamer,  to  make  the  schooner  an  easy 
prize.  As  the  Cuyler  approached,  howTever,  the  blockade- 
runner  got  under  way,  and  steered  for  the  beach.  Here  she 
grounded,  her  crew  making  for  the  land.  A boat  was  sent  to 
take  possession,  and  the  Cuyler  was  anchored  as  near  the 
shore  as  she  could  safely  go. 

Meantime,  a party  of  men  had  collected  on  the  beach,  and 
opened  a sharp  lire  of  musketry,  under  cover  of  the  dunes. 
This  was  returned  from  the  Cuyler,  and  with  the  help  of  an 
occasional  shell,  the  steamer  silenced  the  fire  from  the  shore. 
A hawser  was  carried  out,  and  an  attempt  wTas  made  to  start 
the  schooner.  The  hawser  was  parted  by  the  strain ; and  a 
second  attempt  met  with  a similar  result,  except  that  this 
time  the  hawser  fouled  the  Cuyler’s  propeller.  The  largest 
hawser  in  the  ship  wTas  now  made  fast  to  the  schooner’s  fore- 
mast, and  the  working  party  wTas  recalled ; but  just  as  they 
got  off,  their  boat  swamped.  Two  other  boats  at  once  put  off 
to  the  rescue,  and,  as  they  approached,  received  a warm  fire 
from  the  sand-hills,  the  enemy  having  now  gathered  in  con- 
siderable force.  As  the  Cuyler’s  stern  was  secured  to  the 
schooner,  and  her  propeller  was  still  clogged,  her  broadside 
could  not  be  brought  to  bear,  and  she  could  only  answer  with 
small  arms.  One  of  the  boats  had  a howitzer ; but  half  her 


136: 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


crew,  including  the  officer  in  charge,  were  already  disabled, 
and  the  four  men  who  remained  could  not  use  the  gun.  At 
this  critical  juncture,  the  Huntsville  arrived  with  two  of  the 
Potomac’s  cutters  in  tow.  Master  Schley  pulled  gallantly  in 
with  the  cutters,  and  the  Huntsville  opened  on  the  beach ; 
and  a series  of  mishaps  which  had  nearly  resulted  in  disaster 
finally  ended  in  success. 

The  most  prominent  event  in  the  history  of  the  blockade 
of  Mobile  was  the  daring  passage  of  the  Confederate  cruiser 
Florida  past  the  blockading  squadron,  on  two  separate  occa- 
sions. The  first  was  on  the  4th  of  September,  1862.  At  this 
time  the  blockade  was  maintained  by  the  sloop-of-war 
Oneida,  and  the  gunboats  Winona  and  Cayuga.  The  senior 
officer  was  Commander  George  H.  Preble  of  the  Oneida. 
The  Oneida  was  one  of  the  four  sloops* built  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  and  she  was  armed  with  two  Xl-inch  guns,  four 
32-pounders,  and  three  Dahlgren  30-pounders.  The  frigate 
Susquehanna  had  been  lying  off  the  port,  but  had  gone  to 
Pensacola  for  repairs  five  days  before.  The  gunboats  Pinola, 
Kanawha,  and  Kennebec  were  also  attached  to  the  blockad- 
ing squadron,  and  temporarily  absent  for  repairs  or  coal.  On 
the  evening  of  the  day  before,  the  Cayuga  had  been  sent  to 
Petit  Bois  and  Horn  Island,  the  entrances  of  Mississippi 
Sound,  which  had  been  left  unguarded.  The  boilers  of  the 
Oneida  needed  some  slight  repairs,  and  on  the  morning  of 
the  day  in  question,  the  fire  had  been  hauled  under  one 
boiler,  while  a full  pressure  of  steam  was  kept  on  the  other. 
The  repairs  were  nearly  completed  soon  after  noon,  and  at 
3.45  p.m.,  the  fire  was  again  started,  though  a working  press- 
ure of  steam  was  not  obtained  for  some  time,  and  the  speed 
of  the  vessel  was  reduced  from  ten  knots  to  seven.  The 
blockading  force,  therefore,  on  this  critical  day,  consisted 
only  of  the  Oneida,  undergoing  repairs,  and  the  Winona. 


THE  GULF  SQUADRONS. 


137 


On  the  7th  of  August  the  Confederate  cruiser  Florida  had 
left  Nassau,  where  she  had  been  lying  for  three  months,  and 
had  put  into  Cardenas  in  Cuba.  Intelligence  of  this  fact 
had  been  received  at  Pensacola,  the  headquarters  of  the 
squadron,  Uut  no  intimation  had  been  sent  to  the  blockading 
officer  off  Mobile,  though  several  vessels  had  come  from 
Pensacola  in  the  meantime.  The  Florida  was  in  a crippled 
state ; her  crew  was  short ; what  men  she  had  were  most 
of  them  sick  with  yellow  fever  ; and  her  battery  was  unpro- 
vided with  the  necessary  equipments.  Her  captain,  Maffitt, 
found  it  necessary  to  make  a port  where  he  could  obtain  a 
crew,  and  the  equipments  that  he  needed ; and  he  decided 
to  attempt  Mobile.  Knowing  that  his  ship  was  an  exact 
duplicate  of  the  English  gun- vessels  that  were  constantly 
cruising  on  the  coast  and  going  in  and  out  of  the  blockaded 
ports,  he  adopted  the  bold  course  of  personating  an  Eng- 
lishman, and  attempting  to  run  the  blockade  of  Mobile  in 
broad  daylight. 

At  3.35  on  the  afternoon  of  the  4th,  the  squadron  off  the 
port,  composed  of  the  Oneida  and  the  Winona,  had  sighted  a 
sail  to  the  southward  and  westward,  and  the  Winona^was  or- 
dered in  chase.  The  sail  was  found  to  be  the  United  States 
man-of-war  schooner  Rachel  Seaman  ; and  the  two  vessels 
were  returning  towards  the  Oneida,  when  at  five  o’clock  an- 
other sail  was  reported  in  the  southeast.  She  was  presently 
discovered  to  be  a steamer  with  a barkantine  rig,  burning 
bituminous  coal,  and  heading  directly  for  the  senior  officer’s 
vessel.  Satisfied  that  she  was  an  English  gun-vessel  in- 
specting the  blockade,  Preble  got  under  way,  and  went  to 
quarters,  steering  for  the  stranger’s  port  bow.  The  latter 
had  been  carrying  a pennant,  and  she  now  hoisted  the  Eng- 
lish ensign. 

The  mles  adopted  on  the  blockade  allowed  foreign  sliips-of- 


138 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


war  the  privilege  of  entering  the  blockaded  ports  ; but  this 
was  of  course  never  done  without  first  communicating  with 
the  squadron  outside.  No  vessel,  whatever  her  character  or 
nationality,  can  be  permitted  to  ran  past  a blockading  squad- 
ron without  this  formality.  Ajs  the  Oneida  approached  the 
supposed  Englishman,  she  put  her  helm  to  starboard  in  order 
not  to  pass  him,  and  came  around  until  she  was  heading  in  the 
same  direction,  still  a little  on  his  port  bow.  He  kept  on  at 
full  speed,  and  when  at  a distance  of  about  one  hundred  yards 
the  Oneida  hailed  him.  Receiving  no  reply,  she  fired  a shot 
across  his  bow,  from  the  rifled  pivot  gun  on  the  forecastle, 
followed  quickly  by  another,  also  across  his  bow,  and  by  a 
third,  close  to  his  forefoot.  As  these  produced  no  impres- 
sion, the  order  was  given  to  fire  into  him,  and  the  starboard 
broadside  was  immediately  discharged.  This  is  stated  to 
have  been  done  three  minutes  after  the  first  shot  was  fired. 
But  with  a blockade-runner  alongside  running  fourteen  knots 
to  the  blockader's  seven,  time  is  counted  by  seconds.  When 
the  broadside  was  fired,  the  stranger’s  ensign  and  pennant 
were  hauled  down.  It  turned  out  that  orders  were  given  on 
board  jthe  Florida,  for  such  she  proved  to  be,  to  hoist  the 
Confederate  flag,  but  the  quartermaster  lost  his  fingers  in 
the  attempt,  and  the  vessel  kept  on  her  course  without  any 
colors.  An  attempt  was  also  made  on  board  the  Florida  to 
loosen  sail ; but  Jhe  Oneida’s  fire  drove  the  men  out  of  the 
rigging.  According  to  Maffitt,  “had  their  guns  been  de- 
pressed, the  career  of  the  Florida  would  have  ended  then  and 
there.”  The  Winona  and  Rachel  Seaman  joined  in  the  firing, 
from  a greater  distance  ; but  the  Florida  did  not  slacken  her 
speed,  and  made  no  attempt  at  resistance.  An  Xl-inch  shell 
from  the  Oneida  passed  through  the  coal-bunker  on  the  port 
side,  but  did  not  explode.  Another  exploded  close  to  the 
port  gangway.  A third  entered  a few  inches  above  the  water- 


THE  GULF  SQUADRONS. 


139 


line,  and  passed  along  the  berth-deck  ; and  a shot  from  the 
Winona  went  through  the  cabin  and  pantry. 

During  the  firing  the  Florida  had  been  gaining  rapidly  on 
her  assailants,  and  she  now  passed  ahead,  making  directly  for 
the  entrance  of  the  channel.  The  Oneida  was  obliged  to 
yaw,  to  bring  her  guns  to  bear,  but  the  chase  was  continued 
until  the  Florida  had  crossed  the  bar.  Then  the  blockading 
vessels  hauled  off.  An  hour  later,  the  Florida  was  safely  an- 
chored under  the  guns  of  Fort  Morgan. 

After  remaining  four  months  at  Mobile,  repairing  and 
completing  her  equipments,  the  Florida  came  out.  This 
time  no  disguise  was  possible,  and  when  his  ship  was  ready, 
Maffitt  only  waited  for  a northerly  wind  and  a dark  night. 
On  the  afternoon  of  January  15,  the  prospect  seemed  favor- 
able, and  the  Florida  ran  down  to  Mobile  Point.  The  vio- 
lence of  the  wind  delayed  her  for  a few  hours,  but  at  two 
o’clock  on  the  morning  of  the  16th,  she  weighed  and  stood  out 
by  the  main  ship-channel  across  the  bar. 

The  blockading  fleet  now  consisted  of  seven  vessels. 
Among  these  was  the  R.  R.  Cuyler,  a fast  steamer  that  had 
been  sent  down  especially  to  stop  the  Florida.  When  Maffitt 
had  come  down  in  the  afternoon,  he  could  see  the  blockading 
vessels  aligned  off  the  main  entrance,  two  miles  from  the 
bar.  He  was  also  sighted  from  the  squadron ; and  the  Cuy- 
ler was  ordered  to  change  her  position,  and  be  prepared  to 
give  chase,  with  the  Oneida.  Between  two  and  three  o’clock 
in  the  morning,  the  enemy  was  reported.  He  passed  be- 
tween the  Cuyler  and  the  flagship  Susquehanna,  at  a distance 
of  three  hundred  yards  from  the  former.  After  a consider- 
able delay,  a part  of  the  squadron  started  in  pursuit.  It  is 
stated  by  an  officer  of  the  Cuyler,  in  a letter  quoted  by  Maffitt, 
that  half  an  hour  was  lost  in  getting  under  way,  owing  to 
a regulation  of  the  ship  by  which  the  officer  of  the  watch 


140 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


was  required  to  report  and  to  wait  for  the  captain  to  come 
on  deck  before  slipping  the  cable.  The  Oneida,  when  she 
saw  the  signal  from  the  flagship,  beat  to  quarters,  but 
remained  at  anchor;  and  at  3.50,  “ having  seen  no  vessel 
running  out,  beat  a retreat.”  1 So  says  her  log.  The  Cuyler, 
however,  saw  the  Florida  distinctly,  and  chased  her  during 
the  rest  of  the  night  and  the  whole  of  the  day ; but  though 
the  blockading  steamer  could  make  at  times  fourteen  knots, 

1 her  highest  speed  that  day  was  twelve  and  a half.  At  night 
the  Florida  changed  her  course  and  ran  off  to  Cuba,  where 
she  was  burning  prizes  the  next  day,  while  the  Cuyler  was 
looking  for  her  in  the  Yucatan  channel. 

On  the  day  after  the  Florida  ran  out,  the  Oneida  was  sent 
to  Key  West  with  despatches  for  Admiral  Bailey,  informing 
him  of  the  escape  of  the  Florida.  Bailey  sent  her  to  the 
coast  of  Cuba ; but  she  missed  the  Confederate  cruiser,  and 
Wilkes,  commanding  the  Flying  Squadron,  having  fallen  in 
with  her,  constituted  her  a part  of  his  force,  as  well  as  the 
Cuyler,  to  the  no  small  injury  of  the  blockade;  an  act  which 
subsequently  brought  down  upon  him  the  displeasure  of  the 
Department. 

Galveston,  the  third  point  of  importance  in  the  Gulf,  was, 
like  Mobile,  comparatively  easy  of  blockade,  except  against 
vessels  of  the  lightest  draft.  The  absence  of  strong  fortifi- 
cations, especially  in  the  early  part  of  the  war,  enabled  the 
blockading  vessels  to  lie  near  the  shore ; and  the  town  was 
exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  squadron,  as  it  found  to  its  cost  in 
August,  1861,  when  a shore  battery  fired  upon  one  of  the 
South  Carolina’s  tenders.  Alden  wTas  then  commanding  the 
blockading  force,  and  he  brought  the  South  Carolina,  which 
drew  only  twelve  feet,  within  a mile  of  the  shore,  and  opened 


1 Meaning  “ beat  the  retreat.1 


THE  GULF  SQUADRONS. 


141 


on  the  batteries.  One  or  two  of  his  shells  fell  in  the  town, 
which  led  to  a protest  from  the  foreign  consnls  against  bom- 
bardment without  notice ; but  the  injury  to  the  town  was 
afterwards  shown  to  be  accidental. 

Occupied  as  he  was  with  active  operations  in  the  Missis- 
sippi, Farragut  early  turned  his  attention  to  the  necessities 
of  the  Gulf  blockade.  In  a letter  written  home  shortly 
after  his  arrival,  he  had  said  : “ My  blockading  shall  be  done 
inside  as  much  as  possible.”  The  special  charge  of  the  ves- 
sels in  the  Gulf  was  entrusted  to  Commodore  Henry  H.  Bell, 
and  the  steps  already  taken  to  convert  the  blockade  of  prom- 
inent points  into  an  occupation  were  continued,  especially  to 
the  westward  of  the  Mississippi,  on  the  coast  of  Louisiana 
and  Texas.  The  principal  entrances  were  Atchafalaya  Bay 
and  the  Calcasieu,  on  the  coast  of  Louisiana,  Sabine  Pass,  at 
the  western  boundary  of  the  State,  and  Galveston,  Pass  Ca- 
vallo,  Aransas,  and  Corpus  Christi,  in  Texas.  Several  small 
vessels  were  sent  to  operate  in  connection  with  a detachment 
of  troops  in  Atchafalaya  and  its  inner  waters,  under  Lieuten- 
ant-Commander Buchanan.  These  operations  continued  for 
a long  period,  though  Buchanan  was  killed  two  months  after 
his  arrival,  in  an  engagement  in  the  T&che.  The  other 
points  were  seized  by  different  expeditions,  whose  operations 
were  attended  with  varying  success ; and  on  the  coast  of 
Texas,  blockade  and  occupation  alternated  at  the  different 
passes  with  considerable  frequency  during  the  rest  of  the 
war.  One  great  difficulty  in  holding  the  occupied  points 
was  the  wTant  of  troops.  In  December,  1862,  Farragut  writes : 
“ It  takes  too  much  force  to  hold  the  places  for  me  to  take 
any  more,  or  my  outside  fleet  will  be  too  much  reduced  to 
keep  up  the  blockade  and  keep  the  river  open  ” — two  prim- 
ary considerations  in  the  operations  of  the  squadron. 

At  all  the  passes  on  the  coast  of  Texas  and  Louisiana  there 


142 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


had  been  considerable  blockade-mnning  by  small  craft  from 
Havana.  To  break  it  up  and  seize  the  passes  three  expedi- 
tions were  sent  out,  one  to  Corpus  Christi,  one  to  Calcasieu 
and  Sabine  Pass,  and  one  to  Galveston.  The  first  of  these, 
under  Acting-Lieutenant  Kittredge,  consisted  of  the  bark 
Arthur,  the  steamer  Sachem,  the  yacht  Corvpheus,  and  one 
or  two  smaller  sailing-vessels.  There  were  only  about  one 
hundred  men  in  all  the  vessels.  Kittredge  was  confident  of 
success,  but  he  could  hardly  have  counted  on  meeting  with 
serious  opposition.  Corpus  Christi  lies  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Nueces  River,  on  a bay  which  is  enclosed  by  the  long  nar- 
row islands  that  make  a double  coast  along  nearly  the  whole 
line  of  the  Texas  shore.  Entering  the  lagoon,  Kittredge 
proceeded  up  the  bay.  On  August  16  and  18  attacks  were 
made  upon  the  city,  and  a battery  which  had  been  thrown 
up  on  the  levee  was  silenced.  On  the  18  th,  a landing  party 
of  thirty  men  with  a howitzer  was  sent  into  the  town,  but 
by  this  time  the  enemy  had  collected  a considerable  force, 
estimated  at  five  hundred  men ; and  though  their  attack 
was  repulsed,  there  was  no  possibility  of  holding  the  place, 
and  the  landing  party  was  withdrawn.  The  vessels,  how- 
ever, continued  to  cruise  inside  of  the  Passes  of  Corpus 
Christi  and  Aransas.  Several  vessels  were  destroyed  or  cap- 
tured, and  the  blockade  became  really  efficient.  The  only 
casualty  was  the  capture  of  Kittredge  and  his  gig’s  crew, 
when  making  an  incautious  reconnoissance. 

The  second  expedition,  under  Acting-Master  Crocker,  set 
out  in  September  for  the  Sabine  River.  The  importance  of 
this  point  as  an  entrance  for  blockade-runners  had  been  under- 
rated, and  no  adequate  blockade  had  been  established.  A 
railroad  crossed  the  river  at  a point  not  very  far  above  Sabine 
City,  and  the  town  was  actively  occupied  in  the  exportation 
of  cotton  and  the  reception  of  large  quantities  of  munitions 


THE  GULF  SQUADRONS. 


143 


of  war.  The  expedition,  consisting  of  the  steamer  Kensing- 
ton and  the  schooner  Rachel  Seaman,  found  the  mortar- 
schooner  Henry  Janes  lying  off  the  entrance.  The  Janes 
constituted  the  whole  blockading  force,  and  she  had  been 
there  only  a few  days.  Crocker  was  an  energetic  officer, 
and  at  once  set  about  active  operations.  The  vessels  as- 
cended the  river  and  attacked  the  fort  protecting  Sabine 
City.  The  fort  was  soon  evacuated  and  the  city  surrendered. 
Crocker  then  made  a reconnoissance  at  the  two  entrances  to 
the  eastward,  Mermenteau  and  Calcasieu,  and  on  his  return 
captured  a blockade-running  schooner,  the  Velocity,  'which 
he  armed  and  manned  as  a cruiser.  Going  once  more  to  Cal- 
casieu, he  pulled  up  the  river  eighty  miles  in  boats,  and  cap- 
tured the  steamer  Dan,  which  he  also  fitted  out  for  service, 
putting  on  board  a rifled  20-pounder  and  a howitzer.  This 
new  acquisition  was  taken  around  to  Sabine,  and  a few  days 
later  Crocker  moved  her  up  the  river,  and  destroyed  the  rail- 
road bridge,  although  the  enemy  were  posted  there  in  force. 
On  his  return,  he  found  that  the  pickets  from  a camp  of  the  en- 
emy’s cavalry,  five  miles  back  of  Sabine  City,  had  given  some 
annoyance.  Landing  with  a party  of  fifty  men  and  a howitzer, 
Crocker  marched  to  the  place,  drove  off  the  enemy,  burned 
their  stables,  and  broke  up  their  encampment.  After  these 
gallant  and  successful  operations,  to  which  were  added  the 
capture  of  several  blockade-runners,  Crocker  returned  in  the 
Kensington  to  Pensacola,  leaving  the  Rachel  Seaman,  and 
the  prize-vessels  Dan  and  Velocity  to  keep  up  a real  block- 
ade at  Sabine  Pass. 

The  expedition  to  Galveston  was  under  the  command  of 
Commander  W.  B.  Renshaw,  and  consisted  of  the  ferry-boat 
Westfield,  Renshaw’s  vessel,  another  ferry-boat,  the  Clifton, 
under  Lieutenant-Commander  Law,  the  side-wheel  steamer 
Harriet  Lane,  Commander  Wain wright,  and  the  gunboat 


144 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


O wasco,  Lieutenant-Commander  Wilson.  The  squadron, 
though  small,  was  a formidable  one  to  send  against  Galves- 
ton, which  was  imperfectly  protected.  All  the  vessels  carried 
for  their  size  heavy  batteries.1 

No  fighting  took  place,  however.  Several  days  were  spent 
in  negotiations,  and  a truce  was  granted  by  Renshaw,  under 
a verbal  stipulation  that  the  force  on  shore  should  not  be 
increased.  The  Confederates  took  advantage  of  this  some- 
what loose  arrangement  to  carry  off  the  guns  from  the  fortifica- 
tions— a proceeding  against  which  Renshaw  remonstrated 
unsuccessfully.  At  the  end  of  the  truce,  the  city  was  surren- 
dered, and  the  fleet  thenceforth  occupied  a secure  position 
inside  the  bay. 

Captain  Renshaw  requested  that  a military  force  should 
be  sent  to  hold  Galveston,  and  reported  that  two  or  three 
hundred  men,  with  half  a dozen  pieces  of  artillery,  could 
easily  defend  themselves  on  Fort  Point  or  Pelican  Island. 
An  expedition  was  accordingly  fitted  out,  which  was  to  land 
at  Galveston,  and  make  that  point  the  base  of  military  oper- 
ations. The  first  detachment  of  troops  consisted  of  three 
companies  of  a Massachusetts  regiment,  under  Colonel  Bur- 
rill,  numbering  two  hundred  and  sixty  men,  but  without 
any  artillery.  This  force  was  clearly  inadequate  to  hold  the 
place ; but  with  such  an  efficient  squadron,  it  seemed  un- 
likely that  the  enemy  would' be  able  to  accomplish  any  great 
results  by  an  attack,  particularly  as  they  had  no  vessels 
specially  adapted  for  hostilities  in  those  waters.  This  ab- 


1 The  general  statement  gives  so  imperfect  an  idea  of  the  powerful  armament  of 
Renshaw’s  squadron,  and  especially  of  the  ferry-boats,  that  it  may  be  worth  while 
to  mention  the  guns  in  detail.  They  were  as  follows  : Westfield — One  100- 
pounder  rifle,  four  VUI-inch  shell  guns  (56  cwt.),  one  IX-inch.  Clifton — twc 
IX-inch,  four  heavy  32-pounders  (57  cwt.),  one  30-pounder.  Harriet  Lane- 
three  IX-inch,  two  24-pound  howitzers.  Owasco — one  XI- inch,  one  20-pounder 
Parrott,  one  24-pound  howitzer. 


THE  GULF  SQUADRONS. 


145 


sence  of  an  enemy  in  force  seems  to  have  given  Renshaw 
a false  sense  of  security,  and  he  neglected  to  destroy  the 
railroad  bridge  connecting  Galveston  with  the  mainland — 
a fatal  omission.  Whatever  may  be  the  disadvantages  under 
which  an  enemy  labors,  there  is  always  danger  to  be  appre- 
hended for  a small  squadron  lying  in  his  waters  ; and  noth- 
ing can  justify  the  want  of  vigilance  or  of  preparation. 


Galveston  Harbor  and  Entrance. 


By  the  end  of  November  Farragut  held  nearly  all  the  prin- 
cipal points  in  the  West  Gulf  except  Mobile.  About  this 
time,  he  writes  : “We  shall  spoil  unless  we  have  a fight  oc- 
casionally. Blockading  is  hard  service,  and  difficult  to  carry 
out  with  perfect  success,  as  has  been  effectually  shown  at 
Charleston,  where  they  run  to  Nassau  regularly  once  a week. 
We  have  done  a little  better  than  that ; we  take  them  now 
I. -7 


146 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


and  then.  I don’t  know  how  many  escape,  but  we  certainly 
make  a good  many  prizes.”  Farragut  was  not  quite  accurate 
in  his  comparison,  as  the  number  of  prizes  reported  for 
Charleston  in  1862  considerably  exceeded  that  at  Mobile. 
In  December  he  says  again  of  the  blockade  at  the  latter 
place  : 4 4 We  have  taken  or  destroyed  all  the  steamers  that 
run  from  Havana  and  Nassau  except  the  Cuba  and  Alice,  and 
I hope  to  catch  those  in  the  course  of  time.” 

But  Farragut’s  hope  of  improving  the  efficiency  of  the  Gulf 
blockade  was  destined  to  be  rudely  shattered.  It  was  only  a 
few  days  after  he  wrote  the  letter  just  quoted  that  the  aspect 
of  affairs  on  the  coast  of  Texas  was  suddenly  changed  by  the 
defeat  of  the  squadron  at  Galveston,  and  the  consequent  ces- 
sation of  the  blockade  at  that  point. 

On  the  last  day  of  December,  intimations  were  received 
by  both  commanders  at  Galveston,  ashore  and  afloat,  that  an 
attack  would  be  made  that  night.  The  affair  was  therefore 
no  surprise  ; in  fact,  the  presumption  is  that  it  was  expected. 
Moreover,  there  was  a bright  moonlight  on  the  night  chosen 
for  the  attack ; and  the  steamers  of  the  approaching  force 
were  seen  in  the  bay  above,  both  by  the  Clifton  and  the 
Westfield.  This  was  about  half -past  one  on  the  morning  of 
the  1st  of  January. 

At  this  time  the  troops  were  occupying  a wharf  in  the 
town,  in  order  that  they  might  have  the  fleet  as  a base. 
The  small  steamer  Sachem,  which  had  been  a part  of  Kit- 
tredge’s  force  at  Corpus  Christi,  had  come  in  from  Aransas 
two  days  before,  in  a broken-down  condition.  The  schooner- 
yacht  Corypheus  had  come  with  her  as  escort,  and  the  two 
vessels  were  lying  opposite  the  wharf.  The  Harriet  Lane 
was  stationed  higher  up  the  channel,  to  the  westward,  and 
therefore  nearer  the  enemy.  The  Westfield  lay  three  or  four 
miles  off,  in  Bolivar  channel,  a body  of  water  to  the  north- 


THE  GULF  SQUADRONS. 


147 


ward  of  the  town,  only  accessible  from  the  harbor  of  Galves- 
ton by  a roundabout  passage  to  the  eastward.  With  the 
Westfield  were  the  schooner  Velocity,  which  Crocker  had 
captured  at  Sabine  Pass,  and  some  transports  and  coal-barks. 
The  Clifton  and  O wasco  were  about  midway  between  the  two 
groups  of  vessels. 

Though  the  enemy  first  made  their  appearance  at  half -past 
one,  it  was  three  o’clock  before  the  attack  began  in  the  town, 
and  only  at  daylight  that  the  Confederate  steamers  reached 
the  Harriet  Lane,  the  nearest  of  the  blockading  force.  The 
latter  was  at  the  time  under  way,  and  anticipated  the  attack, 
herself  taking  the  offensive.  Her  opponents  were  two  river- 
steamers,  the  Bayou  City  and  the  Neptune,  the  first  armed 
with  a rifled  68-pounder,  the  second  with  two  small  brass 
pieces.  Each  carried  from  150  to  200  men,  and  both  were 
barricaded  with  cotton  bales,  twenty  or  more  feet  above  the 
water-line. 

As  the  two  steamers  came  down,  the  Harriet  Lane  ad- 
vanced to  meet  them,  firing  her  bow  gun.  The  Bayou  City 
replied,  but  her  gun  burst  at  the  third  fire.  The  Harriet 
Lane  then  ran  into  her,  carried  away  her  wheel-guard,  and, 
passing,  gave  her  a broadside,  which  did  her  little  damage. 
The  Neptune  then  rammed  the  Harriet  Lane,  but  she  was 
herself  so  much  injured  by  the  collision  that  she  backed  off 
out  of  action,  and  soon  after  sank  on  the  flats  in  eight  feet  of 
water.  The  Bayou  City  rammed  the  Lane  in  her  turn,  and 
her  bow  catching  under  the  guard-rail  of  the  other  vessel, 
she  was  held  fast.  A sharp  fire  of  musketry  was  now  ex- 
changed between  the  two  vessels,  which  caused  no  great 
mortality  on  either  side,  though  it  inflicted  an  irreparable 
loss  on  the  Federal  steamer  by  wounding  the  captain  and 
first  lieutenant,  Wain wright  and  Lea,  both  excellent  officers. 
The  fire  drove  the  Harriet  Lane’s  crew  from  their  guns,  and 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


148 

the  enemy  boarded,  and,  after  a short  struggle,  carried  the 
vessel.  Wain wright  was  killed  at  the  head  of  his  men,  de- 
fending his  ship  gallantly  to  the  last,  and  fell  after  having 
received  seven  wounds.  Lea  had  already  been  mortally 
wTounded  before  the  enemy  boarded. 

After  Wainwright  fell,  no  defence  was  attempted.  The 
surviving  senior  officer,  an  acting-master,  almost  immediately 
surrendered,  though  less  than  a dozen  men  were  seriously 
hurt  out  of  his  crew  of  112.  Upon  this  proceeding  Farragut 
makes  the  following  brief  comment : “It  is  difficult  to  con- 
ceive of  a more  pusillanimous  surrender  of  a vessel  to  an 
enemy  already  in  our  power.  ” 

Meantime  the  other  vessels  were  variously  occupied.  The 
Sachem  and  Corypheus,  lying  near  the  wharf  held  by  the 
troops,  supplied  in  some  measure  the  want  of  artillery ; and 
the  battle  on  shore,  which  had  begun  about  three  o’clock, 
was  kept  up  until  daylight,  the  Confederates  gradually  com- 
ing closer  to  our  lines.  The  Owasco,  at  the  beginning  of 
the  engagement  in  the  city,  had  moved  up  to  a position 
between  the  Sachem  and  Corypheus,  and  united  with  them 
in  the  support  of  the  troops.  When  daylight  showed  the 
Harriet  Lane  engaged  with  two  of  the  enemy’s  vessels,  the 
Owasco  moved  up  to  assist  her,  occasionally  touching  the 
ground,  as  she  steamed  up  the  channel,  which  was  two  hun- 
dred yards  wide  at  this  point.  After  proceeding  a short  dis- 
tance, she  was  driven  back  by  the  small-arm  fire  of  the 
Bayou  City  ; and  wThen  the  howitzers  of  the  Lane  opened  on 
her,  she  backed  down  below  the  Sachem  and  Corypheus, 
and  took  up  her  berth  opposite  the  town. 

It  remains  to  account  for  the  two  other  steamers,  the  West- 
field  and  the  Clifton,  which,  despite  the  fact  that  they  were 
ferry-boats,  were  well-fitted  to  act  with  effect  in  such  an  en- 
counter as  this.  The  Westfield  got  under  way  at  the  first 


THE  GULE  SQUADRONS. 


uy 

sight  of  the  enemy’s  steamers,  but  had  no  sooner  begun  to 
move  than  she  went  fast  aground.  It  was  high  water  at  the 
time,  and  Benshaw  signalled  for  assistance.  In  response  to 
the  signal,  Lieutenant-Commander  Law  took  the  Clifton 
around  to  Bolivar  channel,  and  made  an  effort  to  get  the 
Westfield  afloat.  In  the  midst  of  this  operation,  the  attack 
began  in  the  town,  and  Benshaw  sent  the  Clifton  back  to 
support  the  other  vessels. 

The  moon  had  now  gone  down,  and  in  the  darkness  Law 
made  his  way  back  slowly,  shelling  the  Confederate  batteries 
as  he  passed  Fort  Point,  the  eastern  end  of  Galveston  Island. 
On  his  arrival  opposite  the  town,  he  came  to  anchor.  Ac- 
cording to  the  report  of  the  Court  of  Inquiry,  the  Clifton 
“did  not  proceed  up  to  the  rescue  of  the  Harriet  Lane, 
owing  to  the  failure  of  the  Owasco,  the  intricacy  of  the  channel, 
and  the  apprehension  of  killing  the  crew  of  the  Harriet  Lane, 
who  were  then  exposed  by  the  rebels  on  her  upper  deck.” 

The  enemy  now  sent  a flag  of  truce  to  demand  the  surren- 
der of  the  vessels,  at  the  same  time  offering  the  privilege  of 
taking  one  out  of  the  harbor  with  the  crews  of  all.  The 
bearer  of  the  demands  announced  the  capture  of  the  Lane, 
and  the  death  of  Wainwriglit  and  Lea,  and  represented  that 
two-thirds  of  her  crew  were  killed  and  wounded — a misrep- 
resentation in  which  he  was  sustained  by  an  officer  of  the 
Harriet  Lane,  whom  he  brought  with  him.  It  appears  that 
the  object  of  this  proceeding  was  to  gain  time.  Law  received 
the  message,  made  a verbal  arrangement  for  a truce,  in  which 
the  status  quo  was  to  be  maintained,  and  went  in  a boat  to 
the  Westfield,  to  refer  the  question  to  Benshaw.  After  a 
long  delay,  which  the  Confederates,  taking  advantage  of  the 
absence  of  written  stipulations,  occupied  in  bringing  down 
the  Harriet  Lane,  moving  up  their  artillery,  and  making  pris- 
oners of  the  troops,  Law  returned  with  Benshaw’s  refusal. 


150 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


The  truce  being  now  ended,  Law  proceeded  to  carry  out 
his  instructions,  which  were  to  take  the  vessels  out  of  the 
harbor  ; a movement  that  was  accomplished  successfully  and 
with  celerity.  It  was  Renshaw’s  intention  to  blow  up  the 
Westfield,  which  was  still  hard  aground,  and  to  come  out  in 
one  of  the  army  transports.  By  some  one’s  carelessness  or 
negligence,  the  explosion  took  place  prematurely,  and  Ren- 
shaw,  together  with  some  of  his  officers,  and  a few  of  his  crew, 
who  had  not  yet  been  transferred,  were  killed.  The  remain- 
der of  the  vessels,  except  the  two  coal-barks,  crossed  the  bar  ; 
and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  remains  of  the  squadron  were 
not  deemed  equal  to  an  engagement  with  the  Harriet  Lane, 
they  steamed  off  at  once  to  Southwest  Pass,  and  the  block- 
ade of  Galveston  was  raised. 

The  blockade  did  not  long  remain  broken.  Immediately 
after  the  arrival  of  the  Clifton,  Admiral  Farragut  sent  Com- 
modore Bell  to  Galveston  with  the  Brooklyn,  the  Hatteras, 
and  several  gunboats,  to  resume  the  blockade.  They  arrived 
off  the  town  on  the  8th,  so  that  the  interruption  lasted  only 
seven  days.  Had  they  been  a day  or  two  later,  they  would 
probably  have  found  the  Alabama  lying  snugly  in  the  port. 
As  it  was,  she  was  sighted  outside,  and  the  Hatteras  was  sent 
to  overhaul  her.  The  chase  resulted  in  an  encounter  twenty- 
five  miles  from  Galveston,  which  lasted  thirteen  minutes,  and 
which  ended  in  the  sinking  of  the  Hatteras.  The  squadron 
cruised  all  night  in  search  of  the  Hatteras,  and  finding  the 
wreck  in  the  morning  returned  to  Galveston. 

In  consequence  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  squadron  from 
Galveston,  after  the  capture  of  the  Lane,  a proclamation  was 
issued,  on  the  20tli  of  January,  by  Magrader,  the  Confederate 
General  commanding  in  Texas,  declaring  that  the  blockade 
had  ceased,  and  inviting  neutrals  to  resume  commercial  in- 
tercourse until  an  actual  blockade  had  been  re-established 


THE  GULF  SQUADRONS. 


151 


“with,  the  usual  notice  demanded  by  the  law  of  nations.” 
Though  the  blockade  had  indisputably  been  raised,  the  pro- 
clamation was  a little  late  in  giving  the  information,  and 
Bell  replied  by  a counter-proclamation  of  the  same  date, 
giving  a general  warning  that  an  actual  blockade  was  in  ex- 
istence. To  another  proclamation  of  Magruder’s,  announ- 
cing the  cessation  of  the  blockade  at  Velasco,  a port  forty 
miles  to  the  southward  of  Galveston,  Bell  could  make  no 
reply,  as  the  only  vessel  assigned  to  that  point  was  on  duty 
off  Aransas. 

Shortly  after  these  events,  on  the  21st,  an  attack  was  made 
on  the  Morning  Light  and  Velocity,  two  sailing-vessels 
blockading  Sabine  Pass.  The  enemy’s  force  consisted  of 
two  “ cotton-clad  ” steamers.  One  of  the  steamers  was  armed 
with  a rifled  68-pounder,  the  other  with  two  24-pounders. 
The  wind  was  light  and  the  blockaders  were  manoeuvred  with 
difficulty  ; and  after  some  resistance  they  surrendered.  On 
receiving  news  of  the  event,  Commodore  Bell  despatched  the 
New  London  and  the  Cayuga  to  Sabine.  When  they  arrived 
they  found  that  the  Morning  Light,  which  was  too  deep  to 
cross  the  bar,  had  been  set  on  fire,  and  was  still  burning. 
Bell’s  promptness  took  away  any  foundation  for  a claim  that 
the  blockade  was  raised,  and  the  incident  led  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  it  was  impossible  to  maintain  a blockade  with  small 
sailing-vessels  at  points  where  the  enemy  had  a force  of 
steamers.  Altogether  the  month  of  January,  1863,  was  a 
disastrous  period  on  the  Texas  blockade. 

During  the  rest  of  the  year  there  was  little  change  in  the 
state  of  affairs.  An  attack  on  Sabine  Pass,  now  strongly  de- 
fended, was  made  by  an  expedition  under  Acting-Lieutenant 
Crocker,  who  had  conducted  the  successful  affair  at  the 
same  point  the  year  before.  Upon  this  occasion  Crocker 
had  a larger  force,  and  a detachment  of  troops  was  ordered 


152 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


to  co-operate.  The  expedition,  however,  was  a failure.  The 
Clifton  and  Sachem  were  forced  by  the  fire  of  the  fort  to 
surrender,  and  the  other  vessels,  with  the  transports,  were 
withdrawn.  Toward  the  end  of  the  year  1863,  and  in  the 
early  part  of  1861,  a series  of  combined  operations  made  by 
the  army  and  navy  resulted  in  the  occupation  of  Brazos, 
Aransas,  and  Pass  Cavallo,  and  the  blockade  of  these  ports 
was  thenceforth  discontinued.  In  the  following  summer,  it 
became  necessary  to  withdraw  the  troops  for  operations  else- 
where, and  early  in  September  the  occupation  was  again  re- 
placed by  a blockade,  which  continued  till  the  end  of  the  war. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


THE  BLOCKADE-RUNNERS. 

During  the  early  part  of  the  war  blockade-running  was 
carried  on  from  the  Capes  of  the  Chesapeake  to  the  mouth  of 
the  Rio  Grande.  It  was  done  by  vessels  of  all  sorts  and 
sizes.  The  most  successful  were  the  steamers  that  had  be- 
longed to  the  Southern  coasting  lines,  which  found  them- 
selves thrown  out  of  employment  when  the  war  broke  out. 
The  rest  were  small  craft,  which  brought  cargoes  of  more  or 
less  value  from  the  Bahamas  or  Cuba,  and  carried  back 
cotton.  They  answered  the  purpose  sufficiently  well,  for  the 
blockade  was  not  yet  rigorous,  speed  was  not  an  essential,  and 
the  familiarity  of  the  skippers  with  the  coast  enabled  them 
to  elude  the  ships-of-war,  which  were  neither  numerous  nor 
experienced  in  the  business.  By  April,  1861,  the  greater 
part  of  the  last  year’s  cotton  crop  had  been  disposed  of,  and 
it  was  estimated  that  only  about  one-seventh  remained  un- 
exported when  the  blockade  was  established.  Cotton  is 
gathered  in  September,  and  shipments  are  generally  made  in 
the  winter  and  spring,  and  considerable  time  must  conse- 
quently elapse  before  a new  supply  could  come  into  the 
market.  The  ‘proclamation  of  the  blockade  caused  for  a 
time  a cessation  of  regular  commerce  ; and  it  was  only  after  a 
considerable  interval  that  a new  commerce,  with  appliances 
specially  adapted  to  the  altered  state  of  things,  began  to  de- 
velop. Meantime  illicit  trade  in  a small  way  flourished, 
7* 


154 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


The  profits  were  considerable,  though  not  comparable  to 
those  of  later  years  ; and  the  work  required  neither  skill  nor 
capital. 

This  guerilla  form  of  contraband  traffic  gradually  decreased 
after  the  first  year,  though  there  was  always  a little  going 
on  from  the  Bahamas,  and  on  the  coast  of  Texas.  By  the 
end  of  the  second  year  it  was  only  to  be  found  in  out-of-the- 
way  nooks  and  corners.  'Little  by  little  the  lines  were  drawn 
more  tightly,  as  Dupont  threw  vessels  into  the  inlets  below 
Charleston,  and  Goldsborough  into  the  Sounds  of  North 
Carolina,  while  the  blockading  force  grew  from  a dozen  ves- 
sels to  three  hundred.  In  all  the  squadrons  the  burning 
and  cutting  out  of  schooners  gave  frequent  occupation  to  the 
blockading  forces,  and  the  smaller  fry  were  driven  from  their 
haunts.  As  these  vessels  were  captured  or  destroyed  one  by 
one,  there  was  nothing  to  replace  them,  and  they  gradually 
disappeared. 

Meantime  the  blockade  was  beginning  to  tell  both  upon 
friends — or,  to  speak  with  exactness,  upon  neutrals — and  upon 
enemies.  The  price  of  cotton  decreased  at  the  South,  and 
advanced  abroad.  The  supply  was  short,  the  crop  of  1861 
being  about  half  that  of  the  previous  year ; East  India  cotton 
had  not  yet  come  into  the  market,  and  the  demand  was  great. 
The  price  of  manufactured  goods  at  the  South  advanced 
enormously.  The  time  was  ripe  for  judicious  action ; and 
the  Liverpool  cotton-merchant,  who  in  the  winter  of  1861-62 
had  found  ruin  staring  him  in  the  face,  suddenly  awoke  to 
the  fact  that  the  ports  of  the  South  were  an  Eldorado  of 
wealth  to  the  man  who  could  go  in  and  come  out  again  in 
safety. 

"With  cotton  at  fourpence  a pound  in  Wilmington  and  two 
shillings  a pound  in  England,  the  Liverpool  merchant  was 
not  a man  to  hesitate  long.  Blockade-running  from  Europe 


THE  BLOCKADE-RUNNERS. 


155 


had  already  been  attempted,  but  the  profits  had  not  been 
sufficient  to  outweigh  the  risk  of  capture  during  the  trans- 
atlantic voyage.  Now,  however,  when  half-crowns  could  be 
turned  into  sovereigns  at  a single  venture,  capitalists  could 
afford  to  run  almost  any  risk ; and  as  it  happened,  at  the 
very  time  when  the  profits  increased,  a plan  was  devised  to 
lessen  the  danger.  Attempts  had  already  been  made  to 
obviate  the  risk  by  a fictitious  destination  to  Nassau  or  Ber- 
muda ; but  the  capture  and  condemnation  of  one  or  two 
vessels  proved  this  device  to  be  a failure.  The  plan  of  trans- 
shipment was  then  adopted,  and  two  vessels  were  employed, 
each  specially  fitted  for  its  peculiar  service,  one  for  the  long 
and  innocent  passage  across  the  ocean,  the  other  for  the 
short  but  illegal  run  to  the  blockaded  port ; and  liability  to 
confiscation  was  thus  reduced  to  a minimum.  Capital  was 
invested  in  large  amounts  in  the  new  industry ; shrewd 
north-countrymen  embarked  in  it,  and  companies  were 
formed  to  carry  on  operations  on  a large  scale.  Officers  of 
rank  in  the  English  navy,  on  leave  of  absence,  offered  their 
services,  under  assumed  names,  and  for  large  compensation, 
to  the  owners  of  vessels  in  the  contraband  trade,  and  met 
with  distinguished  success  in  their  enterprises.  Doubtless 
there  were  few  of  these  last ; but  the  incognito  which  they 
preserved  has  been  respected,  and  neither  their  names  nor 
their  number  have  been  generally  made  known. 

The  Confederate  Government  did  not  hesitate  to  enter 
the  field  and  take  a share  in  the  business.  Vessels  adapted 
to  the  purpose  were  bought  by  agents  in  England,  and 
loaded  with  munitions  of  war,  and  Confederate  naval  officers 
under  orders  from  the  Department  were  placed  in  command. 
These  vessels  cleared  under  the  English  flag,  taking  out  a 
sailing  captain  to  comply  with  the  requirements  of  law. 
Later  they  were  transferred  to  the  Confederate  flag,  and 


156 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


carried  on  a regular  trade  between  Nassau  or  Bermuda  and 
Wilmington  or  some  other  blockaded  port.  The  Govern- 
ment owned  three  or  four  such  vessels,  and  was  part-owner 
in  several  others.  These  last  were  required  to  cany  out 
cotton  on  Government  account,  as  part  of  their  cargo,  and  to 
bring  in  supplies.  Among  the  vessels  wholly  owned  by  the 
Government  was  the  Giraffe,  a Clyde-built  iron  side-wheel 
steamer,  of  light  draft  and  considerable  speed,  which  had 
been  used  as  a packet  between  Glasgow  and  Belfast.  She 
became  famous  under  a new  name,  as  the  R.  E.  Lee  ; and 
under  the  efficient  command  of  Captain  Wilkinson,  who  had 
formerly  been  an  officer  of  our  navy,  and  who  was  now  in 
the  Confederate  service,  she  ran  the  blockade  twenty-one 
times  in  ten  months,  between  December,  1862,  and  November, 
1863,  and  carried  abroad  six  thousand  bales  of  cotton.  The 
cotton  was  landed  at  Nassau,  the  Government  not  appearing 
in  the  transaction  as  shipper  or  owner.  Here  it  was  entrusted 
to  a mercantile  firm,  which  received  a large  “ commission” 
for  assuming  ownership,  and  by  this  last  it  was  shipped  to 
Europe  under  neutral  flags.  The  firm  employed  for  this 
purpose  is  reported  to  have  obtained  a handsome  return  from 
its  transactions. 

The  trade  was  now  reduced  to  a system,  whose  working 
showed  it  to  be  nearly  perfect.  The  short-voyage  blockade- 
runners,  destined  for  the  passage  between  the  neutral  islands 
and  the  blockaded  coast,  began  to  make  their  appearance. 
In  these  every  device  was  brought  into  use  that  could  in- 
crease their  efficiency.  Speed,  invisibility,  and  handiness, 
with  a certain  space  for  stowage,  were  the  essentials;  to 
these  all  other  qualities  were  sacrificed.  The  typical  block- 
ade-runner of  1863-4  was  a long,  low  side-wheel  steamer  of 
from  four  to  six  hundred  tons,  with  a slight  frame,  sharp 
and  narrow,  its  length  perhaps  nine  times  its  beam.  It  had 


THE  BLOCKADE-RUNNERS. 


157 


feathering  paddles,  and  one  or  two  raking  telescopic  funnels, 
which  might  be  lowered  close  to  the  deck.  The  hull  rose 
only  a few  feet  out  of  the  water,  and  was  painted  a dull  gray 
or  lead  color,  so  that  it  could  hardly  be  seen  by  daylight  at 
two  hundred  yards.  Its  spars  were  two  short  lower-masts, 
with  no  yards,  and  only  a small  crow’s-nest  in  the  foremast. 
The  deck  forward  was  constructed  in  the  form  known  as 
“turtle-back,”  to  enable  the  vessel  to  go  through  a heavy 
sea.  Anthracite  coal,  which  made  no  smoke,  was  burned  in 
the  furnaces.  This  coal  came  from  the  United  States,  and 
when,  in  consequence  of  the  prohibition  upon  its  exporta- 
tion enforced  by  the  Government,  it  could  not  be  obtained, 
the  semi-bituminous  Welsh  coal  was  used  as  a substitute. 
When  running  in,  all  lights  were  put  out,  the  binnacle  and 
fire-room  hatch  were  carefully  coyered,  and  steam  was  blown 
off  under  water.  In  the  latest  vessels  of  this  class  speed 
was  too  much  studied  at  the  expense  of  strength,  and  some 
of  them  were  disabled  before  they  reached  their  cruising- 
ground. 

The  start  from.  Nassau  or  Bermuda  was  usually  made  at 
such  a time  that  a moonless  night  and  a high  tide  could  be 
secured  for  running  in.  A sharp  lookout  was  kept  for 
cruisers  on  the  outside  blockade,  and  the  blockade-runner, 
by  keeping  at  a distance,  could  generally  pass  them  unob- 
served. If  by  accident  or  carelessness  he  came  very  close, 
he  took  to  his  heels,  and  his  speed  enabled  him  to  get 
away.  He  never  hove  to  when  ordered ; it  was  as  hard  to 
hit  him  as  to  overtake  him : a stray  shot  or  two  he  cared 
nothing  for.  Even  if  his  pursuer  had  the  advantage  of  him 
in  speed,  which  was  rarely  the  case,  he  still  kept  on,  and, 
by  protracting  the  chase  for  a few  hours,  he  could  be  sure 
that  a squall,  or  a fog,  or  the  approach  of  night  would  en- 
able him  to  escape.  Wilkinson  describes  a device  which 


158 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


was  commonly  employed  under  these  circumstances.  In 
running  from  Wilmington  to  Nassau,  on  one  occasion,  he 
found  himself  hard  pressed  by  a sloop-of-war.  His  coal 
was  bad,  but  by  using  cotton  saturated  with  turpentine,  he 
succeeded  in  keeping  ahead.  The  chase  had  lasted  all  day, 
and  at  sunset  the  sloop  was  within  four  miles,  and  still 
gaining.  The  engineer  was  then  directed  to  make  a black 
smoke,  and  a lookout  was  stationed  with  a glass,  to  give 
notice  as  soon  as  he  lost  sight  of  the  pursuer  in  the  deep- 
ening twilight.  The  moment  the  word  came,  orders  were 
given  to  close  the  dampers,  and  the  volumes  of  smoke  ceased 
to  pour  out ; the  helm  was  put  hard-a-starboard,  changing 
the  course  eight  points  ; and  the  blockade-runner  disap- 
peared in  the  darkness,  while  the  cruiser  continued  her 
course  in  pursuit  of  a shadow. 

Having  passed  the  outside  blockade  successfully,  and  ar- 
rived in  the  neighborhood  of  his  destination,  the  blockade- 
runner  would  either  lie  off  at  a distance,  or  run  in  close  to 
the  land  to  the  northward  or  southward  of  the  port,  and  wait 
for  the  darkness.  Sometimes  vessels  would  remain  in  this 
way  unobserved  for  a whole  day.  If  they  found  the  place  too 
hot  and  the  cruisers  too  active,  one  of  the  inlets  at  a little 
distance  from  the  port  of  destination  would  give  the  needful 
shelter.  Masonboro  Inlet,  to  the  north  of  Wilmington,  was 
a favorite  resort  for  this  purpose.  At  night  the  steamers 
would  come  out  of  hiding  and  make  a dash  for  the  entrance. 

The  difficulty  of  running  the  blockade  was  increased  by 
the  absence  of  lights  on  the  coast.  In  approaching  or  skirt- 
ing the  shore,  the  salt-works  in  operation  at  various  points 
served  as  a partial  substitute.  Temporary  lights  were  used  at 
some  of  the  ports  to  aid  the  blockade-runners.  At  Charles- 
ton, there  was  a light  on  Fort  Sumter.  At  Wilmington, 
in  the  first  year,  the  Frying  Pan  light-ship  was  taken  in- 


THE  BLOCKADE-RUNNERS. 


159 


side  the  entrance,  and  anchored  under  Fort  Caswell,  where 
she  was  burnt  in  December,  1861,  by  two  boat’s  crews  from 
the  Mount  Vernon.  At  New  Inlet,  a light  was  placed  on 
“the  Mound,”  a small  battery  that  flanked  the  works  on 
Federal  Point.  In  the  earlier  blockade,  the  lights  of  the 
squadron  served  as  a guide  to  blockade-runners.  After  the 
general  practice  was  discontinued,  the  plan  was  adopted  of 
carrying  a light  on  the  senior  officer’s  vessel,  which  was  an- 
chored in  the  centre  of  the  fleet,  near  the  entrance.  This 
fact  soon  became  known  to  the  blockade-runners ; indeed, 
there  was  little  about  the  squadron  that  was  not  known  and 
immediately  disseminated  at  Nassau,  that  central-office  of 
blockade-running  intelligence.  Thenceforth  it  served  as  a 
useful  guide  in  making  the  channel.  After  a time  the  block- 
ading officer  discovered  his  error,  and  turned  it  to  account 
by  changing  his  position  every  night,  thereby  confusing 
many  calculations. 

The  run  past  the  inshore  squadron  was  always  a critical 
moment,  though  by  no  means  so  dangerous  as  it  looked.  It 
was  no  easy  matter  on  a dark  night  to  hit,  much  less  to  stop, 
a small  and  obscure  vessel,  going  at  the  rate  of  fifteen  knots, 
whose  only  object*  was  to  pass  by.  But  the  service  neverthe- 
less called  into  action  all  the  faculties  of  the  blockade- 
runner.  It  required  a cool  head,  strong  nerve,  and  ready 
resource.  It  was  a combat  of  skill  and  pluck  against  force 
and  vigilance.  The  excitement  of  fighting  was  wanting,  as 
the  blockade-runner  must  make  no  resistance  ; nor,  as  a rule, 
was  he  prepared  to  make  any.  But  the  chances,  both  out- 
side and  inshore,  were  all  in  his  favor.  He  had  only  to 
make  a port  and  run  in,  and  he  could  choose  time,  and 
weather,  and  circumstances.  He  could  even  choose  his 
destination.  He  always  had  steam  up  when  it  was  wanted. 
He  knew  the  critical  moment,  and  was  prepared  for  it ; and 


160 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


his  moments  of  action  were  followed  by  intervals  of  repose 
and  relaxation.  The  blockader  on  the  other  hand,  was  in 
every  way  at  a disadvantage.  He  had  no  objective  point 
except  the  blockade-runner,  and  he  never  knew  when  the 
blockade-runner  was  coming.  He  could  choose  nothing, 
but  must  take  the  circumstances  as  they  happened  to  come  ; 
and  they  were  pretty  sure  to  be  unfavorable.  He  was  com- 
pelled to  remain  in  that  worst  of  all  situations,  incessant 
watchfulness  combined  with  prolonged  inaction.  There 
would  be  days  and  nights  of  anxious  waiting,  with  expecta- 
tion strained  to  the  tensest  point,  for  an  emergency  which 
lasted  only  as  many  minutes,  and  which  came  when  it  was 
least  expected.  There  was  no  telling  when  or  where  the 
blow  would  need  to  be  struck ; and  a solitary  moment  of 
napping  might  be  fatal,  in  spite  of  months  of  ceaseless  vigil- 
ance. 

At  New  Inlet,  which  was  a favorite  entrance,  the  blockade- 
runners  would  frequently  get  in  by  hugging  the  shore, 
slipping  by  the  endmost  vessel  of  the  blockading  line. 
Even  on  a clear  night  a properly  prepared  craft  was  invisible 
against  the  land,  and  the  roar  of  the  surf  drowned  the  noise 
of  her  screw  or  paddles.  Having  a good  pilot  and  little 
depth,  she  could  generally  run  well  inside  of  the  blockaders. 
After  passing  the  line,  she  would  show  a light  on  her  inshore 
side  ; this  was  answered  from  the  beach  by  a dim  light, 
followed  by  another,  above  and  beyond  the  first.  These 
were  the  range-lights  for  the  channel.  By  getting  them  in 
line,  the  blockade-runner  could  ascertain  her  position,  and  in 
a few  moments,  she  would  be  under  the  guns  of  the  fort. 
When  the  practice  of  blockade-running  was  reduced  to  a 
system,  a signal-service  was  organized  on  shore,  and  signal 
officers  and  pilots  were  regularly  detailed  for  each  vessel. 
After  the  fall  of  Fort  Fisher,  and  before  the  fact  was  known, 


THE  BLOCKADE-RUNNERS. 


161 


the  duties  of  the  signal-service  were  assumed  by  the  officers 
of  the  Monticello,  under  the  direction  of  Cushing  ; and  two 
well  known  blockade-runners,  the  Stag  and  the  Charlotte, 
were  helped  in  by  range-lights  from  the  shore,  only  to  find 
themselves  prizes  when  they  were  comfortably  anchored  in 
the  river. 

Vessels  passed  so  often  between  the  squadron  and  the  shore 
that  special  measures  were  taken  to  stop  it.  The  endmost 
vessel  was  so  placed  as  to  leave  a narrow  passage.  When  the 
blockade-runner  had  passed,  the  blockader  moved  nearer 
and  closed  the  entrance,  at  the  same  time  sending  up  signal 
rockets.  Two  or  three  of  her  consorts  were  in  waiting  and 
closed  up,  and  the  adventurous  vessel  suddenly  found  her- 
self hemmed  in  on  all  sides,  and  without  a chance  of  escape. 

Whenever  a blockade-runner  was  hard  pressed  in  a chase, 
it  was  a common  practice  for  the  captain  to  run  her  ashore, 
trusting  to  favorable  circumstances  to  save  a fragment  of  his 
cargo.  Communicating  with  the  forces  in  the  neighborhood, 
he  would  obtain  the  co-operation  of  a detachment  of  infantry, 
often  accompanied  by  one  or  two  pieces  of  artillery,  which 
would  harass  the  parties  sent  from  the  blockading  vessels  to 
get  the  steamer  off.  At  Wilmington,  lunettes  were  thrown  up 
along  the  shore,  large  enough  for  two  guns,  and  a field-bat- 
tery of  Whitworth  12-pounders  was  kept  in  constant  readiness 
to  run  down  and  occupy  them.  Sometimes  the  blockaders 
were  able  to  command  the  land  approaches,  and  so  prevent 
the  people  on  shore  from  doing  mischief  ; but  at  other  times 
the  latter  had  it  all  their  own  way.  It  was  no  easy  matter  in 
any  case  to  float  off  a steamer  which  had  been  beached  in- 
tentionally under  a full  head  of  steam,  especially  if  the  tide 
was  running  ebb  ; and  the  fire  of  one  or  two  rifled  guns 
placed  close  by  on  the  beach  made  the  operation  hazardous. 
The  only  course  left  was  to  burn  the  wreck ; and  even  then,  if 


162 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


the  work  was  not  done  thoroughly,  the  chances  were  that  the 
fire  would  be  extinguished,  and  the  damaged  vessel  ulti- 
mately recovered.  In  July,  1863,  the  Kate,  one  of  the  new 
English-built  craft,  after  running  to  Charleston  and  being 
chased  off,  put  into  Wilmington.  She  attempted  to  pass  the 
fleet  off  New  Inlet,  but  choosing  her  time  badly,  she  was 
sighted  about  five  in  the  morning,  and,  after  a chase,  she 
was  run  ashore  on  Smith’s  Island,  and  abandoned.  The 
troops  came  down,  but  did  nothing.  A party  was  sent  in 
from  the  Penobscot  to  get  her  off ; but  this  failing,  she  was 
set  on  fire,  and  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  boat-party  re- 
ported that  he  had  disabled  her  so  effectually  that  she  would 
be  of  no  further  use.  Three  weeks  later,  however,  she  was 
floated  off  by  the  Confederates,  and  anchored  under  the  bat- 
teries ; a position  from  which  she  was  cut  out  with  some 
difficulty. 

The  Hebe,  a Bermuda  steamer,  was  run  ashore  a fortnight 
later  on  Federal  Point,  under  circumstances  generally  simi- 
lar, except  that  it  was  blowing  a gale  from  the  northeast.  A 
boat  sent  in  from  the  Niphon  was  swamped,  but  the  crew 
succeeded  in  getting  on  board  the  Hebe.  A second  boat 
was  driven  ashore,  and  the  crew  were  taken  prisoners  by  the 
cavalry  on  the  beach.  The  Hebe  was  covered  by  a two-gun 
Whitworth  battery  and  fifty  or  more  riflemen.  Other  boats 
put  off,  and  rescued  a few  of  the  men  on  board  the  steamer. 
The  last  boat  capsized ; and  the  remaining  men  of  the  first 
party  fired  the  ship,  and  making  for  the  shore  were  captured. 
This  time  the  vessel  was  destroyed.  A few  days  later  the 
large  vessels  of  the  squadron  came  in,  silenced  the  battery, 
and  finally  sent  in  a landing-party,  and  brought  off  the  guns. 

One  night  in  October  of  the  same  year  the  Venus,  one  of 
the  finest  and  fastest  of  the  vessels  in  the  Nassau-Wilmington 
trade,  made  the  blookading  fleet  off  New  Inlet.  She  was 


THE  BLOCKADE-RUNNERS. 


163 


first  discovered  by  the  Nansemond,  commanded  by  Lieuten- 
ant Lamson.  Lamson  was  always  on  the  alert,  and  his  work 
was  always  done  quickly  and  thoroughly.  After  a short 
chase,  he  overhauled  the  Venus.  When  abeam  he  opened  fire 
on  her.  Four  well-directed  shells  played  havoc  with  the 
blockade-runner.  The  first  struck  her  foremast ; the  second 
exploded  in  the  cabin ; the  third  passed  through  forward, 
killing  a man  on  the  way ; and  the  fourth,  striking  near  the 
water-line,  knocked  in  an  iron  plate,  causing  the  vessel  to 
make  water  fast.  This  was  good  practice,  at  night,  with 
both  vessels  making  nearly  fourteen  knots.  The  blockade- 
runner  headed  straight  for  the  shore,  and  she  was  no  sooner 
hard  and  fast,  than  the  boarders  had  taken  possession,  and 
captured  her  officers  and  crew.  As  it  was  impossible  to 
move  her,  she  was  riddled  with  shells  and  finally  burnt 
where  she  lay. 

One  of  the  prettiest  captures  made  off  Wilmington  was 
that  of  the  Ella  and  Anna,  by  Acting  Master  J.  B.  Breck  of 
the  Niphon,  in  the  following  November.  Breck  was  an  offi- 
cer of  pluck  and  resource,  and  he  won  a name  for  himself  by 
his  dashing  successes  on  the  Wilmington  blockade.  About 
five  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  the  9th  of  November,  as  he  was 
returning  along  the  shore  from  a chase  near  Masonboro  Inlet, 
he  discovered  a side-wheel  steamer  to  the  northward,  stealing 
along  toward  the  entrance  of  the  river.  Outside  of  her  lay  a 
blockader,  which  opened  on  her  with  grape,  and  the  block-  1 
ade-runner,  finding  herself  intercepted,  steered  directly  for 
the  Niphon  with  the  intention  of  running  her  down.  Breck 
saw  the  intention,  and  fixed  on  his  plan  in  an  instant.  Head- 
ing for  the  steamer,  he  formed  his  boarders  on  the  bow.  The 
blockade-runner  dashed  on  at  full  speed  under  a shower  of 
canister,  and  struck  him  a blow  that  carried  away  his  bowsprit 
and  stem.  In  a moment,  his  boarders  were  over  the  rail  and 


164 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


on  the  deck  of  the  blockade-rnnner  ; and  a few  seconds  made 
her  a prize.  She  had  on  board  three  hundred  cases  of  Aus- 
trian rifles  and  a quantity  of  saltpetre  ; and  the  prize-sale 
netted  $180,000.  The  Ella  and  Anna  was  taken  into  the  ser- 
vice, and  in  the  next  year,  under  her  new  name  of  the  Mal- 
vern, became  famous  as  the  flagship  of  Admiral  Porter. 

The  warfare  on  both  sides  was  accompanied  by  a variety  of 
ruses  and  stratagems,  more  or  less  ingenious  and  successful, 
but  usually  turning  out  to  the  benefit  of  the  blockade-runner. 
When  a steamer  was  sighted,  the  blockading  vessel  that  made 
the  discovery  fired  signals  in  the  direction  she  had  taken. 
This  was  at  best  an  uncertain  guide,  as  the  blockaders  could 
only  make  a rough  guess  at  the  stranger’s  position.  The 
practice  was  no  sooner  understood  than  the  enterprising  cap- 
tains at  Nassau  sent  for  a supply  of  signal  rockets,  and  there- 
after they  were  carried  as  a part  of  the  regular  equipment. 
Bunning  through  the  fleet,  and  finding  himself  discovered, 
the  captain  immediately  fired  his  rockets  in  a direction  at 
right  angles  to  his  course  ; and  the  blockaders  were  sent  on 
a wild-goose  chase  into  the  darkness.  If  there  were  many 
of  them,  they  were  apt  to  get  in  each  other’s  way ; and  more 
than  once  serious  damage  was  done  by  a friendly  vessel. 
The  Howquah,  off  Wilmington,  on  a dark  night,  in  Septem- 
ber, 1864,  had  nearly  succeeded  in  making  a prize,  when  the 
concentrated  fire  of  the  batteries,  the  blockading  squadron, 
and,  according  to  the  belief  of  the  commander,  of  the 
blockade-runner,  proved  to  be  too  much  for  him,  and  caused 
him  to  draw  off. 

One  of  the  blockade-running  captains  relates  that,  on  a 
certain  night,  when  he  found  himself  alongside  a vessel  of 
the  fleet  and  under  her  guns,  he  was  told  to  heave  to.  Ac- 
cordingly, steam  was  shut  off,  and  he  replied  that  he  had 
8topi>ed.  There  was  a moderate  sea,  and  the  boat  from  tha 


THE  BLOCK ADE-RUNNEBS. 


165 


cruiser  was  delayed.  As  it  reached  the  side  of  the  blockade- 
runner,  the  captain  of  the  latter  gave  the  order,  “ Full  speed 
ahead,”  and  his  vessel  shot  away  toward  the  channel.  A de- 
ception of  this  kind,  whatever  may  be  thought  of  it  abstractly, 
was  one  that  would  be  likely  to  recoil  on  the  blockade-run- 
ners. A vessel  or  two  might  avoid  being  sunk  by  pretending 
to  surrender,  but  a blockader  would  hardly  be  caught  twice 
by  such  a trick.  The  next  time,  instead  of  hailing  before  he 
fired,  he  would  fire  before  he  hailed  ; and  he  would  be  per- 
fectly justified  in  so  doing.  Indeed,  it  is  a question  whether 
in  a blockade  so  persistently  broken  as  that  of  Wilmington, 
the  ordinary  rules  of  action  for  belligerent  cruisers  should 
not  be  modified,  and  vessels  found  in  flagrante  delicto , 
whether  neutrals  or  not,  be  destroyed  instead  of  being  cap- 
tured. Certainly,  if  destruction  and  not  capture  had  always 
been  the  object,  fewer  blockade-runners  would  have  escaped, 
and  possibly  fewer  would  have  undertaken  the  business. 
There  is  always  a possibility  that  a vessel  met  at  sea,  how- 
ever suspicious  the  circumstances,  may  be  innocent;  but 
when  found  running  through  the  blockading  fleet,  her  guilt 
is  established,  and  if  there  is  any  question  about  bringing 
her  to — and  at  Wilmington  there  was  always  rather  more 
than  a question— the  blockader  is  not  far  wrong  whose  first 
thought  is  to  inflict  a vital  injury. 

As  it  was,  blockade-running  was  not  an  occupation  in- 
volving much  personal  danger,  and  little  apprehension  was 
felt  about  running  through  the  fleet.  Calcium  lights  were 
burned,  and  shot  and  shell  flew  thickly  over  and  around  the 
entering  vessel,  but  they  did  not  often  hit  the  mark.  At  Wil- 
mington it  was  perhaps  not  so  much  the  inshore  blockade 
that  killed  the  trade  as  the  practice  of  keeping  fast  cruisers 
outside.  Until  near  the  end  of  1864,  when  the  stringency 
of  the  blockade  became  extreme,  the  captures  were  not 


166 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


numerous  enough  to  take  up  more  than  a slight  margin  of 
the  enormous  profits  that  it  netted.  These  profits  were 
made  both  on  the  outward  and  the  inward  voyages,  and  it  is 
hard  to  say  which  were  the  more  extraordinary.  The  inward 
cargoes  consisted  of  aH  kinds  of  manufactured  goods,  and 
especially  of  “hardware,”  the  innocent  name  under  which 
arms  and  ammunition  were  invoiced.  The  sale  of  these 
brought  in  from  five  hundred  to  one  thousand  per  cent,  of 
their  cost.  The  return  cargo  was  always  cotton,  and  the 
steam-presses  at  Wilmington,  reducing  it  to  the  smallest 
possible  bulk,  enabled  the  long,  narrow  blockade-runners  to 
carry  six  hundred,  eight  hundred,  or  even  twelve  hundred 
bales,  of  five  or  six  hundred  pounds  each.  Even  the  upper 
deck  was  piled  up  with  two  or  three  tiers  of  bales.  As  a 
clear  profit  of  £30,000  each  way  was  no  uncommon  result,  it 
is  easy  to  believe  that  owners  could  afford  to  lose  a vessel 
after  two  successful  trips.  It  was  the  current  opinion  in  the 
squadron  off  Wilmington,  in  the  early  part  of  the  last  year, 
that  two-thirds  of  the  vessels  attempting  to  enter  were  suc- 
cessful ; and  it  has  been  estimated  that  out  of  the  sixty-six 
blockade-runners  making  regular  trips  during  the  war,  forty 
were  captured  or  destroyed,  but  only  after  a successful 
career  for  a shorter  or  longer  period.  Gradually,  in  the 
last  few  months,  too  many  vessels  were  caught  to  make  the 
trade  profitable ; and  it  was  slowly  declining,  though  it  did 
not  cease  altogether  until  the  blockade  was  raised. 

As  for  the  compensation  of  those  who  did  the  work,  it  may 
be  interesting  to  give  the  schedule  of  rates  of  pay,  on  board 
a first-class  vessel,  when  the  business  was  at  its  height.  The 
figures  are  given  by  “A.  Roberts,”  one  of  the  most  famous 
of  the  noms  de  guerre  in  the  contraband  trade  of  Nassau. 
The  rates  are  for  a single  trip  from  Nassau  to  Wilmington 
and  back.  Half  the  amount  was  given  as  a bounty  at  the 


THE  BLOCKADE-RUNNERS. 


167 


beginning  of  the  voyage,  and  half  at  its  successful  comple- 
tion. The  amounts  are  as  follows  : 


Captain £1,000 

Chief  Officer 250 

Second  and  Third  Officer 150 

Chief  Engineer 500 

Crew  and  firemen  (about) 50 

Pilot, 750 


Besides  the  money  received,  officers  wTere  able  to  stow 
away  little  cargoes  of  their  own,  and  so  to  make  on  each  trip 
a private  speculation ; and  an  occasional  cotton-bale  was 
brought  out  for  a friend,  by  way  of  making  a handsome  pres- 
ent. In  fact,  the  blockade-running  captains,  after  six  months 
of  employment,  could  afford  to  retire  with  a snug  compe- 
tency for  the  rest  of  their  life. 

The  merchants  who  withdrew  early  from  the  business  ac- 
quired considerable  fortunes ; but  those  who  kept  on  until 
the  end  met  with  heavy  losses.  Any  speculation  that  brings 
sudden  and  excessive  profits  is  likely  to  be  overdone ; and 
large  amounts  of  capital  were  sunk  in  the  last  months  of  the 
war.  At  the  close,  the  thriving  business  of  Nassau  and  Ber- 
muda suddenly  collapsed,  and  they  reverted  to  their  former 
condition  of  stagnation  ; while  the  mercantile  enterprise  of 
Liverpool  was  directed  to  other  and  more  legitimate  chan- 
nels. 


CHAPTEK  VII. 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 

The  Confederate  naval  authorities  early  recognized  that 
the  most  vulnerable  point  of  their  enemy,  as  a maritime 
power,  lay  in  his  merchant  marine.  In  1861  the  United 
States  still  occupied  the  second  place  among  commercial  na- 
tions. Of  the  total  registered  tonnage,  however,  less  than 
one-tenth  belonged  to  the  seceding  States  ; and  this  rapidly 
disappeared.  In  a warfare  against  commerce,  the  Confeder- 
ates could  strike  heavy  blows,  without  fear  of  being  struck 
in  return.  Accordingly,  it  was  against  commerce  that  they 
immediately  took  the  offensive  ; and  they  maintained  their 
position  until  the  end  of  the  war — after  ther  end,  in  fact. 
The  Federal  Government,  on  the  other  hand,  could  not  make 
use  of  commerce-destroyers,  because  there  was  no  enemy’s 
commerce  to  destroy.  It  follows  that  the  history  of  the 
ocean  warfare  during  the  conflict  falls  naturally  into  a recital 
of  the  doings  of  Southern  cruisers. 

The  policy  of  systematic  operations  against  the  merchant 
fleet  of  the  United  States  was  adopted  at  the  outset.  As 
early  as  April  17,  1861,  Davis  published^  his  famous  proc- 
lamation, announcing  his  purpose  of  issuing  letters-of- 
marque.  At  this  time,  the  practice  of  privateering  had  been 
somewhat  discredited  by  the  general  concurrence  of  Euro- 
pean States  in  the  Declaration  of  the  Congress  of  Paris. 
But  the  Southern  leaders  counted  upon  a support  abroad 


THE  COMMERCE  DESTROYERS. 


169 


that  would  not  be  weakened  by  the  influence  of  sentimental 
considerations ; and  as  the  United  States  had  not  subscribed 
the  Declaration,  neither  party  was  bound  by  its  articles. 
When  the  circular  invitation  of  the  Powers  was  sent  to  this 
Government  in  1856,  Secretary  Marcy  proposed  to  'amend 
the  rules  by  the  addition  of  a new  article,  exempting  private 
property  at  sea  from  capture.  No  action  was  taken  on  the 
proposal,  and  the  negotiations  were  suspended  until  Presi- 
dent Lincoln’s  accession  to  office.  About  a week  after  Davis’s 
proclamation  was  issued,  the  Department  of  State  instructed 
the  Minister  of  the  United  States  at  London  to  reopen  ne- 
gotiations, and  offered  to  accfede  unconditionally  to  the  Dec- 
laration. This  proposal  seemed  to  point  too  strongly  to  an 
effort  to  clothe  Southern  privateering  with  an  illegal  charac- 
ter, and  the  British  Government  refused  to  make  an  agree- 
ment which  should  be  applicable  to  the  existing  war.  As 
the  United  States  were  thus  debarred  from  any  present  ad- 
vantage to  be  derived  from  the  adoption  of  the  rule,  the 
whole  question  was  dropped. 

A volunteer  navy  may  in  some  degree  supply  the  place  of 
privateers,  supposing  that  plenty  of  time  and  an  elastic 
organization  are  at  command,  wTith  a flourishing  merchant 
marine  upon  which  to  draw  ; but  at  the  South,  in  1861,  there 
was  no  merchant  marine.  Still  less  was  there  time  or 
organization.  In  fact,  the  scheme  of  a volunteer  navy  was 
tried  by  the  Confederate  Government  later  in  the  war,  and 
proved  a signal  failure.  Accordingly,  the  naval  administra- 
tion of  the  Confederacy  was  wise  in  turning  over  its  work  to 
.private  parties,  and  thus  saving  its  own  energies.  The 
ocean  was  covered  with  an  unsuspecting  and  unprotected 
commerce,  which  lay  at  the  mercy  of  any  one  whose  hostile 
intentions  were  backed  by  a single  gun.  Few  and  indifferent 
as  were  the  vessels  available  for  privateering,  a score  of 
I. — 8 


170 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


prizes  had  been  brought  into  New  Orleans  bj  the  end  of 
May,  six  weeks  after  the  issue  of  the  proclamation. 

It  was  necessary  to  decide  at  the  outset  in  what  light 
the  acts  of  the  Southern  privateers  should  be  regarded. 
Though  the  Confederate  Government  was  recognized  by 
the  courts  as  belligerent,  and  a state  of  war  was  held  to 
exist,  the  legal  authority  of  the  United  States  over  its  sub- 
jects could  not  come  to  an  end,  even  while  these  subjects 
were  enemies.  According  to  the  strict  legal  view,  neither 
the  fact  of  a civil  war,  nor  its  express  recognition,  involved 
any  abrogation  of  the  powers  of  the  Government  over  its 
subjects  in  revolt.  The  Constitution  defines  treason  to  be 
the  levying  of  war  against  the  United  States  and  giving  aid 
and  comfort  to  the  enemies  thereof ; and  it  was  competent 
for  the  State  to  bring  to  trial  for  treason  those  whose  acts 
came  within  the  constitutional  definition.  But  the  insurrec- 
tion assumed  such  large  proportions  in  the  beginning,  and 
was  directed  by  such  complete  governmental  machinery,  that 
every  consideration  of  policy  and  necessity,  as  well  as  of 
humanity  and  morality,  prescribed  a course  of  action  under 
which  the  insurgents  should  be  treated  as  belligerents,  and, 
when  captured,  as  prisoners  of  war. 

An  attempt  was  made  to  put  those  engaged  in  hostilities  at 
sea  upon  a different  footing,  and  to  bring  them  to  trial  for 
piracy.  The  j)roclamation  of  April  19  gave  expression  to 
this  principle.  In  it  the  President  said : 

“And  I hereby  proclaim  and  declare  that  if  any  person 
under  the  pretended  authority  of  the  said  States,  or  under 
any  other  pretence,  shall  molest  a vessel  of  the  United 
States,  or  the  persons  or  cargo  on  board  of  her,  such  person 
will  be  held  amenable  to  the  laws  of  the  United  States  for 
the  prevention  and  punishment  of  piracy.” 

The  policy  of  the  Government,  as  set  forth  in  the  procla/ 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


171 


mation,  was  never  earned  out,  because  it  was  found  to  be  im- 
practicable. Certain  of  the  crews  of  the  captured  privateers 
were  tried,  and  as  their  acts  fell  specifically  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  law  defining  piracy,  conviction  was  in  some 
cases  obtained  ; but  the  Confederate  authorities  threatened 
retaliation,  and  they  were  in  a position  to  carry  out  their 
threat.  The  Government  therefore  went  no  further  with  its 
prosecutions.  Nor  is  it  clear,  if  they  had  continued,  upon 
what  ground  they  could  have  been  justified.  The  fact  that 
the  war  was  a civil  war  afforded  no  reason  for  a distinction 
between  combatants  at  sea  and  combatants  on  land.  As 
naval  warfare  is  no  more  criminal  than  land  warfare,  those 
captured  in  the  one  occupation  are  as  much  entitled  to  be 
treated  as  prisoners  of  war  as  those  captured  in  the  other, 
The  only  explanation  of  the  prosecution  of  the  “ Savannah 
pirates,”  as  the  reports  designate  them,  is  the  fact  that  the 
Government,  having  taken  a definite  position  in  the  procla- 
mation of  April  19,  before  the  magnitude  of  the  insurrec- 
tion was  fully  realized,  was  unwilling  to  recede  until  the 
courts  had  sustained  its  action. 

During  the  first  year  of  the  war  the  privateers  met  with 
moderate  success.  A considerable  number  of  small  vessels 
were  fitted  out,  old  slavers,  tugs,  fishing-schooners,  revenue 
cutters,  and  small  coasters  of  all  descriptions.  Many  of  them 
would  lie  securely  in  the  inlets  on  the  coast  of  the  Carolinas, 
and  issue  forth  when  they  sighted  a stray  merchantman  off 
the  coast,  returning  to  cover  when  they  had  made  their  cap- 
ture. Others  went  to  work  more  boldly,  but  nearly  all  had 
a short  career.  The  brig  Jeff  Davis,  a condemned  slaver, 
after  cruising  off  the  New  England  coast  and  making  several 
valuable  prizes,  was  wrecked  on  the  coast  of  Florida.  The 
Beauregard,  a Charleston  schooner,  was  captured  by  the 
U.  S.  bark  W.  G.  Anderson.  The  schooner  Judah  was 


172 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISER& 


burnt  at  her  wharf,  at  the  Pensacola  Navy  Yard,  by  a party 
of  officers  and  men  from  the  flagship  Colorado.  The  Savan- 
nah, a Charleston  pilot-boat  of  fifty-four  tons,  was  captured 
when  three  days  out  by  the  brig  Perry,  one  of  the  block- 
ading force,  and  was  carried  into  New  York,  where  the  trial 
of  her  crew  for  piracy  led  to  the  threat  of  retaliation  upon 
prisoners  in  Southern  hands.  The  Petrel,  which  had  for- 
merly been  a revenue  cutter,  was  sunk  by  a shell  from  the 
frigate  St.  Lawrence,  cruising  off  Charleston. 1 

In  spite  of  the  successes  of  the  sailing-vessels  of  the  navy 
against  the  early  privateers,  it  took  some  time  to  drive  off 
or  capture  all  these  mosquitoes  of  ocean  warfare.  In  fact, 
the  practice  of  privateering  may  be  said  to  have  died  out 
rather  than  to  have  been  broken  up.  The  blockade  was  in- 
directly instrumental  in  killing  it.  Its  principal  object  was 
gain,  but  there  was  little  to  be  gained  when  prizes  could 
not  be  sent  into  port.  The  occupation  of  commerce-de- 
stroying pure  and  simple,  however  useful  and  patriotic,  is 
not  lucrative ; and  it  was  therefore  left  to  the  Confederate 
naval  officers,  who  took  it  as  a part  of  their  duties.  The 
privateers  hitherto  employed  in  it  were  soon  diverted  to  the 
more  profitable  pursuit  of  carrying  contraband.  The  work 
which  they  had  abandoned  was  then  taken  in  hand  by  the 
Confederate  Government,  and  it  was  carried  on  by  the  navy 
during  the  rest  of  the  war  with  results  that  exceeded  the 
most  sanguine  expectations. 

The  first,  or  nearly  the  first,  of  the  regularly  commissioned 
naval  vessels,  as  distinguished  from  the  privateers,  was  the 
Sumter.  Indeed,  she  was  one  of  the  first  vessels  of  any  kind 

1 The  story  has  been  so  often  repeated  that  the  St.  Lawrence  was  disguised  as 
a merchantman,  and  that  the  Petrel  attempted  to  capture  her  that,  although  a 
matter  of  no  special  importance,  it  may  be  worth  while  to  state  that  it  has  no 
foundation  in  fact.  The  Petrel  endeavored  to  escape  from  the  St.  Lawrence,  but 
the  latter  chased  and  overhauled  her. 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


173 


fitted  out  for  hostile  purposes  at  the  South,  as  Semmes  was 
ordered  to  command  her  on  the  18th  of  April,  1861.  She 
was  a screw-steamer  of  five  hundred  tons,  and  was  lying  at 
New  Orleans,  being  one  of  a line  of  steamers  plying  regu- 
larly between  that  port  and  Havana.  The  frame  of  the  ves- 
sel was  strengthened,  a berth-deck  was  put  in,  the  spar-deck 
cabins  were  removed,  and  room  was  found  for  a magazine 
and  additional  coal-bunkers.  She  was  armed  with  an  VIII- 
inch  pivot-gun  between  the  fore  and  main  masts,  and  four 
24-pound  howitzers  in  broadside. 

Semmes  had  hoped  to  get  his  vessel  out  before  the  block- 
ade began ; but  on  the  26th  of  May  the  Brooklyn  appeared 
off  the  mouth  of  the  river,  where  she  was  soon  after  joined 
by  the  Powhatan.  Later,  the  Massachusetts  and  South 
Carolina  were  added  to  the  squadron,  and  both  the  passes 
were  closed. 

The  Sumter  was  not  ready  for  sea  until  the  18th  of  June. 
At  this  date,  she  dropped  down  the  river  to  the  forts,  and 
thence  to  the  Head  of  the  Passes,  where  she  remained  at 
anchor  for  nearly  a fortnight,  watching  for  an  opportunity 
to  run  out.  Here  Semmes  had  every  advantage,  as  he  could 
obtain  accurate  information  of  the  movements  of  the  block- 
ading vessels,  while  they  were  ignorant  of  his  presence.  The 
Brooklyn  had  made  an  effort  to  ascend  the  river,  but  after 
grounding  once  or  twice  gave  up  the  attempt.  If  the  vessels 
could  have  taken  a position  at  the  Head  of  the  Passes,  they 
might  have  guarded  securely  all  the  outlets,  instead  of  keep- 
ing up  an  imperfect  blockade  while  lying  off  the  bar  at  the 
different  mouths.  Twice  a report  that  one  or  another  of 
the  blockaders  had  left  her  station  led  Semmes  to  run  down 
one  of  the  Passes ; but  each  time  he  failed  to  escape.  The 
second  time  he  remained  in  Pass-a-Loutre,  a few  miles  from 
the  bar,  unobserved  by  the  Brooklyn  ; and  after  a few  hours 


174 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


of  waiting,  at  a moment  when  the  latter  had  left  her  anchor- 
age in  chase  of  a sail,  he  made  for  the  mouth  of  the  Pass. 
The  Brooklyn,  upon  sighting  him,  left  her  chase,  and  at- 
tempted to  head  him  off ; but  he  reached  the  bar  and  got  out 
to  sea.  The  Brooklyn  followed,  and  carrying  sail  and  steam, 
was  still  gaining  on  him;  but  by  hauling  up  a couple  of 
points,  Semmes  brought  the  wind  so  far  ahead  that  his 
pursuer  took  in  her  sails,  and  she  gradually  dropped  astern, 
haying  lost  the  opportunity  of  destroying,  at  a single  blow, 
nearly  the  whole  sea-going  navy  of  the  Confederacy. 

When  only  three  days  out,  the  Sumter  made  her  first 
prize,  the  bark  Golden  Rocket,  which  was  burnt.  By  the 
6th  of  July,  or  in  less  than  a week  after  running  the  block- 
ade, she  had  captured  seven  other  merchantmen.  One  of 
these  was  ordered  to  New  Orleans  with  a prize-crew,  and 
was  recaptured.  The  remaining  six  were  taken  in  to  Cien- 
fuegos,  where  they  were  afterward  released  by  the  Spanish 
authorities.  During  the  next  two  months,  the  Sumter 
cruised  in  the  Caribbean  Sea,  and  along  the  coast  of  South 
America.  She  received  friendly  treatment  in  the  neutral 
ports  which  she  visited,  and  was  allowed  to  stay  as  long  as 
she  liked.  She  coaled  without  hindrance  at  Curacao,  Trini- 
dad, Paramaribo,  and  Maranham.  Only  at  Puerto  Cabello, 
in  Venezuela,  was  she  required  to  depart  after  forty-eight 
hours.  There  was  no  concealment  about  her  character  or 
her  movements ; but  none  of  the  vessels  that  were  sent  in 
pursuit  of  her  were  able  to  find  her.  Among  these  were  the 
Niagara  and  the  Powhatan,  from  the  Gulf  Squadron,  and 
the  Keystone  State,  Richmond,  Iroquois,  and  San  Jacinto. 

After  leaving  Maranham,  Semmes  shaped  his  course  iot 
the  calm-belt.  Here  he  expected  to  overhaul  many  mer- 
chantmen ; but  he  only  captured  two,  both  of  which  he 
burnt.  Neither  was  an  important  capture,  except  that  from 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


175 


one  of  them  the  Sumter  was  enabled  to  replenish  her  stock 
of  fresh  provisions. 

After  two  months  of  cruising  in  the  Atlantic,  the  Sumter 
put  in  to  St.  Pierre,  in  the  island  of  Martinique,  for  coal  and 
water.  She  had  been  here  only  five  days  when  the  Iroquois 
came  in,  a very  fast  sloop-of-war,  under  Captain  Palmer. 
The  usual  warnings  in  regard  to  the  neutrality  of  the  port 
were  administered  by  the  French  authorities,  and  the  Ameri- 
can sloop,  after  reconnoitering  the  Sumter  closely,  came  to 
anchor.  Finding  that  the  rule  forbidding  either  vessel  to 
leave  port  within  twenty-four  hours  of  the  other  would 
be  rigidly  enforced,  Palmer  lost  no  time  in  getting  under 
way  again,  to  take  a position  outside.  The  coast  at  St.  Pierre 
forms  an  open  roadstead,  twelve  miles  wide ; and  here  Pal- 
mer waited,  standing  off  and  on,  as  near  as  he  could  venture 
without  laying  himself  open  to  the  charge  of  hovering  within 
neutral  waters.  So  matters  remained  for  a week. 

On  the  night  of  the  23d  of  November,  when  the  Sumter 
had  finished  all  her  preparations,  she  weighed  anchor  and 
stood  out.  Arrangements  had  been  made  for  signalling  her 
movements  from  one  of  the  American  schooners  in  port ; 
and  Semmes,  with  his  quick  perception  and  ready  resource, 
took  advantage  of  the  fact  to  throw  his  enemy  off  the  scent. 
Heading  for  the  southern  point  of  the  roads,  he  held  his 
course  until  he  was  sure  that  the  Iroquois  was  following  the 
signal  lights ; then  doubling  suddenly,  he  returned  under 
cover  of  the  land,  and  stopping  from  time  to  time,  he  suc- 
ceeded in  giving  Palmer  the  slip.  A fortunate  rain-squall 
concealed  his  movements,  and  in  half  an  hour  he  was  run- 
ning under  a full  head  of  steam  for  the  northern  end  of  the 
island,  while  the  Iroquois  was  chasing  furiously  to  the 
southward.  In  a little  while  she  discovered  the  ruse,  and 
retraced  her  course;  but  the  Sumter  was  not  to  be  seen, 


176 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


and  Palmer,  despairing  of  finding  her,  made  his  way  to  St. 
Thomas. 

The  Sumter  now  cruised  to  the  eastward  with  moderate 
success.  Three  prizes  were  taken  and  burnt.  Bad  weather 
came  on,  and  after  a time  it  became  necessary  to  make  a 
port  and  refit.  Cadiz  was  selected,  and  thither  the  ship  pro- 
ceeded, arriving  early  in  January.  The  Spaniards  showed 
no  disposition  to  have  her  remain  long,  and  after  being 
docked  and  repaired  she  sailed  for  Gibraltar.  On  the  way 
she  made  two  prizes,  one  of  which  was  burnt,  and  the  other, 
having  a neutral  cargo,  was  ransomed. 

The  career  of  the  Sumter  now  came  to  an  end.  She  had 
no  coal,  and  neither  the  government  nor  the  private  dealers 
would  furnish  a supply.  The  vessel  herself  was  hardly  in  a 
condition  to  go  to  sea,  and  the  question  of  transferring  her 
officers  to  a new  ship  had  been  considered,  when  the  Tns- 
carora  arrived  at  Gibraltar.  Taking  her  station  at  Algeciras, 
on  the  Spanish  coast,  .the  Tuscarora  set  on  foot  an  effectual 
blockade  of  the  Confederate  cruiser.  Later  the  Kearsarge 
and  the  Ino  arrived.  In  view  of  serious  defects  in  the 
boilers,  and  of  the  other  unfavorable  circumstances,  the 
Sumter  was  condemned  by  a survey,  and  afterward  sold. 
She  became  subsequently  a blockade-runner.  During  her 
cruise  she  had  made  seventeen  prizes,  of  which  two  wero 
ransomed,  seven  were  released  in  Cuban  ports  by  order  of 
the  Captain-General,  and  two  were  recaptured.  Apart  from 
the  delays  caused  by  interrupted  voyages,  the  total  injury 
inflicted  by  the  Sumter  upon  American  commerce  consisted 
in  the  burning  of  six  vessels  with  their  cargoes. 

One  of  the  half-dozen  vessels  which  had  been  sent  in 
search  of  the  Sumter  was  the  screw-sloop  San  Jacinto,  com- 
manded by  Captain  Charles  Wilkes.  Early  in  November, 
1861,  the  San  Jacinto  was  at  Havana.  The  Confederate 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


177 


commissioners,  Mason  and  Slidell,  had  shortly  before  arrived 
at  that  place,  having  been  brought  to  Cardenas  by  the  famous 
blockade-runner  Theodora.  They  were  to  take  passage  for 
St.  Thomas  in  the  British  mail-steamer  Trent,  a vessel  be- 
longing to  a regular  line  of  steamers  between  Vera  Cruz  and 
St.  Thomas.  Wilkes  left  Havana  on  the  2d,  having  formed 
the  intention  of  intercepting  the  steamer  and  seizing  the 
commissioners. 

The  Trent  sailed  on  the  7th,  and  on  the  next  day  she  was 
brought  to  in  the  Bahama  Channel  by  the  San  Jacinto.  A 
shot  was  fired  across  her  bow,  and  as  she  continued  on  her 
course  it  was  followed  by  a shell.  When  the  Trent  stopped, 
Lieutenant  Fairfax  was  sent  on  board,  with  orders  to  bring 
off  the  commissioners  and  their  secretaries.  As  they  refused 
to  come  except  under  constraint,  another  boat  was  sent  to  the 
steamer  in  charge  of  Lieutenant  Greer,  with  a party  of 
marines,  and  the  four  passengers  were  removed.  The  diffi- 
cult task  of  carrying  out  his  instructions  was  performed  by 
Lieutenant  Fairfax  with  discretion  and  forbearance,  though 
there  was  much  to  have  provoked  a man  of  less  coolness  and 
self-command.  The  mail-agent  on  board  the  Trent,  a re- 
tired Commander  of  the  British  Navy,  was  noisy  in  his  de- 
monstrations, and  the  bearing  of  the  people  on  board  was 
offensive  and  irritating.  According  to  the  joint  statement 
made  by  the  commissioners,  “many  of  the  passengers  be- 
came highly  excited,  and  gave  vent  to  the  strongest  expres- 
sions of  indignation,  seeming  to  indicate  a purpose  of  resist- 
ance on  their  part ; ” and  a slight  movement  was  made  by 
the  guard  of  marines,  which  checked  the  disturbance.  The 
affair  was  conducted  with  as  much  good  order  and  propriety 
as  such  a proceeding  would  admit. 

The  prisoners  were  taken  to  Fort  Warren,  but  were  subse- 
quently given  up  to  the  British  Government.  The  Navy  De« 
8* 


178 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


partment,  somewhat  prematurely,  gave  Captain  Wilkes  an 
emphatic  commendation.  But  the  Secretary  of  State,  who 
was  more  fully  acquainted  with  the  current  of  opinion  in 
England,  and  who  saw  the  slender  barrier  that  stood  in  the 
way  of  war,  avoided  committing  himself.  He  wrote  to  Mr. 
Adams  that  the  act  had  been  performed  without  instructions 
from  the  government,  and  that  nothing  had  been  done  on 
the  subject  to  anticipate  discussion.  This  immediate  dis- 
avowal of  the  act,  made  under  no  demand  or  pressure, 
enabled  the  government,  when  it  was  called  upon  to  take  a 
definite  position,  to  yield  becomingly  to  Earl  Russell’s  re- 
quest that  the  prisoners  should  be  released. 

Indeed,  there  was  nothing  else  to  be  done.  After  the  first 
burst  of  satisfaction  was  over,  the  more  Wilkes’s  act  was 
looked  at  in  the  light  of  sober  reason,  the  less  could  it  be 
justified.  It  consisted  in  the  removal  of  four  persons  from 
a neutral  vessel  making  a voyage  between  neutral  ports, 
because  they  occupied  an  official  station  under  the  Confeder- 
ate Government.  Such  an  act  has  no  foundation  in  interna- 
tional law  or  usage.  The  United  States,  in  particular,  have 
always  maintained  the  opposite  principle,  and  in  1812  they 
had  even  gone  to  war  to  maintain  it,  as  against  the  English 
doctrine  of  the  right  of  impressment.  This  fact  was  turned 
to  account  by  Seward  in  the  elaborate  review  of  the  case 
presented  by  him  to  the  British  Government,  after  the  latter 
had  demanded  the  release  of  the  commissioners  ; and  it  was 
shown  that  Great  Britain,  by  condemning  the  act  of  Wilkes, 
had  for  the  first  time  acknowledged  the  illegality  of  her  an- 
cient practice. 

The  question  whether  the  vessel  herself  was  or  was  not 
liable  to  capture  is  one  to  which  international  law  does  not 
make  a definite  answer.  The  rule,  roughly  stated,  which 
has  the  general  support  of  text- writers,  declares  that  neutral 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


179 


vessels  employed  in  transporting  persons  or  despatches  of  the 
enemy,  in  connection  with  the  operations  of  war,  are  liable 
to  capture  and  condemnation.  But  the  rule  is  subject  to 
many  important  limitations,  and  as  far  as  precedent  is  con- 
cerned, it  rests  exclusively  upon  ten  cases,  decided  in  the 
English  Admiralty  Court  between  1802  and  1810,  in  seven  of 
WThich  the  vessels  were  condemned.  The  judgments  of  Lord 
Stowell  in  these  cases  may  be  said  to  have  created  the  rule. 
None  of  them  covered  exactly  the  case  of  the  Trent,  though 
in  one  or  two  there  were  enough  points  of  resemblance  to 
make  the  question  a fair  subject  of  consideration  by  a prize- 
court.  But  the  question  could  only  be  brought  before  a 
court  by  capturing  the  vessel  and  sending  her  in  for  adjudi- 
cation. 

Wilkes  probably  had  some  such  idea  in  his  mind,  for  he 
excused  his  release  of  the  Trent  by  referring  to  his  want  of 
force,  and  to  the  inconvenience  that  would  be  caused  by  the 
detention  of  the  passengers  and  mails.  The  first  reason  was 
under  the  circumstances  hardly  applicable.  The  second, 
commendable  as  was  its  motive,  could  not  justify  Wilkes  in 
allowing  the  Trent  to  proceed,  if  the  rule  applied  to  her,  and 
if  there  was  a reasonable  suspicion  of  her  guilt.  If  there 
was  no  such  suspicion,  his  only  course,  according  to  every 
principle  and  precedent,  was  to  release  her  as  he  found  her, 
with  all  her  cargo  and  occupants  intact.  The  course  which 
he  adopted,  though  it  seemed  from  his  point  of  view  to  be  a 
middle  course,  and  therefore  the  safest,  was  really  no  middle 
course  at  all.  It  was  a proceeding  of  a totally  different 
character  from  either  of  the  others.  Its  clear  illegality  was 
due  to  the  principle,  of  which  Wilkes  lost  sight  for  the 
moment,  that  the  captor  of  a neutral  vessel  has  no  right  to 
concern  himself  as  to  the  persons  who  may  be  therein, 
except  so  far  as  their  presence  may  afford  a ground  for  the 


180 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


capture ; and  that  the  only  question  for  him  to  decide  is 
whether  the  vessel  can  be  charged  with  any  illegal  act,  and, 
according  to  the  decision,  to  release  her  or  make  her  a prize. 

The  action  taken  by  the  British  Government,  upon  re- 
ceiving news  of  the  event,  was  summary  in  the  extreme.  It 
was  no  new  thing  for  the  naval  officers  of  a belligerent  to 
commit  an  error  by  which  a temporary  injury  resulted  to  a 
neutral.  The  usual  course  under  such  circumstances  is  for 
the  injured  party  to  make  proper  representations,  assuming 
that  the  act  was  the  error  of  a subordinate ; upon  which  a 
disavowal  is  made,  and  in  cases  demanding  it  an  apology 
and  reparation,  and  with  this  the  affair  ends.  All  this  was 
done  in  the  case  of  the  Trent ; and  though  the  representations 
of  the  British  Government  were  made  in  suitable  form,  and 
some  discretion  was  left  with  Lord  Lyons  as  to  his  action, 
yet  the  two  despatches  sent  by  Earl  RusseH  on  the  30  th  of 
November  were  in  reality  not  the  opening  of  a negotiation, 
but  an  ultimatum.  At  the  same  time,  every  preparation  for 
war  was  set  on  foot ; vessels  were  fitted  out,  and  troops 
were  ordered  to  Canada  ; and  the  whole  community,  aroused 
by  these  measures,  thought  itself  already  on  the  verge  of 
hostilities.  Mr.  Seward’s  despatch,  written  on  the  same  day 
with  Earl  KusseH’s  ultimatum,  and  communicated  to  the  latter 
by  Mr.  Adams,  gave  ample  assurance  that  the  injury,  such  as 
it  was,  proceeded  from  the  mistake  of  an  individual.  But  this 
fact  was  concealed,  after  the  despatch  had  been  received, 
and  the  preparations  were  continued.  Of  course  the  moral 
effect  of  these  preparations  was  to  arouse  a sympathy  for 
the  Southern  cause  throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of 
England  ; and  without  further  comment  on  the  position  of 
the  English  Government,  it  is  enough  to  say  that  had  it  been 
influenced  at  this  time  by  unfriendly  motives,  it  could  hardly 
have  adopted  a more  unfriendly  course  of  action. 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


181 


Long  before  the  cruise  of  the  Sumter  was  over,  the  Con- 
federate Government  saw  that  it  would  be  unable  to  build 
suitable  cruising  sliips-of-war  at  home,  and  took  steps  to 
procure  them  abroad.  Under  the  rules  of  international  law, 
however,  ships-of-war  are  or  ought  to  be  difficult  things  for 
a belligerent  to  obtain  from  a neutral.  They  stand  on  a 
footing  by  themselves,  quite  different  from  that  of  other 
contraband  articles.  For  supplies  of  ordinary  contraband, 
furnished  by  its  subjects,  a neutral  State  is  not  responsible  , 
and  the  subjects  who  carry  on  such  a trade  do  it  at  their  own 
risk,  and  are  not  interfered  with  by  their  government.  But 
the  construction  of  a belligerent  vessel  fitted  for  purposes  of 
war  falls  outside  the  class  of  acts  which  foreign  subjects 
may  perform  consistently  with  the  neutrality  of  their  gov- 
ernments ; and  according  to  the  rule  embodied  in  the  Treaty 
of  Washington,  though  not  acknowledged  by  Great  Britain 
to  have  been  in  force  during  the  Civil  War,  “ a neutral  gov- 
ernment is  bound  to  use  due  diligence  to  prevent  the  fitting 
out,  arming,  or  equipping  within  its  jurisdiction  of  any  ves- 
sel which  it  has  reasonable  ground  to  believe  is  intended  to 
cruise  or  carry  on  war  against  a power  with  which  it  is  at 
peace  ; and  also  to  use  like  diligence  to  prevent  the  depart- 
ure from  its  jurisdiction  of  any  vessel  intended  to  cruise  or 
to  carry  on  war  as  above,  such  vessel  having  been  specially 
adapted,  in  whole  or  in  part,  within  such  jurisdiction,  to 
warlike  use.” 

Whether  this  rule  was  a part  of  international  law  in  1861 
or  not,  a rule  somewhat  approaching  it  was  generally  ac- 
cepted, and  found  expression  in  the  neutrality  laws  of  differ- 
ent States.  The  British  statute  then  in  force  imposed  a 
penalty  for  the  “ equipping,  furnishing,  fitting  out,  or  arm- 
ing ” of  a vessel  with  the  intent  that  the  vessel  should  cruise 
or  commit  hostilities  against  a friendly  State.  The  British 


182 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Government  held  that  this  act  defined  the  extent  of  its  neu- 
tral obligations  ; and  the  Confederate  agents  were  therefore 
safe  if  they  could  evade  its  specific  provisions.  This  was 
accomplished  successfully  by  causing  ships  to  be  built  and 
sent  out  completely  prepared  for  warlike  operations,  except 
that  they  lacked  their  battery,  ammunition,  and  full  crew. 
All  that  was  needed  to  supply  these  defects  was  then  sent  in 
another  vessel  to  an  appointed  rendezvous  outside  of  British 
jurisdiction.  When  the  two  vessels  met,  the  guns  and  other 
equipments  were  transferred,  and  the  cruiser  becarhe  a Con- 
federate sliip-of-war  on  the  spot. 

In  order  to  carry  out  this  plan  of  operations,  it  was  neces- 
sary for  the  Confederacy  to  have  its  regularly  authorized 
agents  abroad.  Besides  the  commissioners,  whose  mission 
was  primarily  diplomatic,  there  was,  first  of  all,  Captain 
James  D.  Bullock,  an  officer  of  the  Confederate  Navy,  who 
acted  for  the  Navy  Department,  and  whose  name  appears  to 
have  been  used  when  it  was  necessary  for  the  Government  to 
be  represented  by  an  accredited  agent,  as  in  the  sale  of  the 
Georgia.  Next  in  importance  came  the  Liverpool  firm  of 
Fraser,  Trenholm  & Co.,  a branch  of  the  Charleston  house 
of  John  Fraser  & Co.,  the  head  of  which,  Trenholm,  was 
for  some  time  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 
The  Liverpool  house  was  the  authorized  depositary  of  Con- 
federate funds  in  Europe,  and  it  conducted,  on  the  other 
side,  the  blockade-running  and  other  enterprises  in  which 
the  Government  at  Richmond  took  a large  part.  There  were 
other  agents,  with  greater  or  less  responsibilities  at  various 
points,  North  and  Huse  in  England,  Barron,  whom  Semmes 
designates  “ our  Chief  of  Bureau  in  Paris,”  Helm  in  Cuba, 
Heyliger  at  Nassau,  and  Walker  at  Bermuda.  These,  or 
most  of  these,  acted  directly  for  the  Government,  and  their 
authority  was  generally  understood  and  recognized.  Be* 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


183 


sides  these,  there  were  others,  foreign  subjects,  sometimes 
merchants  in  good  standing,  who  were  ready  to  act  when  a 
third  person  was  required  to  carry  out  a fictitious  transfer, 
or  to  perform  some  part  in  a transaction  which  was  too  deli- 
cate for  the  principals.  Sometimes  two  or  three  interme- 
diaries would  be  employed,  each  of  whom,  whatever  his 
suspicions  might  be,  could  swear  that  he  was  ignorant  of 
any  purpose  in  contravention  of  neutrality  ; and  the  differ- 
ent steps  in  the  transaction  were  adroitly  involved  and  con- 
fused until  it  became  impossible  to  obtain  sufficient  evi- 
dence to  secure  the  conviction  of  any  of  the  guilty  parties, 
on  a charge  of  violation  of  the  neutrality  laws. 

The  Florida  was  the  first  of  the  commerce-destroyers  of 
English  origin.  She  was  built  at  Liverpool  in  the  fall  and 
winter  of  1861-62,  and  ingenious  measures  were  taken  to 
conceal  her  ownership  and  destination.  It  was  given  out 
that  she  was  building  for  the  Italian  Government,  her  osten- 
sible owner  being  a merchant  of  Liverpool  and  Palermo. 
The  Italian  Consul,  however,  disclaimed  all  knowledge  of  her, 
and  her  pretended  destination  deceived  no  one  but  the  Eng- 
lish authorities.  ^Representations  made  to  the  Foreign  Office 
by  the  United  States  Minister  were  of  no  effect,  and  on  the 
22d  of  March,  1862,  the  Florida  cleared  from  Liverpool 
under  the  name  of  the  Oreto,  and  without  a cargo,  for 
Palermo  and  Jamaica.  About  the  same  time,  the  guns  and 
ammunition  for  the  new  cruiser  were  shipped  in  the  steamer 
Bahama  from  Hartlepool  for  Nassau. 

The  Oreto  or  Florida  arrived  at  Nassau  on  the  28  th  of 
April.  She  was  consigned  to  Adderly  & Co.  This  firm 
was  the  Nassau  correspondent  of  Fraser,  Trenholm  & Co.,  of 
Liverpool,  who  were  notoriously  the  financial  agents  of  the 
Confederate  Government  in  England.  Adderly  <fc  Co.  de- 
livered the  vessel  to  Maffitt,  an  officer  of  the  Confederate 


184 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Navy,  who  was  subsequently  placed  in  command  ; and  other 
officers  were  sent  over  to  join  her.  She  was  removed  to 
Cochrane’s  Anchorage,  nine  miles  from  Nassau,  and  began  to 
take  on  board  her  arms  and  ammunition  ; but  this  proceed- 
ing was  presently  discontinued,  as  it  would  leave  no  loop- 
hole for  the  authorities  to  ignore  the  character  of  the  vessel. 
During  this  time,  and  later,  she  was  inspected  officially  by 
English  naval  officers,  who  reported  that  she  wTas  4 4 in  every 
respect  fitted  as  a man-of-war,  on  the  principle  of  the  de- 
spatch gun-vessels  in  Her  Majesty’s  service*”  She  was  de- 
serted by  most  of  her  crew,  because  they  were  unwilling  to 
engage  in  hostilities,  and  a new  crew  was  shipped  at  Nassau. 

In  view  of  these  facts  the  Oreto  was  libelled  in  the  Yice- 
Admiralty  Court.  The  trial  did  not  reflect  credit  upon  the 
character  of  judicial  proceedings  in  the  British  colonies. 
The  vessel  was  released  on  the  7th  of  August,  and  sailed  on 
the  same  day,  under  the  command  of  Maffitt,  for  Green  Cay, 
an  uninhabited  island  in  the  Bahamas.  Here  she  took  on 
board  her  battery,  consisting  of  two  Vll-inch  rifles,  and  six 
Vi-inch  guns,  wTith  carriages  and  ammunition,  and  forthwith 
proceeded  on  her  cruise,  under  the  Confederate  flag.  Maffitt 
had  only  been  able  to  obtain  a crew  of  twenty-two  men ; and 
he  had  no  sooner  got  to  sea  than  the  yellow  fever  appeared 
on  board.  To  add  to  his  difficulties,  he  found  that  in  the 
hurry  of  departure  from  Nassau,  some  of  the  most  essential 
equipments  of  the  battery  had  been  left  behind,  and  he  was 
without  rammers,  sponges,  sights,  locks,  elevating-screws, 
and  other  indispensable  articles.  With  great  reluctance,  he 
gave  up  for  the  time  his  intended  cruise,  and  steered  for  the 
coast  of  Cuba.  Avoiding  the  cruisers,  he  arrived  at  Cardenas, 
his  effective  crew  reduced  by  sickness  to  only  three  men. 
Here  he  was  attacked  by  the  fever,  but  recovered  after  a 
critical  illness.  The  authorities  of  Cuba  observed  their  neu- 


THE  COMMERCE -DESTROYERS. 


185 


tral  obligations,  and,  though  Stribling,  the  first  lieutenant 
of  the  Florida,  succeeded  in  getting  on  board  a dozen  men 
under  the  name  of  laborers,  nothing  could  be  done  to  make 
up  the  deficiencies  of  the  battery. 

After  a week  in  Cardenas,  Maffitt,  still  prostrated  by  dis- 
ease, took  the  Florida  to  Havana.  Nothing  could  be  ob- 
tained here,  and  he  resolved,  as  the  only  course  open  to 
him,  to  make  at  once  for  Mobile.  Proceeding  directly  from 
Havana,  the  Florida  sighted  Fort  Morgan  and  the  blockading 
squadron  on  the  4fch  of  September.  In  view  of  the  helpless 
condition  of  the  ship,  and  the  crippled  state  of  her  crew  and 
battery,  Sfcribling  was  in  favor  of  a cautious  line  of  action, 
and  advised  delaying  the  attempt,  at  least  until  night.  But 
Maffitt  had  studied  the  chances,  and  he  decided  that  the 
boldest  course  was  the  safest. 

How  the  Florida  succeeded  in  her  daring  attempt,  and 
how,  after  four  months  of  rest  in  Mobile,  she  ran  the  block- 
ade outward  on  the  night  of  January  16,  1863,  has  been 
already  told.  In  the  course  of  ten  days  after  leaving 
Mobile  she  captured  three  small  vessels,  which  she  burned, 
after  the  example  set  by  the  Sumter.  According  to  Maffitt, 
his  “ instructions  were  brief  and  to  the  point,  leaving  much 
to  the  discretion,  but  more  to  the  torch.”  On  January  26, 
the  Florida  put  into  Nassau,  where  her  appearance  as  a 
ship-of-war  must  have  caused  some  confusion  to  the  mer- 
chant who  had  sworn  at  the  trial  in  July  that  he  considered 
her  as  a merchant-vessel,  and  then  had  delivered  her  to 
Maffitt.  She  was  received,  however,  with  an  ovation,  allowed 
to  remain  thirty-six  hours,  when  the  instructions  of  the  Gov- 
ernment limited  the  time  to  twenty-four,  and  took  on  board 
coal  for  three  months,  though  the  authorities  had  been  di- 
rected to  limit  coal-supplies  to  a quantity  sufficient  to  ena- 
ble the  belligerent  cruiser  to  reach  the  nearest  port  of  her 


186 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


own  country.  A month  later  she  received  one  hundred  tons 
of  coal  at  Barbadoes,  in  further  violation  of  the  instruc- 
tions, which  forbade  a second  supply  within  three  months. 

The  important  part  of  the  Florida’s  cruise  began  with  her 
departure  from  Barbadoes.  In  the  space  of  five  months, 
fourteen  prizes  were  taken  and  destroyed,  in  accordance 
with  the  orders  of  the  Confederate  Government.  The  cruise 
extended  from  the  latitude  of  New  York  to  the  southward 
of  Bahia.  The  neighborhood  of  the  island  of  Fernando  de 
Noronha  was  found  to  be  a fruitful  cruising-ground.  One  of 
the  vessels  captured  here,  the  Lapwing,  was  laden  with  two 
hundred  and  sixty  tons  of  coal,  and  Maffitt,  by  converting  her 
into  a tender,  was  enabled  to  supply  the  wants  of  his  ship 
without  going  into  port. 

On  the  6th  of  May,  the  Florida  captured  the  brig  Clar- 
ence, off  the  coast  of  Brazil.  After  putting  some  light  guns 
on  board,  and  a few  men,  Maffitt  entrusted  the  command  of 
the  Clarence,  now  a ship-of-war,  to  Lieutenant  Bead  of  the 
Florida,  an  officer  whose  daring  and  readiness  of  resource 
were  worthy  of  Semmes  himself.  Bead  proceeded  north- 
ward on  a roving  cruise,  along  the  coast  of  the  United 
States,  and  during  the  month  of  June  he  made  lively  work 
of  it  between  the  Chesapeake  and  Portland.  By  the  10th  he 
had  captured  five  vessels.  Four  of  these  were  destroyed. 
The  fifth  was  the  schooner  Tacony,  and  finding  her  better 
suited  to  his  purpose,  Bead  burned  the  Clarence,  after  trans- 
ferring his  guns  and  crew  to  the  new  cruiser.  In  the  next 
fortnight,  the  Tacony  made  ten  prizes.  The  last  of  these, 
the  Archer,  then  became  a ship-of-war,  and  the  Tacony 
shared  the  fate  of  the  Clarence.  The  Archer’s  career  was 
short.  Two  days  after  she  was  put  in  commission,  Bead  ran 
into  Portland  with  a party  of  his  men  in  boats,  and  surprised 
and  cut  out  the  revenue-cutter  Caleb  Cushing,  which  was 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


187 


lying  in  the  harbor.  Next  morning,  however,  he  was  at- 
tacked by  steamers  which  had  been  hastily  manned  and  sent 
out  from  Portland.  As  he  could  not  make  a successful  re- 
sistance, Read  set  the  cutter  on  fire,  and  put  off  in  his  boats 
to  the  Archer ; but  he  was  pursued  and  captured,  and  was 
shortly  after  a prisoner  in  Fort  Warren. 

After  refitting  and  coaling  at  Bermuda  in  July,  the  Flor- 
ida sailed  for  Brest.  Here  she  remained  nearly  six  months, 
and  was  docked  and  thoroughly  repaired.  Mafhtt  was  re- 
lieved by  Captain  Barney,  who  in  turn  gave  place  to  Cap- 
tain Morris.  The  Florida  sailed  from  Brest  in  February, 
and  after  cruising  for  four  months,  put  in  again  to  Bermuda. 
Here  she  repaired,  and  took  on  board  eighty  tons  of  coal,  by 
permission.  Further  supplies  were  taken  without  permis- 
sion, the  authorities  not  bestirring  themselves  very  vigor- 
ously to  enforce  the  regulations,  and  accepting  Morris’s 
statement  that  Mobile  was  the  first  Confederate  port  he  ex- 
pected to  visit.  He  did  not  visit  Mobile,  whatever  may 
have  been  his  expectations,  but  made  a second  raid  of  three 
months  on  the  merchant  vessels  of  the  United  States,  this 
time  on  their  own  coast.  Crossing  the  Atlantic,  he  was  at 
Teneriffe  early  in  August ; and  returning,  he  arrived  on  the 
5th  of  October  at  Bahia. 

The  United  States  sloop-of-war  Wacliusett,  Commander 
Napoleon  Collins,  was  lying  at  this  time  in  Bahia.  The 
Florida  came  in  and  anchored  near  the  shore,  about  half  a 
mile  from  the  Wacliusett’s  berth.  Immediately  after  her  ar- 
rival, a Brazilian  corvette,  in  apprehension  of  a disturbance, 
took  a position  between  the  two  vessels  and  near  the  Florida. 

The  Florida  had  received  permission  to  remain  in  port  for 
forty-eight  hours,  and  Collins  made  up  his  mind  to  destroy 
or  capture  her  before  the  time  arrived  for  her  departure. 
Accordingly,  before  daybreak  on  the  morning  of  the  7tli,  he 


188 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


got  under  way,  and  crossed  the  bow  of  the  Brazilian.  It  was 
his  intention  to  run  the  Florida  down,  and  sink  her  at  her 
anchor ; but  the  plan  was  imperfectly  carried  out,  and  the 
Wachusett’s  bow,  striking  the  enemy  on  the  starboard  quar- 
ter, cut  down  her  bulwarks  and  carried  away  her  mizzenmast 
and  main-yard,  but  did  not  disable  her.  A few  pistol  shots 
.were  fired  from  the  Florida,  as  the  Wachusett  backed  off, 

! which  were  returned  with  a volley  of  small  arms,  and  with  a 
discharge  from  two  of  the  broadside  guns.  The  Florida 
then  surrendered. 

At  the  time  of  the  capture,  Captain  Morris  was  on  shore, 
together  with  a number  of  the  officers  and  crew.  Lieuten- 
ant Porter,  who  had  been  left  in  command,  came  on  board 
the  Wachusett  with  sixty-nine  officers  and  men.  A hawser 
was  carried  to  the  Florida,  and  she  wras  towed  out  of  the 
harbor.  The  Wachusett  had  tlireo  men  slightly  wounded, — 
the  only  casualties  in  the  engagement. 

In  the  protest  subsequently  made  by  the  Brazilian  Gov- 
ernment, it  was  stated  that  upon  the  discharge  of  the 
Wachusett’s  guns  an  officer  was  sent  from  the  Brazilian  cor- 
vette to  inform  Collins  that  the  forts  and  vessels  would  open 
fire  upon  him,  if  he  persisted  in  attacking  the  Florida.  At 
this  time  the  capture  had  been  already  made.  The  officer 
of  the  deck  on  board  the  Wachusett,  according  to  the  Bra- 
zilian account,  promised  to  desist.  This  statement  was 
denied  by  the  American  officers.  The  fact  that  the  conver- 
sation, whatever  it  may  have  been,  w^as  carried  on  in  English 
and  Portuguese,  would  probably  be  sufficient  to  account  for 
a misunderstanding.  The  corvette’s  boat  then  returned, 
and  the  Brazilian  captain  fired  a gun,  “ to  ratify  his  intima- 
tion,” as  he  expressed  it ; and  all  was  quiet  again.  As  the 
Wachusett  steamed  out  of  the  harbor  with  her  prize,  the 
Brazilian  made  a pro  forma  demonstration,  without  stopping 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


189 


the  two  vessels,  and  the  latter  proceeded  by  way  of  St. 
Thomas  to  Hampton  Roads.  Here  the  Florida  was  sunk, 
according  to  the  official  declaration  of  the  United  States 
Government,  through  “an  unforeseen  accident,”  after  a col- 
lision wfitli  an  army  transport. 

The  capture  of  the  Florida  was  as  gross  and  deliberate  a 
violation  of  the  rights  of  neutrals  as  was  ever  committed  in 
any  age  or  country.  It  is  idle  to  attempt  to  apologize  for  it  or 
to  explain  it ; the  circumstances  were  such  that  the  question 
does  not  admit  of  discussion.  All  that  can  be  said  is  that  it 
was  the  independent  act  of  an  officer,  and  that  it  was  dis- 
avowed by  the  Government.  In  the  words  of  the  Secretary 
of  State,  it  “ was  a:i  unauthorized,  unlawful,  and  indefensi- 
ble exercise  of  the  naval  force  of  the  United  States  within 
a foreign  country,  in  defiance  of  its  established  and  duly  rec- 
ognized Government.”  That  the  action  of  Collins  met  wfith 
approval  and  satisfaction  throughout  the  country,  in  spite  of 
the  official  utterances,  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  considering 
that  communities  in  general  know  little  of  international  law, 
and  in  a case  of  this  kind  do  not  stop  to  reason  about  prin- 
ciples. Moreover,  the  slight  regard  which,  during  nearly 
four  years,  neutrals  had  shown  for  their  obligations  toward 
the  United  States,  and  the  use  of  their  own  territories  which 
they  had  permitted  to  the  Southern  cruisers,  had  aroused  in 
this  country  a just  indignation  and  a deep-seated  sense  of 
wrong  and  outrage.  Collins  refers  to  the  previous  conduct 
of  Brazil  by  way  of  justification.  He  says  in  his  report : “I 
thought  it  probable  the  Brazilian  authorities  would  forbear 
to  interfere,  as  they  had  done  at  Fernando  de  Noronha, 
when  the  rebel  steamer  Alabama  was  permitted  to  take  into 
the  anchorage  three  American  ships,  and  to  take  coal  from 
the  Cora  [Louisa]  Hatch  within  musket-sliot  of  the  fort ; 
and  afterward,  within  easy  range  of  their  guns,  to  set  on  fire 


190 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


those  unarmed  vessels.  I regret,  however,  to  state  that  they 
fired  three  shotted  guns  at  us,  while  we  were  towing  the 
Florida  out.” 

The  imputation  of  blame  cast  by  Collins’s  “ regret  ” upon 
the  Brazilian  authorities  was  unnecessary.  What  the  Bra- 
zilian vessels  should  have  done  was  to  engage  the  Wacliusett, 
and  prevent  the  capture.  What  they  attempted  to  do,  ap- 
parently, was  to  pursue  such  a course  of  action  and  inaction 
combined  as  would  enable  their  Government  to  avoid  a dif- 
ficulty with  either  belligerent.  That  they  did  not  propose 
to  engage  the  Wachusett  is  tolerably  clear ; but  at  the  same 
time  they  did  enough  to  make  a diplomatic  defence,  in  case 
the  Confederacy  should  ever  be  in  a position  to  settle  ac- 
counts with  their  Government. 

The  second  cruiser  built  in  England  for  the  Confederates 
was  the  Alabama,  whose  career  began  in  July,  1862.  The 
attention  of  the  Foreign  Office  had  been  first  called  to  this 
vessel  by  a note  from  Mr.  Adams  on  the  23d  of  June.  The 
evidence  then  submitted  as  to  her  character  was  confined  to 
a statement  made  by  the  Consul  at  Liverpool,  of  suspicious 
circumstances  connected  with  the  vessel.  The  communica- 
tion was  referred  to  the  law  officers  of  the  Crown,  who  gave 
the  opinion  that,  if  the  allegations  were  true,  the  building 
and  equipment  of  the  vessel  were  a ‘ ‘ manifest  violation  of 
the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  and  steps  ought  to  be  taken  to 
put  that  act  in  force  and  to  prevent  the  vessel  from  going 
to  sea.”  It  was  added  that  the  Customs  authorities  at 
Liverpool  should  endeavor  to  ascertain  the  truth  of  the 
statements,  and  that,  if  sufficient  evidence  could  be  ob- 
tained, proceedings  should  be  taken  as  early  as  possible. 
On  the  4th  of  July,  the  report  of  the  Customs  officers 
was  transmitted  to  Mr.  Adams,  tending  to  show  that  there 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


191 


was  no  sufficient  evidence  tliat  a violation  of  the  Act  was 
contemplated. 

Other  correspondence  and  opinions  followed.  On  the 
21st,  affidavits  were  delivered  to  the  authorities  at  Liverpool, 
one  of  which,  made  by  a seaman  who  had  been  shipped  on 
board  the  vessel,  declared  that  Butcher,  the  captain  of  the 
Alabama,  who  engaged  him,  had  stated  that  she  was  going 
out  to  fight  for  the  Confederate  States.  Other  depositions 
to  the  same  effect  were  received  on  the  23d  and  25th,  all  of 
which  were  referred,  as  they  came  in,  to  the  law  officers. 
The  latter  rendered  the  opinion  that  the  evidence  of  the  de- 
ponents, coupled  with  the  character  of  the  vessel,  made  it 
reasonably  clear  that  she  was  intended  for  warlike  use  against 
the  United  States ; and  recommended  that  she  be  seized 
without  loss  of  time. 

Notwithstanding  that  the  urgency  of  the  case  was  well 
known  to  the  Government,  and  notwithstanding  also  that,  of 
the  four  depositions  upon  wdiich  the  law  officers  chiefly 
based  their  opinion,  one  had  been  received  on  the  21st  of 
July,  two  others  on  the  23d,  and  the  fourth  on  the  25th,  the 
report  was  not  presented  until  the  29th.  On  that  day,  how- 
ever, the  Alabama  left  Liverpool,  without  an  armament,  and 
ostensibly  on  a trial  trip.  She  ran  down  to  Point  Lynas,  on 
the  coast  of  Anglesea,  about  fifty  miles  from  Liverpool. 
Here  she  remained  for  two  days,  completing  her  prepara- 
tions. On  the  morning  of  the  31st,  she  got  under  way  and 
stood  to  the  northward  up  the  Irish  Sea ; and,  rounding 
the  northern  coast  of  Ireland,  she  passed  out  into  the  At- 
lantic. 

Among  the  innumerable  side-issues  presented  by  the  case 
of  the  Alabama,  the  facts  given  above  contain  the  essential 
point.  That  the  attention  of  the  British  Government  was 
called  to  the  suspicious  character  of  the  vessel  on  the  23d  of 


192 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


June ; that  her  adaptation  to  warlike  use  was  admitted ; 
that  her  readiness  for  sea  was  known ; that  evidence  wa3 
submitted  on  the  21st,  the  23d,  and  finally  on  the  25tli  of 
July  that  put  her  character  beyond  a doubt;  and  that  in 
spite  of  all  this,  she  was  allowed  to  sail  on  the  29th,  make 
the  real  foundation  of  the  case  against  Great  Britain. 

The  Alabama  arrived  at  Port  Praya,  in  the  Azores,  on  the 
10th  of  August.  Here  she  was  joined  on  the  18th  by  the 
bark  Agrippina  of  London,  bringing  her  battery,  ammuni- 
tion, stores,  and  coal ; and  two  days  later  the  steamer  Ba- 
hama came  in  from  Liverpool,  with  Semmes  and  the  re- 
mainder of  the  officers  and  crew.  After  a week  spent  at 
Angra  Bay,  preparing  for  the  cruise,  Semmes  left  his  an- 
chorage on  the  24th  of  August ; and,  going  a fewT  miles  off 
the  coast  to  be  outside  of  neutral  jurisdiction,  he  complied 
with  the  formalities  of  putting  his  ship  in  commission. 
His  crew  had  been  shipped  at  Point  Lynas  for  a fictitious 
voyage.  Of  these,  eighty  were  now  re-shipped;  and  the 
remainder  were  obtained  from  the  men  that  had  come  out 
in  the  Bahama.  Nearly  all  belonged  to  Liverpool.  Those 
who  were  unwilling  to  go  returned  to  England  in  the  other 
vessel ; and  the  Alabama  started  on  her  cruise. 

The  first  two  months  were  spent  in  the  North  Atlantic. 
In  this  time  twenty  prizes  were  taken  and  burnt.  In  one  or 
two  cases,  there  were  at  least  doubts  as  to  the  hostile  own- 
ership of  the  cargo  ; but  the  prize-court  of  the  Confederacy 
now  sat  in  Semmes’s  cabin,  and  all  questions  of  law  and  fact 
were  settled  by  the  captain’s  decision.  The  interested  neu- 
tral in  these  cases  was  Great  Britain,  and  Semmes  had 
doubtless  satisfied  himself  beforehand  as  to  how  far  he 
could  safely  go.  There  was  no  probability  that  the  British 
Government,  after  making  so  little  effort  to  prevent  his 
departure,  would  quarrel  with  him  about  the  destruction  of 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


193 

a cargo  of  her  subjects’  merchandise.  That  Semmes  was 
not  mistaken  in  his  conjecture,  is  proved  by  the  letter  in 
reference  to  this  point,  addressed  by  direction  of  Earl  Rus- 
sell to  the  Liverpool  Chamber  of  Commerce.  The  letter 
says  : “ British  property  on  board  a vessel  belonging  to  one 
of  the  belligerents  must  be  subject  to  all  the  risks  and  con- 
tingencies of  war,  so  far  as  the  capture  of  the  vessel  is  con- 
cerned. The  owners  of  any  British  property,  not  being 
contraband  of  war,  on  board  a Federal  vessel  captured  and 
destroyed  by  a Confederate  vessel  of  war,  may  claim  in  a 
Confederate  prize-court  compensation  for  the  destruction  of 
such  property.” 

However  one  may  wish  to  avoid  reviving  an  old  grievance, 
which  is  now  happily  a grievance  of  the  past,  it  is  impossible 
to  avoid  comparing  the  extreme  complaisance  of  the  Foreign 
Office  toward  the  acts  of  Semmes — acts  for  which  a neutral 
ordinarily  demands  instant  reparation — and  its  summary 
action  in  the  case  of  the  Trent,  when  the  property  of  its 
subjects  had  been  in  no  way  injured.  In  one  case  it  ex- 
cused not  only  the  officer,  but  the  Government  under  which 
he  was  acting ; and  its  suggestion  of  a remedy  for  the  own- 
ers, in  view  of  the  character  of  prize  proceedings  in  the 
Confederacy,  was  little  less  than  a mockery.  In  the  other 
case,  it  accompanied  its  diplomatic  demands  with  hostile 
preparations,  and  it  encouraged  the  manufacture  of  public 
sentiment  in  favor  of  war  by  withholding  explanatory  de- 
spatches. The  inference  is  unavoidable  that  the  Govern- 
ment deliberately  intended  to  pursue  a policy  as  unfriendly 
as  it  could  possibly  be  without  passing  the  technical  bounds 
of  a legal  neutrality. 

After  cruising  as  far  as  the  Banks,  the  Alabama  turned  her 
head  southward.  Her  coal  was  nearly  exhausted,  and  ar- 
rangements had  been  made  before  starting  for  receiving  a 
I.-9 


194 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


fresh  supply,  from  vessels  despatched  for  the  purpose  from 
England,  which  were  to  meet  her  at  dates  and  places  agreed 
upon.  Arriving  on  the  18th  of  November  at  Fort  de  France, 
in  the  island  of  Martinique,  Semmes  found  the  Agrippina 
awaiting  him  ; but  he  postponed  taking  in  his  coal,  and  as  a 
precaution,  sent  her  to  another  rendezvous. 

Already,  in  October,  the  San  Jacinto,  now  commanded  by 
Commander  Ronckendorff,  had  been  ordered  to  cruise  in  the 
West  Indies,  in  search  of  the  Alabama,  and  the  latter  had 
not  been  at  Martinique  a day  before  the  sloop  came  in.  She 
carried  one  Xl-inch  and  ten  IX-inch  guns  ; so  that  in  arma- 
ment the  Alabama  was  not  a match  for  her.  As  the  Governor 
of  Martinique  proposed  to  enforce  the  ‘ 4 twenty-four  hours  ” 
rule,  the  San  Jacinto  did  not  come  to  anchor,  but  went  out 
to  cruise  beyond  the  marine  league,  waiting  for  the  enemy 
to  leave  the  harbor.  She  did  not  have  long  to  wait.  On 
the  20th,  early  in  the  evening,  the  Alabama  put  out.  Signal 
was  made  from  an  American  brig  in  the  harbor,  and  Semmes 
was  prepared  for  a critical  moment.  But  the  night  was 
dark,  and  the  San  Jacinto  was  lying  well  out  from  the  en- 
trance ; and  though  she  had  two  boats  on  the  watch,  the 
Alabama  got  out  unobserved.  As  the  San  Jacinto,  how' 
ever,  was  deficient  in  speed,  she  would  have  had  some  diffi- 
culty in  bringing  on  an  engagement,  even  if  she  had  met 
the  enemy. 

After  coaling  at  Blanquilla  from  the  Agrippina,  Semmes 
shaped  his  course  for  the  Mona  Passage  and  thence  for  the 
Windward  Passage.  He  remained  cruising  in  and  near  the 
latter  for  five  days.  On  the  7tli  of  December,  the  Ariel,  one 
of  the  mail- steamers  for  which  he  had  been  waiting,  was 
captured,  with  a large  number  of  passengers.  These  he  pro- 
posed to  land  at  Kingston,  before  burning  the  ship,  but  the 
prevalence  of  yellow  fever  prevented  him  from  carrying  out 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


195 


the  plan,  and  the  steamer  was  released  under  heavy  ran- 
som-bonds. 

After  making  some  necessary  repairs  to  her  engine,  the 
Alabama  passed  to  the  southward  and  westward,  cruising  in 
the  Gulf  of  Honduras  and  off  the  coast  of  Yucatan.  At  the 
Areas,  a group  of  small  islands  in  the  Bay  of  Campechy,  she 
met  another  coal-bark.  She  remained  here  at  anchor  for 
two  weeks,  coaling  and  refitting.  Thence,  on  the  5th  of  Jan- 
uary, 1863,  Semmes  proceeded  to  off  the  coast  of  Texas,  hav- 
ing formed  the  bold  design  of  intercepting  a part  of  the 
transport  fleet,  which  he  supposed  would  at  this  time  be  on 
its  way  to  Galveston. 

The  Alabama  arrived  off  Galveston  at  noon  on  the  11th. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  only  ten  days  before  her  arrival 
the  unfortunate  affair  had  taken  place  at  that  port,  which 
resulted  in  the  loss  of  the  Harriet  Lane  and  Westfield,  and 
the  raising  of  the  blockade  by  two  Texan  river-steamers. 
A squadron  under  Commodore  Henry  H.  Bell,  composed  of 
the  Brooklyn,  the  Hatteras,  and  three  or  four  gunboats,  had 
been  hurriedly  collected  at  New  Orleans,  to  resume  the 
blockade,  and  several  of  the  vessels  had  arrived  off  Galves- 
ton shortly  before  the  appearance  of  the  Alabama.  The 
latter  was  sighted  from  the  masthead  of  the  Brooklyn  when 
about  twelve  miles  off.  She  had  no  steam  up,  nor  were  any 
sails  set  that  could  be  distinguished.  The  lookout  from  the 
masthead  took  her  for  a bark  or  a three-masted  schooner. 
The  Brooklyn’s  fires  were  out,  and  new  grate-bars  were  being 
put  in ; otherwise  she  would  have  gone  in  pursuit  of  the 
stranger.  As  it  wTas,  the  commodore  signalled  the  Hatteras 
to  chase,  and  the  latter  got  under  way,  and  steamed  in  the 
direction  indicated. 

In  the  number  of  men  on  board,  the  two  ships  wTere  nearly 
equal ; but  the  Hatteras  w'as  far  from  being  a match  for  the 


196 


TIIE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Alabama,  either  in  lier  gnns  or  in  her  construction.  She  was 
a mere  shell ; an  iron  side-wheeler,  of  eleven  hundred  tons, 
built  for  carrying  passengers  on  the  Delaware — an“  excur- 
sion-boat,^ in  short.  The  armaments  of  the  two  vessels 
were  as  follows : 

Hattekas. 

Number  of  Guns. 

4 short  32-pounders  (27  cwt.) 

2 rifled  30-pounders 

1 rifled  20-pounder 

1 howitzer 

Total,  8 guns 220  lbs. 

Alabama. 

Number  of  Guns. 

6 long  32 -pounders  (52  cwt.) . . 

1 rifled  100-pounder  (Blakeley) 

1 VUI-inch  shell  gun 

Total,  8 guns  1 360  lbs. 

The  efficiency  of  the  enemy’s  battery  was  quite  double 
that  of  the  Hatteras.  Added  to  which,  the  engines  and 
boilers  of  the  Hatteras  were  exposed  to  every  shot,  while  the 
Alabama’s  machinery  was  protected  by  coal-bunkers  and  by 
its  position  below  the  water-line.  Moreover,  the  Hatteras 
had  no  speed ; and  the  ease  with  which,  toward  the  end  of 
the  chase,  she  overhauled  the  stranger,  led  her  captain, 
Blake,  to  suspect  that  he  was  being  played  with,  and  that 
the  intention  was  to  draw  him  away  from  the  squadron. 

1 Blake  says  in  his  report  that  there  was  also  a rifled  24-pounder  on  board  the 
Alabama,  but  as  Semmes  states  that  this  was  a 9 pounder,  it  is  omitted  in  the 
statement. 


Weight  of  Pro- 
jectiles. 

. 192  lbs. 

. 100  lbs. 

. 68  lbs. 


Weight  of  Pro- 
jectiles. 

. 128  lbs. 

. 60  lbs. 

. 20  lbs. 

. 12  lbs. 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


197 


If  iiis  suspicions  were  well  founded,  however,  he  had  noth- 
ing to  do  but  to  keep  on  his  course  and  fight,  and  he  pre- 
pared for  a vigorous  attack.  When  he  had  left  the  flagship, 
between  three  and  four  in  the  afternoon,  the  chase  was  not 
in  sight  from  the  Hatteras  ; and  it  was  only  after  he  had 
proceeded  some  distance  that  he  discovered  her  to  be  a 
bark-rigged  steamer,  standing  on  under  topsails  away  from 
the  bar,  and  occasionally  steaming  a little.  The  fact  was 
immediately  signalled  to  the  flagship,  but  the  signals  were 
not  observed. 

At  dusk  the  Alabama  lay  to,  being  then  about  twenty 
miles  from  the  squadron,  and  waited  for  the  Hatteras  to 
come  up.  Blake  had  resolved  to  run  up  as  close  as  possible, 
and  if  his  surmises  were  correct,  to  endeavor  to  board. 
With  the  Alabama  it  was  his  only  chance.  As  he  ap- 
proached he  hailed,  and  the  other  vessel  replied,  giving  as 
her  name,  “ Her  Majesty’s  ship  Petrel.5’  This  gentle  ruse 
lulled  Blake’s  suspicions,  and  he  gave  orders  to  send  a boat 
on  board  the  stranger.  The  Alabama  only  waited  for  Blake’s 
reply  to  her  hail,  to  make  sure  of  his  nationality ; and  on 
receiving  it,  before  the  boat  had  gone  more  than  its  length 
from  the  ship,  she  discharged  a broadside  at  the  Hatteras. 

During  the  hailing,  Semmes  had  endeavored  to  get  a rak- 
ing position  astern  of  the  Hatteras,  but  the  latter  had 
thwarted  the  attempt.  After  the  firing  began,  both  vessels 
moved  forward,  the  Hatteras  trying  to  get  on  board;  but 
the  Alabama  passed  ahead,  and  Blake,  though  he  came  very 
near — being  not  more  than  thirty  or  forty  yards  off  at  one 
time — failed  to  accomplish  his  object.  The  firing  was  sharp 
on  both  sides  ; but  out  of  fifty  shots  estimated  by  Blake  to 
have  been  fired  from  his  vessel,  only  seven  hit  the  mark. 
One  struck  the  Alabama  under  the  counter,  penetrating  as 
far  as  a timber,  and  then  glanced  off ; a second  struck  the 


198 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


funnel ; a third  passed  through  both  sides  ; a fourth  en- 
tered the  lamp  room  ; and  the  others  lodged  in  the  bunkers. 
None  of  the  shells  exploded.  The  Alabama’s  fire,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  most  destructive.  In  the  space  of  a few 
moments  the  Hatteras  was  riddled  like  a sieve.  Shells  were 
exploded  in  the  hold  and  the  sick  bay,  and  set  them  on  fire ; 
another  shell  entered  the  cylinder;  and  presently  the  walk- 
ing beam  was  shot  away.  Desperate  as  his  position  now 
was,  Blake,  with  the  tenacity  that  was  characteristic  of  him, 
held  out  a few  minutes  longer,  knowing  that  he  was  beaten, 
yet  hoping  that  some  chance  might  damage  his  enemy.  But 
the  Alabama,  placing  herself  in  an  unassailable  position  on 
his  bow,  had  him  completely  at  her  mercy,  and  continued 
to  pour  in  a galling  fire.  Whole  sheets  of  iron  were  torn  off 
the  side  of  the  Hatteras,  allowing  a volume  of  water  to  en- 
ter; and  with  his  ship  on  fire  in  two  places,  and  sinking 
fast,  and  his  engine  and  pumps  disabled,  Blake  saw  that  a 
few  moments  of  delay  would  only  result  in  the  sacrifice  of 
all  on  board,  and  gave  up  the  hopeless  struggle. 

The  action  had  lasted  thirteen  minutes.  At  its  close,  the 
crew  of  the  Hatteras  were  hastily  removed,  and  ten  minutes 
after  they  had  left  the  ship  she  went  down  bow  foremost. 
The  Brooklyn,  Sciota,  and  Cayuga,  soon  after  the  beginning 
of  the  fight,  had  got  under  way,  and  steered  in  the  direction 
of  the  flashes ; but  they  cruised  all  night  without  meeting 
anything,  while  the  Alabama  was  steadily  holding  her  course 
to  Jamaica.  On  her  wTay  back  to  Galveston  the  next  morn- 
ing, the  Brooklyn  discovered  the  masts  of  a wreck,  standing 
upright,  with  the  tops  awash ; and  only  by  a mark  on  the 
liurricane-deck,  which  was  found  adrift,  wa3  the  wreck  iden- 
tified as  that  of  the  ill-fated  Hatteras. 

The  Alabama  now  put  in  to  Port  Royal,  Jamaica,  where 
6he  landed  her  prisoners  and  repaired  damages.  The  latter 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


199 


were  not  serious,  and  the  ship  remained  only  five  days  in 
port.  After  burning  two  prizes,  the  crews  of  which  were 
landed  at  San  Domingo,  Semmes  shaped  his  course  for  a 
point  on  the  great  highway  of  South  American  commerce,  near 
the  equator.  He  remained  in  this  neighborhood  two  months, 
and  captured  eight  vessels.  All  of  these  were  destroyed 
except  one,  the  Louisa  Hatch,  which  was  loaded  with  coal. 
Proceeding  to  the  Brazilian  island  of  Fernando  de  Noronha, 
with  the  Hatch  in  company,  he  coaled  in  the  harbor  from 
his  prize.  He  then  took  her  out  and  burned  her.  While 
lying  in  the  port  two  American  ships  arrived  outside,  and  the 
Alabama  wTas  permitted,  without  any  remonstrance  from  the 
authorities,  to  run  out  and  destroy  them,  returning  the  same 
day  to  the  harbor.  These  were  the  acts  to  which  Collins 
afterward  referred,  in  excusing  his  capture  of  the  Florida. 
The  Brazilian  authorities  clearly  neglected  their  duty  in  al- 
lowing this  violation  of  neutrality  to  pass  without  remon- 
strance or  interference,  but  as  far  as  the  case  of  the  Florida 
is  concerned,  one  wrong  cannot  be  said  to  justify  another. 

Semmes  now  cruised  for  two  months — his  usual  time  for 
remaining  in  one  locality— on  the  coast  of  Brazil,  stopping 
for  a fortnight  at  Bahia.  Ten  prizes  were  added  to  his  list 
in  this  period.  One  of  these,  the  bark  Conrad,  was  taken 
into  the  Confederate  service  as  a tender,  armed  with  two 
captured  12-pounders,  and  put  in  commission  at  sea  under 
the  name  of  the  Tuscaloosa.  About  the  first  of  July  the  two 
vessels  proceeded  to  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  where  they 
arrived  on  the  29  th.  The  Alabama  remained  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  the  Cape  until  the  24th  of  September,  occasion- 
ally putting  in  at  Cape  Town  or  at  Simon’s  Bay. 

A question  arose  at  Cape  Town  in  reference  to  the  charac- 
ter of  the  Tuscaloosa.  As  prizes  could  not  be  brought  by 
the  cruisers  of  either  belligerent  into  British  ports,  the 


200 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Tuscaloosa,  if  a prize,  would  be  excluded.  Semmes  claimed 
for  her  all  the  privileges  of  a commissioned  ship-of-war,  and 
the  civil  authorities  were  inclined  to  side  with  him.  Sir 
Baldwin  Walker,  however,  the  admiral  commanding  at  the 
Cape,  took  an  opposite  view,  and  wrote  to  the  governor  that 
“to  bring  a captured  vessel  under  the  denomination  of  a 
vessel-of-war,  she  must  be  fitted  for  warlike  purposes,  and 
not  merely  have  a few  men  and  a few  small  guns  put  on 
board  her  (in  fact,  nothing  but  a prize-crew),  in  order  to  dis- 
guise her  real  character  as  a prize.  Nov/,  this  vessel  has  her 
original  cargo  of  wool  still  on  board.  . . . Viewing  all 

the  circumstances  of  the  case,  they  afford  room  for  the  sup- 
position that  the  vessel  is  styled  a tender,  with  the  object  of 
avoiding  the  prohibition  against  her  entrance  as  a prize  into 
our  ports,  where,  if  the  captors  wished,  arrangements  could 
be  made  for  the  disposal  of  her  valuable  cargo.” 

The  Admiral’s  straightforward  opinion  was  overruled  ; but 
when  the  case  was  reported,  the  Tuscaloosa  having  then  left 
Cape  Town,  the  Home  Government  instructed  the  governor 
that  the  vessel  was  a prize,  and  should  have  been  detained. 
These  instructions  were  calculated  to  afford  a cheap  satisfac- 
tion to  the  United  States,  without  injuring  the  Confederates. 
Unfortunately,  the  Tuscaloosa  disturbed  the  calculation  by 
again  coming  into  port,  after  a cruise  to  Brazil,  and  the 
colonial  governor  proceeded  to  detain  her,  in  accordance 
with  the  instructions  of  his  superiors.  This  was  not  at  all 
what  the  Home  Government  wanted ; and  it  immediately  dis- 
avowed the  act,  and  ordered  the  restoration  of  the  Tusca- 
loosa to  Lieutenant  Low,  her  commander,  on  the  ground  that 
“ having  been  once  allowed  to  enter  and  leave  the  port,  he 
was  fairly  entitled  to  assume  that  he  might  do  so  a second 
time.”  Comment  on  these  proceedings  is  hardly  necessary. 

Having  made  arrangements  soon  after  his  arrival  at  Cape 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


201 


Town  for  the  sale  of  the  Sea  Bride,  his  latest  prize,  and  of 
the  Tuscaloosa’s  cargo,  Semmes  retired  with  his  vessels  to 
Angra  Pequena,  a point  on  the  west  coast  of  Africa,  out- 
side of  civilized  jurisdiction,  and  made  the  transfers.  The 
Tuscaloosa  was  then  ordered  to  the  coast  of  Brazil. 
After  cruising  for  twTo  weeks  off  the  Cape,  Semmes  put 
into  Simon’s  Bay.  Here  he  learned  that  the  Vanderbilt, 
under  Commander  Baldwin,  was  cruising  in  search  of  him, 
having  left  the  Bay  only  five  days  before.  Being  satisfied 
that  his  pursuer  would  not  return,  he  remained  in  port  a 
week,  making  preparations  for  his  projected  cruise  to  the 
East  Indies.  During  this  stay  in  port,  he  shipped  eleven 
men,  to  make  up  for  losses  by  desertion. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  go  into  the  details  of  this  part  of  the 
cruise.  It  lasted  six  months,  and  resulted  in  the  capture 
and  destruction  of  seven  vessels.  First  running  due  south 
until  she  struck  the  fortieth  parallel,  the  Alabama  then 
steered  to  the  northward  and  eastward  for  the  Straits  of 
Sunda.  She  watched  the  Straits  for  a time,  and  next 
crossed  the  China  Sea  to  Condore,  an  island  off  the  coast  of 
Cochin-China.  Returning  by  way  of  Singapore,  the  Mala- 
bar coast,  and  Mozambique  Channel,  she  found  herself  on 
the  20th  of  March  again  at  the  Cape.  Thence  she  sailed  on 
the  24th  for  Europe. 

In  consequence  of  the  appearance  of  the  Alabama  and 
Florida,  the  Navy  Department,  in  September,  18G2,  had  set 
about  making  a systematic  effort  to  put  a stop  to  the  depre- 
dations of  the  commerce-destroyers.  A flying  squadron  was 
fitted  out  to  cruise  in  the  West  Indies,  and  the  command 
was  given  to  Captain  Charles  Wilkes.  In  its  instructions, 
dated  September  8,  1862,  the  Department,  after  recounting 
the  fitting-out  of  the  Alabama  and  Florida,  and  the  fact  that 
they  were  cruising  in  the  West  Indies,  went  on  to  say: 
9* 


202 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


“ The  Department  has  information  that  other  vessels  are 
destined  for  similar  purposes  in  the  same  quarter,  and  it  is 
therefore  essential  that  prompt  and  vigorous  measures  be 
adopted  for  annihilating  these  lawless  depredators  by  their 
capture,  and,  if  necessary,  destruction.  You  have  been  se- 
lected to  command  a squadron  for  this  purpose.  . . .” 

The  instructions  designated  the  West  Indies  and  Bahamas 
as  the  cruising  ground,  and  named  the  sloops-of-war  Wachu- 
sett  and  Dacotah,  the  double-enders  Cimmerone,  Sonoma, 
Tioga,  and  Octorara,  and  the  fast  side-wheel  steamer  San- 
tiago de  Cuba  as  the  vessels  that  were  to  compose  the  squad- 
ron. Of  these  only  the  Wachusett  and  the  Dacotah  were 
fitted  to  cope  singly  with  the  Alabama ; but  other  suitable 
vessels  were  subsequently  added  to  the  squadron. 

Wilkes  sailed  from  Hampton  Boads  in  the  Wachusett  on 
the  24th  of  September.  His  cruise  lasted  about  nine 
months.  During  two  months  of  this  time,  the  Alabama  was 
in  the  same  waters ; while  the  Florida,  when  she  left  Mobile, 
ran  directly  into  his  cruising  ground.  But  Wilkes  was  un- 
able to  find  them ; and  the  main  purpose  of  his  cruise,  the 
capture  of  the  commerce-destroyers,  was  never  carried  out. 

First  and  last,  Wilkes  had  sixteen  vessels  under  his  com- 
mand. He  made  some  captures  of  neutral  vessels  engaged 
in  contraband  trade,  and  he  worried  from  time  to  time  the 
English  steamers  in  the  West  Indies,  thereby  causing  un- 
necessary friction.  He  incurred  the  displeasure  of  the  De- 
partment by  several  unwarranted  acts,  but  particularly  by 
the  retention  of  vessels,  as  a part  of  his  command,  which  be- 
longed to  other  squadrons  or  had  been  ordered  on  special 
service.  The  Oneida  and  the  Cuyler,  which  had  been  sent 
in  pursuit  of  the  Florida  after  her  escape  from  Mobile,  were 
among  the  vessels  appropriated  in  this  way ; and  Farragut 
was  led  to  express  himself  strongly  on  the  subject,  and  to 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


203 


suggest  that  if  any  of  Wilkes’s  ships  came  into  his  neigh- 
borhood, he  should  adopt  a similar  line  of  action.  But 
the  fatal  mistake  made  by  Wilkes  was  in  detaining  the  Van- 
derbilt ; and  in  consequence  of  this  and  other  causes  of  dis- 
satisfaction, he  was  relieved  in  June,  1863,  by  Commodore 
Lardner. 

After  the  Alabama  had  reached  the  West  Indies,  in  Novem- 
ber, 1862,  it  was  foreseen  that  she  could  not  remain  long  in 
that  quarter ; and  the  Vanderbilt,  one  of  the  fastest  steamers 
in  the  navy,  was  fitted  out  to  cruise  under  Commander  Bald- 
win, with  a roving  commission,  in  the  direction  it  was  sup- 
posed she  would  take.  The  orders  of  the  Department  to 
Baldwin,  dated  January  27,  1863,  when  the  Alabama  was  on 
her  way  to  her  cruising  ground  near  the  equator,  show  with 
what  remarkable  foresight  Semmes’s  movements  were  pre- 
dicted, and  his  probable  cruise  mapped  out. 

The  orders  read  : “You  will  first  visit  Havana,  where  you 
may  obtain  information  to  govern  your  further  movements. 
You  can  then  visit  any  of  the  islands  of  the  West  Indies,  or 
any  part  of  the  Gulf,  at  which  you  think  you  would  be  most 
likely  to  overtake  the  Alabama,  or  procure  information  of 
her.  When  you  are  perfectly  satisfied  that  the  Alabama  has 
left  the  Gulf  or  the  West  Indies,  and  gone  to  some  other 
locality,  you  will  proceed  along  the  coast  of  Brazil  to  Fer- 
nando de  Noronlia,  and  Bio  de  Janeiro,  making  inquiry  at 
such  places  as  you  may  deem  advisable.  From  Bio  continue 
your  course  to  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  thence  back  to  St. 
Helena,  Cape  de  Verde,  the  Canaries,  Madeira,  Lisbon, 
Western  Islands,  and  New  York.  If  at  any  point  word  is 
obtained  of  the  Alabama  or  any  other  rebel  craft,  you  will 
pursue  her  without  regard  to  these  instructions.” 

This  judicious  plan  was  defeated  by  Wilkes.  On  the  28th 
of  February,  the  Vanderbilt,  after  looking  in  at  Martinique 


204 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


and  Guadaloupe,  fell  in  with  the  Wachusett  off  St.  Thomas. 
Wilkes  thereupon  left  the  Wachusett,  and  transferring  his 
flag  to  the  Vanderbilt,  proceeded  to  Havana.  He  was  much 
, pleased  with  his  new  acquisition.  On  the  20th  of  March  he 
wrote  the  Department : “I  cannot  well  describe  to  you  the 
efficiency  of  this  steamer,  and  the  excellent  condition  of  dis- 
cipline she  is  in,  and  the  many  advantages  she  offers  for  this 
particular  cruising.  Her  speed  is  much  beyond  that  of  any 
other  steamer  I know  of,  and  her  armament  is  equal  to  any- 
thing she  can  possibly  have  to  encounter.  ” 1 Nothing  would 
induce  Wilkes  to  part  with  her,  until  the  13th  of  June,  when, 
in  obedience  to  peremptory  orders  from  the  Department,  he 
allowed  her  to  go  on  her  cruise.  She  proceeded  directly  to 
the  coast  of  Brazil.  But  it  was  now  too  late  : the  bird  had 
flown.  The  Alabama  had  been  at  Fernando  de  Noronha  on 
the  10th  of  April,  and  at  Bahia  on  the  11th  of  May  ; and  by 
the  1st  of  July  she  had  left  the  South  American  coast  alto- 
gether. 

Touching  at  the  Brazilian  ports,  Baldwin  found  himself 
everywhere  upon  the  track  of  the  enemy,  but  a month  be- 
hind her.  He  followed  her  to  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  stop- 
ping on  the  way  at  St.  Helena.  At  the  Cape  Semmes  eluded 
him  successfully ; and  the  cruise  of  the  Vanderbilt,  from 
which  so  much  had  been  expected,  produced  no  substantial 
reshit. 

At  the  very  time  that  the  Alabama  left  the  Cape  and  dis- 
appeared in  the  Indian  Ocean,  the  United  States  sloop-of- 
war  Wyoming  was  cruising  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Straits 
of  Sunda,  to  protect  the  commerce  passing  over  the  great 
highway  to  the  China  Sea.  Two  days  before  the  Alabama 
arrived  in  the  Straits  the  Wyoming  was  lying  at  Batavia, 


1 The  Vanderbilt  carried  two  lUO-pounder  rifles  and  twelve  IX-inch  guns. 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


205 


one  hundred  miles  to  the  eastward.  When  the  Wyoming 
put  to  sea,  Semmes  doubled  on  her.  and  himself  ran  down 
into  the  Java  Sea  north  of  Batavia.  The  Wyoming  returned 
to  Batavia,  and  Semmes  made  his  way  to  the  China  Sea. 
During  the  first  week  in  December,  the  sloop  was  at  Singa- 
pore and  Johore,  while  Semmes  was  refitting  at  Condore,  to 
the  northward.  Late  in  the  same  month,  Semmes,  on  his 
way  home,  put  in  to  Singapore,  and  remained  there  four 
days.  But  by  this  time  the  Wyoming  was  off  on  a false 
chase  to  Manila,  twelve  hundred  miles  away  to  the  north- 
east, and  the  opportunity  of  meeting  the  Alabama  was  gone 
forever. 

The  Alabama  arrived  at  Cherbourg  from  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope  on  the  11th  of  June.  Here  Semmes  proposed  to  have 
her  docked  and  thoroughly  repaired;  but  permission  was 
delayed,  and  the  vessel  was  still  lying  in  the  harbor  when, 
on  the  14th,  the  sloop-of-war  Kearsarge,  commanded  by  Cap- 
tain John  A.  Winslow,  steamed  into  Cherbourg.  The  Kear- 
sarge was  lying  at  Flushing  when  the  news  reached  her  of 
the  Alabama’s  arrival ; and  she  immediately  proceeded  to 
Cherbourg,  in  the  hope  of  an  engagement.  After  send- 
ing a boat  ashore,  she  steamed  out  of  the  harbor  without 
anchoring;  and,  taking  her  station  outside,  maintained  a 
close  watch  for  the  enemy,  in  case  he  should  attempt  to 
escape. 

But  Semmes  had  no  intention  of  running  away.  After 
warring  so  long  on  unarmed  merchant-ships,  he  could  not 
afford  to  decline  the  battle  that  was  so  pointedly  offered 
him  by  a vessel  with  which  he  wTas  nearly  matched.  His 
English  friends,  who  had  stood  by  him  loyally  hitherto, 
though  he  gave  them  much  to  carry,  would  have  been  com- 
pelled to  disown  him  if  he  had  shirked  the  encounter.  He 
met  the  occasion  squarely,  and  wrote  a letter  to  a resident 


206 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


of  Cherbourg,  by  which  the  United  States  Consul  was  defi- 
nitely informed  of  his  intention  to  engage  the  Kearsarge. 

For  four  days  the  Alabama  was  occupied  with  prepara- 
tions for  battle ; and  between  nine  and  ten  o’clock  on  the 
morning  of  the  19th,  she  came  out  of  the  harbor.  The 
weather  was  fine,  with  a slight  haze.  It  was  Sunday, 
Semmes’s  “ lucky  day ; ” but  for  once  his  luck  had  deserted 
him.  Perhaps  he  had  some  apprehensions  of  this  kind,  as  he 
sent  ashore  all  his  valuables,  including  his  captured  chro- 
nometers, and  his  collection  of  ransom-bills,  which  were  to  be 
paid  after  the  recognition  of  the  Confederacy.  The  Kear- 
sarge was  lying  three  miles  off  the  eastern  entrance,  as  the 
Alabama  came  down  to  the  west  of  the  breakwater,  escorted 
as  far  as  the  marine  league  by  the  Couronne,  a French  iron- 
clad which  was  to  guard  the  neutrality  of  the  territorial 
waters.  Following  the  two  vessels  was  an  English  yacht,  the 
Deerhound.  Semmes’s  purpose  had  been  made  public,  and 
the  shore  was  covered  wuth  throngs  of  people,  wherever  a 
spot  could  be  found,  to  witness  the  fight. 

As  the  Alabama  came  out,  the  Kearsarge  steamed  off  shore, 
to  be  well  outside  the  neutral  limits,  and  to  prevent  Semmes 
from  finding  a refuge  if  the  battle  went  against  him.  On 
reaching  a point  seven  miles  from  the  land,  the  Kearsarge,  at 
10.50,  was  turned  short  around,  and  steered  for  the  enemy. 

The  armament  of  the  two  ships  was  as  follows : 

Kearsarge. 

Number  of  Guns. 

4 short  32-pounders 

2 Xl-inch  pivots  (smooth-bore) 

1 30-pounder  (rifle) 


Weight  of  Pro- 
jectiles. 

. 128  lbs. 

. 272  lbs. 

. 30  lbs. 


7 guns 


430  lbs. 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


207 


Alabama. 

Number  of  Guns?. 

6 long  32-pounders  (52  cwt.) . . . 

1 rifled  100-pounder  (Blakeley) 

1 VUI-inck  shell-gun 

8 guns 360  lbs. 

In  the  matter  of  speed,  that  primary  essential  of  a ship- 
of-war,  the  Kearsarge  had  somewhat  the  advantage.  The 
difference  in  the  number  of  men,  163  in  the  Kearsarge  and 
149  in  the  Alabama  (including  officers  in  both  cases),  was 
not  material.  Both  ships  had  their  batteries  pivoted  to 
starboard  ; and  the  Alabama  fought  seven  guns  on  her  en- 
gaged side,  while  the  Kearsarge  fought  five.  As  to  the  size 
of  the  ships,  the  tonnage  of  the  Kearsarge  was  1,031,  and 
that  of  the  Alabama  1,016,  by  the  old  system  of  measure- 
ment. They  were,  therefore,  in  most  respects  closely 
matched ; and  in  regard  to  the  comparative  strength  of  their 
armaments,  it  can  only  be  said  that  each  carried  what  was 
considered  by  those  who  fitted  her  out  the  most  effective 
battery  for  a ship  of  that  size. 

As  soon  as  the  Kearsarge  had  turned  to  approach  her,  the 
Alabama  opened  fire,  from  a raking  position,  at  a distance  of 
a mile.  This  was  at  10.57.  The  Kearsarge  came  on  at  full 
speed,  receiving  a second  broadside,  and  part  of  a third. 
Coming  within  nine  hundred  yards,  she  sheered  off  and  re- 
turned the  enemy's  fire  with  her  starboard  battery.  At  this 
point,  she  took  the  offensive  and  endeavored  to  pass  astern 
of  the  Alabama  and  rake  her  ; but  the  latter  prevented  the 
manoeuvre  by  sheering,  still  keeping  her  starboard  broad- 
side to  the  sloop.  These  tactics  were  continued  throughout 


Weight  of  Pro- 
jectiles. 

. 192  lbs. 

. 100  lbs. 

. 68  lbs. 


208 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


the  action.  Both  vessels  circled  about  a common  centre, 
keeping  broadside  to  broadside,  and  apparently  heading  in 
opposite  directions,  but  in  reality  following  each  other  on 
their  circular  course.  In  this  way,  they  made  seven  com- 
plete revolutions,  the  Kearsarge  under  a full  head  of  steam, 
always  endeavoring  to  close  and  rake,  and  the  Alabama  edg- 
ing around,  and  keeping  only  her  broadside  exposed. 

The  crew  of  the  Alabama  had  had  little  practice  in  firing 
at  a target,  having  been  compelled  to  husband  their  ammu- 
nition, and  the  warfare  in  which  they  had  been  engaged  for 
eighteen  months  not  being  of  a kind  that  called  for  expert- 
ness in  gunnery.  Their  firing  at  the  beginning  was  rapid 
and  wild,  though  it  became  steadier  toward  the  close.  The 
crew  of  the  Kearsarge,  on  the  other  hand,  under  the  thorough 
training  of  Thornton,  her  efficient  executive,  made  excellent 
practice,  firing  with  deliberateness  and  precision.  They  had 
been  instructed  to  point  the  heavy  guns  rather  below  than 
above  the  water-line,  leaving  it  to  the  32-pounders  to  sweep 
the  decks.  The  two  Xl-inch  guns,  and  especially  the  after 
gun,  played  havoc  with  the  enemy.  The  two  ships  gradu- 
ally neared  in  their  revolutions,  until  they  were  only  five  or 
six  hundred  yards  apart.  At  this  distance,  the  100-pounder 
rifle  of  that  day  was  no  match  for  the  heavier  smooth-bores, 
in  an  engagement  between  wooden  vessels ; and  the  sides  of 
the  Alabama  were  torn  out  by  shells  and  her  decks  covered 
with  killed  and  wounded.  The  crew  of  her  after  pivot-gun 
was  renewed  four  times  during  the  action,  and  nearly  every 
man  that  had  served  it  was  disabled. 

At  noon,  after  the  action  had  been  continued  hotly  for  an 
hour,  the  Alabama  ceasdd  firing,  and  headed  for  the  shore, 
then  five  miles  distant.  This  exposed  her  pert  side,  which 
was  blown  out  by  the  Xl-inch  shells,  and  only  two  guns 
could  be  brought  to  bear,  one  of  which  had  been  shifted 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


209 


from  the  other  side.  The  ship  was  filling  rapidly,  and  as 
the  water  was  rising  in  the  fireroom,  Semmes  set  his  fore- 
trysail and  jibs,  in  the  hope  of  escaping  into  neutral  waters. 
The  Kearsarge  steered  to  cross  his  bow,  and  she  was  rapidly 
approaching,  when  Semmes  saw  that  the  end  had  come,  and 
struck  his  flag.  The  Kearsarge  then  stopped,  “ uncertain 
whether  Captain  Semmes  was  not  using  some  ruse,”  as  Wins- 
low reports,  and  because  it  was  not  quite  clear  whether  the 
flag  had  been  hauled  down  or  shot  away.  A white  flag  was 
then  displayed,  and  the  fire  of  the  Kearsarge  ceased.  Pres- 
ently the  Alabama  renewed  her  fire  ; and  the  Kearsarge,  in 
consequence,  opened  again  and  fired  three  or  four  times. 
All  this  time  the  white  flag  was  flying.  Semmes  afterward 
made  bitter  complaints  of  this  violation  of  the  laws  of  war ; 
but  it  was  perfectly  justified  by  the  firing  of  the  Alabama 
after  she  had  made  the  signal  of  surrender. 

It  was  now  a little  past  noon,  and  the  Alabama  was  settling 
perceptibly.  A boat  came  alongside  the  Kearsarge  to  an- 
nounce the  surrender,  and  to  ask  assistance  for  the  sinking 
vessel.  The  only  two  boats  in  the  ship  that  were  not  dis- 
abled were  lowered  and  sent  to  bring  off  the  officers  and 
crew ; and  the  Alabama’s  boat  was  allowed  to  go  back  for 
the  same  purpose,  the  officer  commanding  the  boat  having 
given  his  pledge  that  he  would  return.  He  did  not  return, 
however  ; and  the  incident  is  another  instance  of  the  results 
which  are  likely  to  attend  the  pledging  or  paroling  of  pris- 
oners during  an  engagement,  or  before  possession  has  been 
taken  of  a vanquished  enemy. 

At  this  moment  the  Deerhound  approached.  She  had 
been  hitherto  a spectator  of  the  action.  Winslow  hailed  the 
yacht,  asking  her  to  assist  in  biinging  off  the  people  of  the 
Alabama.  The  Deerhound  complied  with  his  request,  and 
heading  for  the  Alabama,  which  was  now  going  down  rapidly, 


210 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


she  picked  up  forty-two  persons,  among  whom  were  Semmes 
and  fourteen  other  officers  ; then,  gradually  edging  off,  she 
steamed  across  the  channel  to  Southampton.  Winslow’s  offi- 
cers implored  him  to  throw  a shell  at  the  Deerhound,  when 
it  was  found  that  she  wTas  making  off,  but  he  refused ; and 
very  properly,  as  her  participation  in  the  affair  was  due  to  his 
own  suggestion.  In  making  this  suggestion,  it  appears  to 
have  been  Winslow’s  idea  that  the  Deerhound,  after  receiving 
the  fugitives,  would  deliver  them  up  to  him  as  his  prisoners. 
But  he  had  no  right  to  expect  anything  of  the  kind.  Had 
the  owner  of  the  Deerhound  taken  such  action,  he  would 
have  incurred  a heavy  responsibility  to  the  power  whose 
officers  and  men  he  had  so  delivered  into  the  hands  of  their 
enemy.  On  the  other  hand,  if  he  had  undertaken  of  his 
own  motion  to  rescue  them,  either  from  death  or  from  cap- 
ture, he  would  have  been  connecting  himself  inexcusably 
with  belligerent  operations.  It  made  no  difference  whether 
the  men  were  in  the  ship,  or  in  boats,  or  in  the  water; 
wherever  they  were,  their  being  there  was  a part  and  a con- 
sequence of  the  battle,  and  while  the  victor  was  on  the  spot, 
and  about  to  reap  the  fruits  of  victory,  a neutral  had  no  right 
to  interfere  in  any  way  whatever.  Had  the  Deerhound’s 
interference  been  unauthorized,  it  would  have  been  the  right 
and  the  duty  of  Winslow  to  have  kept  her  off,  and  if  the  oc- 
casion required  it,  to  have  used  force  in  so  doing.  But  as 
she  was  doing  merely  what  Winslow  asked  of  her,  it  is  hard 
to  see  how  he  could  have  been  justified  in  firing  at  her,  or 
what  blame  could  be  imputed  to  her  owner. 

The  engagement  lasted  an  hour,  and  in  twenty  minutes 
after  the  last  shot  was  fired  the  Alabama  sank  out  of  sight. 
The  number  of  casualties  on  board  the  defeated  cruiser  was 
not  far  from  forty.  Semmes  allows  thirty  in  his  report, 
written  at  Southampton  two  days  after  the  action  ; but  owing 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


211 


to  liis  hasty  departure,  and  his  separation  from  the  rest  of 
his  crew,  he  could  not  well  have  known  the  whole  number. 
Of  the  seventy  prisoners  taken  by  the  Kearsarge,  three  were 
in  a dying  condition,  and  seventeen  were  wounded.  Of  the 
crew  of  the  Kearsarge,  three  men  were  wounded  by  the 
bursting  of  a 68-pound  shell  on  the  quarter  deck,  one  of 
whom  afterward  died.  With  this  exception  no  one  was  hurt. 

It  is  commonly  supposed  that  the  Alabama’s  guns  were 
served  by  seamen-gunners  from  the  Excellent,  the  gunnery- 
ship  of  the  English  navy.  The  supposition  rests  on  a state- 
ment made  soon  after  the  action  by  a reporter  of  the  Lon- 
don Times , who  referred  to  Semmes  as  his  authority.  But 
Semmes  denied  the  statement  explicitly.  A large  number  of 
his  crew  were  Englishmen,  several  of  whom  had  served  in  men- 
of-war,  and  a few  were  Naval  Reserve  men ; but  beyond  this 
there  seems  to  have  been  no  foundation  for  the  assertion.  If 
it  was  true,  it  certainly  did  not  speak  well  for  the  Excellent. 
Out  of  three  hundred  and  seventy  shot  and  shell  fired  by  the 
Alabama,  only  twenty-eight  struck  the  Kearsarge,  of  which 
one-half  took  effect  in  the  hull.  The  rest  struck  the  sails, 
rigging  and  boats.  None  of  the  twenty-eight  did  any  mate- 
rial injury.  The  hammock- nettings  of  the  Kearsarge  were  set 
on  fire,  but  the  flames  were  soon  extinguished.  One  100- 
pound  shell  exploded  in  the  smoke-stack.  Another  lodged 
in  the  stern-post,  but  fortunately  did  not  explode ; which 
led  Semmes  to  say  that  the  fate  of  the  battle  was  decided  by 
the  defects  of  a percussion  cap.  It  is  not  an  uncommon 
foible  in  beaten  commanders  to  assign  these  accidental  or 
incidental  causes  for  their  defeat,  and  sometimes  with  more 
or  less  foundation ; but  in  the  engagement  of  the  Kearsarge 
and  Alabama,  the  difference  in  the  efficiency  of  the  crews 
was  too  marked  to  admit  this  as  in  any  sense  an  explanation. 
Moreover,  the  shell  was  fired  in  the  latter  part  of  the  action, 


212 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


when  the  Alabama  was  already  beaten.  The  Kearsarge  fired 
one  hundred  and  seventy-three  shot  and  shell  during  the 
fight.  How  many  took  effect  it  is  impossible  to  say  ; but 
there  were  few  of  them  that  failed  to  do  some  injury,  and  in 
an  hour  they  sank  the  enemy. 

Great  capital  was  made  by  Semmes  and  his  friends  after 
the  action  by  asserting  that  the  Kearsarge  was  covered  with 
“ chain-plating,”  and,  in  fact,  an  ironclad;  and  furthermore, 
that  by  concealing  the  fact,  Captain  Winslow^  had  taken  a dis- 
honorable advantage  of  his  adversary.  The  plating  consisted 
simply  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  fathoms  of  sheet-chain 
placed  on  the  vessel’s  side  in  the  wake  of  the  engine,  secured 
up  and  down  by  marline  to  eyebolts  in  the  planking,  and 
covering  a space  fifty  feet  in  length  by  six  in  depth.  The 
device  was  adopted  to  serve  as  a protection  for  the  machinery, 
as  the  coal  bunkers  were  emptied.  It  would  have  afforded 
no  protection  against  the  100-pound  projectiles,  if  they  had 
struck  it ; but,  as  a matter  of  fact,  it  was  struck  only  twice, 
once  by  a shot,  and  once  by  a shell,  from  a 32-pounder,  which 
broke  the  chain  as  they  struck.  The  protection  it  afforded 
was  therefore  immaterial.  As  to  the  deception,  it  was  cov- 
ered with  one-inch  deal  boards,  as  a finish ; it  had  been  put 
on  a year  before  at  the  Azores ; and  no  secret  had  ever  been 
made  of  it.  But  even  supposing  that  there  had  been  an 
intention  to  deceive,  it  would  have  been  quite  as  legitimate 
as  the  ordinary  disguises  of  neutral  flags  or  merchant-rigs, 
which  are  every-day  ruses ; and  Semmes  had  never  shown 
such  a disposition  to  encounter  ships-of-war  as  to  make  it 
advisable  to  discourage  him  unnecessarily.  Whether  there 
was  an  intention  to  deceive  or  not,  the  claim  of  Semmes  that 
he  had  been  deluded  into  fighting  an  ironclad  under  the 
supposition  that  she  was  a wooden  vessel,  will  not  be  treated 
by  history  with  great  respect,  in  view  of  his  well-known  as- 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


213 


tuteness ; and  in  view  of  the  fact  that,  had  he  been  disposed 
to  use  them,  he  might  have  found  in  his  chain-locker  the 
materials  for  casing  his  own  vessel  in  similar  armor.  Never- 
theless, he  understood  perfectly  the  course  of  public  senti- 
ment in  England;  and  w7lien  it  appeared  that  an  English- 
built  vessel,  with  English  guns,  and  a crew  of  Englishmen, 
had  been  thoroughly  beaten  and  sunk  in  an  hour  by  Ameri- 
cans in  an  Ameiican  ship  with  American  guns,  the  ironclad 
theory  received  ready  acceptance,  and  was  held  to  account 
sufficiently  for  that  phenomenal  occurrence. 

In  1863,  the  year  after  the  Florida  and  Alabama  appeared, 
several  attempt  were  made  by  the  Confederacy  to  send  ad- 
ditional cruisers  to  sea,  but  most  of  them  were  unsuccessful. 
The  ironclad  rams  built  by  the  Lairds  for  Bullock  were 
seized  by  the  English  Government,  after  a three  months’ 
delay,  during  which  the  most  earnest  remonstrances  were 
made  by  Mr.  Adams,  ending  with  a solemn  declaration  that 
to  suffer  the  departure  of  the  vessels  was  an  act  of  war. 
The  Canton  or  Pampero  was  also  seized,  and  remained  under 
seizure  during  the  rest  of  the  war.  The  Alexandra,  whose 
trial  was  one  of  the  celebrated  cases  under  the  Neutrality 
Laws,  was  finally  released.  She  was  subsequently  libelled 
at  Nassau,  and  remained  there  until  the  war  was  over.  By 
this  time  the  Government  had  begun  to  show  a little  more 
regard  for  its  neutral  obligations.  Two  cruisers,  however, 
got  to  sea  from  English  ports  during  this  year.  These  were 
the  Rappahannock  and  the  Georgia. 

The  Rappahannock  had  a very  brief  career.  She  was  for- 
merly the  Victor,  and  had  been  a despatch-vessel  in  the 
British  Navy.  The  Government,  finding  her  unserviceable, 
sold  her  on  November  10,  1863,  to  private  parties,  who  were 
acting  for  the  Confederates.  After  the  sale,  the  vessel  re- 


214 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


mained  at  Sheerness,  refitting  under  tlie  direction  of  per- 
sons connected  with  the  Royal  Dockyard.  Suspicions  were 
aroused  as  to  her  character,  and  inquiries  were  set  on  foot ; 
and  the  vessel,  to  escape  detention,  hastily  put  to  sea,  with 
the  workmen  still  in  her,  and  with  only  a part  of  her  crew, 
which  had  been  enlisted  by  the  Inspector  of  Machinery  at 
the  dockyard.  She  was  put  in  commission  in  the  channel, 
as  a Confederate  man-of-wTar,  with  the  usual  ceremonies. 
Proceeding  to  Calais,  she  claimed  admission  to  the  port  as  a 
ship-of-war  in  distress,  and  needing  repairs.  The  impu- 
dence of  this  demand  was  too  much  for  even  the  most  sym- 
pathetic neutral;  and  after  the  Rappahannock  had  made 
some  attempt  to  enlist  more  men,  and  to  continue  her  prep- 
arations for  sea,  her  operations  were  summarily  ended  by  a 
French  gunboat,  which  was  stationed  across  her  bow.  Find- 
ing it  impossible  to  fit  her  out,  her  commander  finally  con- 
cluded to  abandon  her. 

The  Georgia  was  somewhat  more  successful.  She  was  a 
screw-steamer  of  about  seven  hundred  tons,  and  was  built 
for  the  Confederates  on  the  Clyde.  She  was  launched  in 
January,  1863,  and  put  to  sea  in  April,  under  the  name  of 
the  Japan.  A Liverpool  firm  was  employed  as  the  interme- 
diary to  cover  all  the  transactions  connected  with  the  vessel. 
One  member  of  this  firm  wTas  her  ostensible  owner,  and  she 
was  registered  in  his  name  as  a British  vessel.  Another 
member  of  the  firm  took  charge  of  a small  steamer,  the  Alar, 
which  was  freighted  with  guns,  ammunition,  and  stores,  and 
met  the  Japan,  or  Georgia,  off  Morlaix,  where  her  prepara- 
tions were  completed.  The  crew  had  already  been  engaged, 
and  advances  had  been  made  by  the  same  firm  before  the 
Georgia  left  the  Clyde.  For  these  transactions,  proceedings 
were  afterwTard  instituted  against  the  guilty  parties,  under 
the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  and  they  wTere  sentenced  to  pay 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


215 


a fine  of  £50  each — a penalty  which  was  hardly  calculated 
to  deter  Her  Majesty’s  subjects  from  committing  violations 
of  neutrality.  Meantime  the  Georgia  had  escaped. 

The  Georgia’s  career  extended  over  a period  of  one  year, 
during  which  she  cruised  in  the  Middle  and  South  Atlantic. 
She  was  at  Bahia  in  May,  1863,  and  at  Simon’s  Bay  in 
August.  Late  in  October  she  arrived  at  Cherbourg,  where 
she  lay  for  four  months,  part  of  the  time  undergoing  repairs 
in  the  dockyard.  During  the  month  of  April,  1864,  she  was 
at  Bordeaux,  again  repairing.  She  had  made  no  prizes  since 
leaving  Cherbourg,  and  her  cruise,  on  the  whole,  had  not 
been  very  successful.  She  was  accordingly  taken  to  Liver- 
pool, her  crew  were  discharged,  her  warlike  equipment 
landed,  and  she  was  sold  to  an  English  ship-owner,  the  bill 
of  sale  being  signed  by  Captain  Bullock,  the  agent  of  the 
Confederate  Navy  Department.  The  transfer  by  a belliger- 
ent to  a neutral  of  a vessel,  even  a merchant-vessel,  during 
war,  is  always  a subject  of  suspicion ; much  more  so  that  of 
a ship-of-war.  At  the  instance  of  Mr.  Adams,  the  Niagara, 
then  lying  at  Antwerp,  under  the  command  of  Commodore 
Craven,  came  to  Liverpool,  ascertained  that  Lisbon  was  the 
destination  of  the  Georgia,  and  immediately  sailed  thither 
to  intercept  her.  Falling  in  with  the  converted  merchant- 
man outside  of  Lisbon,  Craven  seized  her,  and  sent  her  to 
Boston,  where  she  was  condemned  by  the  prize-court ; and 
her  owner  never  received  any  satisfaction  for  the  loss  of  the 
£15,000  which  he  had  been  so  rash  as  to  pay  to  the  Confed- 
erate Treasury. 

About  the  time  that  the  Georgia  was  launched,  another 
attempt  was  made  by  the  Confederates  to  send  out  a cruiser, 
this  time  from  one  of  their  own  ports.  For  eight  months  the 
blockade-runner  Nashville  had  been  lying  in  the  Great 
Ogeecliee  River,  blockaded  by  three  of  our  gunboats.  Dur- 


216 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


in g the  early  part  of  this  time,  she  had  been  loaded  with 
cotton,  and  it  wTas  her  intention  to  run  the  blockade  at  the 
first  opportunity ; but  the  river  was  so  well  guarded,  that, 
though  constantly  on  the  alert,  she  never  ventured  to  run 
out.  Later,  she  withdrew  up  the  river,  her  cargo  wras  re- 
moved, and  she  returned  to  her  position  fitted  out  as  a 
privateer. 

The  Nashville’s  speed  and  other  admirable  qualities  were 
well  known,  and  it  was  a matter  of  the  first  importance  to 
destroy  her.  Nothing  but  the  most  constant  watchfulness 
prevented  her  egress.  She  lay  in  an  unassailable  position 
above  Fort  McAllister,  a strong  and  well-constructed  earth- 
work, which  was  so  placed  as  to  enfilade  the  narrow  and 
difficult  channel  for  a mile  below.  The  river  had  been 
staked  opposite  the  fort,  and  a line  of  torpedoes  had  been 
planted  at  intervals  lower  down  in  the  channel.  Above  the 
obstructions  lay  the  Nashville,  ready  to  dash  out  at  the  first 
sign  of  a relaxation  of  the  blockade. 

The  blockading  gunboats  were  powerless  to  do  more  than 
watch,  and  early  in  1863,  the  force  had  been  increased  by 
the  addition  of  the  monitor  Montauk,  under  Commander 
Worden.  On  the  27th  of  January,  and  again  on  the  1st  of 
February,  Worden  had  made  attacks  upon  the  fort;  but 
notwithstanding  the  vigor  and  accuracy  of  the  bombard- 
ment, the  character  of  the  work  was  such  that  the  injuries 
resulting  from  the  attack  were  easily  repaired.  The  moni- 
tor stood  the  test  well,  for,  though  repeatedly  hit,  she 
received  little  damage.  Her  progress  up  the  liver  was 
checked,  not  by  the  battery,  but  by  the  obstructions ; and 
the  fort,  though  incapable  of  making  a serious  impression 
on  the  vessel,  could  iirevent  the  destruction  of  the  barrier. 
When  the  Monitor  advanced,  the  Nashville  found  a refuge 
up  the  river,  where  she  was  out  of  the  way  of  any  possible 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


217 


harm ; and  the  only  result  which  the  blockading  force 
seemed  able  to  accomplish  was  to  prevent  her  from  coming 
out. 

On  the  evening  ~of  the  27th  of  February,  the  Nashville 
was  observed  to  be  in  motion  above  the  fort.  Making  a 
careful  reconnoissance,  Worden  discovered  that,  in  moving 
up  the  river,  the  steamer  had  grounded  about  twelve  hun- 
dred yards  above  the  barrier.  He  saw  his  opportunity,  and 
resolved  to  make  the  most  of  it.  Having  decided  upon  the 
destruction  of  the  Nashville,  he  made  his  plans  with  care 
and  judgment.  As  it  was  high  water  at  the  time  of  her 
grounding,  he  knew  that  she  could  not  get  off  before  morn- 
ing ; and  though  an  attack  by  daylight  would  expose  him 
to  the  fire  of  the  fort,  he  decided  to  wait,  in  the  conviction 
that  the  steamer  was  in  his  power,  and  that  the  light  was  as 
great  a necessity  to  him  as  it  could  be  to  his  enemy. 

At  daylight  the  next  morning,  the  Montauk  moved  up  to 
the  barrier,  followed  at  a distance  by  the  three  gunboats. 
Between  the  monitor  and  her  antagonist  lay  a point  of 
swampy  land,  which  formed  the  sharp  bend  in  the  river  be- 
low which  the  obstructions  had  been  placed.  Planting  him- 
self directly  under  the  fire  of  Fort  McAllister,  to  which  he 
made  no  attempt  to  reply,  Worden  opened  deliberately 
upon  the  Nashville,  whose  upper  works  only  were  visible 
across  the  swamp,  until  he  had  determined  the  range  with  ac- 
curacy. Dropping  his  Xl-incli  and  XV-incli  shells  with  fatal 
precision  upon  the  vessel,  he  could  watch  the  explosion  of 
shell  after  shell  on  her  decks ; and  in  a few  minutes  she  was 
in  flames. 

A thick  fog  now  settled  down,  and  shut  out  the  combat- 
ants from  view.  The  Montauk  continued  her  fire  at  inter- 
vals, keeping  her  guns  at  the  same  direction  and  elevation ; 
and  a sharp  lookout  was  kept  for  boarding-parties,  which 
I.— 10 


218 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


might  have  taken  advantage  of  the  weather  to  come  off  from 
the  fort.  No  attempt  was  made,  however;  and  when  the 
fog  lifted,  the  Nashville  was  on  fire  forward,  aft,  and  amid- 
ships. Presently  her  pivot  gun  exploded  with  the  heat ; 
next  the  smoke-stack  toppled  over ; and  finally,  about  one 
hour  after  the  attack  had  begun,  the  magazine  blew  up, 
leaving  nothing  of  the  vessel  but  the  smoking  fragments  of 
her  hull. 

To  the  Montank,  the  battle  had  been  no  more  than  an 
hour’s  target  practice  of  a winter  morning.  The  gunners  of 
Port  McAllister,  either  unprepared  or  demoralized,  made  bad 
work  of  it,  and  struck  the  ironclad  only  five  times,  doing  no 
damage.  The  gunboats,  remaining  at  a considerable  dis- 
tance down  the  river,  though  near  enough  to  fire  with  ef- 
fect at  the  fort,  were  not  injured  in  the  least.  After  the  de- 
struction of  the  Nashville,  the  Montauk  dropped  down  the 
river.  On  her  way  she  struck  and  exploded  a torpedo, 
causing  a serious  leak,  but  Worden  kept  on  until  safely  out 
of  range  of  the  fort.  The  monitor  was  then  run  upon  a mud 
flat,  which  stopped  the  leak  effectually  until  the  injury  could 
be  repaired.  This  was  the  only  casualty  in  the  action — an 
action  which  in  its  neatness  and  finish  left  nothing  to  be 
desired. 

The  last  of  the  commerce -destroyers  was  the  Sea  King,  or 
Shenandoah.  This  vessel  was  a full -rigged  ship  with  aux- 
iliary steam  power,  of  seven  hundred  and  ninety  tons,  built 
on  the  Clyde,  and  employed  in  the  East  India  trade.  She 
was  a very  fast  ship,  a twenty-four  hours’  run  of  three  hun- 
dred and  twenty  miles  being  no  uncommon  thing  with  her. 
She  cleared  from  London  for  Bombay  October  8,  1864,  her 
Captain,  Corbett,  having  a power  of  sale  from  the  owner  to 
dispose  of  her  at  any  time  within  six  months.  She  had  on 
board  a large  supply  of  coal  and  provisions ; but  she  was  not 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


219 


altered  Or  equipped  for  war  purposes,  and  she  carried  no 
armament  except  two  12-pounders,  which  had  been  on  board 
when  she  was  originally  purchased. 

On  the  same  day,  the  steamer  Laurel  left  Liverpool,  hav- 
ing  cleared  for  Nassau,  with  several  Confederate  naval 
officers,  and  a cargo  of  cases  marked  “ machinery,”  but  con- 
taining guns  with  their  carriages  and  equipments.  Making 
her  way  to  Funchal,  Madeira,  she  met  the  Sea  King.  The 
two  vessels  then  proceeded  to  Desertas,  a barren  island  in 
the  neighborhood,  where  the  Sea  King  received  her  arma- 
ment and  stores,  and  was  transferred  by  Corbett  to  Captain 
Waddell,  of  the  Confederate  navy,  her  future  commander. 
Waddell  put  her  in  commission,  under  the  name  of  the 
Shenandoah,  and  she  started  on  her  cruise. 

The  plan  of  the  cruise  of  the  Shenandoah  wTas  based  upon 
the  movements  of  the  Pacific  whaling  fleet.  A portion  of 
this  fleet  habitually  cruised  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Caroline 
Islands  for  sperm  whales,  going  north  in  spring.  It  passed 
the  Bonins  and  along  the  coast  of  Japan,  to  the  Sea  of  Och- 
otsk,  where  it  cruised  for  right  whale.  Thence  it  pro- 
ceeded to  Behring  Strait  and  the  Arctic  Ocean.  On  its  re- 
turn, it  refreshed  at  the  Sandwich  Islands,  generally  arriving 
there  in  October  or  November.  The  plan  adopted  for  the 
Shenandoah  was  to  leave  the  meridian  of  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope  about  the  1st  of  January  for  Australia,  arriving  about 
the  middle  of  February ; thence  after  a short  stay,  to  pro- 
ceed north  through  the  Carolines  ; and  after  spending  some 
time  in  the  route  of  the  China-bound  clippers,  to  enter  the 
Ocliotsk,  and  make  the  round  of  Behring  Strait.  Upon  her 
return,  she  was  to  take  up  a position  a little  to  the  north- 
ward of  the  Sandwich  Islands,  to  intercept  such  of  the  fleet 
as  might  have  escaped. 

This  elaborate  plan  was  devised  by  Commander  Brooke  at 


220 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Richmond,  and  was  the  direct  result  of  that  officer’s  experi- 
ence in  1855,  when  serving  with  the  North  Pacific  Exploring 
Expedition.  It  was  sent  by  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  to  Bullock,  who  had  recently  obtained  control  of  the 
Sea  King,  and  wTho  was  considering  what  disposition  should 
be  made  of  her.  Bullock  immediately  acted  upon  it.  As 
the  commerce  of  the  United  States  had  been  thinned  out 
in  the  cruising  grounds  of  the  Alabama  and  the  other  com- 
merce-destroyers, it  was  desirable  to  seek  a new  field  of 
operations ; and  the  Richmond  plan  seemed  to  answer  the 
purpose. 

In  pursuance  of  this  plan,  after  cruising  for  three  months 
in  the  Atlantic,  and  taking  several  prizes,  the  Shenandoah 
proceeded  to  Tristan  d’Acunha,  where  the  crews  of  the  cap- 
tured vessels  were  landed.  From  this  point  she  went  to 
Melbourne,  where  she  remained  nearly  a month.  She  was 
allowed  to  make  extensive  repairs  in  her  machinery,  or  at 
least,  repairs  that  took  a considerable  time,  and  she  took  on 
board  three  hundred  tons  of  coal  from  a vessel  sent  from 
Liverpool  for  the  purpose.  Having  left  Madeira  short  of 
her  complement,  she  enlisted  forty-three  men  at  Melbourne, 
■who  were  taken  on  board  as  the  vessel  was  on  the  point  of 
sailing. 

Leaving  Melbourne  on  the  18th  of  February,  1865,  the 
Shenandoah  proceeded  under  sail  to  her  proposed  cruising 
ground  in  the  neighborhood  of  Behring  Strait.  Here  she 
captured  and  burned  a large  number  of  whalers.  The  cap- 
ture and  destruction  of  prizes  was  continued  until  the  28th 
of  June,  when  it  came  to  an  end,  on  account  of  information 
received  by  Waddell,  that  the  Confederate  Government  had 
ceased  to  exist.  Waddell  then  brought  his  vessel  to  Liver- 
pool, and  surrendered  her  to  the  British  Government. 

The  efforts  of  the  Confederate  agents  to  obtain  ships-of' 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


221 


war  in  France  were  defeated  by  tlie  timely  interference  of 
the  French  Government.  Six  vessels  of  a formidable  char- 
acter were  built,  but  only  one,  the  Stonewall,  found  its  way 
into  the  hands  of  the  Confederates,  and  this  one  only  toward 
the  close  of  the  war.  Proceeding  to  Ferrol  in  March,  1865, 
she  fell  in  with  the  frigate  Niagara  and  the  sloop-of-war 
Sacramento,  under  Commodore  Craven,  who  took  up  a posi- 
tion in  the  adjoining  port  of  Coruna.  The  Stonewall  was 
a ram  with  armored  sides  (four  or  five  inches),  a 300-pounder 
rifled  Armstrong  gun  in  the  casemated  bow,  and  a fixed  tur- 
ret aft  containing  two  rifled  70-pounders.  The  Niagara 
carried  ten  150-pounder  Parrott  rifles,  and  the  Sacramento 
a miscellaneous  armament,  in  which  two  Xl-inch  and  two 
IX-inch  guns,  and  one  60-pounder,  were  the  principal  pieces. 
The  Stonewall  moved  out  before  the  harbor  of  Coruna,  mak- 
ing various  demonstrations  calculated  to  provoke  an  en- 
counter ; but  the  twTo  vessels  refrained  from  attacking  her, 
upon  the  ground  that  an  engagement  would  result  disas- 
trously. 

It  is  only  necessary  to  make  one  comment  on  this  affair. 
The  Stonewall  was  truly  an  ugly  antagonist.  It  is  the 
opinion  of  many  professional  men  that,  properly  handled, 
she  could  have  sunk  the  two  American  vessels  ; and  as  far 
as  probabilities  were  concerned,  the  chances  might  be  said 
to  lie  with  the  ram.  It  may,  however,  be  seriously  ques- 
tioned whether  operations  which  are  based  exclusively  upon 
nice  calculations  of  the  risk  to  be  run  in  engaging  an  enemy 
are  likely  to  be  fruitful  of  great  results. 

The  Stonewall  proceeded  to  Lisbon,  and  thence  to  Ha- 
vana, where  she  was  surrendered  to  the  United  States  by 
the  Spanish  Government,  the  war  having  terminated.  She 
was  subsequently  sold  to  Japan. 

Among  all  the  developments  in  naval  warfare  that  were 


222 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


brought  about  between  1861  and  1865,  the  art  of  commerce- 
destroying,  as  systematized  and  applied  by  Semmes,  will 
not  be  reckoned  the  least  important.  In  saying  this,  it  must 
be  understood  that  reference  is  made,  not  to  its  ethical,  but 
to  its  military  aspect.  As  a mode  of  carrying  on  hostilities 
it  is  neither  chivalrous  nor  romantic,  nor  is  it  that  which  a 
naval  officer  of  the  highest  type  would  perhaps  most  de- 
sire to  engage  in  ; but  it  fulfils,  in  an  extraordinary  degree, 
the  main  object  of  modern  war,  that  of  crippling  an  ad- 
versary. 

As  war  in  our  days  has  lost  much  of  its  brutality,  so  it  has 
largely  lost  the  element  of  chivalry ; it  has  become  scien- 
tific, stern,  bloody,  and  business-like.  The  Alabama’s  mode 
of  warfare,  however,  combined  the  greatest  effect  with  the 
least  bloodshed,  and,  it  may  be  added,  with  the  least  outlay 
of  men  and  money ; and  its  success  has  stimulated  efforts  in 
the  great  navies  of  the  world,  which  will  doubtless  some 
day  result  in  similar  enterprises.  The  name  of  the  Alabama, 
like  that  of  the  Monitor,  has  become  a generic  term ; and 
future  Alabamas  will  regard  the  cruise  of  Semmes’ s vessel 
as  the  starting-point  in  all  their  operations. 

Commerce-destroying  had  been  practised  on  a considerable 
scale  in  earlier  wars ; but  the  introduction  of  fast  steamers 
enabled  Semmes  to  carry  his  operations  to  a point  of  perfec- 
tion that  had  never  before  been  attained.  His  preliminary 
cruise  in  the  Sumter  showed  him  the  possibilities  and  the 
limitations  of  this  species  of  warfare ; and  he  entered  upon 
the  cruise  of  the  Alabama  with  a well-considered  plan  of 
operations.  He  began  with  a careful  study  of  the  ocean 
highways  of  commerce ; and  these  determined  the  locality 
of  his  successive  cruising-grounds.  It  is  upon  this  discovery 
of  strategic  points  that  his  patent  chiefly  rests.  He  calcu- 
lated nicely  the  time  required  for  news  of  his  presence  to 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


223 


reach  the  United  States,  and  before  a ship  could  be  sent 
after  him,  he  had  moved  to  a new  scene  of  operations.  The 
period  which  he  generally  allowed  himself  in  any  one  quar- 
ter was  about  two  months.  At  the  end  of  this  time  he  was 
on  his  way  to  another  craising-ground ; and  unless  his 
movements  could  be  foreseen,  he  was  tolerably  safe  from 
pursuit.  He  passed  his  first  two  months  in  the  North  At- 
lantic. His  next  field  was  the  West  Indies.  On  each  of 
these  stations  he  found  a large  number  of  unprotected  mer- 
chant-vessels. After  leaving  the  West  Indies,  he  posted 
himself  near  the  equator,  in  the  track  of  South  American 
commerce.  The  waters  over  which  this  commerce  passes  lie 
within  a belt  not  more  than  one  hundred  miles  wide.  The 
Alabama  occupied  this  belt.  Next  she  passed  two  months 
on  the  coast  of  Brazil.  Thence  she  went  to  the  Cape,  near 
which  the  whole  commerce  of  the  Indian  Ocean  must  pass. 
At  the  Cape  again  she  remained  about  two  months ; but 
American  shipmasters  had  by  this  time  become  cautious, 
and  they  gave  the  African  coast  a wide  berth.  From  the 
Cape  Semmes  went  to  the  Straits  of  Sunda,  the  gateway  of 
the  China  Sea.  Here  he  remained  two  months,  and  was 
again  successful. 

During  all  this  period  the  Alabama  was  kept  constantly 
moving.  The  only  delays  were  for  repairs  and  coal.  The 
latter  was  furnished  at  first  by  coaling-vessels  sent  to  ap- 
pointed rendezvous.  Later,  the  ship  depended  upon  prizes, 
and  upon  supplies  in  neutral  ports,  which  were  never 
grudged.  When  a long  cruise  made  repairs  or  rest  a neces- 
sity, an  anchorage  was  selected,  which  from  its  remoteness 
and  obscurity,  and  from  its  slight  dependence  upon  a civil- 
ized power,  gave  an  opportunity  to  refit  at  leisure  and  in 
security.  The  Areas,  Fernando  de  Noronlia,  Angra  Pequena, 
and  Pulo  Condore  were  successively  utilized  in  this  way. 


224 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


When  more  extensive  repairs  were  required,  Semmes  put 
boldly  into  a neutral  port,  and  liis  ingenuity  generally  sup- 
plied the  authorities  with  the  points  that  were  needed  te 
justify  them  in  extending  to  him  every  facility. 

It  is  common  to  speak  of  the  Alabama  and  the  other  Con- 
federate cruisers  as  privateers.  It  is  hard  to  find  a suitable 
designation  for  them,  but  privateers  they  certainly  were  not. 
The  essence  of  a privateer  lies  in  its  private  ownership ; its 
officers  are  persons  in  private  employment ; and  the  au- 
thority under  which  it  acts  is  a letter  of-marque.  To  call 
the  cruisers  pirates  is  merely  to  make  use  of  invective. 
Most  of  them  answered  all  the  legal  requirements  of  ships- 
of-war;  they  were  owned  by  the  Government,  and  they 
were  commanded  by  naval  officers  acting  under  a genuine 
commission.  Some  of  them  were  put  in  commission  at  sea 
or  in  foreign  waters,  and  never  saw  the  country  of  their 
adoption;  but  their  commission  could  not  thereby  be  in- 
validated. There  is  no  rule  of  law  which  prescribes  the 
place  where  a Government  shall  commission  its  ships,  or 
which  requires  the  ceremony  to  take  place,  like  the  ses- 
sions of  prize-courts,  within  the  belligerent  territory. 

Assuming  that  the  commissioned  vessels  of  the  Cenfed- 
erates  were  prima  facie  ships-of-war,  the  question  arises 
whether  they  were  entitled  to  the  privileges  accorded  to 
such  vessels  by  the  usage  of  nations.  They  were  acting  for 
a Government  whose  belligerency  had  been  recognized, 
though  no  recognition  had  been  accorded  to  the  state  which 
it  was  seeking  to  establish.  This  fact  might  modify  some- 
what the  view  in  which  the  vessels  were  regarded  by  foreign 
states,  in  that  the  latter  could  maintain  no  official  relations 
with  the  insurgent  Government,  and  were  therefore  de- 
prived of  the  ordinary  method  of  redress,  if  the  vessels 
should  commit  an  offence  against  their  sovereignty.  But 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


225 


the  method  of  obtaining  redress  by  negotiation  is  by  na 
means  the  only  way  of  dealing  with  offending  ships-of-war 
in  foreign  waters.  They  may  be  summarily  ordered  to  de- 
part ; they  may  be  forbidden  to  enter ; and,  finally,  if  they 
assail  in  any  w^ay  the  local  sovereignty,  or  if  they  refuse  to 
comply  with  an  order  for  their  departure  or  their  exclusion, 
force  may  be  used  against  them.  There  is,  and  there  can 
be,  no  rule  of  law,  which  compels  a government  to  remain 
passive  wdiile  its  laws  are  openly  violated,  simply  because  of 
the  sanctity  which  is  supposed  to  surround  a public  vessel ; 
nor,  when  a neutral  government  has  allowed  its  neutrality 
to  be  infringed  by  the  cruisers  of  one  belligerent,  can  it 
justify  itself  to  the  other  by  putting  forward  such  a plea. 
With  stronger  reason,  a ship -of- war  whose  very  existence  is 
a consequence  of  evasions  or  infringements  of  the  local  law 
may  be  denied  the  ordinary  immunities.  When,  therefore, 
the  Alabama  and  the  Florida,  vessels  that  had  been  allowed 
to  go  to  sea  from  English  ports  in  violation  of  English  neu- 
trality, at  a subsequent  period  entered  ports  of  the  same 
Power,  while  engaged  in  their  belligerent  enterprises,  the 
Government  could  not  excuse  its  inaction  on  the  ground  of 
respect  for  the  Confederate  commission ; and,  by  refusing 
either  to  exclude  or  to  detain  the  cruisers,  it  added  to  the 
wrong  which  it  had  already  committed. 

In  view  of  the  respect  which  civilized  states  exact  for 
their  public  vessels,  it  is  desirable  that  every  safeguard 
should  be  employed  by  the  State  itself  to  protect  this 
character  from  abuse.  The  Confederate  Government  showed 
considerable  laxity  in  this  respect.  If  it  had  not  been  in- 
capable of  negotiation,  and  if  the  neutral  powers  had 
pursued  the  ordinary  policy  of  neutrals,  it  would  doubtless 
have  received  some  emphatic  remonstrances  on  the  subject. 
It  procured  cruisers  abroad  through  “ shifts  and  strata- 
10* 


226 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


gems,”  1 cleared  them  under  the  names  of  fictitious  owners, 
or  brought  them  out  without  a clearance,  took  formal  pos- 
session of  them  on  the  high  seas,  though  they  wTere  osten- 
sibly and  according  to  their  papers  foreign  vessels,  and  put 
them  in  commission  as  ships-of-war.  It  procured  other 
vessels  abroad,  not  intended  for  war  purposes,  which  it 
owned  and  controlled,  and  in  some  cases  officered  from  its 
navy,  and  which  it  employed  in  trade — that  is,  as  blockade- 
runners.  These  vessels,  owned,  controlled,  and  officered  by 
the  Confederate  Government,  sailed  sometimes  under  the 
British  flag,  and  w7ith  British  papers,  and  sometimes  with 
those  of  the  Government  to  which  they  belonged.  They 
were  fitted  out,  now7  as  ships-of-w7ar,  now  as  merchant  vessels, 
according  as  the  one  character  or  the  other  would  best 
satisfy  the  exigency  of  the  moment,  and  the  demands  of  the 
local  authorities  in  foreign  ports. 

A few  of  the  prominent  cases  w7ill  serve  to  show  the 
nature  of  these  arrangements.  The  Japan  or  Georgia  left 
the  Clyde,  registered  in  the  name  of  a British  subject  as  a 
British  vessel,  and  she  remained,  for  nearly  three  months, 
still  registered  in  the  name  of  her  ostensible  owner,  though 
she  was  all  that  time  engaged  in  hostilities  against  tho 
United  States.  A year  later  she  returned  to  Liverpool  and 
was  dismantled.  Whether  she  was  then  a sliip-of-vTar  or  a 
merchant  vessel  does  not  appear.  She  w^as  soon  after  sold 
to  an  English  subject,  the  bill  of  sale  being  signed  by 
Bullock,  just  as  the  Sumter  had  been  sold  at  Gibraltar,  wdien 
Semmes  found  that  he  could  not  take  her  out  to  sea. 

The  Rappahannock  left  Slieerness  in  haste  as  a merchant- 
vessel,  with  her  workmen  still  in  her,  assumed  a public 
character  in  the  run  across  the  channel,  and  sought  admis- 


1 Earl  Russell’s  letter  of  February  12,  18G5. 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


227 


sion  at  Calais  as  a ship-of-war  in  distress.  The  Tuscaloosa, 
a prize  of  the  Alabama,  entered  the  harbor  at  the  Cape  with  a 
prize  crew,  and  with  her  captured  cargo,  which  she  hoped  to 
sell,  still  on  board,  and  claimed  the  privileges  of  a ship-of- 
war,  because  her  captor  chose  so  to  designate  her;  and 
after  being  accorded  these  privileges,  she  left  the  harbor  to 
carry  her  wool  to  Angra  Pequena,  where  it  was  actually  sold. 
A British  Vice- Admiralty  court  could  obtain  no  evidence  at 
Nassau  that  the  Florida,  an  exact  copy  of  the  gun-vessels  of 
the  English  navy,  was  other  than  a merchantman,  owned  by 
a British  firm,  and  in  a week  after  her  release  she  was  at  sea 
as  a Confederate  ship-of-war.  Toward  the  close  of  the  war 
blockade-runners  were  hastily  converted  into  cruisers,  and 
as  hastily  changed  back  to  blockade-runners,  until  the  Con- 
federate navy  list  must  have  been  a hopeless  muddle.  The 
blockade-runner  Edith  suddenly  appeared  out  of  Wilming- 
ton one  night  in  October,  1864,  under  the  character  and  des- 
ignation of  the  “ C.  S.  Steamer  Chickamauga,”  armed  with 
a 64-pounder  and  a 32-pounder,  and,  after  seizing  and  de- 
stroying four  or  five  unfortunate  coasters,  returned  to  port 
in  three  weeks,  to  resume  her  former  state  and  occupation. 
It  is  hard  to  see  what  purpose  could  be  served  by  belliger- 
ent operations  of  such  a character,  at  this  stage  of  the  con- 
flict, and  it  shows  the  desperate  straits  to  which  the  Con- 
federate Government  was  put  toward  the  end  in  attempting 
to  keep  up  the  semblance  of  a naval  war. 

But  the  vessel  which  had  the  most  varied  career  was  the 
Tallahassee.  She  wTas  originally  called  the  Atlanta,  and 
under  that  name  she  arrived  at  Bermuda  in  the  spring  of 
1864.  She  made  two  trips  to  Wilmington  as  a blockade- 
runner.  She  was  then  converted  into  a cruiser,  under  the 
name  of  the  Tallahassee,  and  sailed  from  Wilmington  early 
in  August.  Her  course  was  shaped  for  Halifax,  where  she 


228 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


arrived  on  the  19th,  after  having  destroyed  several  vessels. 
Owing  to  the  vigilance  of  the  authorities,  who  for  once  were 
on  the  alert  to  prevent  infringements  of  the  neutrality  regu- 
lations, she  was  unable  to  accomplish  all  that  she  wanted  in 
getting  repairs  and  coal,  and  on  the  26th,  she  returned  to 
Wilmington.  In  November  she  made  another  short  cruise, 
this  time  under  the  name  of  the  Olustee,1  during  which  she 
took  a few  prizes.  With  this  cruise  her  belligerent  career 
came  to  an  end.  Her  battery  was  removed,  and  her  officers 
and  crew  were  detached.  A bill  of  sale  was  drawn  up,  the 
ostensible  purchaser  being  the  navy  agent  at  Wilmington ; a 
register  was  issued,  a crew  engaged,  a cargo  of  cotton 
shipped,  and  invoices  and  bills  of  lading  made  out  in  the 
prescribed  form.  She  received  the  name  of  the  Chameleon, 
which  must  have  been  a piece  of  pleasantry  on  the  part  of 
whoever  may  have  been  considered  as  her  owner.  She  left 
Wilmington  in  December,  under  the  command  of  Captain 
Wilkinson,  of  the  Confederate  navy,  under  orders  from  the 
Navy  Department,  and  her  object  was  to  obtain  a supply  of 
provisions  at  Bermuda,  of  which  the  army  was  in  dire  need. 
Upon  her  arrival  the  Lieutenant-Governor  was  somewhat 
exercised  as  to  her  character,  but  finally  decided  that  she 
was  not  a man-of-war,  having  been  “ sold  to  a private  mer- 
chant,” to  borrow  the  phrase  of  the  British  counter-case  at 
Geneva.  According  to  Wilkinson,  the  vessel  had  been  “ so 
thoroughly  whitewashed  ” that  the  authorities  could  find 
nothing  to  lay  hold  of.  After  loading  her  cargo,  she  steered 
for  Wilmington,  but  Fort  Fisher  had  now  fallen,  and  she  was 
compelled  to  put  back.  Charleston  was  tried  with  no  better 
success ; and  after  landing  her  provisions  at  Nassau,  the 


1 According  to  the  statement  in  the  case  of  the  United  States  at  Geneva,  “it  is 
not  quite  clear  whether  she  made  two  trips,  one  under  each  name,  or  whether  the 
name  was  changed  in  one  trip.” 


THE  COMMERCE-DESTROYERS. 


229 


Chameleon  was  taken  to  Liverpool,  and  delivered  to  Fraser, 
Trenliolm  & Co.,  the  Confederate  agents.  She  was  subse- 
quently seized  by  the  British  Government,  and  ultimately 
surrendered  to  the  United  States. 

A great  deal  of  uncalled-for  abuse  has  been  heaped  upon 
the  South  for  the  work  of  the  Confederate  cruisers,  and 
their  mode  of  warfare  has  been  repeatedly  denounced  as 
barbarous  and  piratical  in  official  and  unofficial  publications. 
But  neither  the  privateers,  like  the  Petrel  and  the  Savannah, 
nor  the  commissioned  cruisers,  like  the  Alabama  and  the 
Florida,  were  guilty  of  any  practices  which,  as  against  their 
enemies,  were  contrary  to  the  laws  of  war.  The  expediency 
of  enforcing  the  right  of  maritime  capture  has  been  much 
discussed  during  the  last  hundred  years,  and  has  often  been 
questioned  on  humanitarian  grounds.  It  is  not  proposed  to 
consider  that  question  here.  For  the  present  purpose,  it  is 
sufficient  that  the  right  to  capture  an  enemy’s  private  prop- 
erty at  sea  is  fully  recognized  by  the  law  and  practice  of  na- 
tions to-day.  All  that  is  necessary  is  to  establish  the  enemy 
ownership,  and  this  being  done,  the  prize-courts  of  every 
country  in  the  world  will  decree  confiscation.  Whether  the 
prize  is  destroyed  at  sea,  or  is  brought  into  a prize-court  and 
condemned,  can  make  no  possible  difference  to  the  owner,  if 
the  owner  is  clearly  an  enemy.  The  officer  making  the  cap- 
ture is  responsible  to  his  Government,  and  as  the  proceeds 
of  the  prize  usually  go  in  part  to  the  State,  the  ofiicer’s 
Government  may  and  doubtless  will  require  him  to  bring  in 
his  prize,  if  possible,  for  adjudication.  But  this  is  a matter 
purely  of  internal  discipline,  a question  between  the  State 
and  its  officers.  So  also,  if  by  accident  or  intention  neutral 
property  is  captured  and  destroyed,  a question  arises  between 
the  captor’s  government  and  that  of  the  neutral,  but  it  is  a 
question  with  which  the  other  belligerent  has  nothing  to  do. 


230 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


So  much  for  the  law  on  the  subject.  As  for  the  practice, 
it  is  usual  for  governments  to  require  their  officers  to  give 
sufficient  reason  why  a prize  is  not  brought  in.  Either  the 
unseaworthiness  of  the  prize,  or  the  want  of  men  to  navigate 
her,  would  manifestly  be  a sufficient  reason.  In  the  absence 
of  any  preventing  cause,  the  prize  should  be  brought  to  a 
port  of  adjudication ; and,  if  that  is  impossible,  to  the  near- 
est neutral  port  that  will  admit  it.  But  during  the  war,  the 
ports  of  the  Confederates  were  under  blockade,  and  the  rule 
was  generally  adopted  by  neutrals  of  excluding  the  prizes  of 
both  belligerents.  Nothing  then  remained  but  to  destroy 
the  captured  vessel  at  sea.  To  have  done  otherwise  would 
have  been  to  abandon  the  right  of  maritime  capture. 

The  practice  of  destroying  prizes,  however,  even  when  it  is 
possible  to  send  them  in,  is  no  new  thing  in  maritime  war- 
fare, especially  in  the  maritime  warfare  of  the  United  States. 
The  cruise  of  the  Argus  in  1813  was  precisely  parallel  to  those 
of  the  Alabama  and  Florida ; and  the  instructions  of  the  Navy 
Department  to  commanding  officers  during  the  war  of  1812 
were  to  “ destroy  all  you  capture,  unless  in  some  extraordinary 
cases  that  clearly  warrant  an  exception.’ * To  take  a later  in- 
stance, in  a decision  in  the  High  Court  of  Admiralty  during 
the  Crimean  War,  Dr.  Lushington  said,  “It  may  be  justifia- 
ble, or  even  praiseworthy  in  the  captors  to  destroy  an  enemy’s 
vessel.  Indeed,  the  bringing  into  adjudication  at  all  of  an 
enemy’s  vessel  is  not  called  for  by  any  respect  to  the  rights  of 
the  enemy  proprietor,  where  there  is  no  neutral  property  on 
board.”  The  French,  in  at  least  two  cases  in  the  war  of  1870, 
burned  prizes  at  sea,  because  it  was  inconvenient  to  send 
prize  crews  on  board ; and  from  more  recent  events  it  is  clear 
that  other  Governments,  in  case  of  war  with  a commercial 
power,  will  deem  themselves  fortunate  if  they  can  rival  the 
achievements  of  the  Confederate  commerce-destroyers. 


CHAPTER  VHL 


CONCLUSION. 

As  it  was  a part  of  the  object  of  this  book  to  deal  with  the 
condition  of  the  navy  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  and  with 
the  preparations  made  by  the  Government  to  carry  it  on,  it 
will  not  be  out  of  place  to  dwell  for  a moment  upon  certain 
conclusions  which  may  be  drawn  from  a consideration  of  this 
branch  of  the  subject.  As  conclusions  by  a non-professional 
observer,  they  are  submitted  with  hesitation  and  diffidence  ; 
and  as  they  carry  with  them  no  weight  of  authority,  they 
may  be  taken  simply  at  their  own  worth. 

A military  force,  whether  intended  to  operate  on  land  or 
at  sea,  exists  primarily  for  purposes  of  war.  Cruising  on 
foreign  stations  during  peace,  in  these  days  when  piracy  has 
disappeared,  is  not  an  occupation  calculated  to  exercise 
fully  its  powers.  Sliips-of-war  are  no  doubt  of  use  from 
time  to  time  at  various  points,  but  their  usefulness  is  not  so 
great  that  a government  whose  foreign  relations  are  gener- 
ally amicable  would  keep  up  a large  establishment  for  this 
object  alone.  Their  real  purpose  is  to  become  the  national 
defence  in  time  of  war.  As  with  the  ships,  so  with  the  offi- 
cers ; it  is  in  war,  not  in  peace,  that  the  fruit  of  their  la- 
bors is  to  be  gathered. 

So  far,  doubtless,  everybody  is  agreed ; in  fact,  what  has 
been  said  is  little  more  than  a truism.  But  the  logical  in- 
ference drawn  from  the  premises  is  far  from  commanding 


232 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


universal  assent,  and  still  farther  from  obtaining  recognition 
in  practice.  The  inference  is  this  : that  the  primary  object 
for  a navy  at  all  times  is  to  maintain  itself,  in  all  its 
branches,  materiel,  personnel,  and  organization,  in  the  most 
perfect  state  that  is  possible  of  readiness  and  efficiency  for 
war.  This  should  be  the  first  and  ever-present  considera* 
tion  with  those  who  enact,  who  administer,  and  who  execute 
measures  of  naval  policy  ; the  ability  to  place  the  whole  es- 
tablishment in  the  condition  of  active  warlike  operation,  as 
instantaneously  and  as  smoothly  as  an  engineer  starts  his 
machine. 

In  1861,  the  navy  was  by  no  means  in  a condition  of 
readiness  for  war,  although  war  was  the  purpose  for  which  it 
existed.  In  materiel,  it  had  a few  ships  suitable  for  cruis- 
ing purposes,  and  it  had  superior  ordnance ; but  half  the 
fleet  was  antiquated,  and  the  rest  was  displaying  the  flag  on 
distant  stations.  As  to  the  personnel,  it  is  useless  to  deny 
the  fact  that  the  list  was  heavily  weighted  by  the  old  officers 
at  the  head,  who  had  reached  their  position,  not  because  of 
merit,  but  because  of  the  date  when  they  happened  to  enter 
the  service  ; that  the  middle  of  the  list  was  suffering  from 
long  stagnation,  and  from  the  absence  of  any  inducement 
to  effort ; and  finally,  that  the  young  men,  who  were  to  bear 
the  brunt  of  the  work,  were  altogether  too  few  for  the  needs 
of  the  service.  It  is  commonly  said  that  the  navy  was  on  a 
peace  footing ; but  if  that  was  the  case,  a complete  and  well- 
defined  provision  should  have  been  made  for  expansion.  To 
speak  of  a “ peace  footing”  implies  that  a “ war  footing”  is 
something  different ; and  no  naval  establishment  can  con- 
sider itself  prepared  for  war  that  has  not  made  beforehand 
all  the  arrangements  necessary  to  pass  at  once  from  one  to 
the  other. 

Conceding  the  necessity  of  a peace  footing  for  personnel 


CONCLUSION. 


233 


and  materiel,  on  the  score  of  expense,  there  is  no  necessity 
for  such  a thing  as  a peace  footing  for  organization.  The 
organization  of  a military  or  naval  establishment  is  fixed 
primarily  with  a view  to  efficiency  in  war,  and  only  such 
slight  modifications  are  introduced  in  time  of  peace  as  are 
indispensable.  So  far  from  this  being  the  case  in  1861,  the 
wdiole  administration  wTas  arranged  on  an  exactly  opposite 
basis.  It  was  about  as  unfitted  for  the  conduct  of  a war  as 
it  was  possible  to  be.  The  organization  was  that  of  five 
bureaus,  independent  of  each  other,  and  only  united  by  a 
common  subordination  to  the  Head  of  the  Department. 
Now,  whatever  merits  the  system  of  nearly  independent 
bureaus  may  have  in  time  of  peace,  it  is  entirely  inadequate 
as  an  organization  for  carrying  on  war.  The  direction  of 
military  or  naval  operations  must  be  centralized,  not  only  in 
the  person  of  the  Departmental  head,  but  in  his  responsible 
professional  advisers  ; and  to  impose  this  heavy  burden  upon 
Chiefs  of  Bureaus,  whose  business  is  with  certain  specific 
branches  of  administration,  is  to  expect  men  to  take  in  at 
the  same  moment  the  whole  field  of  view  and  the  minutest 
details  of  a single  part.  It  is  the  essence  of  a good  organ- 
ization that  every  branch  of  it  should  have  its  own  work, 
and  should  confine  itself  to  that;  and  for  that,  and  that 
alone,  it  should  be  held  to  the  fullest  responsibility.  The 
province  of  a Bureau  is  to  furnish  a gun,  or  a hull,  or  an 
engine,  or  a crew,  the  best  possible  that  can  be  obtained ; 
and  to  devolve  upon  its  Chief  the  duty  of  planning  cam- 
paigns is  only  to  divert  him  from  his  legitimate  business, 
and  would,  in  the  nature  of  things,  result  disastrously  both 
to  the  campaign  and  the  bureau.  The  general  direction  of 
military  and  naval  operations,  if  we  are  to  accept  the  testi- 
mony of  the  highest  authorities  and  the  evidence  of  the  most 
successful  campaigns,  is  the  work  of  men  bred  in  the  busi- 


234 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


ness.  It  cannot  be  done  successfully,  according  to  the  de- 
mands of  modern  warfare,  by  this  or  that  officer  picked  up 
on  the  spur  of  the  moment,  or  by  boards  of  officers  created 
as  the  exigency  arises.  It  must  be  put  in  the  hands  of  those 
who  have  spent  much  labor  and  thought  in  examining  and 
fastening  upon  the  strong  and  weak  points  of  all  possible 
enemies ; who  have  made  their  office  the  repository  of  all 
possible  information ; who  have,  as  Moltke  is  said  to  have 
had,  the  whole  details  of  campaigns  in  their  pigeon-holes,  to 
be  modified,  month  by  month,  as  new  circumstances  arise ; 
and  finally,  who  are  studying,  not  gunnery,  nor  machinery, 
nor  construction,  nor  fleet-tactics  alone,  but  the  science  of 
wae,  in  all  its  bearings,  as  an  actual,  living,  and,  above  all, 
as  a growing  science.  In  short,  the  direction  of  naval  opera- 
tions, like  that  of  military  operations,  should  be  entrusted 
to  a previously-trained  and  previously-equipped  General 
Staff. 

Now,  in  1861,  the  navy  had  no  general  staff.  Staff- work 
was  a branch  of  naval  science  as  uncultivated  as  the  attack 
and  defence  by  torpedoes  ; nor  did  it  occur  to  the  authorities 
at  the  time  that  a staff  might  be  created.  So  they  set  about 
to  find  a substitute.  By  one  of  those  fortunate  accidents, 
which  lead  our  happy-go-lucky  nation  to  fall  on  its  feet, 
when  it  has  come  unprepared  upon  a crisis,  a man  had  about 
this  time  come  forward,  in  connection  with  the  relief-expedi- 
tions to  Fort  Sumter,  wTho  was  fitted,  as  nearly  as  any  one  man 
could  be,  to  take  charge  of  the  work.  This  man  was  Captain 
Gustavus  Y.  Fox.  It  may  be  said  in  passing  that  an  accident 
of  this  kind  cannot  be  counted  on,  nor  can  it  justify  the  ab- 
sence of  preparation,  when  preparation  is  so  simple  and  easy 
— in  war  nothing  must  be  left  to  chance.  In  addition  to  his 
natural  attainments,  which  were  exceptional,  Fox  was  a man 
of  varied  experience,  having  passed  eighteen  years  in  the  navy, 


CONCLUSION. 


2C5 


during  which  he  had  served  in  ships-of-war,  in  the  Coast  Sur- 
vey, and  in  command  of  mail-steamers.  Five  years  before 
the  war  he  had  resigned,  and  had  engaged  in  business.  He 
therefore  started  in  his  career  as  Assistant  Secretary  with  a 
grasp  of  the  situation,  and  a capacity  to  meet  it,  that  could 
be  found  in  few  men  at  that  time,  either  outside  the  service 
or  in  it.  To  say  that  he  became  Assistant  Secretary  does  not 
define  his  position.  He  was  anything  but  an  Assistant  Secre- 
tary. He  was  really  the  Chief  of  Staff ; or  rather  he  was  the 
•whole  general  staff  in  person.  Of  course  he  could  not  per- 
form all  the  details  of  his  work  himself,  and  as  he  had  not  at 
command  a previously-trained  body  of  staff-officers,  he  made 
judicious  use  of  the  material  at  his  disposal  by  the  creation 
of  tem'porary  boards.  One  board  was  organized,  composed 
of  Captains  Dupont  and  Davis,  Major  Barnard  of  the  Engi- 
neers, and  Professor  Bache,  to  report  on  the  coast  of  the 
enemy,  its  points  of  access  and  its  defences.  Here  the  ex- 
ceptional character  of  the  war  led  to  the  selection  of  excep- 
tional persons  to  give  the  information  necessary  for  intelli- 
gent operations ; for,  as  the  enemy’s  coast  was  also  our  own, 
no  one  could  be  better  informed  about  its  accessibility  and 
defences  than  the  Superintendent  of  the  Coast  Survey,  and 
the  engineer  who  had  built  the  forts.  Similarly  another 
board,  composed  of  Commodores  Smith  and  Paulding,  and 
Captain  Davis  again,  was  appointed  to  examine  plans  for 
ironclad  vessels.  The  board  modestly  stated  in  its  report 
that  it  approached  the  subject  4 ‘with  diffidence,' having  no 
experience  and  but  scanty  knowledge  in  this  branch  of  naval 
architecture.,,  It  was  composed  of  extremely  able  men,  and 
their  conclusions  were  formed  under  the  circumstances  with 
promptness  and  judgment.  Yet  the  report  of  the  board  was 
only  made  September  16,  five  months  after  the  war  may  be 
said  to  have  begun,  and  six  weeks  after  the  Act  of  Congress 


236 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


authorizing  the  expenditure  for  the  purpose  of  building  iron- 
clads. A properly-organized  general  staff  in  working  opera- 
tion would  have  had  every  plan  that  could  be  presented 
thoroughly  examined  and  passed  upon  before  Congress  was 
even  in  session ; and  the  contracts  should  have  been  ready 
for  signature  on  the  day  after  the  appropriation  was  made, 
i The  importance  of  time,  even  in  a war  as  loosely  conducted 
and  as  long  drawn  out  as  that  of  the  Rebellion,  has  no  better 
illustration  than  in  the  case  of  the  Monitor.  Congress  as- 
sembled July  5 ; a month  later  it  passed  the  appropriation  ; 
in  six  weeks  the  board  reported;  three  weeks  afterward 
the  contract  for  the  Monitor  was  signed  ; and,  after  all  this 
deliberation  and  discussion,  had  the  Monitor’s  arrival  in 
Hampton  Roads  been  postponed  by  one  single  day,  by  the 
infinitesimal  space,  considering  the  length  of  preparation,  of 
twenty-four  hours,  she  would  have  found  little  in  the  shape 
of  a fleet  to  need  her  protection. 

It  is  a common  mistake  to  point  to  our  experience  in  1861 
to  show  that  a navy  can  be  prepared  for  action  at  short  no- 
tice. It  is  supposed  that,  because  the  Government  came  out 
victorious  in  the  end  in  its  naval  operations,  without  having 
made  any  preparation  beforehand,  it  will  always  be  safe  to 
postpone  measures  looking  to  war  until  the  war  is  upon  us — 
the  supply  of  a large  body  of  trained  officers,  the  selection 
of  the  ablest  men  for  the  higher  grades,  the  establishment 
and  training  of  a general  staff,  the  organization  of  reserves, 
the  construction  of  modern  vessels.  It  is  true  that  a partial 
substitute  for  all  these  requisites  of  an  efficient  force  was 
secured  before  the  war  was  over;  that  in  1865  there  were 
7, 600  officers  and  50, 000  seamen  in  the  service,  that  the  ablest 
men  had  come  to  the  front,  that  a Chief  of  Staff  was  found 
in  the  person  of  the  Assistant  Secretary,  and  that  the  fleet 
had  been  increased  from  sixty-nine  vessels  to  six  hundred 


CONCLUSION. 


237 


and  seventy-one,  two  hundred  and  eight  of  which  had  been 
built  or  begun  while  hostilities  were  going  on.  Perhaps,  if 
our  next  war  lasts  four  years,  and  if  all  the  sea-board  cities 
are  not  destroyed  during  the  first  half-year,  we  may  do  the 
same  again.  No  doubt  the  Administration  was  handicapped 
at  the  outset  by  its  unwillingness,  for  reasons  of  public 
policy,  to  take  the  offensive ; but  even  allowing  for  this 
delay,  the  fact  remains  that  in  the  first  six  months — months 
during  which,  in  modern  wars,  not  only  the  most  telling 
blows  are  struck,  but  the  issue  of  the  war  is  generally 
decided — all  that  could  be  done  with  the  most  strenuous 
efforts,  and  the  greatest  energy  in  the  administrative  head, 
was  to  collect  our  fragmentary  resources  and  to  discover 
the  men  who  could  make  them  available.  Fortunately,  we 
were  fighting  a Government  that  was  destitute  of  a naval 
force.  Had  our  enemy  been  a maritime  power  with  a navy 
in  the  most  ordinary  condition  of  readiness,  and  with  a com- 
petent working  staff,  it  would  have  fared  ill  with  us  in  the 
first  summer.  In  our  next  war  we  shall  probably  have  no 
such  good  fortune,  and  we  shall  learn  to  our  cost  the  fatal 
result  of  procrastination. 

It  is  idle  to  suppose,  in  face  of  the  changes  that  mechani- 
cal science  is  making  every  year  in  our  daily  lives,  that  the 
materials  of  naval  warfare  will  remain  long  at  any  given 
stage  of  development.  Progress  will  go  on,  and  the  only 
way  in  which  a naval  force  can  be  kept  up  which  shall  be 
equal  to  the  barest  necessities  of  the  country  is  by  a con- 
stant adaptation  of  fleets  and  armaments  to  the  new  demands 
of  modern  war.  Objectors  may  say  that  if  changes  are  so 
rapid,  new  constructions  will  shortly  be  superseded  by 
newer  ones.  But  science  advances,  whether  Governments 
wish  it  or  not ; and  if  the  navy  is  to  be  kept  up  at  all,  it 
must  be  kept  up  to  date.  New  instruments  of  warfare  can- 


238 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


not  be  manufactured  in  a day ; nor  can  officers  be  expected 
to  use  them  to  advantage  when  they  have  had  no  previous 
opportunity  to  practise  their  use.  “ Our  occupation,”  wrote 
Admiral  Jurien  de  la  Gravi&re,  shortly  after  the  war,  “was 
formerly  an  instinct ; now  it  is  a science.”  The  mastery 
of  a science  requires  study ; but  while  war  is  going  on,  men 
have  little  time  to  think,  much  less  to  study.  They  can 
only  use  as  best  they  may  the  new  tools  that  are  put  into 
their  hands,  if  their  government  has  not  given  them  modern 
tools  beforehand.  Even  admitting,  though  it  should  never 
be  admitted  for  a moment,  that  it  is  too  much  to  ask  that 
provision  should  be  made  for  keeping  the  material  in  the 
forefront  of  scientific  progress,  there  is  at  least  a limit  to 
the  distance  which  it  may  be  allowed  to  fall  in  the  rear.  If 
we  must  be  out  of  date,  it  is  better  to  be  four  years  behind 
the  times  than  to  be  twenty  years  behind. 

It  is  hard  to  see  how  the  advocates  of  a policy  of  procras- 
tination can  reiterate  the  old  arguments  about  the  success 
of  our  naval  operations  in  the  war,  to  justify  inaction.  It 
was  not  really  a naval  war,  for  there  was  hardly  a naval 
enemy.  There  were  three  or  four  cruisers  at  sea,  some  of 
which  were  captured  or  destroyed  after  having  obliterated  our 
commerce,  and  one  of  which,  at  least,  never  was  captured. 
There  was  an  extemporized  fleet  here  and  there,  made  up  of 
anything  that  came  to  hand,  such  as  drove  the  blockading 
squadron  from  the  Head  of  the  Passes.  There  was  one 
steam-frigate  that  had  been  raised  out  of  the  water,  and 
made  in  some  sense  a modern  war  vessel,  -which  played 
havoc  with  her  antiquated  opponents,  and  for  a month  kept 
the  force  at  Hampton  Roads  at  bay.  There  were  other 
ironclads  which  had  been  fitted  out  under  almost  every  dis- 
advantage that  circumstances  could  create,  and  which  had  a 
short  career  at  various  points.  In  coping,  not  with  this 


CONCLUSION. 


239 


force,  for  it;  could  hardly  be  called  a force,  but  with  the  sim- 
ple obstruction  of  natural  causes,  the  navy,  as  soon  as  it  ob- 
tained any  suitable  ships,  maintained  an  extensive  blockade, 
and  captured  many  vessels  ; it  occupied  several  points  on 
the  coast,  but  only  three  of  them  in  the  first  year ; it  was 
compelled  to  postpone  attacking  others  until  years  had 
been  spent  in  making  them  impregnable  ; and  it  cruised  in 
the  dark  after  the  commerce-destroyers,  without  adequate 
sources  of  intelligence  or  unity  of  direction.  In  the  first 
six  months,  the  enemy  had  few  powerful  forts,  and  fewer 
torpedoes  ; his  navy  hardly  existed ; and  yet  all  that  could 
be  done  was  to  effect  an  entrance  at  Hatteras  Inlet,  and  to 
establish  a blockade  that  during  this  period  came  near  the 
suspicion  of  being  fictitious,  except  at  a few  of  the  principal 
ports.  If  a navy  can  be  built  to  order  after  a war  begins, 
how  did  it  happen  that  with  unheard-of  efforts  there  was  not 
an  adequate  force  afloat  in  September,  1861,  to  enter  every 
Southern  port  ? 

The  cause  did  not  lie  in  the  officers.  Such  faults  as  they 
had  were  faults,  not  of  the  men,  but  of  the  system — a system 
which  ignored  the  cardinal  principle  of  naval  policy,  that  a 
navy  must  always  be  maintained  in  a condition  of  readiness 
for  instant  war.  Neither  in  its  central  organization,  nor  in 
the  number  and  mode  of  advancement  of  its  personnel,  nor 
in  the  character  of  its  ships,  did  it  approach  such  a condi- 
tion. Even  the  bravery,  endurance,  and  energy  of  its  offi- 
cers, and  the  capacity  shown  in  its  direction  during  the  war, 
in  the  face  of  extraordinary  obstacles,  cannot  blind  us  to  the 
fact  that  the  work  would  have  been  better  and  more  quickly 
done  under  a better  system — a system  which  should  utilize 
the  long  intervals  of  peace  to  prepare,  with  the  utmost  thor- 
oughness, for  the  sudden  emergency  of  war. 


c U.  ’ 

isse 

2 

11 

3 

1 

5 

3 

8 

5 

3 

1 

42 


APPENDIX  A. 


SLS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  NaVY,  MARCH  4,  1861. 


In  Commission. 


Class. 


Sailing-frigates 


Sailing-sloops. 


Store-ships  (sails) 

Screw  frigate 

Screw -sloops  (1st 
class). 


Side- wheel  steamers. . 


Screw-sloops  (2d 
class). 


Screw-steamers  (3d 
class). 


Side- wheel  steamers. . 
Steam-tender 


Name. 

Station. 

Congress 

Coast  of  Brazil. 

Sabine 

Home  Squadron  (Pensacola). 

Cumberland 

Home  Squadron  (returning 
from  Vera  Cruz). 

Constellation  . . . 

Coast  of  Africa. 

Macedonian 

Home  Squadron  (Vera  Cruz). 

Portsmouth 

Coast  of  Africa. 

St.  Mary’s 

Pacific. 

Saratoga 

Coast  of  Africa. 

John  Adams 

East  Indies. 

Van  d alia 

East  Indies. 

St.  Louis 

Home  Squadron  (Pensacola). 

Cyane 

Pacific. 

Levant 

Pacific. 

Relief 

Coast  of  Africa. 

Release 

New  York. 

Supply 

New  York. 

Niagara  

Returning  from  Japan. 

San  Jacinto  . . . 

Coast  of  Africa. 

Lancaster 

Pacific. 

Brooklyn 

Home  Squadron  (Pensacola). 

Hartford 

East  Indies. 

! Richmond 

Mediterranean. 

i Susquehanna . . . 

Mediterranean. 

Powhatan 

Home  Squadron  (returning 
from  Vera  Cruz). 

Saranac 

Pacific. 

(Mohican  

Coast  of  Africa. 

Narragansett  . . . 

Pacific. 

Iroquois 

Mediterranean. 

Pawnee 

Washington. 

'Wyoming 

Pacific. 

' Dacota  h 

East  Indies. 

i Pocahontas 

I 

Home  Squadron  (returning 
from  Vera  Cruz). 

Seminole 

Coast  of  Brazil. 

Wyandotte 

Home  Squadron  (Pensacola). 

Mohawk 

New  York. 

Crusader  

New  York. 

Sumter 

Coast  of  Africa. 

Mystic 

Coast  of  Africa. 

Michigan 

Lake  Erie. 

Pulaski 

Coast  of  Brazil. 

Saginaw 

East  Indies. 

Anacostia 

Washington. 

I- — 11. 


242 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Available,  but  not  in  Commission. 


No.  of 
vessels. 

Class. 

Name. 

Station. 

. 

1 

Shin-of-the-line 

Vermont 

Boston. 

r 

Potomac 

New  York. 

Brandywine 

New  York. 

5 

Sailing-frigates 

St.  Lawrence  . . . 

Philadelphia. 

Raritan 

Norfolk. 

Santee 

Kittery. 

r 

Savannah  

New  York. 

Plymouth 

Norfolk. 

Jamestown 

Philadelphia.  ‘ 

Germantown  . . . 

Norfolk. 

9 

Sailing- sloops ■{ 

Vincennes 

Boston. 

D<  catur 

San  Francisco. 

Marion 

Portsmouth,  N.  H. 

Dale 

Portsmouth,  N.  H. 

Preble 

Boston. 

Bainbridge 

Boston. 

3 

Brigs ^ 

Perry 

New  York. 

Dolphin 

Norfolk. 

Roanoke  

iNew  York. 

Colorado 

Boston. 

5 

Screw-frigates - 

Merrin  ac 

Norfolk. 

Minnesota 

Boston. 

Wabash 

New  York. 

1 

Screw  sloop  (1st  class) . . 
Side-wheel  steamer 

Pensacola 

Norfolk. 

1 

Mississippi 

Boston. 

1 

Side-wheel  steamer  (3d  ) 
class).  C 

Water  Witch.... 

Philadelphia. 

1 

Sream-fcender 

John  Hancock . . 

San  Francisco. 

27 

Unserviceable. 


9 


Ships-of-the-line 


Sailing- frigates 

Permanent  store  and 
receiving  vessels 
(sails). 


I 


Pennsylvania . . . 'Receiving  ship,  Norfolk. 

Columbus ! In  ordinary,  Norfolk, 

Ohio  Receiving  ship,  Boston, 

North  Carolina..  Receiving  ship,  New  York. 

Delaware In  ordinary',  Norfolk. 

New  Orleans On  the  stocks,  Sackett's  H’br. 

Alabama |On  the  stocks,  Rittery'. 

Virginia  On  the  stocks,  Boston. 

New  York On  the  stocks,  Norfolk. 

Constitution Practice  ship,  Annapolis. 

United  States...  In  ordinary,  Norfolk. 

Columbia 'in  ordinary.  Norfolk. 

Independence. . . Mare  Island.  California. 

Fredonia Valparaiso. 

Falmouth Aspinwall. 

Warren I Panama. 


2 


Permanent  store  and 
receiving  vessels  < 
(steam). 

Screw-frigate 

Side-wheel  vessel 

Floating  battery  (steam). 


Alleghany 

Princeton 

Franklin  . 

Fulton 

Stevens  . . 


Baltimore. 

Philadelphia. 

^On  the  stocks,  Kittery. 
In  ordinary,  Pensacola. 
Unfinished,  Hoboken. 


APPENDIX  A, 


243 


Summary. 


Class. 

In 

commission. 

Available, 
but  not  in 
commission. 

Unser- 

viceable. 

Total. 

Sailing-vessels : 

Ships-of-the-line 

1 

9 

10 

Frigates 

2 

5 

3 

10 

Sloops 

11 

9 

20 

Brigs 

3 

3 

Store-ships 

*3 

*4 

7 

Total 

16 

18 

16 

50 

Steamers : 

Screw-frigates 

1 

5 

1 

7 

Screw-sloops,  1st  class 

5 

1 

6 

Side-wheel  steamers,  1st  class. 

3 

1 

4 

1 Screw-sloops,  2d  class 

8 

8 

Side-wheel  steamers,  2d  class. 

'i 

1 

Screw  steamers,  3d  class 

*5 

5 

Side- wheel  steamers,  3d  class . 

3 

i 

4 

Tenders 

1 

l 

2 

Permanent  store-ships 

*2 

2 

Floating  battery 

1 

1 

Total 

26 

9 

5 

40 

Total  sail  and  steam 

42 

27 

21 

90 

APPENDIX  B. 

Vessels  Constructed  or  Projected,  1861-65. 
Unarmored  Vessels. 


Name. 

Guns. 

Tonnage. 

Remarks. 

Ammonoosuc  Class. 
7 screw-sloops : 

17  to  19  i 

3,213  to  3,713  i 

Ammonoosuc  (Iowa) . . 

17 

3,213 

Bon  Homme  Richard 

20 

3,213 

Never  built. 

Chattanooga 

17 

3,233 

Sunk  and  after- 

Madawaska (Tennessee) 

17 

3,281 

wards  sold,  1872. 

Neshaminy  (Nevada) 

17 

3,213 

Sold,  1877. 

Pompanoosuc  (Connecticut). . 

19 

3,713 

Wampanoag  (Florida) 

15 

3,281 

Idaho  Class. 
1 screw-sloop : 

Idaho  

8 

2,368 

Java  Class. 

S screw- sloops,  spar  deck  : 

25 

3,177 

Antietain 

25 

3,177 

Guerriere 

25 

3,177 

Sold,  1S72. 

Illinois | 

25 

3,177 

25 

3,177 

On  the  stocks,  1874. 

Kewaydin  (Pennsylvania)... 

25 

3.177 

Minnetonka  (California) 

25 

3,177 

Sold,  1S75. 

Ontario  (New  York) 

25 

3,177 

Piscataqua  (Delaware) 

25 

3,177 

Hassalo  Class. 

2 screw-sloops,  spar  deck  : 

25 

3,365 

Hassalo 

13 

3,365 

Never  built. 

Watauga 

13 

3,365 

1 

Never  built. 

1 The  first  figures  under  each  class  indicate  the  battery  and  tonnage  as  pro* 
jected. 


APPENDIX  B. 


245 


Unarmored  Vessels—  Continued. 


Name. 

Guns. 

Tonnage. 

Remarks. 

Contoocook.  Claes. 

10  screw- sloops,  clippers,  single 

13 

2.34S 

deck : 

Arapahoe  

13 

2.348 

Never  built. 

Contoocook  (Albany) 

13 

2,348 

Sold  in  1872. 

Keosauqua 

13 

2,348 

Never  built. 

Man i ton  ( W orcester) 

13 

2,348 

Mondarnin 

13 

2,348 

Never  built. 

Mosholu  (Severn) 

13 

2,348 

Sold,  1877. 

Pushmataha  (Congress) . ... 

13 

2.348 

Tali  gay  uta 

13 

2,348 

Never  built. 

Wanalosett 

13 

2,348 

Never  built. 

Willamette 

13 

2,348 

Never  built. 

Kearsarge  Class . 

4 screw- sloops : 

8 to  10 

1,023  (average). 

Kearsarge 

7 

1.031 

Oneida  

0 

1,032 

Sunk,  Yedo,  1870. 

Tuscarora  

10 

997 

Wachusett 

9 

1,032 

Shenandoah  Class . 

6 screw-sloops : 

8 to  16 

1,367  to  1,533 

Canandaigua 

9 

1,395 

Lackawanna 

9 

1,533 

Monongahela 

9 

1.378 

Sacramento 

9 

1,367 

Wrecked,  1867. 

Shenandoah  

9 

1,378 

Ticonderoga 

9 

1,533 

Ossipee  Class. 

4 screw-sloops : 

10  to  13 

1,210 

Juniata 

9 

1,240 

Os.-ipee. 

9 

1.240 

Adirondack 

9 

1,240 

Wrecked  near  Aba  - 

Housatonic * 

9 

1,240 

co,  Aug.  23. 1862. 
Sunk  (torpedo), 

Serapis  Class. 
8 screw-sloops : 

12 

1,380 

Feb.  17,  1864. 

Algoma  (Benicia) 

12 

1.380 

Launched,  1869. 

( onfiance  

12 

1,380 

Not  built. 

Detroit 

12 

1,380 

Not  built. 

Meredosia 

12 

1,380 

Not  built. 

Peacock  

12 

1,380 

Not  built. 

Serapis 

12 

1,380 

Not  built. 

Taghkanic 

12 

1.380 

Not  built. 

Talladega 

12 

1,380 

Not  built. 

Resaca  Class. 

4 screw- sloops : 

8 

831  to  900 

Nantasket 

10 

900 

Quinnebaug 

10 

831 

Resaca 

10 

900 

Sold. 

Swatara 

10 

831 

246 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Unarmored  Vessels—  Continued. 


Name. 

Guns. 

Tonnage. 

Remarks. 

Nlpsic  Class. 

8 screw-sloops : 

7 to  12 

593 

Kansas 

8 

593 

Maumee 

4 

593 

Sold,  1869. 

Nipsic 

4 

593 

Nyack 

3 

593 

Pequot 

4 

593 

Sold,  1869. 

Saco 

3 

593 

Shawmut 

3 

593 

Yantic 

. Unadilla  Class. 

S3  screw-gunboats : 

4 to  7 

507 

Aroostook 

Sold,  1869. 

Cayuga 

Sold.  Oct.  25,  1865. 

Chippewa 

Sold,  Nov.  30, 1865. 

Chocura 

Sold,  1867. 

Huron 

Sold,  May  14, 1809. 

Itasca 

Sold,  Nov.  30, 1665. 

Kanawha 

Sold,  1866. 

Katahdin.  

Sold,  Nov.  30, 1865. 

Kennebec  

Sold,  Nov.  30, 1865. 

Kineo 

Sold. 

Marblehead 

Sold. 

Ottawa 

Sold.  Oct.  25,  1665. 

Owasco 

Sold,  1865. 

Pembina 

Sold,  1865. 

Penobscot 

Sold,  1869. 

Pinola  

Sold,  1865. 

Sagamore 

Sold.  1866. 

Sciota 

Sunk  (torpedo), 
1865 ; sold,  1865. 

Seneca  

Sold. 

Tahoma 

Sold,  1867. 

Unadilla 

Sold,  1869. 

Winona 

Sold,  1865. 

Wissahickon 

Sold,  1865. 

Pinta  Class. 

9 screw-tugs : 

2 

350 

Fortune 

2 

350 

Leyden 

2 

350 

Mayflower 

2 

350 

Nina 

2 

350 

Palos 

2 

350 

Pinta 

2 

350 

Speedwell 

2 

350 

Standish 

2 

350 

Triana 

2 

350 

Pilgrim  Class. 

2 screw-tugs : 

2 

170 

Maria 

.... 

.... 

Pilgrim 

APPENDIX  B. 


247 


Unarmored  Vessels—  Continued. 


Name. 

Guns. 

Tonnage. 

Remarks, 

Octorara  Class. 

12  side-wh’l  stmrs,  double-enders 

7 to  11 

730  to  950 

Cimmerone 

10 

860 

Sold. 

Conemaugh 

8 

955 

Sold,  1867. 

Genesee 

4 

803 

Sold,  1867. 

Mahaska 

6 

832 

Sold. 

Maratanza 

6 

786 

Sold. 

Miami 

7 

730 

Sold,  1865. 

Octorara 

6 

829 

Sold,  1866. 

Paul  Jones 

6 

863 

Sold,  1867. 

Port  Royal 

8 

805 

Sold,  1866. 

Sebago 

6 

852 

Sold. 

Sonoma 

6 

955 

Sold,  1867. 

Tioga  

6 

819 

Sold,  1807. 

Sassactis  Class. 

27  side-wh'l  stmrs,  double  enders : 

10  to  14 

974 

Agawam 

8 

974 

Sold,  1867. 

Algonquin 

12 

974 

Sold,  1869. 

Ascutney 

8 

974 

Sold,  1868. 

Chenango 

8 

974 

Sold. 

Chicopee 

8 

974 

Sold.  1865. 

Eutaw 

8 

974 

Sold,  1805. 

Iosco 

8 

974 

Lenapee 

8 

974 

Sold. 

Mackinaw 

8 

974 

Sold,  1867. 

Massasoit  

8 

974 

Sold,  1867. 

Mattabesett 

8 

974 

Sold,  1867. 

Mendota 

8 

974 

Sold,  1867. 

Metacomec 

8 

974 

Sold,  1868. 

Mingoe 

8 

974 

Sold.  1867. 

Osceola 

8 

974 

Soldi  1867. 

Otsego 

8 

974 

Sunk  (torpedo), 
Dec.  9,  1864. 

Pawtuxet 

8 

974 

Sold,  1567. 

Peoria 

8 

974 

Sold. 

Pontiac 

8 

974 

Sold,  1867. 

Pontoosuc 

8 

974 

Sold,  1866. 

Sassacus 

8 

974 

Sold. 

Shamrock 

8 

974 

Sold. 

Tacony 

8 

974 

Sold. 

Tallahoma 

8 

974 

Sold. 

Tallapoosa 

8 

974 

Winooski 

8 

974 

Sold. 

Wyalusing 

8 

974 

Sold,  1867. 

Mohongo  Class. 

7 side- wheel  steamers,  iron,  dou- 

ble enders : 

10 

1,030 

Ashuelot 

10 

1,030 

Mohongo 

10 

1,034 

Sold,  1870. 

Monocacy 

10 

1,030 

Muscoota 

10 

1,<  30 

Sold,  1869. 

Shamokin  

10 

K 1,030 

Sold.  1869. 

Suwanee 

10 

1.030 

Wrecked. 

Winnipec 

10 

1,030 

Sold,  1869. 

248 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Unarmoiied  Vessels — Continued. 


Name. 

Guns. 

Tonnage. 

Remarks. 

Water ee  Class. 

1 side-wh‘1  steamer,  iron,  double- 

12 

974 

ender : 

Wateree 

12 

974 

Wrecked,  1868. 

Ironclads. 


Sea-going  broadside  vessels  (case- 
mate) : 

10 

D under  berg 

5,090 

(Roc  ham  beau); 
sold,  1867. 

New  Ironsides 

IS 

3,486 

Burned,  League  Is- 
land. 

Sea-going  turret  vessels : 

Dictator 

2 

3.033 

Puritan 

4 

3,265 

Roanoke  

6 

3,435 

Kalamazoo  Class. 

4 double-turret  monitors : 

4 

3,200 

Kalamazoo  (Colossus)  

4 

3,200 

Passaconaway  (Mass.) 

4 

3,200 

Quinsigamond  (Oregon) 

4 

3,200 

Shackamaxon  (Nebraska)  . . . 

4 

3,200 

Monadnock  Class , 

4 double-turret  monitors : 

4 XV-in. 

1.564 

A gamenticus  (Terror) 

4 XY-in. 

1.564 

Miantonomoh 

4 XV-in. 

1,564 

Monadnock 

4 XV-in. 

1,564 

Tonawanda  (Amphitrite) .... 

4 XV-in. 

1,564 

Onondaga  Class. 

1 double-turret  monitor : 

4 

1.250 

Onondaga  

4 

1,250 

Sold. 

Winnebago  Class. 

4 double-turret  monitors : 

4 

970 

Chickasaw 

4 

970 

Sold,  1874. 

Kickapoo  (Kewaydin) 

4 

970 

Sold,  1874. 

Milwaukee 

4 

970 

Sunk  (torpedo), 
March  28,  1865. 

Winnebago  (Tornado) 

4 

970 

Sold. 

Canonicus  Class. 

9 single  turret  vessels : 

2 

1,034 

Canonicus 

2 

1,034 

Catawba  

2 

1,034 

Sold,  1868. 

Mahopac  

2 

1,034 

Manayunk 

2 

1,034 

APPENDIX  B. 


249 


Ironclads — Continued. 


Name. 

Guns. 

Tonnage. 

Remarks. 

Canonicus  Class — Continued. 

Manhattan 

2 

1,034 

Oneota . 

2 

3,034 

Sold,  1868. 

Saugus 

2 

1,034 

Tinpecanoe  (Wyandotte) 

2 

3,034 

Sunk  at  Mobile. 

Tecumseh 

2 

1,034 

Passaic  Class. 

10  single-turret  vessels : 

2 to  4 

844 

Camanche 

.... 

844 

Catskill 

844 

Lehigh 

2 

844 

Montauk 

2 

844 

Nahant  

2 

844 

N an  tucket 

2 

844 

Passaic  

2 

844 

Patapsco 

2 

844 

Sunk,  Jan.  35, 1865. 

Sangamon  (Jason) 

2 

844 

Weehawken 

2 

840 

Sunk,  Dec.  6,  1863. 

Ya~oo  Class. 

20  single-turret  vessels : 

1 to  2 

640 

Casco  (Hero) 

614 

Chimo  (Piscataqua) 

614 

Cohoes 

614 

Broken  up,  1874. 

Etlah 

614 

Klamath 

614 

Sold,  3874. 

Koka 

614 

Broken  up,  1874. 

M odoc 

614 

Broken  up,  1874. 

Napa 

614 

Broken  up,  1874. 

Naubuc  (Minnetonka) 

614 

Broken  up,  1874. 

Nausett 

614 

Broken  up,  1874. 

Shawnee 

614 

Shiloh  (Iris) 

614 

Sold,  1874. 

Squando  (Algoma) 

614 

Broken  up,  3874. 

Suncook 

614 

Broken  up,  1874. 
Broken  up,  1874. 

Tunxis  (Otsego) 

614 

Umpqua 

614 

Sold,  1874 ; N.  O. 

Wassuc 

614 

Broken  up,  1874. 

Waxsaw  (Niobe) 

.... 

Broken  up,  1874. 

Yazoo 

Sold,  1874. 

Yuma 

Sold,  1874. 

2 single-turret  vessels : 

2 

479 

Marietta 

2 

479 

Sold,  1873. 

Sandusky 

2 

479 

Sold,  1873. 

3 single-turret  vessels : 

Neosho  (Osceola  ) 

2 to  7 
2 

623 

Sold,  1873. 

Osage 

2 

623 

Sunk,  1865. 

Ozark  

7 

578 

Sold,  1865. 

2 casemate  vessels : 

3 to  5 

Chillicothe 

3 

*203 

Sold,  1865. 

Tuscumbia’ 

5 

505 

Sold,  1868. 

250 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


Miscellaneous. 


Name. 

Guns. 

Tonnage. 

Remarks. 

Galena 

6 

738 

Indianola  

4 

442 

Captured  in  1863. 
Sunk  in  1863. 

"Keokuk 

2 

677  * 

Monitor 

2 

776 

Sunk  in  1862. 

APPENDIX  G 


Instructions  from  Flag-Officer  Goldsborough  to  Offi- 
cers Commanding  Blockading  Vessels. 


All  officers  commanding  vessels  employed  on  blockading  service  belonging  to  the 
squadron  under  my  command,  are  to  be  governed  by  the  following  general  direc- 
tions in  the  discharge  of  their  duties : 

1.  Duly  not'fy  neutrals  of  the  declaration  of  the  blockade,  and  give  to  it  other- 
wise all  the  publicity  in  your  power. 

2.  The  blockade  must  be  strict  and  absolute,  and  only  public  armed  vessels  of 
foreign  powers  are  to  be  permitted  to  enter  the  ports  which  are  placed  in  a state 
of  blockade. 

3.  Protect  our  commerce  from  the  depredations  of  privateers,  and,  as  a matter 
of  course,  capture  them  and  all  other  vessels  of  the  enemy  whenever  you  can  do 
so  without  being  seduced  away  from  your  station. 

4.  A lawful  maritime  blockade  requires  the  actual  presence  of  an  adequate  force 
stationed  at  the  entrance  of  the  port,  sufficiently  near  to  prevent  communication. 
The  only  exception  to  this  rule  arises  out  of  the  occasional  temporary  absence  of 
the  blockading  vessels,  produced  by  accident,  as  in  the  case  of  a storm,  which 
does  not  suspend  the  legal  operation  of  a blockade,  and  to  take  advantage  of  such 
an  accidental  absence  is  a fraudulent  attempt  to  break  the  blockade,  and  will 
justify  the  application  of  penalties. 

5.  A neutral  or  foreign  vessel,  proceeding  toward  the  entrance  of  a blockaded 
port,  is  not  to  be  captured  or  detained  if  she  shall  not  have  received  previously 
from  one  of  the  blockading  squadron  a special  notification  of  the  existence  of  the 
blockade.  This  notification  must  be  inserted  in  writing  on  the  register  and  mus- 
ter-roll of  the  neutral  vessel  by  the  cruiser  which  meets  her,  and  it  should  contain 
the  announcement,  together  with  statements  of  the  day  and  the  latitude  and 
longitude  in  which  it  was  made. 


252 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS. 


6.  Until  the  ports  are  closed  by  proclamation  (that  is,  declared  to  be  no  longer 
ports  of  entry)  the  warning  just  mentioned  is  to  be  continued  to  vessels  instead  of 
capturing  at  once,  as  will  be  the  case  when  they  come  to  be  so  closed. 

7.  Vessels  leaving  guarded  insurgent  ports  without  legal  clearances  are  to  be 
seized  and  sent  in  for  adjudication.  If  it  be  claimed  that  there  is  not  an  effective 
blockade,  and  therefore  that  they  are  entitled  to  depart,  still  they  must  not  dis- 
regard our  municipal  laws  and  the  requirements  of  the  National  Government. 

8.  On  the  coast  of  North  Carolina  more  particularly,  there  is  an  extensive 
scheme  of  deliberately  concerted  measures  to  evade  our  vigilance  and  disregard 
our  laws.  This  must  be  broken  up,  and  every  effort  is  to  be  made  to  accomplish 
the  purpose  effectually. 

9.  Vessels  with  contraband  goods  on  board,  approaching  any  of  the  blockaded 
ports,  or  vessels  that  may  have  cleared  for  any  of  these  ports,  or  be  found,  with  a 
due  warning  on  their  papers,  hovering  about  any  of  them,  are  all  to  be  seized  and 
sent  in  for  adjudication. 


L.  M.  Goldsborough, 

Flag -Officer, 


September  28,  1861, 


INDEX. 


Adams,  Charles  Francis,  180,  190, 
213 

Alabama,  the,  150 ; built,  190  et 
seq.  ; captures  Ariel,  194  ; 
sinks  the  Hatteras,  195  et  seq. ; 
armament  of,  2C6 ; fights  Kear- 
sarge,  207  et  seq.;  sunk,  212 

Albemarle,  the,  97  et  seq.;  at- 
tempts made  to  destroy,  100 
et  seq.;  destroyed,  104  et  seq. 

Atlanta,  the,  in  Wassaw  Sound, 
116  et  seq. 

Bahia,  neutrality  of,  violated,  187 

Bailey,  Commodore  Theodorus, 
commands  East  Gulf  squad- 
ron, 123  et  seq. 

Bankhead,  Commander,  commands 
Monitor,  79  et  seq. 

Bayou  City,  the,  147  et  seq. 

Beaufort,  N.  C. , headquarters 
blockading  squadron,  46,  94 

Bell,  Commodore  Henry  H.,  141, 
150  et  seq. 

Bermuda,  usefulness  to  blockade- 
runners,  37  et  seq. , 153  et  seq. 

Blockade,  its  establishment,  27  et 
seq. ; prizes  taken  during,  44 ; 
vessels  destroyed  during,  44 ; 


effect  of,  44  et  seq.  ; objects 
of,  83 ; Confederate  view  of,  88 
et  seq. 

Blockade-runners,  34  et  seq. ; deci- 
sions against,  38  et  seq. ; strata- 
gems of,  38  et  seq.,  91;  de- 
scription and  history  of,  153 
et  seq. 

Blockading  squadron,  East  Gulf, 
123;  difficulties  of,  123  et 
seq. 

Blockading  squadron,  Gulf,  121  et 
seq. 

Blockading  squadron,  North  At- 
lantic, 90  et  seq. 

Blockading  squadron,  South  At- 
lantic, 90,  105  et  seq.;  disposi- 
tion of,  115,  116 

Blockading  squadron,  West  Gulf, 
123 

British  Government,  warlike  prep- 
arations of,  1 80  et  seq. ; viola- 
tion of  neutrality  by,  190,  200, 
225  et  seq. 

Brooke,  Lieutenant  John  M.,  22; 
restores  Merrimac,  54 

Brooklyn,  the,  11,  121,  173  et  seq., 
195,  198 

Buchanan,  Captain  Franklin,  com- 


254 


INDEX. 


mands  Merrimac,  62  ; wound- 
ed, 68,  76 

Cape  Fear  River,  91  et  seq. 

Chaplin,  Lieutenant,  bravery  of,  86 

Charleston,  S.  C.,  blockade  of,  84, 
84  et  seq.,  87  et  seq.,  107  et 
seq.  ; attempts  to  raise  block- 
ade of,  109,  111  et  seq.,  158 
et  seq. 

Chicora,  the,  attempts  to  raise 
blockade  of  Charleston,  109  et 
seq. 

Clarence,  the,  186 

Clifton,  the,  143,  144  (note),  146  et 
seq.,  152 

Collins,  Commander  Napoleon,  cap- 
tures the  Florida,  189  ; his  act 
disavowed,  189  et  seq. 

Colorado,  the,  121,  172 

Confederate  Government,  naval 
policy  of,  168  et  seq. ; its  agents 
abroad,  182 

Congress,  the,  60  et  seq.  ; taken, 
64 ; burned,  65 

Craven,  Commodore,  commands 
Potomac  flotilla,  87  et  seq. 

Crocker,  Acting  Master,  com- 
mands expedition  to  Sabine 
River,  142  et  seq. 

Crosman,  Lieutenant,  124  et  seq. 

Cumberland,  the.  48,  52,  60  et  seq. ; 
sunk  by  the  Merrimac,  63  et 
seq. 

Cushing,  Captain,  daring  exploits 
of,  94  et  seq,,  101,  161 

Cuyler,  the,  122,  135,  139 

Dahlgren,  Admiral,  105 

Downes,  Commander,  117  et  seq. 

Dupont,  Admiral,  90,  105,  115 

Ericsson,  John,  plans  monitor,  55 


Farragut,  Admiral,  90, 123,  141, 
145  et  seq.,  148, 150 
Florida,  blockade  of,  124  et  seq. 
Florida,  the,  fights  the  Massachu- 
setts, 132 ; runs  blockade  cf 
Mobile,  137  et  seq. , 184  et  seq. ; 
captured  at  Bahia,  187 
Flusser,  Lieutenant-Commander, 
97 ; killed,  98 
Fisher,  Fort,  90 

Fox,  Captain  Gustavus  V.,  61 
(note),  66  (note),  234  et  seq. 
Freeborn,  the,  86 

Galveston,  Tex.,  blockaded,  35, 
140  et  seq.,  143  et  seq. 
Georgetown,  87  et  seq. 

Georgia,  the,  built,  214 ; cruises, 
214  et  seq.  ; sold,  215 
Goldsborough,  Commodore  L.  M., 
60,  76  et  seq.,  90  et  seq. 
Greene,  Lieutenant  S.  Dana,  on 
Monitor,  56,  69 
Gunboats  built,  19 
Guns,  naval,  before  and  during  the 
war,  2, 15 ; loss  of,  at  Norfolk, 
54 

Hampton  Roads,  blockaded,  47, 
82,  85 

Handy,  Captain  Robert,  12S,  131 
Harriet  Lane,  143,  144  (note),  146 
et  seq.  ; captured,  148 
Hatteras  Inlet,  90 
Hatteras,  the,  150 ; fights  Ala- 
bama, 195  et  seq. 

Havana,  a port  for  blockade-run- 
ners, 37 

Housatonic,  the,  111 
Huntsville,  the,  122,  136 

Ironclads  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
war,  2 


INDEX. 


255 


Iroquois,  the,  11 ; chases  Sumter, 
175 

Isherwood,  B.  F.,  Engineer -in- 
Chief,  49 

Jamestown,  the,  64,  66,  77 

Jones,  Lieutenant  Catesby,  com- 
mands Merrimac,  68 

Kearsarge,  the,  205;  armament 
of,  206  ; fights  Alabama,  207 
et  seq. 

Keystone  State,  blockades  Nor- 
folk, 35;  attacked  by  rams, 
HO 

Key  West,  blockaded,  35  83 

Kittredge,  Acting  - Lieutenpmt, 
commands  expedition  to  Cor- 
pus Christi,  142 

Lardner,  Captain,  123 

Lee,  Acting  Rear-Admiral,  com- 
mands South  Atlantic  Squad- 
ron, 90 

Lee,  R.  E.,  the,  156 

McCauley,  Commodore,  49,  51 ; 
destroys  vessels  at  Hampton 
Roads,  51  et  seq. 

McKean,  Flag  Officer  Wm.  W., 
relieves  Commodore  Mervine, 
123 

Maffitt,  Captain,  137  et  seq.  ; com- 
mands the  Florida,  184 

Mallory,  Confederate  Secretary  of 
Navy,  22 

Manassas,  the,  129 

Maps,  the  Blockaded  Coast,  36 ; 
Hampton  Roads,  50 ; entran- 
ces to  Cape  Fear  River,  92 ; 
entrances  to  Charleston  Har- 
bor, 106 ; passes  of  the  Missis- 


sippi, 127  ; entrance  to  Mobile 
Bay,  133 ; Galveston  Harbor 
and  entrance,  145 
Marston,  Captain  John,  60,  67 
Mason,  Confederate  commissioner, 
seized,  177  et  seq. 
Massachusetts,  the,  at  Key  West, 
35,  121, 132 

Matamoras,  its  importance  to 
blockade  runners,  37 
Mattabesett,  the,  99 
Memphis,  the,  111 
Mercedita,  the,  attacked,  110  et 
seq. 

Merrimac,  the,  48  et  seq.,  61 ; 
name  changed  to  Virginia,  61 
62 ; in  Hampton  Roads,  63  et 
seq.  ; fight  with  the  Monitor, 
68  et  seq.  ; repaired,  76 ; de- 
stroyed, 78 

Mervine,  Commodore  Wm.,  84; 

commands  Gulf  Squadron,  121 
Miami,  the,  98 

Minnesota,  the,  60,  62,  65  et  seq., 
82,  85 

Mississippi  River  blockaded,  122; 

passes  of,  126  et  seq. 
Mississippi,  the,  11,  84,  121  et 
seq. 

Mobile,  Ala. , blockaded,  35,  122  et 
seq.,  132  et  seq. 

Monitor,  the,  built,  55;  its  con- 
struction, 56  et  seq.  ; voyage 
to  Chesapeake,  58  et  seq.  ; at 
Hampton  Roads,  67 ; fight 
with  the  Merrimac,  68  et  seq., 
78  et  seq.  ; sinks,  81 
Monroe,  Fortress,  47  et  seq.,  52 
Montauk,  the  216  et  seq.  ; de- 
stroys the  Nashville,  217  et 
seq. 

Morgan,  Fort,  133,  139 


INDEX. 


^'C 

Morris,  Captain,  187 
Morris,  lieutenant,  62 

Nahant,  the,  117  et  seq. 

Nashville,  the,  fitted  up,  215  et 
seq.  ; destroyed,  217  et  seq. 
Nassau,  port  for  blockade-run- 
ners, 36  et  seq.,  155  et  seq. 
Navy,  Confederate  organization, 
etc.,  21 

Navy,  Union  organization,  1-21 ; 
condition  of,  in  1861,  232;  at 
close  of  war,  236 

Navy  Yard,  Norfolk,  46  et  seq.  ; 
abandoned,  52  et  seq.  ; partly 
destroyed,  53 
Neptune,  the,  147  et  seq. 

New  Orleans,  La.,  blockade  at,  35, 
46,  122 

Newton,  Isaac,  Engineer  of  Mon- 
itor, 56,  58 

Niagara,  the,  at  Charleston,  34,  84, 
121  et  seq. 

Norfolk,  Va.,  blockaded,  35,  46  et 
seq.,  55,  71  et  seq.  ; surren- 
ders, 78 

Officers,  naval,  at  commence- 
ment of  war,  4 et  seq. 

Oneida,  the,  136 

Oreto,  the,  183 

O wasco,  the,  144,  144  (note) 

Palmetto  State,  the,  attempts  to 
raise  blockade  of  Charleston, 
109  et  seq. 

Patrick  Henry,  the,  64,  66 
Paulding,  Commodore  Hiram,  51 
et  seq.  ; burns  Navy  Yard  at 
Norfolk,  53 
Pawnee,  the,  11,  51 
Pendergrast,  Commodore,  82,  84 


Pensacola,  Fla.,  blockaded,  35,  46, 
122  et  seq.,  132 
Pensacola,  the,  11 
Ponchartrain  Lake  blockaded,  46 
Pope,  Captain  John,  128,  131 
Porter,  Commodore  David  D.,  90, 
121 

Port  Royal,  105,  107 
Port  Royal,  the,  77 
Potomac  River  blockaded,  85 
Powhattan,  the,  11,  114,  121  et 

seq. 

Preble,  the,  128  et  seq. 

Privateers,  the,  168  et  seq. 

Quaker  City,  the,  111 

Raleigh,  the,  77 
Rams,  at  commencement  of  war, 
3,  48,  61,  63  et  seq.,  97  et  seq., 
109  et  seq. , 221 

Rappahannock,  the,  213  et  seq. 
Renshaw,  Commander  W.  B., 
commands  expedition  to  Gal- 
veston, 143  et  seq.,  149 ; killed, 
150 

Resolute,  the,  86 
Rhode  Island,  the,  79 
Richmond,  the,  11,  128  et  seq. 
Roanoke,  the,  60,  62,  65  et  seq., 
66  (note) 

Rodgers,  Commander  John,  117  et 
seq. 

Rowan,  Commander,  91 

Sabine  River,  its  importance  to 
blockade-runners,  142  et  seq. 
St.  Lawrence,  the,  62, 66  et  seq.,  89, 
172 

St  Louis,  th^,  122 
San  Jacinto,  the,  177,  194 
Sassacus,  the,  99 


INDEX. 


J57 


Savannah,  Ga.,  blockaded,  35,  85, 
87  et  seq.,  107,  109 
Selfridge,  Lieutenant,  51 
Semmes,  Captain,  commands  the 
Sumter,  173  et  seq.  ; com- 
mands the  Alabama,  192  et 
seq.,  209  et  seq.,  222  et  seq. 
Snenandoah,  the,  bought,  218 ; 

cruise  of,  219  et  seq. , 220 
Ship  Island,  132 
Smith,  Captain  Melancton,  99 
Smith,  Lieutenant  Joseph  B.,  61 
South  Carolina,  the,  at  Pensacola, 
35  ; at  Galveston,  35,  140 
Southfield,  the,  sunk,  98 
Steamers,  disposition  at  com- 
mencement of  war,  14  ; pur- 
chases r-P,  17  et  seq.,  20  et  seq. 
Stonewall,  the,  221 
Stripling,  Commodore  Cornelius 
K.,  123 

Stringham,  Commodore,  appointed 
to  command  of  Atlantic  squad- 
ron, 82,  83  et  seq. , 90 
Sumter,  the,  172  et  seq. ; sold  176  ; 
damage  done  by,  176 

Tauoma,  the,  124  et  seq. 
Tallahassee,  the,  career  of,  237  et 
seq. 

Tattnall,  Commodore,  assumes 
command  of  naval  defences 
of  Virginia,  76 ; sinks  Merri- 
mac.  78 

Texas,  blockade  and  coast  of,  46 


Torpedoes,  invention  and  early  his- 
tory of,  3 et  seq. 

Tredegar  Iron  Works,  22,  54 

Trent,  the,  1 77  et  seq. 

Tuscaloosa,  the,  199  et  seq. 

Union,  the,  blockades  S**  Hannah, 
85 

Vanderbilt,  the,  77,  203  et  seq. 

Vincennes,  the,  128,  130  et  seq. 

Wachusett,  the,  captures  the 
Florida,  188,  202 

Ward,  Commodore  Jas.  H.,  85  et 
seq:;  killed,  88 

Water  Witch,  the,  122,  128  et  seq. 

Weehawken,  the,  captures  the  At- 
lanta, 117  et  seq. 

Westfield,  the,  143,  144  (note) ; 
146  et  seq. ; destroyed,  150 

Wilkes,  Captain,  140 ; seizes  Ma~ 
son  and  Slidell,  177  et  seq. 

Wilkes,  Captain  Chas.,  commands 
flying  squadron,  201 ; relieved 
of  command,  203  et  seq. 

Wilmington,  85,  87  et  seq.;  harbor 
of,  91,  92  et  seq. 

Winslow,  Lieutenant  Francis,  128 
et  seq.,  135 

Worden,  Lieutenant  John  L., 
commands  Monitor,  56,  67  et 
seq.;  wounded,  71.  75  (note); 
commands  Montauk,  216 

Wyalusing,  the,  9& 


Messrs.  CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

publish,  under  the  general  title  of 

The  CAMPAIGNS  of  the  CIVIL  WAR, 

A Series  of  volumes,  contributed  by  a number  of  leading 
actors  in  and  students  of  the  great  conflict  of  i86i-’65,  with 
a view  to  bringing  together,  for  the  first  time,  a full  and 
authoritative  military  history  of  the  suppression  of  the 
Rebellion. 


The  final  and  exhaustive  form  of  this  great  narrative,  in  which  every 
doubt  shall  be  settled  and  every  detail  covered,  may  be  a possibility 
only  of  the  future.  But  it  is  abnatter  for  surprise  that  twenty  years 
after  the  beginning  of  the  Rebellion,  and  when  a whole  generation 
has  grown  up  needing  such  knowledge,  there  is  no  authority  which  is 
at  the  same  time  of  the  highest  rank,  intelligible  and  trustworthy,  and 
to  which  a reader  can  turn  for  any  general  view  of  the  field. 

The  many  reports,  regimental  histories,  memoirs,  and  other  materi- 
als of  value  for  special  passages,  require,  for  their  intelligent  reading, 
an  ability  to  combine  and  proportion  them  which  the  ordinary  reader 
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which  have  supplied  this  satisfactorily  to  any  large  part  of  the  public. 
Undoubtedly  there  has  been  no  such  narrative  as  would  be  especially 
welcome  to  men  of  the  new  generation,  and  would  be  valued  by  a very 
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the  time  would  be  allowed  to  pass  when  it  would  be  possible  to  give 
to  such  a work  the  vividness  and  accuracy  that  come  from  personal 
recollection.  These  facts  led  to  the  conception  of  the  present  work. 

From  every  department  of  the  Government,  from  the  officers  of  the 
army,  and  from  a great  number  of  custodians  of  records  and  special  infor- 
mation everywhere,  both  authors  and  publishers  have  received  every  aid 
that  could  be  asked  in  this  undertaking ; and  in  announcing  the  issue  of 
the  work  the  publishers  take  this  occasion  to  convey  the  thanks  which 
the  authors  have  had  individual  opportunities  to  express  elsewhere. 


The  volumes  are  duodecimos  of  about  250  pages  each, 
illustrated  by  maps  and  plans  prepared  under  the  direction 
of  the  authors. 

The  price  of  each  volume  is  $1.00. 


The  following  volumes  are  now  ready : 

I* — The  Outbreak  of  Rebellion.  By  John  G.  Nicolay, 
Esq.,  Private  Secretary  to  President  Lincoln ; late  Consul- 
General  to  France,  etc. 

• 

A preliminary  volume,  describing  the  opening  of  the  war,  and  covering  tltflt 
period  from  the  election  of  Lincoln  to  the  end  of  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run. 


II , — From  Fort  Henry  to  Corinth . By  the  Hon.  M. 

F.  Force,  Justice  of  the  Superior  Court,  Cincinnatti;  late 
Brigadier-General  and  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen’l,  U.S.V.,  commanding 
First  Division,  17th  Corps:  in  1862,  Lieut.  Colonel  of  the 

20th  Ohio,  commanding  the  regiment  at  Shiloh ; Treasurer  of 
the  Society  ol  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 

The  narrative  of  events  in  the  West  from  the  Summer  of  1861  to  May,  1862 ; 
covering  the  capture  of  Fts.  Henry  and  Donelson,  the  JBattle  of  Shiloh,  etc.,  etc. 


All . — The  Peninsula.  By  Alexander  S.  Webb,  LL.D., 
President  of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York:  Assistant 
Chief  of  Artillery,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  1861 -’62  ; Inspector 
General  Fifth  Army  Corps;  General  commanding  2d  Div., 
2d  Corps ; Major  General  Assigned,  and  Chief  of  Staff,  Army 
of  the  Potomac. 

The  history  of  McClellan’s  Peninsula  Campaign,  from  his  appointment  to  the 
end  of  the  Seven  Days’  Fight 

IV. — The  Army  under  Pope.  By  John  C.  Ropes.  Esq., 
of  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  the  Massa- 
chusetts Historical  Society,  etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  Pope  to  command  the  Army  of  Virginia,  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  McClellan  to  the  general  command  in  September,  1862 


V. — The  AnHefam  and  Fredericksburg  By  Francis 
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erly Colonel  20th  Mass.  Infantry ; Lieut.  Col  of  the  20th 
Massachusetts  at  the  Battle  of  the  Antietam ; Member  of 
the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  of  the  Massa- 
chusetts Historical  Society,  etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  McClellan  to  the  general  command,  September,  1862,  to 
the  end  of  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg. 

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Doubleday,  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen’l,  U.  S.  A , and  Maj.  Gen’l, 
U.S.V.  ; commanding  the  First  Corps  at  Gettysburg,  etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  Hooker,  through  the  campaigns  of  Chancellorsville  and 
Gettysburg,  to  the  retreat  of  Lee  after  the  latter  battle. 


VII. — The  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  By  Henry  M. 
Cist,  Brevet  Brig.  Gen’l  U.S.V.  ; A.A.G.  on  the  stnff  of 
Major  Gen’l  Rosecrans.  and  afterwards  on  that  of  Major  Gen’l 
Thomas  ; Corresponding  Secretary  of  the  Society  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland. 

From  tlie  formation  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  the  end  of  the  battles  at 
Chattanooga,  November,  1863. 


VIII. — The  Mississippi.  By  Francts  Vinton  Greene, 
Lieut,  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  Army  ; late  Military  Attache  to  the 
U S.  Legation  in  St.  Petersburg  ; Author  of  “ The  Russian 
Army  and  its  Campaigns  in  Turkey  in  1877-78,”  and  of 
“Army  Life  in  Russia.” 

An  account  of  the  operations — especially  at  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson — by 
vrhich  the  Mississippi  River  and  its  shores  were  restored  to  the  control  of  the  Union. 

IX.  — Atlanta.  By  the  Hon.  Jacob  D.  Cox,  Ex-Governor  of 

Ohio;  late  Secretary  of  the  Interior  of  the  United  States; 
Major  General  U.  S.V.,  commanding  Twenty-.third  Corps 
during  the  campaigns  of  Atlanta  and  the  Carolinas,  etc.,  etc. 

From  Sherman’s  first  advance  into  Georgia  in  May,  1864,  to  the  beginning  of 
the  March  to  the  Sea. 

X. —The  March  to  the  Sea— Franklin  and  Nashville. 

By  the  Hon.  Jacob  D.  Cox. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  March  to  the  Sea  to  the  surrender  of  Johnston — 
including  also  the  operations  of  Thomas  in  Tennessee. 

XI.  — The  Shenandoah  Valley  in  1SG4.  The  Cam- 

paign of  Sheridan.  By  George  E.  Pond,  Esq.,  Asso- 
ciate Editor  of  the  Army  and  Navy  Journal . 

XII.  — The  Virginia  Campaign  of’GA  and  ’65.  The 
Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Army  of  the 
James.  By  Andrew  A.  Humphreys,  Brigadier  General 
and  Bvt.  Major  General,  U.  S.  A.  ; late  Chief  of  Engineers ; 
Chief  of  Staff,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  1863-64;  commanding 
Second  Corps,  1864-65,  etc.,  etc. 

Statistical  Itecord  of  the  Armies  of  the  United 
States.  By  Frederick  Phisterer,  late  Captain  U.  S.  A. 

This  Record  includes  the  figures  of  the  quotas  and  men  actually  furnished  by 
all  States  ; a list  of  all  organizations  mustered  into  the  U.  S.  service;  the  strength 
of  the  army  at  various  periods  ; its  organization  in  armies,  corps,  etc.;  the  divisions 
of  the  country  into  departments,  etc.;  chronological  list  of  all  engagements,  with  the 
losses  in  each  ; tabulated  statements  of  all  losses  in  the  war,  with  the  causes  of 
death,  etc.;  full  lists  of  all  general  officers,  and  an  immense  amount  of  other  valuable 
statistical  matter  relating  to  the  War. 

The  complete  Set,  thirteen  volumes,  in  a box.  Price,  $12.50 
Single  volumes,  . . . . . • i.eo 

V * For  rale  by  all  booksellers , or  sent , fast-paid,  upon  receipt  of  price , by 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER’S  SONS,  Publishers, 

743  and  745  Broadway,  New  York. 


NOW  COMPLETE 


In  three  volumes,  12mo,  with  Maps  and  Plans. 


Navy  in  the  Civil  War 


HE  WORK  OF  THE  NAVY  in  the  suppression  of  the  Rebellion  was 


certainly  not  less  remarkable  than  that  of  the  Army.  The  same 
forces  which  developed  from  our  volunteers  some  of  the  finest  bodies  of 
soldiers  in  military  history,  were  shown  quite  as  wonderfully  in  the  creation 
of  a Navy,  which  was  to  cope  for  the  first  time  with  the  problems  of  modern 


The  facts  that  the  Civil  War  was  the  first  great  conflict  in  which  steam 
was  the  motive  power  of  ships ; that  it  was  marked  by  the  introduction  ot 
the  ironclad ; and  that  it  saw,  for  the  first  time,  the  attempt  to  blockade 
such  a vast  length  of  hostile  coast — will  make  it  an  epoch  for  the  techinal 
student  everywhere. 

But  while  the  Army  has  been  fortunate  in  the  number  and  character  of 
those  who  have  contributed  to  its  written  history,  the  Navy  has  been  com- 
paratively without  annalists.  During  a recent  course  of  publications  on 
the  military  operations  of  the  war,  the  publishers  were  in  constant  receipt 
of  letters  pointing  out  this  fact,  and  expressing  the  wish  that  a complete 
naval  history  of  the  four  years  might  be  written  by  competent  hands.  An 
effort  made  in  this  direction  resulted  in  the  cordial  adoption  and  carrying 
out  of  plans  by  which  Messrs.  CHARLES  SCRIBNER’S  SONS  are 
enabled  to  announce  the  completion  of  a work  of  the  highest  authority  and 
interest,  giving  the  whole  narrative  of  Naval  Operations  from  1861  to  1865. 

I.  THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS.— By  Pro- 
fessor J.  Russell  Soley,  U.  S.  Navy. 

II.  THE  ATLANTIC  COAST.— By  Rear-Admiral  Daniel 

Ammen,  U.  S.  Navy. 

III.  THE  GULF  AND  INLAND  WATERS.  — By  Commander 
A.  T.  Mahan,  U.  S.  Navy. 

Uniform  with  ((  The  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War,”  with  majs 
and  diagrams  prepared  under  the  direction  of  the  Authors. 


CHARLES  SCRIBNER’S  SONS,  Publishers, 


THE 


warfare. 


Price  per  Volume,  $1.00. 


7 I I Ji  : -I!  Droxdway,  X<w  Ytn-li. 


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